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Chapter One 
The art and craft of policy-making. 
 
1.1. The Problem Stated. 
1.2. Research Design. 
1.3. Modernisation, political development and political disorder in political science. 
1.4. Nehruana literature. 
1.5. Conclusion. 
 
 
1.1. The Problem Stated. 
 
This thesis seeks to analyse the art and craft of policy-making. By focusing on Indian 
Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, the aim is to take both actor and context seriously. Nehru, 
who led the country for seventeen years, initially as head of the interim legislature (1947 – 
1952) and then winning general elections three times (1952, 1957, 1961), was also leader of 
the Indian National Congress party in addition to holding other ministerial posts during his 
prime ministership. Having spent altogether more than nine years imprisoned during the 
independence struggle1 and anointed as successor to Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru attained a 
larger than life stature in Indian politics. The impact he had, has been long-lasting and far-
reaching. His admirers and critics alike, attribute the resilience of India’s democracy to his 
                                                 
1 On December 6, 1921, Jawaharlal Nehru was arrested for the first time, along with his father, Motilal Nehru. 
Jawaharlal was briefly released and then re-arrested. Motilal was released in 1922 while Jawaharlal was released 
on January 31, 1923. Other periods of jail sentence followed: October 19, 1930 – January 1931; December 26, 
1931 to August 30, 1933; February 12, 1934 – September 1935; November 1940 – December 1941; August 
1942 – June 1945. 
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stewardship during the crucial decades after independence, from the years 1947 to 1964. 
However, as will be demonstrated the existing literature on Nehru tends to be narrative at best 
and sycophantic at worst. Furthermore, there is surprisingly little that deals with the 1950s in 
an analytic and systematic way, a period which would seem to be a crucial phase in the 
transition from colony to post-colonial state with important implications for the long-run 
consolidation of India’s modern, democratic institutions. Addressing this gap, the thesis 
proposes an interpretation based upon a theoretical framework where the individual actor’s 
choices are set within a specific institutional context. Nehru is the ‘pivotal actor’ given the 
power he gradually accumulated2 and thus his preferences, world view and ‘vision’ need to 
be explored in depth and detail. He cannot however, be seen in isolation for both during the 
formative phase prior to independence and as prime minister, contextual constraints need to 
be taken into account. This is where the existing literature is again disappointing for there are 
only scattered examinations of the power politics at the time of independence.3 Nehru’s 
position of power was by no means guaranteed and translating his preferences into policy 
required both tactical manoeuvring and bargaining. The goal of the thesis therefore is to turn 
attention towards Nehru, the political actor, to identify the challenges that he faced, the 
strategies that were devised to maintain, enhance and project power, and in the process, the 
impact this had on the policies that were formulated and implemented under his leadership. 
 
The thesis selects three policy choices for which Jawaharlal Nehru can be personally 
associated with and which also represent the three core pillars of Nehru’s overall 
modernization project: the secular state, a non-aligned foreign policy, and a self-sufficient 
                                                 
2 Jawaharlal Nehru was the prime minister of India from August 15, 1947 till his death in May 1964. During this 
time he also held the positions of Minister for External Affairs of India (for the entire period) and Finance 
Minister of India for one year (1958 – 1959), in addition  to acting as chairperson on numerous committees and 
organisations and most importantly, serving as president of the Indian National Congress party on three 
occasions after independence (1951, 53 and 54). 
3 See section 1.4. for a literature review of the publications on Jawaharlal Nehru. 
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economy. The Hindu Code Bills of the 1950s was legislation that aimed at reforming Hindu 
law and produced extensive parliamentary debates on the treatment of majority and minority 
communities and the dual, sometimes conflicting, duty of the state to act as reformer and 
modernizing agent as well as guarantor of equality and security. The Panchasheela 
Agreement signed by India and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1954 was 
showcased at the time as a success story for non-alignment and the founding of the Planning 
Commission in 1950 established the leading authority on industrial policy for the planned 
economy. In all three cases extensive public debates were generated, first in the form of the 
Constituent Assembly Debates4 and later the Lok Sabha Debates.5 These three are selected 
because Nehru promoted them as key policies and each was given prominence during the 
general elections when they were advocated as central goals of the Congress party manifesto 
as defining issues that set the Congress apart from other political parties. Furthermore it is 
argued that the early 1950s were a period of intense power mongering as Nehru faced the 
challenge of consolidating his power. Each of these policies therefore became both a test as 
well as demonstration of power. The criteria of success are proposed as (1) Nehru’s 
preferences being articulated within the Congress party resolutions, (2) Nehru’s preference 
becoming the dominant position within the party and parliamentary terms of debate and, (3) 
Nehru’s preference taking shape in the form of policy. 
 
Furthermore, it is posited that the decade of the 1950s was a crucial one that 
profoundly shaped India’s subsequent political development. To qualify such a proposition 
the thesis draws upon the insights of path dependency which claims that choices made in the 
past can set into motion a self-reproducing dynamic through which a set of preferences 
                                                 
4 Formed in 1946 the Constituent Assembly was elected to write the Constitution of India and served as the 
country’s first parliament after independence.  
5 Parliamentary debates. 
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remain predominant.6 As a result, the ability to change or deviate from a particular course 
becomes more and more difficult as time goes by. The heuristic value of this concept and the 
problems associated with it are examined further on in the chapter.  
 
The three cases are particularly interesting if one raises the question of how successful 
was Nehru in terms of fulfilling and implementing his own ideals? An argument can be made 
that, both Panchasheela and the Hindu Code Bills were failures leading neither to peaceful 
friendly brotherhood with China nor paving the way towards a uniform civil code applicable 
to all citizens regardless of religion or community as the basis for a secular state. The 
Planning Commission on the other hand is an example of a successful institutional 
arrangement that facilitated and coordinated the goals of a planned economy. If, in addition 
one examines the long-run implications of these three policy choices the contrast is brought 
out even more strongly. While the Planning Commission was to become unassailable it also 
proved itself to be highly adaptable, transforming itself from being the central component in a 
planned economy, to a mechanism and facilitator of marketisation, privatization and 
capitalization during the period of economic liberalisation. In contrast, the Panchasheela 
agreement bequeathed a legacy of ambiguity7 and contradictions in India’s foreign policy in 
general and towards China in particular whilst the Hindu Code Bills left in its wake a highly 
polarised political arena and an incomplete agenda of establishing a secular legal system for 
all.  
 
 
                                                 
6 A discussion of this concept will follow.  
7 I have applied this concept previously in an article co-authored with Mitra, S.K. ‘The new Dynamics of Indian 
Foreign Policy and its Ambiguities’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 18 (2007), pp. 19 – 34 where I 
used it to refer to contradictions such as the possession of nuclear weapons but the lack of a nuclear doctrine and 
the swings from appeasement, assertion to aggression that seem to characterise much of India’s foreign policy 
record.  
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1.2. Research Design. 
 
The thesis aims at a theory-driven case study where Jawaharlal Nehru is examined as 
a case of leadership. Individual policies are taken as the unit of analysis since this allows one 
to explore (a) the ideas that he represented, (b) the institutional and political constraints of his 
context (c) the range of alternatives available at the time (d) the decision-making process and, 
(e) the longer-run implications for policy implementation. By focusing on policy as the unit 
of analysis one gains an insight into both the internal (cognitive) and external (contextual) 
factors that go into decision-making, which provides a better understanding of why an actor 
made a particular choice. Whilst the thesis aims at implementing a general model for 
studying leaders, Nehru’s context plays an important role given the historical background of 
the transfer of power from the British to independent India. It is argued that at times like 
these, known as ‘critical junctures’ in the literature on path dependency and historical 
institutionalism (terms that will be explained in the following chapter), the policy-making 
process is an additionally important instrument and mechanism of leadership given that the 
leader faces unusually high expectations and a stronger than normal level of legitimacy. It is 
posited, further on in this chapter, that this is an unusual approach to studying Nehru as a 
political actor and the implications that his preferences had for India’s subsequent political 
development. In the final, concluding chapter of the thesis a case will be made to demonstrate 
the usefulness of such an approach in understanding leadership in general. 
 
Two questions initiated the research behind the thesis: (1) what were the factors that 
determined Nehru’s decisions and, (2) can one evaluate the consequences of the choices 
made? These emerged out of a curiosity about how to study the legacies of key political 
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actors. The narrative biography whilst useful for details and insights more often than not fails 
to provide the basis for a comparison across time and space. Nor does the format of a 
biography usually allow for a systematic analysis of intentions of the actor(s) on the one hand 
and eventual outcome(s), on the other. Hence the thesis begins with a theory of agency which 
takes both the actor’s preferences into account as well as the strategic context. For this, the 
analysis borrows from new institutionalism in particular, the insight that sequence and timing 
in the decision-making process matters and that rationality is context-dependent.  
 
Going beyond the causes of action, to explore the consequences, the argument is 
made that, at ‘critical junctures’, key policy decisions can alter a country’s path of 
institutional development. Identified by a prominent historical institutionalist as an 
instrument of analysis “that traces divergent trajectories back to systematic differences either 
in antecedent conditions or in the timing, sequencing, and interaction of specific political-
economic processes, suggesting that not all options are equally viable at any given point in 
time”8 it is posited in the thesis that the early 1950s represented such a ‘critical juncture’. 
While there was continuity with the colonial period, the transfer of power, as the process of 
handing over power to Indians came to be known, and the subsequent shape of India’s 
political institutions were far from inevitable. Most early India observers expected Indian 
democracy and territorial unity to be short lived. Instead, the period and its leaders generated 
a set of political institutions that represented a unique blend of continuity and disjuncture 
with the colonial past. Jawaharlal Nehru, as a political figure, was at the centre of this 
transition to and consolidation of power.  
 
                                                 
8 Thelen, Annual Review of Political Science, 1999, p. 385. 
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In the case of India, the phase leading up to independence and its immediate aftermath 
was a period of intense negotiation and bargaining during which the premises for institutional 
design were laid out. While Nehru is certainly to be credited with having sustained India’s 
fledgling democracy and providing the country with a period of stability, the policies directly 
associated with him have not been subjected to a rigorous analysis.  This, it is argued is a 
major lapse, for the existing Nehru literature tends towards biography and hagiography. By 
focusing on the micro-level of decision making and policy implementation it is proposed that 
a more finely grained appraisal of the ‘Nehru era’ will be possible. 
 
To do this, the thesis applies a ‘structured, focused comparison’ to three examples of 
policy choices. As Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett explain in their book, Case 
Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, the method is ‘structured’ because 
general questions are being asked that reflect the research objective and these questions are 
asked of each thus making systematic comparison possible. The method is ‘focused’ because 
it deals with certain, specified aspects of the historical cases being examined.  
 
The thesis concerns itself with four central variables:  
(1) The structure of opportunities which is observed in terms of the power structure at the  
time, identified in terms of the organisational set-up, the various contenders for power 
and the range of issue positions. 
(2) Vision which is defined in terms of the meaning that particular issues have for the 
actor both in terms of their inherent value, as ends in themselves and, as instruments 
for attaining something else. This draws upon the distinction that has been drawn by 
Max Weber in terms of wertrationalität and zweckrationalität and will be discussed in 
the following chapter.  
8 
 
(3) Strategy which is examined in terms of tactics such as the timing of decisions, the 
framing of policy debates and the justifications used to promote a particular policy.  
(4) The policy outcome which is compared across the three examples in terms of the 
institutional provisions that arise as a result of a particular policy choice.  
The first three are explanatory variables that are proposed as having an important effect on 
the policy outcome.  
 
In chapter two an underlying model is presented using the above variables and based 
upon assumptions and insights drawn from the theories of rational choice, new 
institutionalism and historical institutionalism. Chapter two also contains a section on the 
methodology applied and addresses the challenge of remaining within the remit of political 
science whilst studying a historical figure. The choice of case studies is discussed as well as 
the sources of data. A model of the policy-making process is constructed through which each 
of the three policy examples is examined. To operationalise ‘Vision’, chapter three examines 
Nehru’s preferences and worldview as articulated in his early writings. Chapter four goes on 
to examine the structure of opportunities in terms of his political rivals and the situational 
considerations of power politics with which he was confronted. A study is also made of the 
consistency of his preferences comparing his Congress party presidential speeches with his 
private writings. The subsequent three chapters take up each of the case studies individually 
and present an investigation into the strategies employed by Nehru in pushing through 
policies in the three fields of social reform, economic development and foreign policy. A 
final chapter summarises the findings generated through a comparison across the three cases 
and explores the implications that initial policy choices have for policy implementation in the 
longer-run. 
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The remainder of this chapter serves as an introduction to the subject of analysis: 
Jawaharlal Nehru, his vision and strategy. To place the study of Nehru within a wider 
context, the following section examines the various arguments that characterized political 
science studies of the non-western world during the 1950s, 60s and 70s. This is important 
because the study of Indian politics has been and continues to be dominated by concepts, 
ideas and discussions emanating from the discourse on modernization, political development 
and the role of the ‘post-colonial state’9. An analysis of a particular leader and his polices, it 
is proposed, provides a different entry-point into the broad phenomena of ‘old societies and 
new states’ since it does not begin with assumptions about the ‘appropriate objectives’ for 
‘changing societies’ as Huntington did in his 1968 book, Political Order in Changing 
Societies, or the presumption of an ideal-type universal, modern state. Instead the thesis takes 
leadership as an indigenous, home-grown category that is comparable across time and space 
in terms of the resources available to the actor and the constraints under which he/she 
operates. All leaders it is posited seek to capture, increase or retain power. The nature of 
power and the methods needed to attain or maintain it, vary according to the historical and 
socio-cultural context. Hence the post-colonial state, as Mitra argues, “is a member of a 
species in the sense that it shares these objectives and attributes with other modern states. 
However, it diverges....in the importance accorded to ‘pre-modern’ political 
forms......and....because they express different cultural values and traditions that form part of 
their cultural heritage.”10 
 
Having identified some of the key authors and texts within the older school of writing 
on modernisation, the chapter presents a historiography of the existing literature on Nehru 
(known in India as Nehruana). A selection of seven biographies is portrayed, dating from 
                                                 
9 See Mitra, S.K. (ed.) The Post-Colonial State in Asia (Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hertfordshire, 1990). 
10 Ibid., p. 6. 
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different periods in time, and an analysis made of how little has changed in terms of the 
interpretation and material used to depict and understand Nehru. 
 
 
1.3. Modernisation, political development and political disorder in political science. 
 
To analyse the existing literature on Nehru and, to a large extent, the writing on 
India’s political development, it is useful to delve into the perspectives that dominated the 
field of political science in the 1950s and 60s. As will be demonstrated, following the survey 
below, the assumptions of that time have strongly influenced the scholarship on India.  
Three general positions are identified in the social sciences literature that addresses the 
phenomena of modernization and political development in the non-western, post-colonial 
world. The first, dating from the late 1950s, was predominantly conducted by sociologists 
and economic historians who applied Western modernization as a model of global 
applicability, the 1960s witnessed a turn towards a more context-specific understanding of 
modernity and its interaction with tradition, and thirdly, the late 1960s generated model-
driven approaches that sought to explain political order and disorder rather than political 
development. This section examines the epistemological assumptions of each of the above, 
demonstrating by reference to the studies on India, the weaknesses of these approaches. The 
chapter ends with the 1970s and the emergence of ‘new institutionalism’ and the school of 
rational choice in political science for these provide the thesis’ theoretical framework and are 
closely examined in chapter two. 
 
Characteristic of the late 1950s is the evolutionary point of view as represented by the 
writings of Rustow and Gerschenkron, both economic historians who proposed a stage-by-
11 
 
stage prognosis of economic development.11 Such an approach implied that it was possible to 
categorise a country’s ‘level’ of economic and even political development according to a set 
of attributes.12 Unlike the pre-war view of industrialisation as degenerative and dangerous, 
the outlook of the 1950s highlighted the success of Western society, economy and politics. 
Modernisation, following the western path, was guaranteed to produce a ‘modernity’ 
comprising a political system that was more participatory and representative, an economy 
that was more efficient and a society that was more just, tolerant and rational. 
 
Similarly, the sociologist, Daniel Lerner, in his 1958 book, The Passing of Traditional 
Society identified four sectors or dimensions that in the process of modernization, are 
systematically related to one another, these being: urbanization, literacy, media participation, 
and political participation.13 By examining the relation between these four, Lerner believed it 
to be possible to rank societies in accordance with their degree of tradition, transition or 
modernity. This highly behavioural perspective produced studies that compiled attribute-
checklists according to which the countries of the world could be ranked by the degree to 
which they approximated the characteristics of Western industrial societies. 
 
Apter, in his Politics of Modernisation similarly employed a dichotomous view: the 
world of tradition on the one hand, where life revolves around the community, is ascription-
oriented, particularistic and functionally diffuse and a modern world on the other, that is 
functionally specific, universalist and achievement-oriented.14 The developmental paradigm 
                                                 
11 Rustow, W.W. The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1960); 
Gerschenkron, A. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. (Cambridge, Mass., 1962). 
12 Applied later by political scientists such as Almond, G. & Coleman, J. The Politics of Developing Areas 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1960); Organski, A.F.K. The Stages of Political Development (Alfred A. 
Knopf, New York, 1965) 
13 Lerner, D. The Passing Of Traditional Society, (New York, The Free Press, 1964), p.46. 
14 Apter, D.E. The Politics of Modernisation. (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1965). 
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to emerge out of this world-view and epistemology of history and reality, proclaimed the 
inevitable need for traditional societies to change psychological attitudes, structure of social 
organisation as well as political change and economic growth.  
 
The difficulties with such an approach are manifold. Among others, Richard Bendix 
identifies various methodological problems for example with the use of ideal types which 
creates a ‘disjunctive characterisation of “tradition” and “modernity”’15 where abstraction can 
result in the exaggeration or simplification of evidence. Referring to Max Weber, Bendix 
repeats the warning that “Developmental sequences too can be constructed into ideal types 
and these constructs can have quite considerable heuristic value. But this quite particularly 
gives rise to the danger that the ideal type and reality will be confused with one another”.16 
The notion of ‘prerequisites’ is another term which Bendix sees as misleading. With its 
implication that countries need to replicate the conditions characteristic of modernity before 
they can ever hope to be successful in their drive for modernisation, the analyst ignores the 
possibility that some of the listed attributes may develop in the course of industrial 
development as a consequence rather than cause of modernisation.17 Proposing a 
reorientation, Bendix suggested that “the industrialisation and democratisation of Western 
Europe was a singular historic breakthrough, culminating in a century-long and specifically 
European development. But modernisation brings about specific discontinuities by virtue of 
its expansive tendencies so that the relation between the intrinsic structure and external 
setting of societies assumes special significance. Thus, the internal, historically developed 
structure of a country and the emulation induced by economic and political developments 
                                                 
15 Bendix, R. “Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.9 (3), 
April 1967, p. 314. 
16 Weber, M. The Methodology of Social Sciences, (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1949), p.101 
17 Bendix, R. “Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.9 (3), 
April 1967, p. 316. 
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abroad affect each country’s process of modernisation.”18 This can be formulated in terms of 
a ‘non-linear modernity’ which offers an alternative to the view of development and politics 
as linear, circular or punctuated, the important point being that even a non-linear trajectory 
has its own path dependent logic19.  
 
Applied to the case of India the above approach was countered by the observation that 
the country seemed to be experiencing processes of modernization that differed both in terms 
of sequence and timing as compared to the Western model, which according to Bendix 
referred to the social change induced by the industrial revolution of England, 1760-1830 and 
the political revolution in France, 1789-1794.20 For instance in many European countries the 
franchise was extended rather slowly, while in many newly independent countries universal 
suffrage had been adopted all at once. A further methodological problem encountered by the 
early modernisation scholars was the question whether methods and concepts drawn from the 
Western experience of history were really applicable to non-Western contexts.21 The need to 
account for, and recognize differences in the routes, the variation in the outcomes of 
modernization, prompted academics to reconsider the relationship between modernity and 
tradition.  
 
The Rudolphs for example, examined the transformation of caste into ‘bearer of both 
India’s ancient regime and its democratic political revolution’.22 The process of 
transformation was described by them as caste having ‘reconstituted itself into the sabha with 
                                                 
18 Ibid. p. 329. 
19 See Mitra, S.K. (ed.) Politics of Modern South Asia. Critical Issues in Modern Politics (Routledge, London, 
2008) , pp. 2 – 5.  
20 Ibid. p. 329. 
21 See Sathyamurthy, T.V. Terms of Political Discourse in India. (University of York, York, 1989), p.5 
22 Rudolph, L. & Rudolph, S. “The Political Role of India’s Caste Association”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 33/1, 
March, 1960, p.22. 
14 
 
characteristics of both the natural and the voluntary association,… defined in terms of both 
dharma and democracy’.23 Their book in 1967, The Modernity of Tradition delved more 
deeply into the structure and function of caste, analysing the relationship of caste and politics 
in terms of three types of political mobilisation: vertical24, horizontal25 and differential.26 
Modern politics, they posited, paradoxically appears to be an instrument for both the revival 
and, the suppression of traditional society. Their idea of something being both traditional and 
modern at the same time was a critical contribution to the literature on modernization and 
political development and further research continued in a similar vein, such as Gusfield27, 
Morris-Jones28 and Bendix.29 Gusfield, writing in 1967 posited that the concept of political 
development is far more difficult and culture bound than is that of economic development, 
pointing out that ‘what is seen today and labelled as the “traditional society” is often itself a 
product of change’.30  
 
                                                 
23 Ibid., p.22. 
24 ‘Vertical Mobilisation’ is defined as “the marshalling of political support by traditional notables in local 
societies that are organised and integrated by rank, mutual dependence, and the legitimacy of traditional 
authority. Notables reach vertically into such social systems by attaching dependents and socially inferior 
groups to themselves through their interests and deference.” Rudolph, L. and Rudolph, S. The Modernity of 
Tradition: Political Development in India, (University of Chicago Press, London, 1967), p. 24. 
25 “Horizontal mobilisation involves the marshalling of popular political support by class or community leaders 
and their specialised organisations. Ignoring the leaders......they make direct ideological appeals to classes or 
communities.” Ibid, p. 25. 
26 “Differential mobilisation involves the marshalling of direct and indirect political support by political parties 
(and other integrative structures) from viable, but internally differentiated, communities through parallel appeals 
to ideology, sentiment and interest. The agent of mobilisation in this case is the political party rather than the 
local notable or community association”. Ibid, p. 26. 
27 Gusfield, J.R. “Political Community and Group Interests in Modern India”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 36/ Summer 
1965, pp.123-41; Gusfield, J.R. “Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change”, 
The American Journal of Sociology, Vol.72/4 (Jan, 1967), pp351-362. 
28 Morris-Jones (The Government and Politics of India, Hutchinson, London 1967). 
29 Bendix, R. “Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.9/3, 
April 1967, pp.292-346. 
30 Gusfield, J.R. “Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change”, The American 
Journal of Sociology, Vol.72/4 (Jan, 1967), pp. 352-353. 
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This problem is brought out well in Subrata Mitra’s article, Flawed Paradigms: Some 
Western Models of Indian Politics31 in which he analyses the discourse on Indian politics. 
Concluding his survey, Mitra identified two sets of difficulties: ‘the fact that the root 
concepts around which (the paradigms) are organised are not germane to the experience that 
comes under their domain’ and ‘that there does not exist a comprehensive discourse on the 
Indian state within which India’s cultural perception of the self could also be specified in 
terms of the political discourse of change’.32 These writers played a crucial role in turning 
attention to context and in establishing that there were many routes to, and, many forms of 
modernisation. Tradition and modernity were thus seen as supplementing rather than 
supplanting each other, no longer defined as stark opposites or as ‘mutually exclusive’.33 
Modern development, it was proposed, might even revive and integrate traditional features 
into the ‘modern’ reality.34 
 
In response to these criticisms, attention was redirected towards the puzzle of why 
some traditional societies seemed to be better able to cope with modern change than others. A 
forerunner in this was S.N.Eisenstadt who in 1964 analysed the ‘Breakdowns of 
Modernisation’ in a likewise titled article. Drawing upon the concept of social mobilisation, 
Eisenstadt put forward the thesis that the internal structures of certain social groups, such as 
the tendency to minimise internal differentiation, were important for ‘when these groups were 
pushed into new, modernised, and differentiated, urban, industrial and semi-industrial 
settings. They resulted in the perpetuation of previous “traditional” types of relationships’ 
                                                 
31 Mitra, S.K. Culture and Rationality, (Sage, London, 1999), pp. 39 – 63. 
32 Ibid. p.57. 
33 Bendix, R. “Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, IX (April 
1967), p.326.  
34 Heesterman, J.C. The Inner Conflict of Tradition: Essays in Indian Ritual, Kingship and Society (University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1985), p. 9. 
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and not the creation of viable new, differentiated institutional structures.35 Eisenstadt claimed 
to have found a purely sociological analysis where, ‘just as the predilection for change is 
necessarily built into any institutional system, so the direction and scope of change are not 
random but depend....on the nature of the system generating the change’.36 Eisenstadt’s work 
was crucial in drawing attention to the fact that societies which were successful at harnessing 
and promoting change, particularly modernising societies, were those which had the capacity 
for internal transformation, a process ‘manifest in structural frameworks or cultural symbols 
that enable some groups to mobilise new forces and resources without necessarily destroying 
the existing structures.’37 Referring to India, Eisenstadt observed how modernisation entailed 
a continuous re-crystallisation of traditional frameworks as for instance in the case of the 
caste system which had given way to ‘more flexible networks of caste associations, organised 
around modern economic, professional and political activities’.38 
 
Challenging the purely sociological perspective, Huntington’s seminal Political Order 
in Changing Societies, published in 1968, argued that political change needed to be regarded 
as distinct from modernisation, and rather than being a correlate of modernisation, was often 
impeded by the latter. As a central hypothesis, Huntington proposed that the relationship 
between political participation and political institutionalisation determined the stability of a 
political system, regardless of the ‘level’ of economic or political development. An 
alternative to the stage-by-stage paradigm, Huntington represented a new wave of scholars 
                                                 
35 Eisenstadt, S.N. “Breakdowns of Modernisation”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 12(4), 1964 
July, p. 359. 
36 Eisenstadt, S.N. ‘Institutionalisation and Change’, American Sociological Review, Vol. 29 / 2 (April, 1964), p. 
247. 
37 Eisenstadt, S.N. ‘Transformation of Social, Political and Cultural Orders in Modernisation’, American 
Sociological Review, Vol. 30 / 5, (October 1965), p. 659. 
38 Ibid. p. 669. 
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who concentrated on the functional features of political development.39 Functional categories 
of comparison, applicable directly across national and cultural boundaries were constructed in 
contrast to the traditional country-by-country or area analysis based upon geographic, 
historical and institutional description. Proposing a ‘functional theory of the political system’ 
Gabriel Almond and James Coleman developed a formal model whereby differing empirical 
variations in the real world could be compared ‘in terms of the frequency and style of 
performance of political functions by political structures’.40 The core propositions made 
were: (i) all political systems have political structure; (ii) all political structure is multi-
functional; (iii) all political systems are culturally mixed, none being all-modern and rational 
nor all-primitive and traditional; (iv) the same functions are performed in all political 
systems. To ask the comparative questions, seven functional categories were proposed: the 
four ‘input’ functions of political socialisation and recruitment, interest articulation, interest 
aggregation and political communication; the three ‘output’ functions of rule-making, rule-
application and rule adjudication. With these tools of analysis, Almond and Coleman 
proposed in their introduction, ‘to offer a comparative analysis of the political system of 
those areas in the world in which dramatic social and political change are taking place – Asia, 
Africa and Latin America’. Another example of a functional theorist, Lucien Pye, compiled a 
list of ten meanings commonly attributed to the idea of political development, including 
increasing equality among individuals in relation to the political system, increasing capacity 
of the political system in relation to its environment and, increasing differentiation of 
institutions and structures within the political system.41  
 
                                                 
39 Almond,G.A. and Coleman, J.S. (eds.) The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1960). 
Almond & Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach  (Boston, 1966). 
40 Almond, G.A. and Coleman, J.S. (eds.) The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1960), p. 62. 
41 Pye, Lucien W. Aspects of Political Development (Boston, 1966), pp.31-48. 
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The early exponents of the functional approach nonetheless, continued to rely on a 
sequential understanding of political development moving towards a self-sustaining polity. 
Focusing on the distribution of power as a critical feature of the political development 
process, Harold D. Lasswell posited, ‘A self-sustaining level of power accumulation is 
reached when the nation is able to furnish its own trained personnel, to achieve structural 
innovations with minimum resort to coercion, and to mobilise resources for national goals.’42 
Representative of this line of thinking include, for example, Morris-Jones’s book, Parliament 
of India43 which examined the extent to which the institution functioned successfully as a 
component of representative government. However, Morris-Jones was also amongst the first 
to caution that the student of political science ‘should not assume, for instance, that 
institutions with familiar names are necessarily performing wholly familiar functions’.44 
Analysing the social backgrounds and behaviour of members of state and central legislatures, 
Morris-Jones examined the role played by parties in Parliament and the particular procedures 
and committees which had evolved from within the Indian system. 
 
Similarly, Myron Weiner was also concerned with the ways in which people were 
inducted into new political processes. His studies of India’s party politics drew attention to 
the crucial role political parties can play in providing stability once they were accepted by the 
citizenry as legitimate channels through which goals and aspirations can be satisfied.45 
Weiner was crucial in pointing out not only the importance of the Congress party but also the 
myriad of opposition parties confronting it and the dangers of factionalism. As Myron Weiner 
himself highlighted, at the heart of such analyses lie policy-oriented questions about the kind 
                                                 
42 Lasswell, H.D. “The Policy Sciences of Development”, World Politics, Vol.17/2 (Jan. 1965) p.290. 
43 Morris-Jones,W.H. Parliament in India (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1957). 
44 Ibid. p. 2.  
45 See for example, Weiner,M. Party Politics in India: the Development of a Multi-Party System (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1957) and Weiner,M. Party Building in a New Nation: the Indian National 
Congress (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1967). 
19 
 
of political institutions and practices can facilitate the emergence of a modern society. “How 
can values and attitudes be changed so as to mobilise people into voluntary corporate action 
on behalf of social and economic change? Who – administrators, political parties, legislators, 
businessmen, trade unions, religious associations, or other voluntary bodies – can mobilise 
people? And insofar as people are mobilised to participate...are they not also likely to 
increase their demands? How can one inculcate into organised groups the belief in some sort 
of public interest which would moderate the kinds of demands made and the techniques used 
to influence government, so that government can function with a minimum of recourse to 
coercive methods to maintain law and order?” 46 
 
In contrast, a comparative, historical school with a preference for variables such as 
classes, institutions and leadership emerged alongside. A representative scholar of this genre 
was Barrington Moore who, in his 1966 classic, Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy, distinguished between three patterns of modernisation: the bourgeois model 
(United States, England), the aristocratic (Japan, Germany) and the peasant (Russia, China). 
In this book Moore argued that the radically different costs and achievements of each model 
were explicable in terms of divergent patterns of social class development. One of the most 
important achievements of Moore’s book was to bring together the study of both Eastern and 
Western history. The case of India was for Moore both puzzling and paradoxical. As a 
political democracy in an Asian setting and one without an industrial revolution India 
represented a paradox, ‘a challenge to and a check upon the theories advanced in this book as 
well as others’.47 The puzzle compared with the other cases, was how despite the odds (a 
rigid caste system, Oriental despotism, parasitic landlordism, stunted agricultural 
development) and without the prerequisites (commercial agriculture, a crown that was held in 
                                                 
46 Weiner, M. “India’s Political Future”, World Politics, Vol.12/1 (Oct. 1959), pp103-119. 
47 Moore, B. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Beacon Press, Boston, 1993) , p. 315. 
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check, a landed aristocracy that was reined in) India had evolved into a democratic political 
system. The price however, of an incomplete process of change, according to Moore, was the 
ongoing tendency of the Indian system towards backwardness, economic inefficiency and a 
disregard for high human costs. According to Moore, ‘by the middle of the 1960s, India had 
no more than haltingly entered upon the process of becoming a modern, industrial society’48 
for rather than being a facilitator of change, democracy had become the elite’s ‘rationalisation 
for refusing to overhaul on any massive scale a social structure that maintains their 
privileges.’ 49 
 
Providing a different reading of the Indian experience yet sharing a similar 
historically comparative methodology, Rajni Kothari’s first book, Politics in India50, 
examined the politicisation process. Differing from the European case, where political 
participation, he claimed, was confined to the upper classes of society and political activity 
was not a significant engine of change, India was also unlike the ‘revolutionary experiments’ 
of China and Russia where, for example, parochial identities were suppressed and 
competition disallowed.51 Instead, he described the Indian model of development as the 
‘politicisation of a fragmented social structure through a penetration of political forms, values 
and ideologies....operating against the background of an essentially apolitical condition of 
society.’52 By this Kothari was referring to India’s long past of failed attempts at constructing 
a viable political authority, the building of a political centre. 
 
                                                 
48 Moore, B. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Beacon Press, Boston, 1993),  p. 413. 
49 Moore, B. Ibid (p.431). 
50 Kothari, R. Politics in India (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1970) . 
51 Ibid. p. 9. 
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The crucial variable Kothari identified ‘was the crystallisation of a dominant political 
centre in the midst of plural identities’53 as a result of the all-encompassing nationalist 
movement and the ‘institutionalisation’ of the dominant political centre, namely the Congress 
party. Combined with a political culture that was non-aggregative, India’s experience with 
nation-building produced not a clash between tradition and modernity but rather a situation 
where modernity (could) survive only by becoming part of tradition, by “traditionalising” 
itself’.54 This anticipated the literature which, much later on, was to speak of political power 
and political categories becoming indigenised.55 Both scholars referred to here (Kothari56 and 
Mitra57 respectively) conceptualised politics as an unfolding process requiring institutional 
analysis and the incorporation of elite strategies. 
 
This was an advance on the existing modernisation literature because Kothari 
provided for a variable that could explain the divergence as well as the convergence in the 
varying attempts of countries to attain political stability, social change and economic well-
being. This variable was termed by Kothari, ‘political institutionalisation’, through which he 
explored the possibility of there being an Indian model consisting of a concerted effort to 
incorporate pluralities and segmentations without using methods of obliteration or 
marginalisation.  Furthermore, unlike the evolutionary approach of early modernisation 
theory, Kothari identified ‘a simultaneous rather than sequential model of development’.58 As 
he puts it: ‘In simultaneously pursuing the goals of political participation, social mobilization, 
and economic development, and at the same time trying to project a world image, the Indian 
                                                 
53 Ibid. p. 420. 
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55 See Mitra et al (eds.) Political Parties in South Asia (Praeger, Westport, 2004) for an application of this 
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56 Kothari, R. Politics in India (Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1985), p. 6. 
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elite spread its energies too broadly on too many tasks but this also enabled it to articulate an 
incremental and cumulative style of nation-building which, because it focused on coalition-
making, enabled it to contain the pressures that inevitably emerged with increasing 
politicisation.’59What this thesis sets out to do is precisely to investigate more closely the 
strategy of coalition-making which varied across the policy arenas of social reform, economic 
development and foreign policy and to assess the implications of this variation. 
 
Among one of the first scholars to consider the case of India as the basis for 
producing a ‘model of incremental change’60, Kothari’s Politics in India reflected a general 
trend that had taken root in political science. By the late 1960s, the study of political 
development had gradually changed from being a largely problem-driven subject to a theory-
building exercise that was policy-oriented. In a landmark article in 1971, Huntington 
summarised this transformation succinctly: “the work of political scientists moved from a 
generalised focus on the political system to the comparative analysis of modern and 
traditional political system, to a more concrete concern with the discreet historical processes 
of modernisation and then back to a higher level of abstraction oriented toward general 
theories of political change.”61 Moving away from the notion of stages and a take-off into the 
self-sustaining polity62, the idea of sequential challenges or crises gained popularity63 which 
in turn was replaced by studies employing the “if…then…” approach.64 This formulation 
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implies a model sequence but suggests that variations from the expected pattern will produce 
problems that are in themselves predictable.  
 
Again the dichotomous nature of tradition and modernity was criticised for producing 
a confusion over whether these were two concrete points in history, the former lying in the 
past and the latter, somewhere in the future, or whether in fact all societies were in transition, 
thus requiring a theory of the different forms and processes of change at work rather than a 
theory of stages. In effect, the earlier attempts to create clear categorisations produced a 
second generation of theorists who argued against the mutually exclusive nature of modernity 
and tradition and cautioned against the use of ideal types as manifestations of actual 
correlations. Latecomers, it was argued had an advantage, modernising rapidly by importing 
technology and borrowing from the experience of early modernisers, skipping whole stages 
of the previously imagined evolutionary process. Contradicting the idea of modernisation and 
political change being linear, these were portrayed as being part of a cyclical process, with 
major ups and downs.65  
 
The problem however, continued to be the core assumption that political order was 
desirable in itself. Thus for Huntington, ‘the primary problem is not liberty but the creation of 
a legitimate public order. Men may, of course, have order without liberty but they cannot 
have liberty without order. Authority has to exist before it can be limited….’.66 As a result all 
forms of disorder were categorised as negative, as forces undermining the processes of 
political development that include literacy, urbanisation, economic growth and the demands 
for political participation. One direct consequence for the study of Indian politics has been 
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the tendency to portray any sign of political disorder as evidence of the break-down, 
disintegration or impending implosion of the country.67 This was characteristic of academic 
writing in the 1980s which observed the declaration of Emergency rule by Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi, the rise of separatist and insurgency movements within the country and the 
assassination of a prime minister. Writing in 1990 Atul Kohli described the growing un-
governability of India in the following terms, ‘The evidence for eroding political order is 
everywhere. Personal rule has replaced party rule at all levels…..Below the rulers, the 
entrenched civil and police services have been politicised. Various social groups have pressed 
new and ever more diverse political demands in demonstrations that often have led to 
violence’.68 The critical challenge Kohli identified was the political incorporation of newly 
mobilised lower strata, additionally challenging at a time when the disintegration of India’s 
major political institution, the Congress party. Like Rudolph and Rudolph in their classic, In 
Pursuit of Lakshmi69, Kohli blamed a structural feature of Indian politics, the highly 
interventionist state, for the growing political disorder: ‘If the role of the Indian state in 
India’s development were minimal, if many of the country’s pressing problems could be dealt 
with by social actors without the help of the state, then the state’s relative ineffectiveness 
would not pose such a crisis.’ 70  
 
This approach however, fails to take into account that crises may actually strengthen a 
political system and prove the resilience of institutions in the face of disorder. Furthermore, 
by not distinguishing between the sources of challenges to regimes, the analysis ends up 
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treating all anti-regime opposition as being alike and takes for granted the mere fact of 
orderliness as desirable. Without any acknowledgement of the costs involved in upholding a 
particular order over another there is the risk of under-estimating the extent to which elites 
themselves might be willing to dismantle existing institutions in the interests of continued 
rule.    
 
On the subject of institutionalisation, Huntington posited that strong institutions 
meant attractive values such as coherence, autonomy, complexity and adaptability. He writes, 
‘without strong political institutions, society lacks the means to define and to realise its 
common interests. The capacity to create political institutions is the capacity to create public 
interests’.71 However, while under-institutionalisation or de-institutionalisation is seen as 
alarming, there is little concern expressed about the danger of over-institutionalisation 
leading to repression and rigidity.   
 
Applying Huntington’s thesis to the Indian case, Myron Weiner developed an ‘index 
of institutionalisation’72 which measured the percentage of candidates who forfeited their 
security deposits in the State assembly elections (a deposit required for the candidate to file 
his nomination and lost if the candidate failed to win one-sixth of the total vote). Weiner’s 
own extensive work on Indian politics was heavily influenced by the political development 
school. Contributing in 1971 to the volume on Crises and Sequences in Collective Theory 
Development in the prominent Studies in Political Development series Myron Weiner focused 
on the growth of participation as a key variable determining political change. A participation 
crisis, defined by Weiner as ‘a conflict that occurs when the governing elite views the 
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demands of behaviour of individuals and groups seeking to participate in the political system 
as illegitimate.’73, is interesting in terms of the various ways in which governing elites 
respond to such crises, the new institutions that may emerge from the resolution of a crisis 
and the dilemmas facing new participants who seek to enhance their influence within the 
political system.  
 
A year later Paul Brass tested the hypothesis on a selection of Indian states to come to 
the conclusion that there was no law-like relationship between political participation / social 
mobilisation and political institutionalisation.74 Additionally, James Manor, writing in 1990 
pointed out the fact that ‘to make a liberal political system work, it is no more necessary for 
them (the Indians) to be liberals than it is for them to be literates’.75 Stability and resilience 
therefore were not to be seen as inevitable outcomes of mass participation and social 
mobilisation but rather the result of politics. Scholarship like that of Manor was crucial for 
bringing politics back into the picture, for drawing attention to the ‘political accommodations, 
bargains and compromises’. 76 
 
As the above analysis has demonstrated, while advances and contributions were made 
to the study of Indian politics and India’s political development through the 1960s, 70s and 
80s, the basic conceptual framework did not alter. Authors considered here such as Rajni 
Kothari, Samuel Huntington, Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne Rudolph, W.H. Morriss-Jones, 
each a classic in his own right, provide what are essentially structural-functionalist 
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explanations for the resilience of India’s political institutions and their ability to combine and 
transcend the modernity-tradition dichotomy. Hence, Morris-Jones writing in 1964 described 
India’s political system as a ‘mediating framework for a dialogue between the two inherited 
traditions of governance and movement’77 and Rudolph and Rudolph, shortly thereafter, 
examined the capacity of India’s modern institutions to tap into pre-colonial and pre-modern 
traditions.78 Expanding their argument in 1987, they went on to explore other features of the 
Indian state such as its centrist nature which ‘minimises the political salience of major 
cleavages’79, the ‘state-dominated pluralism’80 where a multiplicity of social groups compete 
with one another under the overall hegemony of the state, an institutionalised system of 
conflict resolution with the state acting as the ‘third party’ or ‘honest broker’81 allowing 
conflict to be localised rather than spreading across the whole system. Identifying ‘hinge 
groups’ that bridged the modernity-tradition gap by drawing their legitimacy simultaneously 
from both, Rudolph and Rudolph explored the changing nature of caste associations and the 
emergence of new hybrid forms such as ‘bullock capitalists’ and the rise of a state which, 
‘Like Hindu notions of the divine,.....is polymorphous, a creature of manifold forms and 
orientations’.82 Meanwhile authors such as Huntington in 1968 and Kothari in 1970 had 
developed theories focusing on the need for strong, stable institutions capable of withstanding 
the inevitable challenges of political and social mobilisation that was entailed in the process 
of modernisation. 
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While certainly enhancing the empirical evidence and advancing the sharpness of 
their theoretical models, the work of the above authors represents a dominant continuum 
within the study of Indian politics and political development born out of the West’s historical 
experience and theoretical engagement with modernity and modernisation. Drawing upon a 
historical sequence of events, the structural approach envisioned grand processes such as 
nation-building and economic growth to be the forces contributing to a transformation of 
society and economy. Emerging from this, the ‘functional paradigm’83 demonstrated how 
particular features of India’s social or political system served the functions of modern life as 
in the work portrayed above of Morris-Jones and Rudolph and Rudolph. Whilst revealing 
new and interesting features of the Indian case, these works remained firmly embedded 
within the structural perspective that identified the state as the central catalytic agent. 
 
The views to emerge as a challenge to these, questioned the assumption of 
modernisation as an irreversible, linear process that could be set in motion once the 
institutional kernels were set in place or the argument that the mere destruction of traditional 
forms assured the development of a new, viable modern system. Having been dominated by 
primarily social accounts of change, the literature on political change, development and order 
finally gave way to a stream of writers from the 1970s on who sought to bring politics centre 
stage as an explanatory variable.84 With this shift came an interest in the theory of agency. 
Ernst Gellner, attacking the Eurocentric assumptions of early modernisation theorists, argued 
that there was a tendency to confuse several distinct sets of features such as, characteristics 
specific to the first transition from traditional to modern, those specific to the European 
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transition, characteristics of any transition and features of a completed transition to 
modernity.85 Gellner’s distinctions drew attention to a previously ignored dimension, the role 
of choice and ideology in the modernisation process and the importance of leadership in 
making strategic decisions. In the writings of Dore, Nettl and Robertson for example, 
modernisation itself is seen as the product of a decision to modernise.86 Modernisation 
according to Nettl and Robertson, ought to be taken as a subjective, relativist term denoting 
the process by which national elites successfully consolidated their position within the state 
and moved toward equivalence with well-placed nations in the international system. The 
elite’s perceptions of this goal depended on the values and exigencies of the international 
system on the one hand, and the values, dispositions and capabilities of the elites in the 
nation, on the other.  
  
By the late 1970s a new shift had occurred with the emergence of rational choice and the 
‘new’ institutionalist paradigm which addressed the role of choice and the constraints of 
context. These shall be reviewed in the subsequent chapter. The following account of Nehru 
biographies demonstrates how choice and context are necessary variables when trying to 
explain the causes and consequences of action. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
85 Gellner, E. Thought and Change (London, 1969), p.139. 
86 Dore, R.P., “The Late-Development Effect” in Evers, H.D. (ed.) Modernisation in South East Asia, 
(Singapore, 1973), pp.65 – 81. and Nettl, J.P. & Robertson, R., International System and the Modernisation of 
Societies, (New York, 1968) . 
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1.4. Nehruana literature. 
 
Seven biographies of Nehru will be reviewed in this section: Micheal Brecher, Nehru: 
A Political Biography (1959), Michael Edwardes, Nehru: A Political Biography (1971), 
B.R.Nanda, Jawaharlal Nehru: Rebel and Statesman (1995), S. Gopal’s three-volume official 
biography, Jawaharlal Nehru: a Biography (1975 – 84), Stanley Wolpert’s Nehru: Tryst with 
Destiny (1996), Judith Brown, Nehru: a Political Life (2003) and finally, Benjamin 
Zachariah, Nehru (2004). By making such a selection the intention is to examine whether 
interpretations or methods of analysis have changed over time. The copious amount of 
research on Nehru that exists varies a great deal in terms of the quality. In this section, the 
thesis examines a selection of biographies by well-known international as well as Indian 
scholars. Despite the shared medium of a chronological, narrative account of his person, the 
books do represent two broad ‘generations’ of Nehru scholars, something which will be 
clarified in the conclusion to this section. Literature that deals with specific aspects such as 
Nehru’s economic thought or books that refer in more general terms to Nehru’s policies and 
legacy will be incorporated into subsequent chapters. 
 
Beginning with the earliest, Michael Brecher’s political biography of Nehru, written 
during Nehru’s lifetime, is a rigorous piece of work that draws upon a range of sources 
including official reports, Nehru’s own writings, that of his contemporaries, newspapers and 
interviews with statesmen in Britain and India.87 Avoiding a narrow focus on Nehru’s person, 
Brecher takes the trouble to explain the institutional framework within which Nehru 
functioned as a political leader. Thus, his chapter on Planning and Welfare contains a 
perceptive description and analysis of the Planning Commission: its membership, its 
                                                 
87 Brecher, M. Nehru, A Political Biography (Oxford University Press, London, 1959). 
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functions and influence.88 Reflecting on Nehru’s role in policy-making, Brecher concludes 
that the Prime Minister was a ‘most effective salesman of planning in the country as a whole’ 
but that the many shortcomings of his programmes ‘reflect in large measure the weaknesses 
of Nehru’s policies and his frequent reluctance to act resolutely when forcefulness is 
necessary’.89 Similarly, on foreign policy Brecher provides an insight into the policy-making 
process, examining the role of parliament, the cabinet, various ‘interest groups’ and key 
individuals, in addition to the exceptionally central role that Nehru occupied.  
 
Writing in 1959 Brecher had yet to witness the failure of Nehru’s approach towards 
China that culminated in the 1962 war but he detected the ambiguities in Nehru’s position 
and strategy of non-alignment.90 In many ways, Brecher’s study is one of the more ‘political’ 
accounts of Nehru and his times. This is achieved by allowing for an analysis of the 
institutional mechanisms and inter-personal dynamics that characterised the newly installed 
democracy. Thus, in addition to the content of Nehru’s beliefs and vision, the reader is given 
a vivid sense both of the substantive and procedural nature of Indian politics then. Out of the 
selection of books reviewed above this comes closest to a policy analysis of the Nehru period. 
Nevertheless the scope for further work remains, for Brecher mentions both the Hindu Code 
Bill and Panchasheela only in passing and his bibliography indicates that parliamentary 
debates were not consulted. As a result, Brecher seems to have intuitively found an approach 
that takes both actor and context into account, but without specifying a methodology and 
analytical framework. 
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Similarly, Michael Edwardes’ Nehru, A Political Biography which is full of insight, 
analysis and perceptive commentary is based upon a loose narrative structure which does not 
seek to explicitly prove anything. By the time the 1971 biography was complete, Edwardes 
had published on a range of historical subjects related to the subcontinent91, a background 
which instils his writing about the freedom struggle with a breadth and depth that sets him 
apart from the other scholars reviewed here. Also, having been a live observer of pre and 
post-independence politics, Edwardes offers an unusual combination of the insider and 
outsider. His writing is not tinged by an unquestioning veneration of Nehru and his aim of 
presenting a ‘political’ biography is motivated by his inquiry into the political causes for 
action, choices and behaviour. For example, when discussing Nehru’s second Congress 
presidency in 1936, a time when the recently formed Congress Socialist Party (CSP) was a 
powerful force within the Congress on the one hand while the right wing dominated the 
leadership, Edwardes observes how Nehru managed the situation: “He wanted national not 
factional leadership. He had noted that as the CSP had increased its influence inside the 
Congress so the right wing closed its ranks. He could best maintain his position by 
identifying with neither but by retaining the support of both Gandhi and the socialists.”92 A 
further interesting interpretation describes how Nehru, frustrated by the internal politics of 
the Congress was encouraged by his ‘opponents’ (Patel, Prasad, Rajagopalachari are referred 
to as the Eumenides93 in Nehru’s life) to seek refuge ‘into the wider and more amenable 
reality of foreign policy.......It was an escape which hardly damaged the struggle for freedom 
                                                 
91 See for example, Edwardes, M High Noon of Empire: India under Curzon (1965), The West in Asia, 1850-
1914 (1967), Bound to Exile: The Victorians in India (1969), East-West Passage: the travel of ideas, arts and 
inventions between Asia and the Western World (1971). 
92 Edwardes, M. Nehru, A Political Biography (Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1971), p. 114. 
93 Refers to the Furies who tormented Orestes in the play by Aeschylus. 
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but after independence Nehru’s preoccupation with foreign affairs was to lead to an 
abdication of decision on internal matters...”.94  
 
The lacuna in Edwardes’ book is similar to that of the Wolpert biography for both 
authors choose to devote more than two thirds of their analysis to the pre-independence 
period, thereby neglecting the years of policy-making under Nehru’s prime ministership. 
Edwardes is highly critical and cynical about the early years after independence, writing 
about the first elections as a ‘travesty of democracy’95, depicting the Nehru-Congress 
combine as an ‘alliance of weakness’ where “Congress had created Nehru and Nehru could 
have led only a party like Congress”.96 Without delving deeply into the debates surrounding 
policy-making within parliament or within the Congress party, Edwardes’ assessment is 
rather harsh, seeing in Nehru’s actions not the tactical politician but someone beset by 
indecisiveness who was “compelled to allow events to take their course, or to be directed on 
course by others more purposeful, until there was only one choice left to him to make.”97 
Since Edwardes does not examine any particular policy in detail he does not portray the 
competing interests at stake nor the process through which Nehru built up his position via co-
optation or polarisation. In the end, it is Nehru’s weaknesses which stand out and not because 
they are flattering (which is often the interpretation presented by his admirers), for Edwardes 
paints a picture of a fallible leader, often misguided by others but quite capable of being 
misleading himself. Whilst Edwardes certainly presents a distinctive interpretation of the man 
and his times, the reader is not given a train of logic to follow in terms of the resources used, 
the assumptions being made about leadership and transition, and the constraints of context. 
The end result is a biography which reads like a gripping novel, partly inevitable given the 
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95 Ibid., p. 248. 
96 Ibid., p. 245. 
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extraordinary conditions it deals with, but also because, particularly in the case of the post-
independence years, Edwardes simply focuses on dramatic and large-scale events like the 
Sino-Indian border war. 
 
Sarvepalli Gopal’s three volume-project is, technically speaking, a tour de force. 
Later, Gopal went on to edit a series of primary documents drawn from the Nehru family’s 
private papers, Nehru’s speeches and public writings, spanning Nehru’s entire life. His 
particular interpretation is of interest here for in a final chapter, summarising Nehru’s 
achievements, Gopal reveals his flagrant admiration for a man who ‘consolidated a nation, 
trained it for democracy, constructed a model for economic development and set the country 
on the path to growth’.98 Gopal ends by describing Nehru as “India’s once and – we may 
hope – future king.’99 Elevating Nehru to the heights of almost a super hero, Gopal’s analysis 
loses credibility and value. The compromises, manoeuvring and politicking to which Gopal 
alludes to in the three volumes make for far more interesting reading, providing insights into 
the complex person that Nehru was and the multiple challenges of his times but these are 
mostly left un-elucidated. Instead, the leader whom he describes ‘was a visionary as well as a 
planner’, who combined ‘intellectual and moral authority’, a man in possession of such 
‘attractive failings’ as ‘the agonising continually in public over all aspects of every question, 
the open-mindedness carried to excess, the over-developed democratic instinct to carry all 
shades of opinion with him, the civilised self-doubt’ begins to sound more like a caricature 
than a credible political actor.100 
 
                                                 
98 Gopal, S. Jawaharlal Nehru, A Biography (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1984), Volume 3, p.302. 
99 Ibid. p. 302. 
100 Ibid. p.299. 
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So far, the three biographies above have exemplified a style of writing that was 
coloured heavily by the ideals through which Nehru was portrayed: Nehru as a moderniser, 
Nehru as the great leader and philosopher king. This can perhaps be accounted for by the fact 
that the authors lived through the Nehru years and were caught up in the euphoria and also, 
later the disappointments of the times. 
 
B.R.Nanda on the other hand, represents the transition to a ‘new’ generation of Nehru 
scholars who sought to reduce the intensity of the spotlight on Nehru and to draw attention to 
his contemporaries and the impact of key individuals surrounding him.  Adopting an essay-
format, B.R.Nanda’s Jawaharlal Nehru, Rebel and Statesman examines various aspects of 
Nehru’s life, ranging from important personal relationships, to the conditions that shaped him 
and the intellectual themes that engaged him. Thus, Nanda emphasizes the mutually 
beneficial relationship to emerge between Nehru and Gandhi, pointing out how Nehru’s 
political career was made by Gandhi’s projecting him as Congress president at decisive 
junctures in 1930, 1936 and 1946. The Nehru-Bose relationship meanwhile is used to 
highlight what a more radical and impulsive Nehru might have looked like and behaved. On 
the themes of religion, partition, socialism, economic planning and non-alignment, Nanda 
expertly weaves together the personal experiences that shaped Nehru’s thinking, the 
situational constraints he was up against and very briefly, the state policy he formulated. By 
not following a chronological narrative, Nanda produces a series of ‘keyhole’ images which 
seem to plunge the reader briefly but intensively into the times. For example in the chapter on 
‘Nehru and Socialism’, Nanda refers to Nehru’s own writings, the contemporaries who 
influenced him, the strategy of accommodation and compromise acquired through 
experience, and the ‘mixed economy’ approach that emerged as a result. Since all this is done 
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in just nine pages it is naturally a brief account but is indicative of the potential for an 
analysis based on variables such as context, preferences and bargaining power. 
 
Stanley Wolpert carries this approach further providing insights into the personal 
relationships between Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose, Nehru 
and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Nehru and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Nehru and Krishna Menon, 
Nehru and Lord Mountbatten. A methodological contribution is also made by Wolpert, who 
draws upon the autobiographies, memoirs and biographies of Nehru’s contemporaries and 
comrades to shed light on Nehru’s life and times – a technique that the thesis also 
implements. Nevertheless it is surprising to note that Wolpert makes no mention of the Hindu 
Code Bills or Panchasheela, probably a reflection of the fact that the bulk of the book 
concerns itself with the pre-1947 period (27 out of the 32 chapters), a self-imposed limitation 
in response to the lack of primary material at the time that Wolpert conducted his research.  
 
Judith Brown’s ‘Nehru’ begins with a clear agenda. Claiming to adopt a different 
approach from other accounts of Nehru’s life, Brown hopes ‘to portray him in a broader 
context, as a man who belonged to a crucial generation in the history of Asia …It shows the 
diversity and complexity of the major issues which confronted them in a time of profound 
and unusually rapid transition’.101 Furthermore Brown’s study seeks to ‘use his life as a 
window into Indian politics and shows how his work and concerns, his ambitions and failures 
can help the analysis of some of the deeper forces operating within the Indian polity’.102 Like 
Zachariah, Brown regards Nehru as having had a critical bearing on India’s political culture 
and thus divides the narrative into five chronological sections, ‘each one deal(ing) with a 
special phase in Nehru’s life, which also coincides with a particular phase in the development 
                                                 
101 Brown, J. Nehru. A Political Life (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003), p. 2. 
102 Ibid. p. 4. 
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of India’s polity and politics’.103 In this way Nehru becomes India and India, Nehru, a 
representation that can only be problematic as will emerge.  
 
Brown opens her narrative with a brief background into the pre-Nehru context with a 
section titled, ‘An Imperial Heritage, 1889-1920’. Whilst this is useful and unusual compared 
with the other biographies under review here, the attention to ‘pre-history’ does not continue 
throughout the book. As a result the reader is provided with the briefest of immersions into 
the workings of the British Raj and the kinds of problems and challenges as well as 
opportunities that were bequeathed to Nehru. The thesis on the other hand gives great 
emphasis to the importance of pre-history by providing a pre-independence background to 
each of the three policy areas. This is necessary because the policy dilemmas and debates that 
Nehru encountered and engaged with, were legacies of the colonial period.  
 
Opting for a thematic framework, Brown hopes to redress the imbalance in 
biographical studies on Nehru where the focus is largely on the freedom struggle and not the 
issues Nehru himself considered vital during his prime ministership.104 Thus, Brown 
examines the process of nation-building, dividing this into (a) ‘the work of imagining the 
nation’, (b) ‘of structuring the nation and giving it political shape’, (c) forging ‘an expanded 
understanding and reality of shared nationhood’ and finally (d) the task of installing the new 
nation in the international order.105 Whilst this approach aims at weaving together the main 
events of Nehru’s prime ministership together with the travails of actually running a 
government ultimately, Brown ends up concentrating on Nehru, the ‘political visionary’, the 
‘cosmopolitan intellectual who could see the broad picture and expound the significance of 
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issues facing India in sweeping historical terms.’106 Like in so many other biographies of 
Nehru, the political manoeuvring that was necessary to maintain his position of power within 
the Congress party and the instrumentalisation of policy issues to establish his primacy in 
political debates, is over-shadowed by the portrayal of the greatness of his stature as an 
intellectual and leader. A further problem emerges with the image Brown creates in a final 
section, titled ‘Frustration of Vision, 1957 – 1964’, of an aging Nehru, from whose hands the 
reins of control were slipping and ‘the demands of politics confronted the principled 
intellectual within Nehru’s complex personality, causing hesitation, tension and often 
distress.’107 The picture Brown paints of these years is that of a leader, increasingly stymied 
by opposition from within the party and the entrenched interests and inherent conservatism 
which came to the fore as Nehru weakened in health and spirit. However, because Nehru’s 
own machinations within party and parliament are under-portrayed, there is a tendency to 
underplay the fact that to some extent these were constraints of his own making. The early 
years of his prime ministership need to be studied not only in light of the high principles and 
values he thought should be the mark of an independent India but also in terms of the 
compromises he inevitably had to make as a skilled politician and, as a result, the 
shortcomings in his vision. 
 
Coming to the most recent biography, Zachariah opts for a more explicitly 
interpretive account.  Unlike Wolpert who weaves a narrative based on fragments and 
excerpted quotations, Zachariah poses concrete questions to which he is trying to find an 
answer. In addition to rescuing Nehru from the mythologies that his supporters, detractors 
and even Nehru himself created, Zachariah emphasizes in the introduction, that the book 
must ask a vital question, namely, ‘what were the social forces that made it possible for 
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Nehru to rise to and to sustain his leadership in the Indian national movement?’108 Providing 
the basis for the book, Nehru’s rise to power, his leadership skills, during the period prior to 
independence and after, are explored from various angles. By examining the nature of 
leadership under colonial rule, Zachariah seeks to contextualise Nehru in terms of the 
resources available and the strategies that were common to the time. In a sub-section entitled, 
‘The Problems of Authenticity and Modernity’, Zachariah highlights the challenges faced by 
Nehru and his contemporaries in justifying the call to universal rights of freedom and self-
determination on the one hand while navigating indigenous notions of and paths toward 
modernity. This was compounded by the fact that these leaders were simultaneously 
negotiating the foundations for a future state as well as moulding the idea of a nation. As a 
study in leadership therefore, Nehru offers a window of analysis into the complexities and 
contradictions that are captured by the idea of a non-linear modernity. 
 
Mid-way through his book, Zachariah interrupts the narrative to dwell on the 
transition to independence, a phase that is important in order to “examine the roots of what 
came to be called the ‘Nehruvian vision’ or the ‘Nehruvian model’, describing thereby what 
might be called the political culture of post-independence India.”109 Seeking a conceptual 
framework, Zachariah breaks down the task into the following components: the parameters of 
the discourse as represented in the Constituent Assembly debates, the institutional framework 
of the Indian National Congress and the imperatives of the time such as communal, identity 
politics, economic redistribution and the consolidation of India’s sovereignty in the 
international realm. However, as will be noted further on, the book falls short in a number of 
ways, particularly in terms of its account and analysis of Nehru’s political manoeuvring and 
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the arguments and alternatives put forward by Nehru’s contemporaries on each of the issues 
that he concerned himself with, including foreign policy. While the latter is perhaps 
inevitable given the biographical focus on Nehru as the central character, the former 
weakness stems from the fact that few studies exist that dissect, chronologically and 
substantively, the conception, formulation and implementation of a particular policy during 
the Nehru era.  
 
In his conclusion, Zachariah pronounces the “Nehruvian project” to a large extent to 
have been a failure but points out that there is a tendency to ‘judge Nehru by standards far 
beyond those applied to most politicians….(perhaps because) he himself set the standards so 
high, and also perhaps because, as Nehru was and regarded himself as an intellectual, 
subsequent writers engage with him in the full splendour of intellectual combat, delighting in 
his inconsistencies and revelling in revealing his compromises.”110 This is where, 
surprisingly, Wolpert’s study proves more insightful for he points out how Nehru was 
perfectly capable of engaging in the dirty business of politics but at the same time worked 
hard at maintaining a clean image. Thus, “Nehru never liked associating himself directly with 
any unscrupulous act, anything as immoral as throwing his ‘friend’ Sheikh Abdullah behind 
bars or forcing his most likely and best-qualified successor Morarji out of his cabinet into the 
political wilderness virtually on the eve of his demise.”111 
 
Another tendency towards over-simplification occurs in Zachariah’s assessment of the 
‘successes’ and ‘failures’ of the Nehruvian period where the reasons and evidence for failure 
                                                 
110 Ibid. p. 262. 
111 Wolpert, S. Nehru. A Tryst with Destiny (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996), p. 489. These incidents 
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are listed as ‘over-optimistic’ targets for the Five Year Plans, an inability to tackle poverty 
because of the limited attention paid to human development, giving in to conservative 
opposition especially with regards social reform and finally, Nehru’s betrayal of his own 
ideals particularly in compromising non-alignment through his aligning with China.112 
However, in his assessment of Nehru’s ‘unfinished business’, Zachariah does not allow for 
the possibility that Nehru’s compromises and half-hearted initiatives were also embarked 
upon for short-term gain, primarily that of consolidating and maintaining power. Seen from 
this angle they were highly successful for, on almost every count, Nehru managed to silence 
critics and disarm opponents. Zachariah refers to this element of strategic calculation in 
Nehru’s behaviour when he describes him as ‘the eternal coalitionist (who) appears to have 
been particularly adept at locking himself into coalitions with his opponents rather than his 
allies’113 but as will become evident from the thesis, Nehru’s tactics did not simply consist of 
coalition-building for, when necessary, he engaged in agenda-setting, bandwagoning and 
stalling procedures that left in its wake more polarisation than consensus. All in all, 
Zachariah’s study of Nehru, while innovative in its overall approach, does not generate the 
kind of subtle insights which Wolpert and Gopal’s more traditionally written biographies 
provide. Furthermore, despite the promising questions at the start of the book, Zachariah ends 
up under-estimating the tactical and strategic side to Nehru’s actions and over-emphasizing 
the substantive content of the ‘Nehruvian vision’.  
 
Examining Nehru biographies reveals how little the field has moved since the late 
1950s. There has been a tendency in the literature to repeat and embellish biographical details 
but not to generate new insights about Nehru, his politics and his times. This is possibly due 
to the fact that there has not been an attempt to apply fresh analytical approaches drawn from 
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the study of politics and research on changing societies or societies in transition. 
Furthermore, because Nehru is more often than not seen as a unique, great man of history, 
coupled with a tendency to neglect Indian politics of the 1950s as a topic in its own right, 
there has been a propensity to focus on the man and not to critically examine his actions or 
context. 
 
Nevertheless it is possible to distinguish between two ‘generations’ of Nehru scholars. 
Writers like Brecher, Edwardes and Gopal share the experience of having been 
contemporaries of Nehru, either observing his politics first hand or, as in Gopal’s case, as a 
public official.114 As a result they approach the subject matter with a natural sensitivity for 
the context, aware of the many pressures as well as the historic opportunities that Nehru had 
as prime minister. Hence their writing is unconsciously mutli-layered. Authors like Judith 
Brown, Stanley Wolpert and Benjamin Zachariah on the other hand represent a shift towards 
a more systematic study of the man and his times but at the same time are coloured by a sense 
of nostalgia for bygone days.  The new element in more recent writing has been to use Nehru 
as a means through which to understand the present or as Brown puts it, ‘how India has come 
to be what it is and to demonstrate some of the resources with which it faces still critical 
domestic issues as well as those with major international dimensions’.115 Nevertheless the 
general trend has been towards an ever-greater magnification of Nehru’s vision at the 
expense of deciphering Nehru’s tactical and strategic behaviour as a political actor. As a 
result, Nehru has remained the country’s philosopher king, the ideal leader who combined 
virtue and wisdom. 
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Not only has this hindered research about Nehru but it has also created a dearth in the 
writing on the politics and policies of the 1950s as will become evident in subsequent 
chapters that focus on the case studies and the literature available in the relevant policy field. 
A deeper exploration of the way in which policy was shaped in the 1950s, the alternatives 
that were foregone and the interests that became congealed in the policy-making process, is 
of crucial importance. The decade of the 1950s marked a critical period of transition, moving 
from the trappings of colonial rule to the infrastructure of an independent, democratic system 
of government. Although the process had started much earlier, the negotiation of core values 
(such as secularism, socialism and non-alignment) went through a crucial phase during the 
early 1950s when policies were being formulated and implemented by an independent Indian 
government for the first time and institutional constraints were respected, undermined and 
remade in the process. In its conclusion the thesis will make the case that the 1950s, (and this 
is not simply reducible to Nehru alone), represents the wellspring of India’s modern politics 
in terms of the resources and interests that continue to set the terms of debate and the limits to 
policy-making.  
 
The ‘next generation’ of scholarship on Nehru ought to be one that aims at combining the 
intuition of those firsthand witnesses with the more analytical approaches of later writers. 
With this as its aspiration, the thesis has invested much time in exploring the context as well 
as developing a theoretical framework to guide the analysis. 
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1.5. Conclusion. 
 
The foregoing survey has demonstrated that early proponents of the ‘modernisation 
paradigm’ in the social sciences failed to explain the divergence in political development 
amongst countries as opposed to the convergence they had predicted that modernisation 
would bring about. Using India as a test case, scholars examined the ways in which tradition 
re-invented itself and modernity took on local features to propose theories about the 
indigenisation process, the ‘idioms’ of politics and the importance of history. Nevertheless 
what remained under-explained was why breakdowns and setbacks occur in the form of 
political violence and the use of coercion, or, why religion retained its political saliency and 
economic growth remained un-sustainable? One explanation to emerge from within Indian 
political science was the ‘deinstitutionalisation’ hypothesis which adopted a moral undertone 
in arguing for the need to resurrect institutions of the state, returning them to their original 
stature during their heyday of the Nehru era. As pointed out by Subrata Mitra, the 
deinstitutionalisation thesis failed to address the “all important question of the cause of the 
structural discontinuity....its proponents are able to offer explanations only in terms of 
political styles and motives of key actors ...the issue of the state’s ability to regenerate itself 
(is not) raised with any degree of seriousness”.116 
 
Furthermore, the survey of biographical material on Jawaharlal Nehru demonstrates 
how generally blinkered the scholarship has been of Nehru’s brand of parliamentary 
democracy following independence, as a result of which few innovative insights have been 
generated from the extensive research that has gone into the bookshelves of Nehruana 
literature. This, the thesis has argued, is a weakness that stems from the underlying 
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methodological and epistemological position adopted by the authors, a position that tends to 
under-value the politics of the time and the compromises that were struck. Mitra points out in 
his essay, Crisis and Resilience in Indian Democracy, “The years from 1950 to 1967 were the 
years of solid Congress dominance. Although the opposition parties did not alternate with the 
dominant party in controlling the government, their exclusion from the formation of public 
policy was more formal than real....This was the basic characteristic of the dominant party 
system which distinguished it from a one-party state as well as from a multiparty system.”117 
Though political competition was thus ‘internalised’ it nevertheless continued and Nehru had 
to be the skilled politician that he was to maintain control and consolidate his dominance.  
 
Examining the resilience of India’s institutions over time, Mitra applies what he 
terms, ‘critical traditionalism’ which “conceptualises governance as germane to all societies. 
Changing environments require changes in the rules of governance, changes which, to be 
legitimate, need to be drawn from the political tradition of the given society.”118 From such a 
standpoint, he then develops an empirical model of governance based on four sets of 
parameters: “a bureaucratic state machinery which combines policy responsiveness with law 
and order management; contribution to agenda setting by local protest movements; political 
elites using two track strategies that combine protest and participation, and constitutional 
change as a political resource”.119  
 
As demonstrated, a literature survey reveals the extent to which Jawaharlal Nehru is 
portrayed as a founding father of the modern Indian nation-state. Whilst misjudgements and 
                                                 
117 Mitra, S.K. “Crisis and Resilience in Indian Democracy” in Mitra, S.K. Culture and Rationality. The Politics 
of Social Change in Post-colonial India. (Sage, New Delhi, 1999), p. 383. 
118 Mitra, S.K. “Crowds and Power: Democracy and the Crisis of ‘Governability’ in India” in Mitra, S.K. 
Culture and Rationality. The Politics of Social Change in Post-colonial India. (Sage Publications, New Delhi, 
1999), p. 373. 
119 Ibid. p. 365. 
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mistakes in his policy choices are recognised, these are usually cast in terms of his having 
been misled, either by advisors or adversaries. The result has been a largely hagiographic 
interpretation of Nehru and his legacy whilst those who have been more critical have not 
delved deeply enough to explain the reasons behind his choices. To imply that Nehru simply 
made unfortunate or even incompetent decisions, leading for instance to an unwanted and 
unforeseen war with China in 1962, does not help us understand why alternative actions were 
rejected. To counter this view the chapter has made the following argument, that choice, as 
much as context and contingency, determines policy content and output. This is what the 
thesis seeks to demonstrate.  
 
In many ways, this thesis follows in the footsteps of Sunil Khilnani whose book, The 
Idea of India is unusual in its unabashed acknowledgement of the importance of politics and 
the political skills of its actors. Khilnani’s introduction draws attention to two central 
variables: ‘the conditions of political competition in India (and) the identity of the 
competitors’.120 Jawaharlal Nehru is analysed in terms of both and Khilnani is one of the 
view observers of Indian political history to state that Nehru was not only a product of his 
times but also an astute, skilled political actor whose vision ‘emerged through constant 
practical adjustments in the face of political contingencies.’121 Most crucially, Khilnani 
demonstrates how contingencies such as partition and the mass communal killings, the early 
crisis over Kashmir served to reinforce, in the mind of Nehru, the need for a strong state. In 
fact he goes as far to state that ‘Constitutional democracy based on universal suffrage did not 
emerge from popular pressure....nor was it wrested by the people from the state; it was given 
to them by the political choice of an intellectual elite.’ 122 
                                                 
120 Khilnani, S. The Idea of India (Penguin Books, London, 1998), p. 13. 
121 Ibid., p. 30. 
122 Ibid., p. 34. 
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Having explored the theoretical framework provided in the modernisation literature it 
was concluded that this genre had been dominated by structural-functionalist explanations 
which fail to take into account the role of choice and strategy. Instead the thesis formulates a 
hypothesis that embraces both agency and context by proposing three explanatory variables: 
Vision, Strategy and the Structure of opportunities. The first two it is argued act as causal 
mechanisms or intervening variables through which the effects of context are mediated, 
producing a particular sequence of events or process of decision-making and policy-selection 
that determines the final shape of a policy and has implications for its further evolution. This 
proposition serves as a heuristic device with which the three examples of policy choices 
selected here are examined. To what extent such an approach, which is based on rational 
choice theory and the ‘new institutionalist’ and ‘historical’ turn in political science of the 
1980s and 1990s, can help uncover new data and a fresh perspective on the preferences of 
actors and their perceptions of the costs and benefits about possible outcomes, is the subject 
of the following, chapter two. 
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Chapter Two 
Epistemology, Theory and Methodology 
 
2.1. Introduction. 
2.2. Rationality, methodological individualism and the ‘Cunning of Reason’. 
2.3. New Institutionalism & Path Dependence: explaining inefficiencies in history. 
2.4. The Analytic Narrative and Historical Institutionalism. 
2.5. Path Dependency and Policy Studies. 
2.6. Designing a model: vision and strategy in policy-making. 
2.6.1. The Puzzle: designing stable institutions in times of change. 
2.6.2. The Hypothesis: vision and strategy as inputs. 
2.6.3. The Explanandum: policy outcomes and institutional resilience. 
2.6.4. The Unit of Analysis: three cases of policy-making. 
2.6.5. The Sources for data collection. 
2.7. Conclusion: the methodological challenges of working on a historical figure.  
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter intends to extract Nehru, the political actor, from the primary material 
available. For this, some tools of analysis about political action is required. Hence, the 
chapter begins with a discussion of rational choice and new institutionalist approaches and 
the insights these have generated. Following this, the analytic narrative as a method is 
presented together with the contributions that the school known as Historical Institutionalism 
has made towards incorporating time and sequence, also known as path dependence, into the 
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analysis of politics. Finally, a model is proposed, drawing upon the actor’s perceptions and 
strategic context to explain policy choices and in the longer-run, their institutionalisation.  
 
 
2.2. Rationality, methodological individualism and the ‘Cunning of Reason’. 
 
Emerging in response to the style of political analysis described in chapter one which 
focused either on grand processes or the idiosyncratic details of rare and influential events, 
rational choice theory was taking shape in the 1950s and 60s. Focusing on individual decision 
making as the source of collective political outcomes, its main postulate was that individuals 
are driven by the logic of rational, self-interest. In contrast to the grand theories of political 
development and change, the rational choice approach aimed at ‘thin’ descriptions generating 
positive statements about political phenomena that could be empirically verified. Individuals 
were assumed to rank their preferences consistently over a set of possible outcomes, taking 
risk and uncertainty into consideration and acting to maximise their expected pay-offs. As a 
result a specific motivation behind action was identified in the form of interests. The goal 
then became to build models that predicted how individuals’ self-oriented actions combined 
to produce collective outcomes through the use of game theory and mathematics.123  A 
central assumption used in such theory-building exercises was the notion of equilibrium, a 
stable outcome at which point no individual could achieve a greater (expected) payoff if he 
had unilaterally selected an alternative course of action. This was an important idea because it 
                                                 
123 Early proponents include Von Neumann & Morgenstern, The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour 
(1944),  Duncan Black’s ‘On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making’ (1948), Kenneth Arrow’s Social Choice 
and Individual Values (1963/ 1951) and Anthony Downs An Economic Theory of Democracy (Harper, New 
York, 1957), William H.Riker’s The Theory of Political Coalitions (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1963), 
Buchanan & Tullock’s The Calculus of Consent (1962), Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action (1965). For an 
early application to Indian politics see Mitra, Subrata K. Governmental Instability in Indian States. (Ajanta 
Press, New Delhi, 1978) and ‘A theory of governmental instability in parliamentary systems', Comparative 
Political Studies, 13:2 (July 1980), pp. 235-263.  
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supported the contention that political processes could result in predictable, stable social 
outcomes, given the constraints imposed by the situation.  
 
In a key text of the time, The Theory of Political Coalitions, William Riker advocated 
a science of politics by building up deductive structures derived from intuitively justified 
axioms, to be then subjected to empirical tests. The central contention of his approach was 
that the rational actor in a political arena, acts strategically and intentionally, calculating how 
to achieve his aims in a given environment. In other words, the theory of rational choice was 
to rest upon the idea of methodological individualism, where the individual consciously takes 
into account stimuli and constraints and acts in a deliberate, rational not mechanical manner. 
In a minimal sense, rationality was taken to mean goal-oriented behaviour.  
 
Reacting to the behavioural movement of the 1960s, ‘bounded rationality’ advocated 
a shift in focus, away from solely examining the external situation of the actor to a closer 
study of the internal, mental schemata that determined the limits to an actor’s rationality. To 
judge whether an act was rational or not, bounded rationality argued that it was necessary to 
know the actor’s goals, his/her conceptualisation of the situation and abilities to draw 
inferences from the available information. Attaching greater weight to the mental process of 
decision- making the emphasis shifted from a study of outcomes, to a study of process. 
Pointing to the phenomena of ‘satisficing’ behaviour, scholars such as Herbert Simon 
developed what is known as the procedural model of rationality, presenting an explanation 
for how people conduct incomplete searches and make tradeoffs between values. A central 
contribution of Herbert Simon was to direct attention away from looking purely at the results 
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of rational choice to examining the process of choice.124 As Simon points out the analyst 
needs to be as much concerned with the characteristics of the rational actor as with the 
characteristics of the objective environment within which he makes his decisions. In other 
words, ‘we must give an account of substantive rationality – the extent to which appropriate 
courses of action are chosen – but also procedural rationality – the effectiveness, in the light 
of human cognitive powers and limitations, of the procedures used to choose actions.’125 The 
thesis adopts bounded rationality as its overarching understanding of human action and hence 
the following five assumptions are central to the analysis undertaken: 
1. Rational behaviour is adaptive given the constraints of the external situation and the 
capacities of the decision-maker. 
2. Actors search for alternatives, consequences and information in a selective and 
incomplete manner based on their limited and uncertain access to information. 
3. Decisions are made once a satisficing alternative is found: the choice need not be the 
optimal one but merely the one that satisfices some minimal need. 
4. Understanding behaviour requires extensive knowledge about the actor’s goals and 
conceptual orientation to the world. 
5. The decision-making process is to be highlighted in order to understand the rationality 
behind the choice rather than the outcome itself126. 
 
The thesis seeks to explain ‘large’ events like the emergence of the Planning 
Commission, India’s particular strategy of economic development and foreign policy choices 
by starting with the level of the individual and hence adopts an epistemological standpoint of 
                                                 
124 Bell, D.E. et al (eds.) Decision-Making. Descriptive, normative and prescriptive interactions. (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1989), p. 60. 
125 Ibid., p. 67. 
126 The five points are drawn from Monroe, K.R. (ed.) The Economic Approach to Politics. A Critical 
Reassessment of the Theory of Rational Choice. (HarperCollins Publishers, New York, 1991), p. 6. 
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methodological individualism. For Weber, methodological individualism “treats the single 
individual and his action as the basic unit, as its ‘atom’”.127 More specifically, 
methodological individualism follows a subjective, interpretive epistemology where 
understanding or ‘verstehen’ is achieved when we, as the observer, know the subjective 
meaning that individuals attach to their own action. Ontologically, the important implication 
Weber made was that it is only individuals who attach a subjective meanings to their actions 
and hence emerges the epistemological thesis that all knowledge about society derives from 
knowledge about individuals. As an advocate of methodological individualism in the social 
sciences, Max Weber considered it possible to use the social scientist’s unique relationship 
with his material to gain scientific insight. The scientific method, according to Weber, 
requires the reduction of a phenomenon to its components, but the reduction needed to be 
carried out to the appropriate level and not further. Thus, for the study of social phenomena, 
reduction to the level of individual consciousness was required in terms of the rational and 
purposive actions of the individual and not to a further level of biological factors. Combined 
then, with a technique of ‘verstehen’ it would be possible to explain action in terms of factors 
that are immediately familiar to everyone.  
 
Core concepts used by the individual methodologist include describing a person as 
having ‘motives’, ‘tastes’ and ‘beliefs’. The first of these refers to that which is valued by the 
actor, the end or ends he hopes to achieve through his actions. While general motives might 
be the same, two individuals may hold very different tastes, in terms of the specifics. Finally, 
beliefs refer to the probability that individuals hold that an action will, in fact serve to realise 
motives, or in other words, the knowledge possessed of the relevant relations of cause and 
                                                 
127 Weber, M (1913) ‘Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology’, The Sociological Quarterly, 1981, (Spring, 
Vol. 22/2), p. 158. 
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effect. In chapter three a ‘cognitive map’128 takes into account these various dimensions and 
is applied to Jawaharlal Nehru’s understanding of key political issues. This will draw upon 
the idea of spatial models in political science which depict who, is close to whom, by 
breaking people and rhetoric down through an analysis of where they stand on major issues 
and cleavages. 
 
However, while making the assumption of situational rationality, i.e. that one may 
explain human actions by construing them to be the result of decisions that rational persons 
would make, it is not contended that they were compelled to make them. As a result it 
becomes of vital importance to examine what alternatives might have been considered, or 
were seen as options at the time. In doing so, the thesis treads a fine line between history and 
the social sciences, the former tending towards the claim that events cannot be explained 
through model-like causal relationships and the latter, aspiring towards a more ‘scientific’ 
approach.  
 
A strong criticism launched by historians against the social sciences is that it distorts 
reality, encouraging an overly deterministic interpretation of events at the expense of human 
freedom and the role of contingency.  Perhaps as a via media it is possible to take something 
from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s idea of ‘the cunning of reason’129, an elaboration of 
Giambattista Vico’s argument that Providence realises its intent through the history that men 
make by their actions. Men are free to act, but the desires that motivate them (as social 
beings) are part of a cosmic plan.  Removing the metaphysical dimension, the core insight 
                                                 
128 The cognitive map is borrowed from Axelrod’s work in which it is defined as „the structure of the causal 
assertions of a person with respect to a particular policy domain”, Axelrod, Structure of decision: the cognitive 
maps of political elites. (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1976), p.58. For more on this please see chapter 
three. 
129 A concept that emerges from Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of World History (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1980). 
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remains a useful one: Men are free to act but the desires that motivate them stem from a 
larger, overarching structural context. Political philosophers have long discussed the 
constraints to human freedom whether in the form of metaphysics as above, Hegel’s 
application of the zeitgeist, Karl Marx’s view of history as class struggle or Jean-Paul Satre’s 
existentialist depictions of the human condition. The position adopted in the thesis is that 
political institutions define a ‘political space’ as well as the temporal period within which 
decision, resolution, conflict or compromise take place, providing the setting wherein the 
activities of individuals and groups are connected. 
 
 
2.3. New Institutionalism & Path Dependence: explaining inefficiencies in history. 
 
Developed from within the rational choice discourse, ‘new institutionalism’ began to 
take shape in the late seventies and early eighties through the work of acclaimed scholars 
such as Shepsle (1979), Shepsle and Weingast (1984, 87) and Riker (1980). Their main 
contribution was to move away from the previously-held assumption of rational choice and 
behavioural theorists, namely the tendency to take the institutional structure as given. This 
was done partly in the hope of achieving a parsimonious theory where the sources of 
preferences and beliefs would be left un-explained, for otherwise, it was warned, there was 
the danger of rendering all explanation hostage to idiosyncratic detail. As a result institutions, 
including electoral system, courts, and legislatures were seen as time and location-bound and 
non-generalisable. The overly atomised conception of man that was generated came to be 
questioned by the ‘new institutionalists’ who sought to return context and structure to the 
analysis. As Shepsle has pointed out, by suppressing any institutional component, rational 
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choice modelling was precariously based upon a single and simple rule of preference 
aggregation.130 
 
As the name indicates, the ‘new’ institutionalists distinguished themselves from an 
‘old’ form of institutionalism which, had attributed a central role to political institutions but 
did not offer a testable explanation of how institutions mirrored and shaped political life. 
Defined by Olson and March in a critical article on the subject, ‘new’ institutionalism 
involved ‘blending elements of an old institutionalism into the non-institutionalist styles of 
recent theories of politics.’131 Where rational choice saw political outcomes as a function of 
three primary factors: the distribution of preferences (interests) among political actors, the 
distribution of resources (powers), and the constraints imposed by the rules of the game 
(constitutions), each exogenous to the political system, new institutionalism argued for 
endogeneity. Preferences and meanings developed within the process of politics, through a 
combination of education, indoctrination and experience, political institutions affected the 
distribution of resources and constitutions, laws, contracts and customary rules of politics 
made some alternatives more legitimate than others.132 
 
Challenging the assumptions underlying modernisation theories which envisioned 
order as imposed by reason (the obvious route to progress) or achieved through a mix of 
competition and coercion, the new institutionalist school offered additional notions of 
political order, raising questions about how institutions came to be selected and what 
sustained them. Most importantly, the writers in this genre offered an interpretation of the 
                                                 
130 Shepsle, K.A. “Studying Institutions: some lessons from the rational choice approach.” Journal of 
Theoretical Politics, 1989, 1(2), pp. 131 - 47. 
131 March, James & Olson, Johan, ‘The New Institutionalism: Organisational Factors in Political Life’, The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 78/3 (Sep. 1984), p. 738. 
132 Bacharah, Peter and Baratz, Morton ‘Decisions and Non-Decisions: An Analytical Framework’, American 
Political Science Review, Volume 57, 1963, pp. 632 – 42. 
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inefficiencies of history, where historical processes could result in outcomes that were sub-
optimal. Thus, theoretical research was needed into how institutions affected things like 
power distribution, the range of preferences or the management of resources. Institutions, it 
was proposed became ‘carriers of wisdom’ or ‘forms of irrational retrogression’.133  
 
By the late 1980s two main lacunae had been identified in the rational choice and new 
institutionalist scholarship which acted to stimulate further research: (1) how to explain 
preference-formation and (2) how to theorise about the origins of institutions and their varied 
ability to adapt in the long-run to changed conditions or to withstand internal and external 
shocks. The dominant response in political science to this latter challenge had been to resort 
to functionalist reasoning that the explanation of institutional forms was to be found in its 
functional consequences for those who created them. For example, in Oliver Williamson’s 
work on transaction costs the argument is made that organisations take on a particular 
institutional form as a result of rational actors trying to reduce transaction costs.134 The 
problem with such an approach is that it ignores the more interesting questions pertaining to 
change and resilience. Furthermore institutions are again simply taken as given - either 
endowed or imposed from above, the assumption being that institutions exist in the form they 
do because they perform particular functions for social actors. Hence the task of the analyst 
became one of laying bare the function that the institution was meant to serve (usually, the 
resolution of some kind of collective action problem).135 Rational Choice theorists are 
                                                 
133 March, James & Olson, Johan, ‘The New Institutionalism: Organisational Factors in Political Life’, The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 78/3 (Sep. 1984), p. 745. 
134 See for instance, Williamson, O.E. ‘The Economics of Organisations – the Transaction Costs Approach.’ The 
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 48/3 (Nov. 1981), pp. 548 - 77. 
135 Pierson, ‘The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Design’ in Governance: An 
International Journal of Policy and Administration Vol.13/4 (October 2000), p. 477. 
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criticised for making it possible to reconcile virtually any observed outcome with a 
functionalist account.136  
 
As one of the most famous representatives of the new institutionalist school, the 
Nobel-prize winning economic historian, Douglas North explored the link between 
institutional constraints and economic performance, asking why some countries seem to get it 
right and others, despite the same formal constraints experienced different results.137 Taking 
up the puzzle of divergence among institutional frameworks and the persistence of 
‘inefficient’ institutions, North argued that in a world lacking perfect competition and 
characterized by imperfect information, and increasing returns to scale, ‘not only can both 
divergent paths and persistently poor performance prevail, the historically derived 
perceptions of the actors shape the choices that they make.’138 Essentially therefore, North 
recognised the impact of subjective preferences and cognitive devices that go into the actors’ 
interpretations of the world and choice of best action to maximise utility. The choices may 
very well be ‘inefficient’ but also have to be seen in context of a longer-drawn out process 
constrained by ‘network externalities, the learning process of organisations, and the 
historically-derived subjective modelling of the issues’.139 In other words, North proposed an 
explanation where increasing returns and path dependence yielded predictions about short-
term choices as well as providing a causal story for the direction of long-term change. 
 
                                                 
136 See Green & Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory, (Yale University Press, 1994) for a critical 
evaluation of the use of rational choice theory in political science. 
137 North, Douglas Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1990, Cambridge University 
Press). 
138 Ibid. pp. 95-96. 
139 Ibid. pp. 99. 
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Drawing upon models explaining technological change140, political scientists have 
borrowed the intuitively interesting idea that politics, like technology, involves some element 
of chance (agency and choice) but that once a path is taken, it can become ‘locked in’, as all 
the relevant actors adjust their strategies to accommodate the prevailing pattern. As Paul 
Pierson points out, the notion of path dependence generally refers to the following key 
claims: “(1) specific patterns of timing and sequence matter, (2) starting from similar 
conditions, a wide range of social outcomes may be possible, (3) large consequences may 
result from relatively ‘small’ or contingent events, (4) particular courses of action, once 
introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse, and (5) political development is often 
punctuated by critical moments or junctures that shape the basic contours of social life.”141 
 
Each of the above, challenges the older assumptions and propositions that constituted 
the modernisation school, for instance the then-prevalent idea that ‘large’ causes like 
urbanisation or industrialisation explained ‘large’ outcomes like modernisation. Similarly, 
most modernisation scholars attributed very little importance to the capacity of rational actors 
to design and implement optimal solutions (given their resources and constraints) to the 
problems that confronted them. Path dependence, as Pierson points out, draws attention to the 
dynamics of increasing returns and the tendency in political life towards positive feedback. 
Douglas North, drawing on research in cognitive psychology and organisational theory, 
argued that actors operate in contexts of high complexity and opacity and are heavily biased 
in the way they filter information into existing ‘mental maps’.142 Confirming information 
                                                 
140 The most well-known being that associated with the case of the ‘QWERTY keyboard’ and the argument 
developed by David, 1985. 
141 Pierson, Paul ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 94/2 (June, 2000), p. 251. 
142 See North, Douglas,  Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), Denzau & North, ‘Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions’, Centre for the Study of 
Political Economy, University of Washington,  1994. 
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tends to be incorporated while disconfirming information is filtered out. Social interpretations 
of complex environments like politics it was argued were especially subject to positive 
feedback, as opposed to arenas of economic interaction where decreasing returns of scale 
were observable. Applied to institutions, Pierson speaks of the institutional ‘stickiness of 
politics’, the difficulties of actually achieving change which in fact can be seen as an intended 
consequence of designers who think in terms of binding their successors for these might also 
one day include political rivals. Recent work on path dependence examines how initial 
institutional decisions, even suboptimal ones, can become self-reinforcing over time.143 These 
initial choices encourage the emergence of elaborate social and economic networks, or as 
North termed it, an ‘institutional matrix’144, greatly increasing the cost of switching to once-
possible alternatives and thereby inhibiting exit.  
 
Initially applied by economists to explain, for instance, the development of modern 
capitalism, as Douglas North did, the idea of increasing returns (or positive feedback) is used 
to demonstrate how established institutions generate powerful inducements that reinforce 
their own stability and further reproduction. For political science the implications were of 
particular interest given the nature of political life which is marked by the collective action 
problem, a density of institutions, power asymmetries and opacity. Thus as Pierson puts it, 
path dependency allows for new questions to be raised about politics, turning the ‘focus on 
branching points and on the specific factors that reinforce the paths established at those 
points’ as well as raising new answers, for instance the increasing returns argument which 
                                                 
143  North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
See S.D.Krasner, Sovereignty, Organised Hypocrisy (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999) for an 
application of this insight to institutions in international relations. 
144 North, D. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
p. 95. 
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‘provide(s) a plausible counter to functionalist explanations’.145 For rather than simply 
assume that the persistence of an institution has something to do with its purpose, it becomes 
interesting to explore what the alternatives might have been as well as the possibility that the 
institution was an accidental outcome and its particular shape, an unintended consequence. 
Reinforcing the new institutionalist interest in process as opposed to focusing solely on 
outcomes, path dependence argues that history matters not because of ‘the past per se, but the 
unfolding of processes over time that (becomes) theoretically central.’146 
 
 
2.4. The Analytic Narrative and Historical Institutionalism. 
 
Historical Institutionalism, which claims to use the ‘comparative historical method to 
sort out the causal mechanisms behind observed empirical patterns’147, has generated 
valuable insights. These include the notion that political processes can best be understood if 
they are studied over time; that structural constraints on individual actions, especially those 
emanating from government, are important sources of political behaviour; and that the 
detailed investigation of carefully chosen, comparatively informed case studies is a powerful 
tool for uncovering the sources of political change.148 
 
One of the core claims of historical institutionalism has been that institutions do more 
than channel policy and structure political conflict, for the very “definition of interests and 
                                                 
145 Pierson, Paul ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 94/2 (June, 2000), p. 263. 
146 Ibid. p. 264. 
147 Thelen, K. “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics”, Annual Review of Political Science, 1999 /2, 
p. 372. 
148 P.Pierson, ‘When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change’ World Politics, Vol.45 / 4 
(July 1993), p. 596. 
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objectives is created in institutional contexts and is thus not separable from them”.149 This 
can be seen as a direct contrast to ‘hard’ rational choice theories which begin with a 
universal, not context-specific, assumption of rationality. However, there are problems with 
the hard core version of rational choice in that there is nothing comparable to the economic 
dictum of getting the most for the least of one’s money in the marketplace. As a result much 
of the criticism of rational choice theory rests on its assumption and conceptualisation of 
rationality. How to incorporate a definition that allows for both material and ethical factors 
remains a central challenge in the literature. While utility or wealth-maximisation 
assumptions produced general and parsimonious theories, the danger was that it could also 
produce tautology in that whatever people do becomes a ‘revealed preference’.150 This is a 
method which posits that the preferences of actors can be revealed by their behaviour but it 
assumes that such preferences hold a normatively ‘true’ status, thus ignoring the effect of 
decision-making errors, miss-information, miss-perception etc.   
 
Like in rational choice, it is also possible for historical institutionalist analysis to be 
‘actor-centred’ in the sense that the players are defined as “any individual or composite actor 
that is assumed to be capable of making purposeful choices among alternative courses of 
action”.151To be persuasive it needs to be proven that the actors are players in the sense that 
their actions are cohesive and strategic. Through in-depth empirical work, the historical 
institutionalist aims at conducting such a deeply micro-foundational study.  
 
                                                 
149 Zysman, J. ‘How Institutions Create Historically Rooted Trajectories of Growth’, Industrial Corporate 
Change, 1994, Volume 3/1, p. 244. 
150 Levi, M. “A model, a method and a map: rational choice in comparative and historical analysis’ in Lichbach 
& Zuckerman, eds. Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure. (Cambridge University Press, 
New York, 1997), p. 24. 
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As summarised by Thelen, a forerunner in the field of historical institutionalism, 
“rather than conceiving of institutions as ‘holding together’ a particular pattern of politics, 
historical institutionalists are more likely to reverse the causal arrows and argue that 
institutions emerge from and are sustained by features of the broader political and social 
context. In this approach to institutions, path dependency involves elements of both continuity 
and (structured) change; institutions are conceived in relational terms and institutional 
arrangements cannot be understood in isolation from the political and social setting in which 
they are embedded.” 152 153 
 
Rejecting a functionalist view of institutions, historical institutionalists see institutions 
as enduring legacies of political struggles. How these legacies are actually maintained is the 
subject of ‘policy feedback’ literature.154 One set of feedback mechanisms portrayed by 
North can be described as the incentive structure or coordination effects.155 What this means 
is that once a set of institutions is in place, actors adapt their strategies in ways that reflect but 
also reinforce the ‘logic’ of the system. A second feedback mechanism has to do with the 
distributional effects of institutions. Here the idea is that institutions are not neutral 
coordinating mechanisms but in fact reflect, even reproduce and magnify, particular patterns 
of power distribution in politics. This body of work emphasizes that political arrangements 
and policy feedbacks actively facilitate the organisation and empowerment of certain groups 
while actively dis-articulating and marginalizing others. The distributional biases in particular 
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institutions or policies ‘feed back’ so that over time some avenues of policy become 
increasingly blocked, if not entirely cut off.156 
 
A core contribution of Thelen is that the key to understanding institutional evolution 
and change lies in specifying more precisely the reproduction and feedback mechanisms on 
which particular institutions rest. Understanding when and how this happens therefore, 
requires a ‘genuinely historical’ analysis in the sense that it should track the unfolding of 
processes, individually and in relation to one another, over time.157 Functionalist perspectives 
fail in that they skirt the issue of the origins of institutions and the important matter of the 
material and ideological coalitions on which institutions are founded. Borrowing from the 
tools of rational choice to sort out the logic of the situation and the response of actors could 
help in conceiving and analysing the consequences of policy ‘collisions’, the unexpected 
openings that allow for institutions to evolve in ways that the original designers did not 
anticipate. However, the core must rest upon a process-oriented analysis which will provide 
insights into how institutions were constructed and consequently, how they might come 
apart.158 Many of the insights from the feedback literature provides tools for exploring the 
following questions: ‘we need to know exactly who is invested in particular institutional 
arrangements, exactly how that investment is sustained over time, and perhaps how those 
who are not invested in the institutions are kept out.’159 
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In epistemological terms, the ‘historical’ turn in political science meant that an 
attempt was made to integrate temporal processes into the analysis and to apply the insight 
that the impact of institutions is often heavily mediated by features of the overarching 
political or historical context. Whereas rational choice theorists tended to regard institutions 
purely in terms of their coordinating functions, the historical institutionalist approaches 
institutions as a legacy of concrete historical processes. As a result, historical institutionalists 
are likely to be interested in origins and the phenomenon of ‘unintended consequences’. 
Perspectives that conceive of change as the breakdown of one equilibrium and its 
replacement with another do not capture this dimension of social and political life, where 
institutions persist as enduring legacies of political struggles. Older classics like Moore 
(1966) and Gerschenkron (1962) emphasized sequencing and timing in the formation and 
evolution of institutional arrangements and political coalitions. However, what was missing 
was the conceptual means through which to demonstrate how outcomes of ‘critical junctures’ 
translated into lasting legacies, or in other words the interaction effects among different 
processes as they unfolded over time and mechanisms for the reproduction of such legacies 
were neglected.160 This is seen to be a central contribution of the historical institutionalist 
genre: the attention it gave to sequencing and the aim of identifying the mechanism that 
linked two variables in a proposed correlation, as a way of strengthening causal analysis.161  
 
The empirical testing of such contentions requires careful, theoretically grounded 
historical analysis of how political resources and constraints alter the context for future 
decision-making. While this draws upon Max Weber’s notions of leadership and charisma as 
propellers of social change and institution building, as an approach, historical institutionalism 
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allows for a broader interpretation of both structure and the agent. Taking into account the 
implications of time horizons, the scope of unintended consequences and the effects of path 
dependency historical institutionalism builds upon the insights of methodological 
individualism made by Max Weber, combining them with more recent claims from rational 
choice and game theory. 
 
Searching for a way through which to bridge the gulf between the methodological 
procedures of historians and those of political scientists and economists, the analytic 
narrative emerged in the late 1990s as a new method of analysis.162 By using an analytic 
narrative two goals are intended, the application of a theoretical framework to empirical data 
and the identification of causal mechanisms that are generalisable. A challenge of dealing 
with ‘historical’ material is precisely the charge that nothing is generalisable, for each 
historical event is unique, contingent upon a set of circumstances. How then might it be 
possible to draw generalisations across time and space? In the words of one its most famous 
advocates and practitioners, Margaret Levi, the analytic narrative ‘represents one attempt to 
improve explanations of unique events and outcomes, unravel particular puzzles, and at the 
same time construct the basis for a social science capable of addressing significant questions 
of the past and present.’163 
 
Analytic narratives involve choosing a puzzle or problem, then building a model to 
explicate the logic of the explanation and to elucidate the key decision points and 
possibilities, and finally evaluating the model through comparative studies and testable 
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generalisation that the model generates.164 The analytic narrative favours parsimonious 
models, ones where the number of exogenous factors are sufficiently few that it is possible to 
know how changes in their values can affect the institutional equilibrium. All narratives have 
to have an anchor, or set of anchors that are explicit in order to make it easier for criticism 
and challenges to be made than in more configurative accounts. This is a different strategy 
than the establishment of a general model from which is derived testable hypotheses, 
explored with appropriate cases165. The assumptions of rational choice and the logic of game 
theory generate hypotheses, but the models are refined in interplay with the detailed elements 
of the narrative. While the claim to generalisability of findings is clearer when hypotheses are 
deduced from general theory, the explanations of specific instances may be less compelling 
and realistic. This has long been a critique of the rational choice program in comparative and 
historical politics and one that the analytic narrative approach attempts to address.166  
 
A common critique of both rational choice and analytic narrative approaches has been 
the danger of conducting curve-fitting exercises, where the model is modified to simply ‘fit’ 
the data. In its defence, the analytic narrative, with its emphasis on facts and historical 
sequence, compels the researcher to search for novel facts that the old model did not 
recognise or capture. This then makes the refinement of the model, part of a progressive 
research programme in the Lakatosian sense.167  
 
The construction of analytic narratives is an iterative process, resembling Alexander 
George’s method of process tracing which attempted to identify intervening causal process 
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between an independent and dependent variable.168 The aim is to convert ‘descriptive 
historical’ accounts into ‘analytic ones’ that are couched in ‘theoretically relevant’ language, 
the central contention being that by tracing processes that may have led to an outcome, it 
helps narrow the list of possible causes.169 Initially the theory is formed from the data, 
selected because it offers a good fit. Rendered explicit, the theory then becomes vulnerable, 
subjected to both logical appraisal and empirical testing. Its logic moreover renders it a 
source of new insights, leading to the gathering of new data and placing the theory at further 
risk. The iteration stops once the testable implications run out, providing a finished product 
that reveals not only a conclusion but also the process of coming to that particular 
interpretation.170 This approach will be discussed in more details in the section on 
methodology in this chapter when the framework for analysis of this thesis is laid out. 
 
Attention to the narrative ensures that, to the extent possible, the author can 
reconstruct the points in the strategic interactions when contingency and uncertainty have an 
impact on the outcome. The model suggests and the narrative explicates why certain paths 
were chosen, others purposely foregone, and others not considered at all. However, path 
dependence requires more than identifying the constraints that derive from past actions or the 
incentives that are built into new institutions. The sequences in which events occur are 
causally important; events in the distant past can initiate particular chains of causation that 
have effects in the present. Path dependence, as understood through the prism of the paths not 
taken, means more than ‘history matters’. Certain institutions in certain contexts become self-
enforcing in the sense that the alternatives continue to appear unattractive. Beliefs of the 
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players then matter as much as history. While beliefs are certainly affected by historical 
experience, they are also affected by what actors know of the other players within the current 
context.171 Path dependence in analytic narratives also implies that once certain institutional 
arrangements are in place – and with them certain distributions of power and authority – it 
becomes more difficult to reverse or change course.  
 
Where this approach differs from other meta-narrative, qualitative analyses such as 
modernisation theorists, world system theorists and others, is two-fold. Firstly, the analytic 
narrative seeks to locate and explore mechanisms that shape the interplay between strategic 
actors and that thereby generate outcomes. Secondly, the above mentioned theories tended to 
be heavily biased towards a structural view of reality, focusing on the origins and impact of 
alignments, cleavages, structures, institutions whilst the analytic narrative provides an insight 
into the choices and decisions made at the level of the individual within a given context.172 
 
 
2.5. Path Dependency and Policy Studies. 
 
While not providing a framework or theory, path dependency offers an alternative 
way of looking at stability and change. As an explanation of a particular phenomenon it 
competes with the argument that institutions and policies exist simply because of the political 
circumstances pertaining at the time. What is highlighted by adopting this approach is that 
choices formed when an institution is being set up or a policy is being formulated, have a 
constraining effect into the future. This, it is posited occurs because institutions and policies 
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have a tendency towards inertia: once particular paths have been forged it requires a 
significant effort to divert to another course.  
 
It is noteworthy that path dependency has been used within political science almost 
exclusively within a broad institutionalist framework. Neo-institutionalism and more 
recently, historical institutionalism both accepted the idea that individuals act under the 
constraints of institutional arrangements, the present structure and functioning of which can 
only be understood in terms of a historical perspective. Hence the application of the insights 
mentioned have tended to be applied at the macro, constitutional level, focusing on formal 
institutions and not at the policy level which is what the thesis concerns itself with. Pierson 
however, does make the point that, ‘major public policies also constitute important rules of 
the game, influencing the allocation of economic and political resources, modifying the costs 
and benefits associated with alternative political strategies, and consequently altering ensuing 
political development’.173 
 
To apply the concept of path dependency to the policy-level, the term policy has to be 
specified and operationalised. As Adrian Kay points out in his paper on the the use of path 
dependency in policy studies, a ‘policy system’ can be sub-divided into policy instruments 
and policy programme.174 While the former may change, this may not necessarily mean the 
introduction of a new policy per se. The insight that path dependency provides is that policy 
decisions accumulate over time which can restrict options for future policy-makers. Hence, 
the fact that today the discussion surrounding a uniform civil code remains highly contentious 
is not simply because a Hindu Nationalist party is instrumentalising the issue, as is often 
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proclaimed. Instead a study of the policy’s origins reveals the controversies and polarisation 
that surrounded the issue already in the 1950s and which, thanks to particular choices and 
decisions under Nehru’s leadership, came to be ‘locked in’. 
 
 
2.6. Designing a model: vision and strategy in policy-making. 
 
Since the thesis does not claim to be unearthing new primary material but rather to be 
asking new questions of the available documentation, the theoretical framework takes on 
particular importance. By raising new questions, it is proposed that fresh insights will be 
generated about Nehru and his political legacy. Current interpretations and explanations for 
Nehru’s behaviour lack an explicit analytical structure which makes comparative research, 
both in terms of other leaders as well as assessing the varying degrees of success within 
Nehru’s own legacy, difficult. Furthermore, a detailed study of policies in the 1950s has yet 
to be done. For example, the literature has skirted the question of why Nehru pushed for and 
signed an agreement like Panchasheela that was based on little concrete material gains for 
India, or why as contentious an issue as the Hindu Code was aggressively promoted just 
before the first elections, only to be abandoned and then reintroduced piecemeal as 
legislation? On the economy, there is scope for investigating how the balance was struck 
between ideological demands for socialist-style planning and the practical needs of allowing 
and enabling a mixed economy to evolve.   
 
The thesis borrows from rational choice in terms of examining the context of 
decisions as well as the decisions themselves in an attempt to examine the costs and benefits 
of policy making as perceived by the actor. This draws upon Subrata Mitra’s application of ‘a 
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game on the rules of the game’ to the analysis of governance.175 While acknowledging the 
cognitive limitations of an individual, the aim is to focus on the norms and institutions that 
constrain behaviour. However, it is necessary to emphasise that it is not being argued that an 
understanding of context is sufficient. Rather, the intention is to demonstrate that an adequate 
explanatory theory must begin with individuals whose choices, even within a given set of 
rules, affect the choices of others and, which often have unintended consequences. The new 
institutionalist approach is concerned both with how human actions combine to create 
institutions and how existing institutions structure individual and aggregate choices.  
 
By reading documents, labouring through archives, interviews and surveying 
secondary literature, the aim is to understand the central actors’ preferences, their 
perceptions, their evaluation of alternatives, the information they possessed, the expectations 
they formed, the strategies adopted and the constraints that limited their actions. The pieces 
are put together, using the technique of process tracing (more on this below) in order to 
construct an analytic narrative that accounts for the particular outcome of interest: the 
breakdown of order, the maintenance of peace, the decision to fight or collude for example. 
Extracting the processes that produce the outcomes of interest, it is proposed, will capture the 
essence of the narrative.176 To elucidate the research design, a summary of the main 
components is provided: the puzzle, a model of policymaking and core hypothesis. Closing 
this chapter is a discussion of the comparative case study method, the types of source material 
used in the thesis and the challenges of studying a historical figure.  
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2.6.1.    The Puzzle: designing stable institutions in times of change. 
 
All politicians must act strategically in order to consolidate power and to convert 
preferences into policy outcomes. The case of Nehru stands out as an example of leadership 
during the crucial phase of transition politics, when a country moves from colonial to post-
colonial status, from occupation to independence, from one ideological extreme to another. It 
is argued that at ‘critical junctures’ such as these leaders are faced with a greater than normal 
challenge of having to balance demands for change and the need for continuity and stability. 
As a result, both vision and strategic constraints take on additional importance in determining 
the substance of and tactics behind policymaking. Whilst in the long-run the goal is to create 
institutional arrangements that guarantee the perpetuity of certain values and interests, the 
first step requires a consolidation of power so that choices, even if they be unpopular, can be 
carried through. In the case of Nehru as chapter four will demonstrate the structure of 
opportunities and constraints was determined by the terms of discourse, a carry-over from the 
pre-independence, freedom struggle days and the newly installed institutions of a 
parliamentary democracy. Furthermore Nehru’s own preferences and vision did not 
necessarily match that of the majority, nor was his position of power guaranteed in the early 
years just after independence. The fact that a number of important policy decisions were 
implemented within the first decade of independence suggest a policy arena that was 
relatively open, a fact that Nehru could use to his advantage.  
 
The question that emerges is why, despite the favourable conditions, Nehru’s record 
in terms of producing a legacy of institutionalised policies was such a mixed one? Here the 
concept of institutionalisation is borrowed from Douglas North who sees institutions as 
‘humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction...made up of formal constraints 
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(rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behaviour, conventions, and self-
imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics’. 177For, if one examines 
closely the policies with which Nehru was personally involved in the framing of, it is 
noteworthy that neither the Hindu Code nor Panchasheela, both heralded as showpiece 
policies, evolved into entrenched practices that determined the incentive structure for India’s 
subsequent social reforms or foreign policy. This is important given that in the realm of social 
reform, the Hindu Code was the big achievement during the years under Nehru’s leadership.  
 
A purview of legislation during Nehru’s administration reveals the following as the 
most important social legislation of which four were part of the Hindu Code. 
1. Special Marriage Act, 1954 
2. The Wakf Act, 1954 
3. Hindu Law of Marriage and Divorce Act, 1955 (Hindu Code) 
4. The Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955 
5. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Hindu Code) 
6. Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (Hindu Code) 
7. Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (Hindu Code) 
 
With regards to foreign policy Panchasheela stands out as a unique document, setting 
out the guidelines for independent India’s foreign policy, and hence can be regarded as an 
important policy for Nehru. Nevertheless as chapter eight will demonstrate, Panchasheela 
was more or less abandoned as a doctrine of foreign policy under subsequent prime ministers. 
On the economic front the record of policymaking is very different given the number of 
colonial provisions that had been put in place to essentially harness British India’s economy 
                                                 
177 North, D. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
p. 3. 
74 
 
for Britain’s needs rather than stimulate economic growth for the benefit of the local 
population. Nehru’s imprint stands out with regards the Planning Commission given his pre-
independence engagement and role as Chairman of the Commission after independence. His 
impact on this policy arena was noteworthy and calls for a closer examination in terms of his 
underlying vision, strategic decisions and impact on the immediate structure of opportunities.  
 
To a large extent the hopes of a newly independent nation had been invested in the 
country’s Constitution, which in its exhaustive length and scope promised equality and 
welfare for all (guaranteed as Fundamental Rights) as well as enshrining a list of ‘Directive 
Principles’ which the Government had a duty to apply when making laws. The Constituent 
Assembly debates attest to the long and thorough procedure through which the various 
articles of the Constitution took their shape. It is interesting to note that Nehru was not one of 
the most vocal participants during this process and the position he adopted on issues during 
these discussions is noted in the following chapters. Nevertheless, the three examples chosen 
here are closely associated with him given that he not only pushed for them in public debates 
but also vouched for them within Congress discussions and in election campaigns. However, 
as has been mentioned above and in chapter one the legacy, in terms of institutionalised 
practices and norms, that has been left behind varies greatly. Hence, the general puzzle 
addressed in this thesis is, under what conditions do policies generate a process of 
sustainable, resilient institutionalisation? 
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2.6.2.  The Hypothesis: vision and strategy as inputs. 
 
The thesis concerns itself primarily with the beliefs, choices and actions of Jawaharlal 
Nehru. Whilst not trying to make a case for ‘the great men make history’ school of thought, 
Nehru is seen to be a pivotal178 figure shaping the political development of India during the 
period of the late 1940s and into the 1950s. This, it is argued was both because of 
circumstances and the particular individual that Nehru was. Being the right man at the right 
place Nehru was catapulted initially into the limelight more by the efforts and fame of others 
like his own father, Motilal Nehru and later, Mahatma Gandhi and gradually, through his own 
efforts to cast himself as the acceptable fallback option, neither as radically leftist as his 
contemporary, Subhas Chandra Bose, nor as conservatively right-leaning as, his senior 
comrade, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (two figures examined more closely in chapter four)179. 
Both contingency and conscious calculation was clearly at play and Nehru emerges as an apt 
case where the individual actor is constrained both by his own worldview as well as the 
institutional context. While delving deeply into the inner world of Nehru (the subject matter 
of chapter three), the man is not seen as independent of his times. Thus, Nehru also provides 
an entry point into the political environment of the late 1940s and early 1950s (subject matter 
of chapter four), a prism through which the changes as well as the continuity of the period, is 
refracted.  
 
At ‘critical junctures’ in time, vision and strategy are especially important in the 
shaping of politics. Key decision-makers are in a position to shift the substantive content of 
discourse through the power of their vision and, via procedural machinations to ensure the 
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precedence of a particular vision. The contention made here is that both are necessary for 
policies to take root. Vision and strategy together determine the staying power of a particular 
policy preference through the mix of value and instrumental rationality, the congealed 
preferences which the policy comes to represent. Again going back to Weber, the distinction 
he drew between ‘instrumental’ and ‘value’ rationality is constructive. Rationality in its more 
traditional sense implied a consequential logic where social action is ‘determined by 
expectations as to the behaviour of objects in the environment and of other human beings; 
these expectations are used as conditions or means for the attainment of the actor’s own 
rationally pursued and calculated ends.’180 Weber’s ‘value’ rationality drew attention to 
outcomes that cannot simply be explained in utilitarian terms, when action is ‘determined by 
a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other 
form of behaviour, independently of its prospects or success.’181 Hence, for example the 
reason people generally refrain from stealing is not simply because of sanctions in place but 
also because it is generally perceived as something bad. Stealing, as the example illustrates, 
might in fact have positive social benefits in the form of enabling poor people to buy goods 
that would usually be beyond their means and hence act as a form of unintended 
redistribution that might work more effectively than fiscal policies! Furthermore the 
existence of stealing provides jobs to locksmiths, insurance companies and lawyers. Hence, a 
consequential point of view cannot automatically demonstrate that stealing is bad. A non-
consequential explanation on the other hand would refer to notions of equality, justice and 
fairness, values and norms that are considered important in their own right.  
 
Vision and strategy, as the core concepts, in this thesis, were chosen as a means 
through which to explore the combined impulses of value and instrumental rationality for 
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together they determine individual behaviour and, in their different mixes, can have 
significantly different implications for policy implementation and policy reform. The actor 
who is driven by his vision and is not strategic in his actions fails to establish a foothold in 
the policy arena and runs the risk of falling by the wayside. This is what happened to Subhas 
Chandra Bose, a contemporary of Nehru with strong alternative views on core issues such as 
the economy and foreign policy but who refused to make the political compromises necessary 
to secure his position within the Congress party. This comparison is examined in chapter 
four. The actor who is all strategy without possessing a strongly articulated vision on the 
other hand, is more likely to gamble with and exploit issues for political gain. 
 
Nehru, as a result, is the focus of the thesis not only in terms of the vision that he 
bequeathed to Indian politics, but also the strategy that he employed to establish himself 
centre stage which in turn had implications for policy formulation and in the longer-run, the 
growth and development of institutional arrangements. In other words, the choices that Nehru 
made with regards policy are explained both in terms of the ideas that shaped his preferences 
as well as the political manoeuvring he engaged in to maintain and consolidate his position 
within the party as well as the position of the party in the political arena at large. Such a two-
pronged analysis argues that institutions are created not solely through strategic interaction182 
nor are reducible to individual preferences and idiosyncrasies. 
 
Drawing upon Douglas North, Nehru is portrayed as an individual entrepreneur, an 
agent of change who responded to the perceived structure of opportunities, and the changes in 
relative prices or preferences. Thus, it is interesting to examine the Nehru of the 1930s 
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compared with the man of the 1940s and 1950s which tracks his transition from the sidelines 
of the Congress party to assuming the mantle of party leadership, to becoming ‘Chacha 
Nehru’ or ‘Uncle Nehru’ to the whole nation. In the process Nehru eventually overshadowed 
other ‘grand’ figures of the independence struggle like Vallabhbhai Patel, Rajendra Prasad, 
Rajagopalachari, J.P.Narayan who had illustrious careers as freedom fighters and in many 
ways who outshone Nehru as intellectual thinkers. 
 
The policies that Nehru ultimately opted for resulted in a particular selection of values 
and norms over others which had both short and long-implications for India’s politics. If, one 
accepts as North does that institutions provide a mechanism for incremental change, then 
institutions take on a critical role in terms of determining the opportunities for new bargains 
and compromises. Newly empowered players have to believe that the benefits of change will 
override the costs entailed which would have to be borne by them and if institutions are 
framed in such a way as to make certain options highly costly, the likelihood for change 
reduces dramatically.  
 
What the thesis is primarily concerned with is the variation in Nehru’s choice of 
strategy when it came to translating his preferences into policy. This raises the 
methodological and epistemological question of how to extract a reliable set of preferences. 
Some have promoted the idea of revealed preferences, using behaviour and action to identify 
“true” interests although this is still susceptible to the effects of misjudgement, passivity, 
inattention. To reconstruct Nehru’s preferences, the thesis examines the body of writings 
which Nehru compiled during his long prison years. Two of these books, An Autobiography 
and Glimpses of World History were not initially meant for publication, the first being a 
reflection upon his prison sentence and as ‘a definite task, so necessary in the long solitudes 
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of gaol life’183 while the second was written as a series of letters to his daughter, Indira. As a 
result the thesis takes these texts as a source of ‘revealed’ preferences since Nehru had the 
time to reflect and consider his position on important issues of the day. The evidence that is 
collected through a text analysis is used together with a content analysis of his speeches as 
president of the Congress party to determine whether there is any inordinate variation in the 
opinions expressed or positions taken. Subsequent chapters reconstruct the different stages in 
the policy-making process to explore whether Nehru’s actions and the content of the policies 
deviated substantially from his inferred preferences. Whilst preferences and ideas certainly 
change over time, it is argued that on the three subjects of economic development, religion 
and foreign policy, Nehru held very strong views which he constantly and consistently 
reiterated over time. Hence, any marked deviations in action or policy content can be read as 
strategic behaviour which emerged in response to the institutional and political constraints 
and opportunities of the time. 
 
The thesis therefore implements three core explanatory variables. Nehru’s vision (the 
articulation of his preferences and priorities) which is given central importance as an 
independent variable because, it is argued, a particular vision predisposes the actor to 
perceive his environment in a certain way. The model examines the interaction with a second 
independent variable, the Structure of Opportunities (the constraints of context, effects of 
path dependency and the parameters of discourse), which although in part constructed by the 
actor’s perception, is also an exogenous factor in its own right.  Finally, through the effects of 
an intervening variable, the Choice of Strategy, (defined in terms of tactics such as the timing 
of decisions, bargaining on substantive content and the kind of arguments used to justify or 
debunk alternatives) a particular policy outcome is produced. It is furthermore posited that, a 
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policy outcome can be deigned ‘successful’ if, at least in the short run, it favourably alters the 
structure of opportunities, i.e. in the actor’s favour.  
This can be depicted as following with the         line depicting the effect of an intervening 
variable and the                line indicating a feedback loop: 
 
Figure 1: model of policy-making. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
While Nehru’s vision is closely studied and chapter three explores his thinking 
process as revealed through his writings, the argument is made that this only explains the 
general tendency of his preferences but not the tactical manoeuvring needed to transform 
values into policy. This is where the thesis takes issue with most interpretations of Nehru 
Structure  of opportunities 
Vision 
Strategy 
Policy Outcome 
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which portray him as driven by strongly held ideals. Any shortcomings or policy failures are 
hence ‘explained’ with arguments that imply he was simply too good for the system. For 
instance, that he was too trusting in the Chinese who betrayed him or, so strongly secular that 
his expectations of the Hindu majority community were too high. Whilst these views may 
certainly be valid, the thesis posits that a much better picture can be gained by perceiving 
Nehru as a potent mixture of idealism and hardnosed political realism.  
 
Furthermore, by simply relying on his vision and ideals one cannot explain the long-
run shelf life of his legacy given the sub-optimal results that his policies generated. Sub-
optimal because in the case of both social reform and foreign policy, Nehru’s policies gave 
birth to institutional practices that did not generate an efficient equilibrium in the long-run. 
‘Efficiency’ is taken here to mean political stability combined with economic growth and 
regional peace. Instead, by focusing on the strategy behind his policies one gains an 
understanding of where and when compromises were made, even on the ideals and substance 
and, how the policy arena was shaped in order to create an advantageous playing field. 
Having examined the choices made in the 1950s, the three policy arenas are tackled in 
chapters five, six and seven and the concluding chapter eight, provides an overview of how 
the three evolved to carry forth the congealed preferences of Nehru. 
 
As a result the chapters on the Planning Commission, Panchasheela and the Hindu 
Code Bills each give particular emphasis to the structure of opportunities as this varies across 
the three cases. To demonstrate the importance of path dependency, a pre-history to each of 
the policy fields is presented in terms of a genealogy of the institutions, laws and debates 
installed or initiated under the British as well as generated from within the freedom 
movement. 
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2.6.3.  The Explanandum: policy outcomes and institutional resilience. 
 
Defined by Douglas North as, ‘the humanly devised constraints that structure 
political, economic and social interaction (institutions) consist of both informal constraints 
(sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, 
laws, property rights)’184, institutions act as the interface between society and the state and 
play a crucial role in determining the room to manoeuvre for elites. In addition to their 
importance in creating order and reducing uncertainty in exchange, institutions are ‘carriers 
of history’ which implies that historical precedent can influence the shaping of a whole 
institutional cluster. Using this insight, the thesis proposes to explore the way in which 
resources and constraints either directly inherited from the British or heavily influenced by 
the colonial experience were translated into new institutional arrangements under Nehru’s 
leadership.  
 
The thesis employs a combination of the analytic narrative and process-tracing which 
has been defined as a method of within-case analysis to evaluate causal processes.185 
According to the leading proponents of this method, Alexander George and Timothy 
McKeown, this method does not solely rely on the comparison of variations across variables 
in each case but also ‘investigate(s) and explain(s) the decision process by which various 
initial conditions are translated into outcomes.”186 Thus, the aim of the researcher is to 
provide a theoretically explicit narrative that carefully traces and compares the sequence of 
events. In the words of Bates and his co-authors, their book, which employed the analytic 
                                                 
184 North, Douglas “Institutions”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.5/1 (Winter, 1991), p. 97. 
185 For one of the earliest explicit definitions of process-tracing in political science see George, Alexander & 
McKeown, T. “Case Studies and Theories of Organisational Decision-Making”. Advances in Information 
Processing in Organisations, 2 (1985), pp. 21 – 58. 
186 George, Alexander & McKeown, T. “Case Studies and Theories of Organisational Decision-Making”. 
Advances in Information Processing in Organisations, 2 (1985), p. 35. 
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narrative, “seek(s) to understand the actors’ preferences, their perceptions, their evaluation of 
alternatives, the information they possess, the expectations they form, the strategies they 
adopt and the constraints that limit their action.”187 The thesis follows in their footsteps and 
examines, in each of the examples,  (a) the preferences and perceptions of Nehru, (b) the 
alternatives available at the time in terms of policy choices, (c) the individuals close to Nehru 
who most probably reinforced his particular view and expectations and, (d) tactical behaviour 
in the decision-making process which reflects the constraints of the context. Process-tracing 
therefore opens up the black box of decision-making to examine whether differences and 
similarities across the three selected examples have a causal or spurious impact on the 
outcomes. Unlike most analyses of Indian politics which tend to focus on collective actors 
such as political parties and caste associations and their functions within the political system, 
the use of process tracing as a methodological tool, allows for hypotheses to be generated 
about pathways and sequential processes. Given that Nehru is the case under study, the 
methodological innovation of process tracing, comparing three examples of policy-making, 
casts a new perspective on the rationality of Nehru’s policy choices.  
 
Since the method of process tracing differs from a historical narrative in that it uses an 
analytical explanation couched in theoretical variables it requires an explicit research design. 
What is crucial here is that at each step in the account, a specific theoretical ‘law’ should be 
tested which acts as a statement of regularity between a set of events. Thus the thesis begins 
with three sets of hypotheses to be tested. While the first two are derived from the theoretical 
literature of rational choice and new institutionalism as discussed above, the third hypothesis 
is drawn from the writings about Jawaharlal Nehru as depicted in chapter one.  
 
                                                 
187 Bates et al, Analytic Narratives (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 11. 
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The three hypotheses correspond to three initial puzzles: 
1. Is rationality context-bound and highly subjective? 
2. Why do sub-optimal institutions persist? 
3. Are Nehru’s policies better understood as the product of visionary thinking or hard-
nosed tactical bargaining? 
 
The hypotheses that follow: 
1. Individuals choose the best action according to stable preference functions and the 
constraints facing them. 
2. Institutions can be explained by the function they serve. 
3. ‘Nehru’s political career was rooted in a vision of a new India, which in turn gave him 
the intellectual and personal energy and commitment necessary for such a long and 
demanding public life. Appreciating the origins and power of this vision is essential 
for an understanding of the man.’188 (the implication being that vision alone enables 
the observer to understand Nehru, the political actor and his policy choices). 
 
To ‘test’ each of these statements, the thesis applies the model proposed above which 
claimed that the structure of opportunities together with the actor’s vision explains the choice 
of strategy and ultimately the policy outcome. It is also posited that the policy outcome and 
subsequent institutional arrangement is subject to the forces of path dependency, unintended 
consequences and positive feedback depending on the strategy employed by the original 
authors of a particular policy. 
 
                                                 
188 Brown, Judith Nehru. A Political Life. (New Delhi, Oxford University Press 2003), p. 5. 
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In order to carry out this study, the policy-making process in each of the three cases is 
traced as thoroughly as possible. To begin with Nehru is the focus of the next chapter which 
examines his worldview and situates him within the discourse at the time on socialism, 
secularism and foreign policy. This is done both by analysing his own writing as well as 
contextualising him with regards to his contemporaries. Formative events in his life prior to 
becoming Prime Minister are highlighted and a cognitive map attempts to assess the 
assumptions and logic behind his policy preferences.  
 
The subsequent chapter examines the constraints of the Congress party and after 
independence, additionally, the role of parliament and the cabinet in the decision-making 
process. Equipped with this background information about Nehru’s internal and external 
worlds, the thesis proceeds to study the separate cases of the Planning Commission, the 
Hindu Code Bills and the Panchasheela Agreement. Each case study follows a similar 
structure: (1) a pre-history of the policy, (2) a portrayal of Nehru’s position on the subject at 
the time of independence and in relation to others, (3) the key individuals close to Nehru and 
influential in the policy field, (4) a step-by-step account of how the policy was articulated in 
the public domain, in parliamentary debates and, (5) an analysis of the policy in its final 
shape at the time of implementation. 
 
A discussion of these findings compared across the three examples is presented in the 
final chapter. Ultimately, the thesis aims at examining the input of both vision and strategy 
that was contained within the three cases of foreign policy, economic policy and social 
reform initiatives implemented by Jawaharlal Nehru as prime minister. By doing such a 
comparative study the goal is to delve as deeply as possible (to the extent that the material 
allows) into the process of policy-making, for it is proposed that this has implications for 
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understanding the origins of India’s post-independence institutions and the long-run scope for 
institutional stability and change.  
 
Figure 2: Path dependency of policy choices. 
 
 
The Alternatives                          Critical Junctures                  Path dependency ‘carriers’                         
                                                                                           
 Patelites                                   
 
 
Nehruvian Socialists                                                                                                                                              
 
 
Gandhian Socialists 
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Rightists 
 
 
 
  
 
 
As depicted above in figure 1.2, the thesis will propose that a ‘critical juncture’ was in 
place during the early 1950s thanks to a number of contingent events listed in the middle box. 
These were, most obviously, independence declared on 15th August, 1947 which marked an 
end to the formal ‘transfer of power from the British to Indian leaders, the Constituent 
Assembly which met from 1946 to November 1949 to determine the country’s new 
constitution and the first general elections of 1952 which led to the formation of the first fully 
elected legislative of the Republic of India. Each of these events are considered important 
contributors to a critical juncture in that they re-wrote the ‘rules of the game’ and introduced 
new players in the form of political parties, voters and parliamentary committees among 
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others. To explore the space of issue positions at the time, the thesis makes use of five 
general categories: Rightists, Patelites, Nehruvian Socialists, Gandhian Socialists and 
Communists, broadly corresponding to the Right-Left spectrum of Western European 
politics. These were manifest during the Constituent Assembly Debates as well as in the 
manifestos of the political parties campaigning in the first elections and in the proceedings of 
the first parliament. The three policy outcomes with which this thesis is concerned are the 
formation of the Planning Commission, the signing of the Panchasheela Agreement and the 
passing of the Hindu Code Bills. Each it is argued, contained a particular package of value 
and instrumental rationality and, each were to demonstrate path dependency effects. Hence, 
while the Planning Commission was born out of a consensual policy process, Panchasheela 
was essentially cast as a non-issue in the debates of the time whilst the Hindu Code was a 
hotly debated and divisive subject. The substantive chapters five, six and seven examine 
these characteristics in detail and their implications are observed in chapter eight. 
 
 
2.6.4. The Unit of Analysis: three cases of policy-making. 
 
Since this thesis engages in a very small-N comparative analysis, the danger of a 
selection bias189 is particularly high. By choosing my three examples there is the risk of 
focusing on three interesting cases but in the process, restricting the analysis artificially to 
extreme cases and producing biased estimates of causal effects. However, the cases were 
chosen for the variation on the dependent variable, i.e. the policy outcome. Panchasheela, for 
all its high rhetoric left behind an under-institutionalised arena in the field of foreign policy-
                                                 
189 A distortion in the results due to the way in which data has been collected. Lijphart advances this view. See 
Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 
65/3, Sep 1971, pp. 682 - 93. 
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making, the Planning Commission in contrast sustained a resilient institutional arrangement 
even in the face of liberalisation and the Hindu Code bills, while an important institutional 
achievement, failed to evolve further, representing a partially-institutionalised policy arena. 
In addition, the cases were selected so as to correspond with the three policy domains that are 
considered to be pillars of Nehru’s legacy. Furthermore, they represented issues that were 
supposedly close to his heart: socialism, modernisation and internationalism. The decision to 
use in-depth studies of particular policies is also what distinguishes this research from the 
existing material on Nehru which tends to employ a linear narrative. Such linearity tends to 
overlook the overlapping, multi-layered nature of politics where issues are inter-linked and 
bargaining takes place at various levels at the same time.190 By looking at three examples of 
policy-making in parallel the hope is to identify both regularities in the behaviour that 
characterises the policy-choice process as well as variations in terms of the outcome. 
 
 
2.6.5. The Sources for data collection. 
 
A variety of primary sources have been consulted in the process of research, including 
newspaper archives, private papers of key individuals, official documents and parliamentary 
debates. The thesis has heavily relied upon the constituent assembly debates, from December 
9th, 1946 to August 15th, 1947, the subsequent ‘Interim Parliament’ debates and, following 
elections in 1952, the Lok Sabha debates of the 1950s, Nehru’s own writings, published 
letters between him and his contemporaries, the publications of his contemporaries191 and his 
                                                 
190 See for instance the literature on the ‘Two level game’ in international relations literature, for example, 
Putnam, R.D. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, International Organization 
42 (Summer 1988), pp. 427 – 460. 
191 These include, among others, published works by Vallabhbhai Patel (freedom fighter and India’s first Home 
Minister), Rajendra Prasad (freedom fighter and India’s first President), Subhas Chandra Bose (freedom 
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Letters to Chief Ministers. Archival research as opposed to fieldwork in the form of 
interviews was chosen as the preferred research strategy. Whilst there are political 
personalities or observers alive today who experienced the Nehru administration first-hand, it 
was decided that a more than fifty-year time lag made memory and recollections too 
unreliable as a source. However, the process-tracing method relies heavily on the in-depth 
knowledge of the analyst and hence a conscious effort was made to read newspapers of the 
time and critical literature that was shaping the minds of many then, for instance as was the 
case with Harold J. Laski’s work.192 This was another reason to keep the number of case 
studies low, to limit them to three in order to conduct a deep investigation into the complex 
conglomeration of historical, contextual and political features that constitute a particular 
policy field.  
 
 
2.7. Conclusion: the methodological challenges of working on a historical figure. 
 
While the analytic narrative and process tracing provide useful tools through which to 
combine a historical narrative with an analytical framework there are a number of pitfalls 
which need to be considered. First of all, process tracing requires an enormous amount of 
data and the thesis is constrained by the information available and time limitations. A lot of 
primary data remains under control of the Nehru-Gandhi family and access is granted on a 
limited and preferential basis. Nevertheless the thesis is confident that from a close 
examination of the parliamentary debates, which so far have been under-utilised by scholars 
                                                                                                                                                        
fighter), J.B.Kripalani (freedom fighter and politician in independent India), Minoo Masani (freedom fighter and 
politician in independent India).  
192 Laski, H. Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1943). 
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in the field, together with the other primary material mentioned above, useful inferences can 
be drawn based on the new kind of questions that the thesis is raising.   
 
A major quandary encountered during research was the question of where the 
narrative should start and when it should end. Since path dependency is seen to be a crucial 
element of the analysis the notion of a ‘starting point’ becomes highly contentious. If, as has 
been argued, only contingent events can trigger path-dependent processes193, then perhaps the 
partition of 1947 leading to the formation of independent India and Pakistan can be used as 
the ‘critical juncture’ in the narrative. Nevertheless the thesis considers the colonial pre-
history in each of the policy fields to be of analytical significance since much of Nehru’s 
thinking represents continuity with colonial practices and preferences. Similarly, in terms of 
deciding where to end the analysis, because of time and space constraints, the chapters focus 
on the period prior to the selection of a particular policy choice and end with the policy 
decision itself, hence, 1950 when the Planning Commission was formed and 1951/52 when 
the First Five Year Plan was launched, 1954 when the Panchasheela Agreement was signed 
and, the Hindu Code comprising of the Hindu Marriages and Divorce Act, 1955, the Hindu 
Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 and 
the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.  
 
An additional problem lies with the fact that process tracing is no guarantee of 
causality and the findings of the case studies may turn out to be contingent generalisations. 
Nevertheless, it is posited that in the process of conducting the analysis, inferences that are 
drawn can be useful in supporting existing theories and may even contain potential policy-
                                                 
193 See Mahoney, J. “Path dependency in historical sociology”, Theory and Society, 29 /4 (2000), pp. 507-548. 
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relevant findings. Hence, the conclusion of the thesis reflects upon possible implications for 
current policy problems in the three fields under study.    
 
The main problem it is argued with existing historical accounts about Nehru and his 
politics is that the literature does not provide adequate explanations for Nehru’s choices and 
the outcomes of these choices. Simply stating that his vision was the driving factor behind his 
action does not provide a complete explanation for it is necessary to examine the extent to 
which this vision was articulated and the process by which it was translated into action. By 
identifying a complex sequence of events the thesis aims at an interpretation that incorporates 
the cognitive, contextual and time-based constraints under which Nehru operated. 
 
In the final concluding chapter a section will discuss how the thesis makes a 
contribution to the area of studies on leaders and leadership in political science. Whilst this 
has been a relatively neglected field, it is argued that individual leaders provide a valuable 
prism through which to analyse the ideas and concepts prevalent at a particular time as well 
as, the institutional ‘rules’ of the game. A central claim made here is that both are important 
in understanding and explaining policy outcomes. Furthermore, it is proposed that a vision 
(see above for a definition) enables the leader to think in terms of strategy that aims at both 
long-run structural changes as well as tactical manoeuvres for immediate political gains, both 
of which are necessary for his or her ‘staying power’. As a result, by examining the structural 
constraints together with the particular compromises and bargains struck, it is possible to 
unpackage the complex mix of tactical manoeuvring and long-run strategic outlook that a 
policy outcome entails.  
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Sheldon Wolin, who in 1960 wrote a book on political philosophy titled ‘Politics and 
Vision’, attached great importance to the notion of vision as an ordering device through 
which reality is given shape. Tracing continuity and innovation in western political thought, 
Wolin examined how major categories in political theory are a ‘continuously evolving 
grammar and vocabulary to facilitate communication and to orient the understanding’.194 The 
analysis of Nehru, who was by no means a political philosopher, nevertheless requires an 
understanding of the categories and semantics that he was applying in order to provide a 
more complete explanation of his actions. The same would be necessary for a political 
analysis of the policy choices of other leaders such as Mao Tse-Tung, Gamal Abdel Nasser, 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah or President Sukarno of Indonesia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
194 Wolin, Sheldon S. Politics and Vision. (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1960), p. 27.  
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Chapter Three 
Nehru, his world view. 
 
3.1. Introduction 
3.2. Nehru’s Formative Phase. 
3.3. Nehru’s Intellectual Context 
3.4. The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites  
3.4.1. Nehru on Religion and Secularism. 
3.4.2. Nehru on Economic Development and Socialism 
3.4.3. Nehru on Foreign policy and Internationalism 
3.5. Conclusion: operationalising a cognitive map. 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a systematic analysis of Nehru’s worldview. This 
will be done in three different steps. At first, a chronological account of his rise to power 
within the Congress party will be presented. This section provides the basic biographical 
details that framed his political career prior to independence. The narrative stops in 1940 
when Nehru began his longest period of prison sentences which lasted into 1945. Between 
the end of World War Two and India’s independence, the transfer of power from British to 
Indian hands was worked out and, will be examined more closely in the following chapter. 
The purpose that this biographical interlude serves is to observe Nehru’s gradual ascendance 
within the party, to highlight his relationship with Mahatma Gandhi and, to take note of the 
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events and issues that may have shaped him. Due to constraints of space this has been 
deliberately kept short.  
 
The chapter then shifts its focus to the core ideas that were to form the pillars of his 
political programme as Prime Minister. The context is still the pre-independence years 
because this is when Nehru did most of his writing during frequent prison terms. The quality 
of this material is generally considered to be high, partly because as a ‘Class A’ political 
prisoner195, Nehru had privileges which usually included the opportunity to order books and 
newspapers. Hence, the books written in the 1930s and early 40s are not only deeply self-
reflective, wide-ranging and extensively referenced, but are also well-informed about current 
politics and, as a result, serve as a useful window into Nehru’s concerns and thought 
processes. This requires a second step, which is to contextualise Nehru intellectually within 
the currents of political and economic thinking that were popular at the turn of the century in 
Britain and Europe. Corresponding with the three policy choices that have been selected as 
the thesis’ focus (the Hindu Code Bills, the Planning Commission and the Panchasheela 
Agreement), are three broader conceptual fields. These are the extent of state involvement in 
developing the economy, the role of the state in reforming society and the nature of the state 
in international politics. In this section therefore, the Fabian and utilitarian discourse, popular 
at the time in Britain, will be presented in order to understand the origins of some of Nehru’s 
beliefs and priorities.  
 
Finally, the chapter seeks to explore the inner consistency of Nehru’s thought process. 
To do this a selection of central statements by Nehru on the three policy themes is presented 
                                                 
195Unlike those who were considered terrorists and sent to the far-off penal colony of the Andaman Islands 
where the rate of death in custody was notoriously high, ‘Class A’ prisoners were allowed regular access to the 
outside world. 
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and analysed by means of a ‘cognitive map’.196 By creating a ‘cognitive map’, the aim is to 
gain an insight into the inner logic and premises underpinning Nehru’s thinking and the 
conclusions that he came to. Since vision is one of the central explanatory variables proposed 
by the thesis, an attempt is made to conduct a comparative analysis of Nehru’s thinking 
across the three issue areas mentioned above. It is argued that such an exercise helps to 
understand the preferences of the actor, his internal logic and, as a result will add to an 
explanation of the choices made in his/her decision-making.  
 
A conclusion summarises Nehru’s position on the role, nature and goals of the state 
which acts as a basis for the contrast drawn in the next, chapter four between him and his 
contemporaries, two of which will be studied in order to locate him within a spectrum of 
political thinking at the time. Subhas Chandra Bose and Rajendra Prasad were both important 
figures in the freedom struggle and each, in their own way, represented and set the bases for 
an alternative to Nehru’s vision of modern Indian politics. While the literature on Subhas 
Chandra Bose is quite substantial and parallels and contrasts are often drawn between the two 
contemporaries, Bose and Nehru, Rajendra Prasad, despite being the first President of the 
Republic, tends to have been a neglected figure in modern India’s politics. This could, in part, 
be due to the fact that Bose’s home state, West Bengal has made a concerted effort to 
encourage scholarship about the leader197 and to preserve his ‘hero-status’ whilst Prasad’s 
state of Bihar has invested little in the creation or preservation of an icon. Nevertheless 
Prasad’s letters of correspondence and publications are available which, along with his 
                                                 
196For a discussion of ‘Cognitive Maps’ see section below. The definition used here is that ‘A cognitive map is a 
representation of the causal beliefs or assertions of a specific individual’, Hart, J. ‘Cognitive Maps of Three 
Latin American Policy Makers’, World Politics, Vol. 30 / 1 (Oct, 1977), p. 116.    
197 An excellent example of this is the Netaji Research Bureau in Calcutta, West Bengal in India: 
See http://www.netaji.org 
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statements in the constituent assembly debates, generate the contrast and comparison with 
Nehru.   
 
 
3.2. Nehru’s Formative Phase. 
  
Biographical material on Nehru is bountiful and the thesis does not claim to make any 
new discoveries about the sources of his ideas and preferences and the external influences on 
him.198 Rather, the aim here is to present a method by which to compare his thinking in the 
three issue areas of secularism, socialism and internationalism. The prime purpose therefore 
that this brief biographical interlude serves, is to contextualise Nehru in terms of key 
happenings in India and major developments in European politics. The table below collates 
the main events that are referred to in this section, juxtaposing crucial developments in the 
Indian political scene with important steps in Nehru’s career. 
 
Table 1: Context and Chronology 
 
 
Phase National Events Jawaharlal’s Political Career 
19th century 
origins 
1885     Founding of the INC 
 
 
1889  Nov. 14 Birth of  
   Jawaharlal Nehru (JN) 
In Search  
of a Creed 
 
 
 
1905-11   Swadeshi movement in Bengal 
1906      Founding of Muslim League 
1907      Surat split of Congress Indian    
     Councils, Act: Morley-Minto reforms 
1910      All India Hindu Sabha founded 
1905-07    JN Schooling at  
    Harrow 
1907 -10     JN Education at 
  Cambridge 
 
 
                                                 
198 For an official biography see S. Gopal’s magisterial three volumes, Jawaharlal Nehru. A Biography. (Oxford 
University Press, Delhi, 1984). 
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1911      British India capital shifts to Delhi 
1914-18   Indian soldiers sent to fight in WW1 
1915      Annie Besant begins  
  Home Rule campaign 
1910-12   JN at Gray’s Inn,  
    London 
1912 JN returns to India 
The arrival 
of Gandhi 
1915      Return of Gandhi from S. Africa 
1916      Home Rule Leagues set up  
  by Besant & Tilak 
1916      ‘Lucknow Pact’ between Congress 
  and Muslim League 
 
 
1916  JN joins Besant’s 
      Home Rule 
1916 JN first meets Gandhi 
 
 
India 
at 
Crossroads 
1919     Government of India Act passed. 
        ‘Dyarchy’ and limited devolution of  
  powers to the provinces. 
1919      Rowlatt Act extended wartime   
         emergency provisions into peacetime 
1919     Gandhi’s first Satyagraha campaign  
          against Rowlatt 
1919      Jallianwala Bagh massacre 
1920      Non-cooperation Khilafat movement  
          begins. 
1919  JN works with Gandhi 
   in Punjab after 
 Jallianwalla Bagh 
 
 
 
 
 
1920  Nehru’s first rural  
    campaigns 
 
India 
Demands 
Independence 
1922      ‘Chauri Chaura’ incident leads  
  Gandhi to call off the non- 
  cooperation movement. 
1922      Gandhi arrested 
1924-26   ‘Council Entry’ by Swarajists 
   led by Motilal Nehru (MN) 
1926-27   Workers and Peasants Parties 
      founded in Bengal, Punjab,  
  Bombay, UP 
1928      Simon Commission & Nehru Report 
1929      Purna Swaraj resolution:  
  ‘Complete Independence’  
  demanded by Congress. 
1930      Salt March (March/ April)   
  inaugurates Civil  Disobedience 
1930-1     First Round Table Conference in  
      London on new constitution for  
  India. Congress boycotts it. 
1931      Gandhi call off Civil Disobedience  
  (March) – Gandhi-Irwin pact 
1931      Karachi Resolutions adopted at  
      Congress 
1921       Motilal Nehru (MN) 
          & JN arrested 
1923-26  JN chairman of  
      Allahabad Municipal 
   Board 
 
1926-27  JN in Europe /  
       Attends Conference 
     for  Oppressed 
     Peoples in Belgium 
1927    MN & JN visit USSR  
 
1929     JN elected Congress 
     President and
     President of AITUC 
 
1930 - 1931 Jan 
      JN in and out of jail 
1931     MN dies 
 
1931 Dec - 1933 Aug  
      JN in and out of jail 
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1931-32  Second Round Table Conference:  
   Gandhi attends as sole Congress representative 
Combating 
the British 
1932-34    Revival of Civil Disobedience 
1934       Congress Socialist Party founded 
1935       Government of India Act 
1936       Elections to Provincial Assemblies 
1937-39    ‘Mass Contact’ programme 
1937-39    Ministry period for Congress in  
      provinces 
1938    Subhas Bose elected Congress president, 
   appoints National Planning Committee 
1939    ‘Tripuri crisis’ over re-election of Bose, 
            Bose resigns & forms Forward Bloc 
1939  Resignation of Congress ministries in  
           protest against Viceroy declaration  
       of war on India’s behalf 
1940 ‘Individual Satyagraha’ begun by Gandhi 
1940  Muslim League ‘Lahore Resolution’ 
1934 Feb - 1935 Sep   JN in jail 
 
1935    JN in Europe 
1935    Death of Kamala Nehru 
1936    JN elected Congress 
  President 
1937-39 JN involved in  
  Mass Contact 
1938  JN appointed chairman 
      of National Planning 
      Committee 
1939  JN visits China 
 
 
1940 Oct - 1945 June  
 JN in and out of jail. 
A battle  
of wills  
at home 
1942      Cripps Mission in India 
1942      Quit India Movement 
1943      Gandhi’s 21-day fast 
1943-45   Bengal Famine 
1944      Gandhi released from prison 
1944      Abortive Gandhi-Jinnah talks 
1945      Release of Congress Working   
                 Committee members including Nehru 
1945      Simla Conference called by  
  Viceroy Wavell 
1945-6     Elections: Muslim League major gains 
 
 
 
 
1944     JN writes Discovery  
             of India in jail 
1945-46   JN defends Indian  
                         National Army 
             prisoners in 
             INA Trials 
The 
 last mile 
1946         Royal Indian Navy mutiny 
1946 Apr - June    Cabinet Mission 
1946 Aug    ‘Direct Action Day’ launched by   
  Muslim League 
1946 Aug 16-18 Great Calcutta Killings begins 
        sectarian violence across the country
1947 Aug 15 Independence Day 
1947         Infiltration of ‘tribals’ into Kashmir 
1946 Sep   Provisional  
   Government sworn in 
 with JN as PM 
 
 
 
 
 
1948 Jan 30  Assassination of Gandhi 
1948 Sep      ‘Police action’ in Hyderabad state.
 
1949 Oct    JN visits USA 
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The period prior to independence is referred to here as Jawaharlal Nehru’s ‘formative 
phase’. This was a time of great political activity in India and using Nehru as the reference 
point, this section seeks to highlight some of the major events and developments leading to 
independence in 1947.  
 
Born in 1889 into a wealthy, Brahmin family settled in Allahabad, in the northern 
state of Uttar Pradesh but who originally hailed from Kashmir, Jawaharlal had a childhood 
that was exposed to both, great religiosity on his mother, Swarup Rani’s part and the highly 
westernised habits and views of his father, Motilal Nehru.199 From 1901 to 1904 Jawaharlal 
was educated at home by a European tutor, then sent, at the age of sixteen, to Harrow and 
from there to Trinity College, Cambridge where he graduated with a Lower Second in the 
Natural Sciences Tripos in 1910. In accordance with the wishes of his father, Motilal Nehru, 
a highly successful barrister and political figure in his own right, Jawaharlal went on to read 
law at Gray’s Inn, London, the same place where before him Mohendas Karamchand Gandhi 
and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, among others, had studied. It is during this time that Jawaharlal 
encountered the movement of Fabian Socialism200 (See the following section on Nehru’s 
Intellectual Context for more details), popular at the time in Britain, through the lectures of 
Harold Laski at the London School of Economics and began to develop a more extreme 
political outlook, distancing himself from his father’s preference for gradual constitutional 
reform. This reflected the growing schism within Indian politics back home. In 1907 the 
Indian National Congress (INC)201 had split at the Surat session, divided between the 
                                                 
199 For example in 1899 Motilal made his first trip to England and was officially excommunicated by his caste 
members when he refused to perform a purification ceremony upon returning.  
200 A British socialist movement, with its origins in the nineteenth century, whose central idea was that 
Socialism could be advanced through gradual reform and not through revolution. At the core of the society were 
Sidney and Beatrice Webb, authors of various studies on industrial Britain and the Soviet Union. See for 
example, Webb, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Soviet Communism: a new civilization?(Scribner, new York, 1936). 
201Founded in 1885 by Allan Octavian Hume, the INC became the leading organisation in the freedom struggle  
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Moderates, which included Motilal Nehru who favoured British-induced reforms and the 
Extremists who called for direct action like boycotts. Importantly, the Extremists at this time 
were largely those advocating a religious nationalism, as in the case of the All-India Hindu 
Sabha202 founded in 1911, an alternative which, as shall emerge, did not appeal to Jawaharlal.  
Not having attained much academic success, Jawaharlal returned to India in August 1912 and 
began to work for his father’s law practice in Ahmedabad. Politics at this point in time in 
India was relatively quiet with leaders of the Swadeshi movement203 in jail. The outbreak of 
World War One in 1914 stirred the political environment and prompted anti-British 
movements to take shape. The Defence of India Act, passed in March 1915 empowered the 
government to suppress civil liberties and imprison anyone deemed to be a threat to British 
interests. Rallying together, the Moderates and Extremists reunited in 1915 and initiated the 
Home Rule Movement which in addition to demanding self-government argued, that the 
British war effort was to be supported not opposed in exchange for concessions later on. The 
Muslim League204 also accepted the argument and in December 1916 the INC and Muslim 
League reached an agreement, known as the ‘Lucknow Pact’ in which the Congress accepted 
separate electorates205 and the League accepted under-representation for Muslims in Muslim-
majority areas in return for over-representation in Muslim-minority areas.  
 
Responding to the events around him, Jawaharlal’s views began to take a clearer 
shape, in particular as he engaged directly in politics for example through Annie Besant’s 
Home Rule League.206 Meeting Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi for the first time in the 
                                                 
202 This, in 1915, became the Hindu Mahasabha. 
203 Swadeshi translates as ‘Self-Sufficiency’. Mahatma Gandhi had developed a strategy of boycotting British 
products and reviving local production methods and products.  
204Founded in 1907 to safeguard the rights of Muslims, the Muslim League eventually became the political 
group agitating for a separate Pakistan.   
205 Separate electorates here referred to provisions which would create electorates consisting only of Muslims. 
206 Launched in 1916 by an English reformer, Annie Besant’s Home Rule League was modelled on the Irish 
experience, and was one of the first successful attempts to create an all-India mass protest movement. The INC 
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winter of 1916 at the Lucknow Congress of the INC, Jawaharlal was unable to relate to his 
style and rhetoric of politics which he found to be an unfamiliar blend of grass-root activism, 
asceticism, religion and philosophy. However, in 1919 when the Rowlatt Act was passed, 
extending wartime repressive legislation into peacetime, it was Gandhi who galvanised the 
Indian response through his first nation-wide campaign in an all-India Satyagraha207 to resist 
the Act through non-violent civil disobedience. This entailed courting arrest, returning of 
titles bestowed by the Raj, boycotts of schools and colleges, withdrawal of lawyers from 
courts, campaigns against the use of foreign cloth. Marking the beginning of Jawaharlal’s 
direct involvement in active politics, another major event of 1919, the Jallianwala Bagh 
massacre, soon came to eclipse the Rowlatt Act. On April 13, opening fire on a peaceful 
gathering of people, General Dyer’s battalion killed hundreds of people, official estimates put 
the number of dead at 379 though it was widely agreed that the actual figure was much 
higher. The Congress began to organise relief work in the Punjab and set up its own enquiry 
committee in which Jawaharlal was involved. During the investigation Jawaharlal was in 
close contact with Gandhi and from then on seems to have found in him, his mentor.  
 
The momentum generated in Punjab and the unity and solidarity which infused the 
Amritsar Congress session was carried forward into the Non-Cooperation Khilafat Movement 
of the 1920s. Following the defeat of Turkey in World War One and the harsh Treaty of 
Sèvres signed on May 14, 1920, Indian Muslims were growing increasingly agitated over the 
fate of the Khalifa208 in Turkey. Recognising the potency of the issue, Gandhi announced a 
non-cooperation movement which was accepted by the Khilafat Committee and the Congress 
party in 1920. Motilal Nehru also changed from his earlier position which had disapproved of 
                                                                                                                                                        
till this point was largely an elite organisation without the grass-root political networks which Gandhi was later 
to create. 
207 Coined by Gandhi, Satyagraha can be translated as ‘truth force’.  
208Also, Caliphate refers to the ‘head of State’ amongst Sunni Muslims. 
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anti-constitutional means, to support Gandhi. Boycotting November 1920 elections, the 
movement represented a dramatic new phase in Indian politics for it witnessed the emergence 
of a popular mass movement entailing radical pan-Islamic and Hindu believers, united by the 
method of non-violent, civil disobedience. The success of the movement carried over into the 
empty streets and hartals209 which greeted the Prince of Wales, future King Edward VIII on 
his visit to India in 1921. 
 
This period seems to have marked a turning point in Nehru’s political career for he 
also began to gain first-hand knowledge about working conditions in factories and the state of 
the peasantry. In 1920 Jawaharlal participated in the Congress’ Allahabad district conference 
and was elected vice-president of the district committee, his first official position. This was 
also the year when Jawaharlal ‘discovered’ the peasants in his first rural, campaigns within 
the Kisan (farmers) movement. Carrying Gandhi’s message of non-violence to the kisans in 
the Uttar Pradesh countryside, it was precisely these principles of satyagraha, entailing self-
restraint which was to clash with Jawaharlal’s own inclinations towards socialism and its 
ideals of radical and revolutionary change. However, for both the Nehrus, this seems to have 
been a period of transition and greater involvement in active resistance against the 
government and on December 6, 1921 both father and son were arrested and sentenced to six 
months in jail each.  
 
Three months into their jail sentence, at what seemed to be the peak of the Non-
Cooperation movement, Gandhi called off the movement in response to an outbreak of 
violence at a place called Chauri Chaura in UP. Shocked by Gandhi’s unexpected move, 
Jawaharlal felt along with others as though the cause of the movement, as well as his own 
                                                 
209An indigenous term for strike action.  
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sacrifices, had been betrayed. His Autobiography noted, ‘The sudden suspension of our 
movement after the Chauri Chaura incident was resented.....What troubled us even more were 
the reasons given for this suspension and the consequences that seemed to flow from them. 
Chauri Chaura may have been and was a deplorable occurrence and wholly opposed to the 
spirit of the non-violent movement; but were a remote village and a mob of excited peasants 
in an out-of-the-way place going to put an end, for some time at least, to our national struggle 
for freedom?’210 For Gandhi however, Chauri Chaura was a sign, a warning from God that 
‘that there is not as yet in India that truthful and non-violent atmosphere which alone can 
justify mass disobedience’ and for which he had to atone.211 Both the language and methods 
that Gandhi employed stand in stark contrast to Nehru’s reasoning.  
 
Briefly released, Jawaharlal was re-arrested on a new charge and commenced his first 
long spell of imprisonment that lasted till January 31, 1923.  Upon his release he agreed to 
become chairman of the Allahabad (UP) Municipal Board where Jawaharlal gained 
experience in administrative work. Disillusioned with the abrupt ending of Non-Cooperation 
and Gandhi having withdrawn himself to reflect and reconsider the methods of the struggle, 
Jawaharlal sought other sources of inspiration. The aftermath of the Russian Revolution was 
felt in India during the mid and late 1920s with the growth of left-wing parties, Workers’ and 
Peasants’ parties, an increase in trade unionism, worker’s agitations and strikes. In this 
context, Jawaharlal’s intellectual moorings began to lean more towards the left.  
 
In March 1926 Jawaharlal, his wife and daughter left for Europe to treat his wife’s 
condition of tuberculosis. During this stay, Jawaharlal travelled to major European cities and 
                                                 
210 Nehru, An Autobiography (The Bodeley Head, London; 1953), p. 82. 
211 Gandhi, M.K. ‘The Crime of Chauri Chaura’ in The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (The Publications 
Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India), Vol. XXII, pp. 415 – 21 and  
‘Divine Warning’, pp. 423 – 27.   
104 
 
met with prominent intellectuals. For example at the International Conference against 
Colonial Oppression and Imperialism at Brussels, which he attended as the representative of 
the INC, Jawaharlal encountered Romain Rolland, Albert Einstein, Sun Yat Sen’s widow, 
Song Qingling. Playing a large part in the proceedings, in the drafting of resolutions and 
making of public statements, Jawaharlal was beginning to carve out for himself an 
international persona.  
 
Upon returning to India, Nehru was to participate in a new phase of Indian politics 
beginning with the arrival of the Simon Commission which was to review India’s progress 
towards higher political development and to determine its fitness for self-government. 
Adding insult to injury, the Commission was composed of all-white members. A boycott was 
to be organised and an All-Parties Conference coordinated cooperation between the INC, the 
Muslim League and other groups. A committee was formed to draw up a rival constitutional 
framework to that of the Simon Commission, and was chaired by Motilal Nehru who, 
continued to favour constitutional reform and gradual progression from dominion status to 
eventual independence. In contrast, Jawaharlal had piloted a resolution at the Madras session 
of Congress in December 1927 declaring ‘independence with full control over the defence 
forces of the country, the financial and economic policy and the relations with foreign 
countries’212 to be the goal of the Indian people. The resolution was criticised by 
contemporaries such as Rajendra Prasad who called it ‘silly’, and feared it would turn 
Congress into ‘the laughing stock of the world’.213 The resolution was also criticised by 
Gandhi who wrote to Nehru to warm him ‘You are going too fast....Most of the resolutions 
                                                 
212 Subjects Committee of Madras Congress, December 25, 1927, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. 3 
(1972),  p.3. 
213 Ibid, p.4. 
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you framed and got carried could have been delayed.’214 Although the resolution was 
ultimately passed, a public confrontation was avoided.  
 
The anti-Simon Commission black flag demonstrations brought large numbers of 
people out onto the streets and pursued the Commission across the country. The Nehru 
Report which emerged from Motilal’s Committee recommended the abolition of separate 
electorates but, treading a fine balance between Muslim League and Hindu Mahasabha 
demands, the Nehru Report ultimately failed to produce a consensus on the issue of reserved 
seats. Carrying out an admirable attempt to foster Hindu-Muslim unity, the Nehru Report was 
an example of how the constitutional approach to self-government could fall hostage to 
internecine disputes and bickering over details, a result that, in Jawaharlal’s view, only served 
to perpetuate British rule. As a last resort, the Nehru Report accepted dominion status on the 
basis that it would be granted within a year, failing which the Congress would demand 
complete independence. One year later, with no clear moves from the government, the 
Congress passed the Purna Swaraj (Complete Independence) Resolution in Lahore on 
December 31, 1929. Elected as Congress president, this represented a high point in 
Jawaharlal’s pre-independence career. On January 26, 1930, the flag of the INC was unfurled 
and hoisted as the national flag and ‘Independence Day’ was marked across India (a date that 
is still commemorated today). 
 
In his presidential speech, Jawaharlal recognised that he had not been the favoured 
choice amongst Congress members. Jawaharlal Nehru was still a relatively unknown figure in 
politics and the masses, workers and peasants, along with the provincial Congress’ elites had 
gathered to cast their votes for either Mahatma Gandhi or Vallabhbhai Patel. Correspondence 
                                                 
214 Gandhi to Jawaharlal, Sabarmati, January 4, 1928, Old Letters, p. 58. 
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between Gandhi and Jawaharlal’s father, Motilal Nehru are revelatory. In mid- 1929 Motilal 
wrote to Gandhi, “The revolt of the youth has become an accomplished fact......It would be 
sheer flattery to say that you have today the same influence as you had on the youth of the 
country some years ago.....All this would indicate that the need of the hour is the head of 
Gandhi and the voice of Jawahar.....There are strong reasons for either you or Jawahar to 
wear the ‘crown’....”.215 Nevertheless, once in the position, Jawaharlal attempted to set out his 
manifesto with a distinct socialist orientation and having been recently elected president of 
the All-India Trades Union Congress (AITUC), he advocated greater cooperation between the 
AITUC and the INC.216 
 
In February 1930 Gandhi declared the British salt tax to be the target of the next civil 
disobedience movement. The government had a monopoly on the manufacture of salt and the 
tax on salt was paid by Indians. Gandhi planned to launch the campaign with a 240-mile ‘Salt 
March’ on March 12 beginning at his Ashram near Ahmedabad and ending at Dandi on the 
west coast where Gandhi would break the law by collecting salt. With this act, civil 
disobedience across the country was ignited and, took the form of either illegal 
manufacturing of salt or the boycotting and burning of foreign textiles.  
 
In response, a British crackdown put many into jail including Jawaharlal who was 
incarcerated from April 14 to October 11 and again from, October 19 to January 1931.  The 
year 1931, must stand as a significant turning point in Jawaharlal’s life for in February the 
death of his father, Motilal left him grief stricken. Furthermore, on March 5, 1931 a truce was 
signed by Gandhi and the Viceroy, Lord Irwin in which Gandhi had agreed to give up 
boycotts as a political weapon. Nehru’s reaction to this was ‘tremendous shock’, or as he put 
                                                 
215 Wolpert, S. Nehru .A Tryst with Destiny (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996), p. 97. 
216 For more on Nehru’s presidential speeches see the subsequent chapter 4. 
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it in his Autobiography, ‘The Civil Disobedience Movement was ended....Was it for this that 
our people had behaved so gallantly for a year? Were all our brave words and deeds to end in 
this........This is the way the world ends, Not with a bang but with a whimper’.217 Despite the 
disappointment and sense of betrayal at Gandhi’s unilateral decision to end the campaign, 
Jawaharlal was unwilling to publicly break with Gandhi. Recognising his vulnerability - the 
Working Committee (central decision-making body of the Congress party218) had proposed a 
unanimous choice of Sardar Patel as Congress president - Nehru was aware of how little 
support he commanded within the party and hence, chose not to risk further alienation by 
openly opposing Gandhi. Asked by Gandhi to move the resolution ratifying the Gandhi-Irwin 
Pact219, Nehru ultimately gave in to his survival instincts and as he recalls, “Almost at the last 
moment, a few minutes before the resolution was taken in the open Congress, I decided to 
sponsor it. In my speech I tried to lay before the great gathering quite frankly what my 
feelings were and why I had wholeheartedly accepted that resolution and pleaded with them 
to accept it.”220 Perhaps as a gesture in return, Gandhi condoned the resolution on 
fundamental rights which Jawaharlal had drafted and introduced, committing the Congress to 
a comprehensive program of social and economic reforms. 
 
After a short period of release, Jawaharlal was back in jail on December 26, 1931 to 
begin his longest term that lasted until August 30, 1933. As has been noted by many of his 
biographers this was a time that Jawaharlal put well to use, reading and writing widely. A 
book of essays and letters to his daughter, Indira Gandhi written during this time was 
                                                 
217 Nehru, An Autobiography (The Bodeley Head, London; 1953),  pp. 257 – 9. 
218 See page 154 for an organigram of the Congress party. 
219 Signed on March 5, 1931 the Pact included a commitment by Gandhi to discontinue civil disobedience and 
on part of the Government, the withdrawal of ordinances issued to curb the activities of the INC, the release of 
prisoners arrested for participating in the civil disobedience movement, removal of the tax on salt and, the 
participation of the INC at the Round Table Conferences to negotiate India’s move towards Dominion status. 
220 Nehru, An Autobiography (The Bodeley Head, London; 1953), p. 266. 
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published as Glimpses of World History in 1934.221 To quell the growing vagueness 
surrounding his thoughts and political inclinations, Jawaharlal published Whither India in 
October 1933 in pamphlet form which sought to answer questions about what was to come 
after independence and the implementation of socialism into policies. Arrested again in 
February 1934 for having denounced imperialism and tried for sedition, Jawaharlal was 
sentenced to two years imprisonment during which he wrote his autobiography (published in 
1936 with the same title).  
 
In September 1935 with Kamala Nehru’s condition deteriorating, Jawaharlal was 
granted early release on the condition that he would go with her to Europe and not return to 
India before his sentence expired in February 1936. In the meantime the Government of India 
Act of 1935 was finally passed setting out a scheme of provincial autonomy, in which British 
Indian provinces would be ruled by elected Indian ministries but the governor would retain 
reserve powers. Separate electorates were maintained and safeguards granted for British 
business and financial interests. In all of this Jawaharlal’s role appears to have been minimal, 
neither having played a major role in formulating nor in resisting the provisions. 
 
Kamala Nehru died on February 28, 1936 and Jawaharlal returned to India in March 
1936 to assume the mantle of Congress President for the second time. By then, rival factions 
within the INC were clearly emerging. Founded in 1934 as a group within the Congress, the 
Congress Socialist Party (CSP) called for the formation of a United Front of anti-imperialist 
forces including the Communist Party of India. One of its most influential spokesmen, 
                                                 
221 Zachariah’s Nehru  (Routledge, London, 2004, p.70) lists some of the books Nehru read during this first long 
phase of imprisonment: Shakespeare, a number of books on China, a book on eugenics, Oswald Spengler’s 
Decline of the West, Emil Ludwig’s historical biographies, Ruskin and Carlyle, Bukharin’s Historical 
Materialism, Kropotkin’s The Great French Revolution, Trotsky’s My Life, Bernard Saw, Ramakrishna’s Hindu 
View of Life, a great deal of history, French and British literature, Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, 
R.H.Tawney’s Religion and the Rise of Capitalism.  
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Jayprakash Narayan advocated a Marxist-Leninist programme. Although Jawaharlal never 
joined the CSP he was regarded by many of its members as a sympathiser. Furthermore, 
thanks to Jawaharlal’s close relationship with Gandhi he was increasingly perceived as the 
bridge between two broad trends that were emerging within the Congress. This included, on 
the one hand the ‘modernists’ referring to industrialists and socialists, united in their faith in 
industrialisation and, on the other hand, the ‘indigenists’222, which meant the Gandhians and 
Hindu sectarians who aspired towards a society based on indigenous traditions. Although 
Gandhi may have seen Jawaharlal as a unifier, others, such as his contemporary, Subhas 
Chandra Bose accused Jawaharlal of never having the courage to oppose the Mahatma and of 
drifting along, trying to please both the Right and the Left.223 
 
As President of the 1936 Congress Jawaharlal’s statements implied a turn towards 
socialism224, alarming businessmen and Congress members on the right of the ideological 
spectrum and adding to the strains caused by a central dilemma about the nature of Indian 
nationalism: was the Indian nationalist movement to be defined as a loose, broad, all-
inclusive, secular movement but one that essentially lacked an ideological core? Right-wing 
tendencies within and without the Congress tended to be Hindu, upper-caste property owners, 
the dominance of whom was likely to alienate the ‘Depressed Classes’, minorities and 
particularly Muslims. On the other hand, the Muslim League at the time was also inclined 
more towards maintaining the zamindar (land owner) - based social order, pushing Muslims 
in favour of radical social change closer to the left wing of the Congress. Within the right 
wing, prominent businessman, such as G.D.Birla and political figures like Vallabhbhai Patel 
and Bhulabhai Desai also identified themselves as ‘Gandhians’.  
                                                 
222 Used by Zachariah , B. Nehru (Routledge, London, 2004), p. 10.  
223 See, Bose’s observation in Netaji Collected Works, (Netaji Research Centre, Calcutta, 1981) Volume 2 p. 
370. 
224 For more on Jawaharlal’s presidential speeches see chapter 4. 
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Confronted by the prospect of provincial elections (as a result of the Government of 
India Act, 1935), the Congress was split between those, especially the leftists, who wanted to 
boycott the elections, and those, especially business leaders and landlords, who wanted 
Congress to work with the Constitution. In the end Congress contested the elections held in 
early 1937 and emerged with massive victories. Contesting 1,161 out of a total of 1,585 seats, 
the Congress won 716 of them. From April 1937, the Congress was running nine out of 
eleven provincial governments, six on its own and three in coalitions. A crucial experience in 
governance and power-sharing, office acceptance also brought the Congress into conflict with 
itself. With ministries containing few representatives of the Left, the CSP and its affiliated 
organisations like the Kisan sabhas and the trade union movement, found themselves 
engaged in a struggle against the Congress which was in effect seen to be helping to run an 
imperialist system. 
 
Till the mid-thirties the philosophy of the Congress-led movement had been to 
provide an institutional umbrella incorporating all hues of political outlook. The crisis over 
Subhas Chandra Bose’s re-election as Congress president in 1939 brought tensions to the fore 
allowing Jawaharlal to emerge as a consensus candidate.225 By this time, Jawaharlal had 
begun to appear as the one of the few possible unifiers within the Congress movement. In 
November 1937, an anonymous article appeared in the Calcutta-based Modern Review, titled 
The Rashtrapati (President)226, warned that there was a tendency to see Nehru as a kind of 
saviour and that the man might be in danger of seeing himself as a latter day Napoleon or 
Caesar. It turned out that Jawaharlal himself was the author and while the intentions behind 
publishing such a piece are debated, the point is that he was increasingly in the limelight. 
From 1937, following the first provincial elections in which the Congress won easily in six of 
                                                 
225 For more on the 1939 crisis see chapter 4. 
226 See Appendix for a copy of this article. 
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the eleven provinces and dominated two more, Jawaharlal took it upon himself to become the 
‘conscience of the ministries’227, reprimanding premiers of various provinces on their policies 
and statements as well as lecturing Congress on the need to keep an eye on the main goal of 
independence. Afraid of losing the collective momentum as the day-to-day running of 
provincial administrations distracted Congress members, and observing fractionalisation 
within Congress, the ‘Mass Contact Programme’ was launched in 1937 with Jawaharlal 
Nehru as one of its main leaders. Aimed at bringing Congress into close contact with those 
who were not yet Congress supporters, Muslim mass contact was deemed a priority.  
 
Drawn into ‘high’ politics more directly, Jawaharlal views on the role of religion in 
politics and the potential for communal violence took on a harder line. For instance, writing 
to Stafford Cripps, at the time an upcoming figure in Labour politics to whom he had been 
introduced to by his friend, Krishna Menon in London228, Jawaharlal was intent on conveying 
the influence of the Congress on the Muslims, claiming that “I come into greater touch with 
the Muslim masses than most of the members of the Muslim League. I know more about their 
hunger and poverty and misery than those who talk in terms of percentages and seats in the 
councils and places in the state services.”229 Issuing such an open challenge, released in the 
form of a statement to the press, Jawaharlal’s actions had the effect of spurning the Muslim 
League to launch a far more successful ‘mass contact’ campaign of its own as well as setting 
the leader of the Muslim League, Muhammad Ali Jinnah on a war path. Other examples can 
be given of occasions when Jawaharlal’s publicly advertised principles did not serve the 
cause of gaining support for the Congress and are an early indication of Jawaharlal’s 
discomfort with, and inability to manage religion as a force in politics. Approaching the 
                                                 
227 Zachariah, B. Nehru (Routledge, London, 2004),  p. 90. 
228 For more on the relationship between Nehru and Krishna Menon see chapter four. 
229 Quoted in Wolpert, S. Nehru. A Tryst with Destiny (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996), p. 223.  
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problem of communal politics in highly dichotomous terms, Nehru more often than not 
depicted the Congress as ‘an advanced organisation’ pitted against ‘a politically reactionary 
organisation like the League’, ruling out the possibility of Congress sharing power with any 
minorities in the provincial ministries, a move which may have helped to dispel accusation 
that Congress provincial rule, particularly in the heavily Muslim-populated state of Uttar 
Pradesh, was discriminatory and repressive against Muslims.  
 
As an escape from the political infighting, Jawaharlal looked to international affairs 
and foreign travel. In 1937 he visited Burma and Malaya and in June 1938 left for Europe 
where he experienced the Spanish Civil War, made numerous public appearances in which he 
spoke on subjects such as the dangers of fascism, imperialist aggression and the world 
situation.230 Witnessing the Munich pact of 1938, Jawaharlal Nehru observed, first hand, the 
growing sense of crisis and approaching war that was building up in Europe. Reflecting the 
growing tendency of British policy makers to regard Jawaharlal Nehru as a potential partner, 
in June 1938 he was invited to a weekend discussion on the possible terms for a treaty on the 
transfer of power with participants such as Sir Stafford Cripps, Harold Laski, Labour 
politicians as well as Krishna Menon of the Independence for India League.231  
 
By December 1939, when the Congress ministries had resigned in protest against 
Britain’s declaration of war on India’s behalf without consulting any of the ‘representative’ 
bodies of Indians, the Congress party organisational capabilities had been diminished, a right-
left fault line had been exposed and communalist politics was on the rise.  For most of the 
Second World War, Nehru was behind bars, jailed from November 1940 to December 1941 
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and again, from August 1942 to June 1945. The period between the end of the war and the 
declaration of independence on August 15th, 1947 will be examined in subsequent chapters 
when the debates of the Constituent Assembly, formed in 1946 to write the Constitution of 
India, are referred to. 
 
3.3. Nehru’s Intellectual Context 
 
Key developments in the political and intellectual climate of turn-of-the-century 
Britain were to play a crucial role in shaping the policies of both post-war Britain and 
independent India. Amongst these, the influence of the Fabian society is an important prism 
through which to observe the change and continuity in ideas and practices from the age of 
Victorian utilitarianism to the post-war social democracy and welfare politics of the Labour 
party. Founded in 1883, the Fabian society attracted a number of intellectuals including 
among others, George Bernard Shaw, H.G.Wells, Annie Besant, Harold Laski, Beatrice and 
Sidney Webb. What is interesting is how closely Nehru’s thoughts on the state, 
modernisation and development reflected the twin sources of ideas popular at the time in 
Britain: utilitarianism and fabianism. 
  
As Governor-General of India in the mid-nineteenth century, Lord Dalhousie upon 
reviewing his years of administration, is supposed to have described the railways, electric 
telegraph and uniform postage which he introduced to India as the ‘three great engines of 
social improvement’.232 Such a reading of legacy reflected the philosophy of utilitarianism, as 
articulated by Jeremy Bentham and James Mill. In his History of British India, Mill had 
questioned the values of Indian society and proposed reforms along Benthamite ideals. 
                                                 
232 Quoted in Ghosh, S.C. The Utilitarianism of Dalhousie and the Material Improvement of India‘, Modern 
Asian Studies, 121/ 1 (1978), p. 97. 
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Despite being a Conservative, Dalhousie was therefore advocating that the key to progress in 
India was the introduction of Western science and knowledge. Crucial to note, is that the 
utilitarian idea of progress was not only progress brought about through scientific innovation 
but also reform of the existing social order. Hence, Dalhousie saw it as his duty to tackle the 
problems of infanticide, female education, the treatment of Hindu widows. Unity of authority, 
uniformity of management and legal practices were essential principles within this vision of 
governance. Codification was to emerge as one central instrument to put these principles into 
practice. References by Dalhousie to ‘the good of the community’, ‘the interests of the 
public’, ‘the welfare of mankind’ were echoes of the central utilitarian, ‘Greatest-happiness 
precept’.  
 
His farewell address on 5 March 1856 in Calcutta is a good example of this: ‘While 
we have a right to congratulate ourselves on what has already been done, while we may 
regard with complacency the introduction into the East of those great instruments of public 
benefit which Science has long since created in the West; while we may rejoice that measures 
have been already taken for opening new sources of public wealth, for ministering to the 
convenience of increasing the happiness, and for raising the mental and social condition of 
the endless millions, whom providence for its own wise ends has committed to our charge; I 
trust we still shall feel that all we have yet done must be regarded as no more than the first 
beginning of greater things that are to come.’233 
 
Nehru, in some ways represented continuity with this line of thinking. His speeches 
and writings, as will be seen in subsequent chapters, often claimed the interests of mankind 
and of society as a whole, to be at stake. Even more striking was Nehru’s propensity to 
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believe in the wisdom and acumen of eminent individuals who could conceptualise and grasp 
the good of the community and take action from a neutral, benevolent position. His tendency 
to concentrate power and decision-making in the hands of a few individuals, his persistent 
monitoring and correspondence with chief ministers throughout his term as prime minister, 
attest to this.  
 
Fabianism, as a current of political thought emerged in response, or rather in dialogue 
with the dominant ideas and in reaction to the experiences of industrialisation during the 
Victorian age. Believing in the possibility of gradual transition and reform, the Fabian 
Society rejected notions of class struggle and revolutionary change advocated by Marx’s 
followers. Instead, it was argued that evolutionary and constitutional methods, the use of 
persuasion and permeation would bring about a gradual process of socialisation.234 Although 
Fabianism came to be embraced by the post-war Labour government it was never a doctrinal 
set of principles. The main goal of its adherents was to tackle the great injustices wrought by 
the capitalist system and to spread the theory of evolutionary socialism. As a result, 
democracy was to play a central part in the Fabian outlook as it provided the opportunity to 
bring about change peacefully and gradually. 
 
The position of Fabianism on the State did not reject the utilitarian notions of the 
‘greatest happiness for the greatest number’ and the need for society to be reorganised from 
above but instead, sought to extend them. Sidney Webb for instance is a good example of 
how utilitarianism was enhanced through his faith in positivism. Hence, science and experts 
were to be essential sources of neutral, rational advice. Much of the activity of government 
then could be left to ‘the disinterested professional expert who invents, discovers, inspects, 
                                                 
234 See for instance Shaw, G.B. Fabian Essays in Socialism (Scott, London, 1889). 
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audits, costs, tests of measures’ so as to pinpoint the facts about social life and its 
requirements.235 The knowledge, accumulated by the scientist, would enable them to 
administer effectively and to indicate priorities on policy matters. Elections, while not to be 
abolished, were to some extent in Webb’s view a symbolic exercise through which popular 
consent for expertly designed policies could be raised. A belief in the inevitability of society 
to become ever more differentiated into functional units, held together through cooperation 
and coordination, meant the broad path of social development was set and, the job of 
politicians and experts was to develop proposals that would ease the way along this route.  
 
A strong alternative to Webb’s view was represented at the time by John Maynard 
Keynes who advocated fiscal and monetary measures to stimulate the economy essentially by 
expanding demand and employment. Furthermore, unlike Webb, Keynes focused on the 
individual as opposed to the common good. Reacting to the depression and unemployment of 
interwar years, Webb criticised Keynes for advocating short-term solutions within the 
framework of a capitalist economy when what was needed was a long-term industrial 
reorganisation within a collectivist economy. Turning therefore to the Soviet Union, which he 
visited in 1932 and 1934, solutions such as ‘planned production for community consumption’ 
appeared to have rationalised the economy for the social good in a way that had abolished 
‘mass unemployment, together with the devastating alteration of commercial booms and 
slumps.’236 In spite of the control exerted by the Communist Part, Webb regarded the Soviet 
political system as a ‘multiform democracy’ in which the individual can participate as a 
citizen, producer, and consumer.237 Ignoring the ineluctable place of conflict in social life, 
                                                 
235 Quoted in Bevir, M. ‘Sidney Webb: Utilitarianism, Positivism and Social Democracy’, The Journal of 
Modern History, Vol. 74 / 2 (June 2002), p. 242.  
236 Webb, Sidney and Webb, Beatrice, Soviet Communism: A New Civilization? (Scribner, New York, 1936), 
Volume 2, p. 602. 
237 Ibid., Volume 1, p. 427. 
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Webb was committed to the ideal of there being an evolutionary movement towards a society 
where conflict would be largely absent since everyone would be working towards a common 
good upon which they agreed. Seeing the market as the epitome of immoral and irrational 
conflict, Webb did not want to recognise the extent to which the Soviet model too, embodied 
violence and conflict. As will be revealed in the rest of the chapter, Nehru’s thoughts and 
ideas about the role of the market and state and, the nature of societal development carry a 
striking resemblance. 
  
 
3.4. The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites 
 
Written in 1976, Robert Axelrod’s Structure of Decision238, introduced cognitive 
mapping as a modelling technique in political science. Defining a cognitive map as a 
“specific way of representing a person’s assertions about some limited domain, such as a 
policy problem” Axelrod explained that the aim was “to capture the structure of the person’s 
causal assertions and to generate the consequences that follow from this structure.”239 
Underlying this statement is the argument that beliefs matter and can make a difference when 
it comes to policy choices and policy outcomes. Referring to another eminent political 
scientist whose work on cognitive psychology is widely known, Axelrod quoted Herbert 
Simon to justify the strategy of inference that he adopts where ‘given the properties of the 
parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer the properties of the 
whole’.240 Having established these two elements, only then is it possible, according to 
Axelrod to make predictions and assessments about the way an individual behaves or reacts 
                                                 
238 Axelrod, R. Structure of Decision. The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites. (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1976). 
239 Ibid. p. 55. 
240 Ibid. p. 55. 
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to changes in his environment. The model, while positing that individuals do operate in 
accordance with the laws of cognitive maps does not assume unlimited rationality. Rather, 
bounded rationality is revealed not so much ‘as failures in (the decision-maker’s) ability to 
draw correct inferences from the beliefs that he does state, but rather as limitations in the 
structure of the beliefs he presents as an image of the policy environment.”241 As Axelrod 
points out it is precisely because of what may be unconscious but, which are essentially self 
imposed, restrictions that serious distortions of the external policy environment are likely to 
occur. A year later, Jeffrey A. Hart in a critical journal article, applied the notion of 
‘cognitive maps’ to a comparative study of three Latin American policy makers.242   
  
Since this thesis is not aiming at an in-depth study of Nehru’s belief system, its goals 
for developing a cognitive map are more modest. The prime concern is to explore whether 
Nehru’s thoughts in the three policy areas of social reform, economic development and 
foreign policy, were equally well-conceptualised and internally consistent. Hence, the chapter 
has its own self-imposed limitation, in that it does not seek to develop a mathematical model 
for Nehru’s overall belief system in order to explain his subsequent policy choices. This 
would be only half the explanation according to the model proposed in chapter two for the 
contextual constraints and exigencies of power politics, it is argued, play a central role in 
understanding why Nehru acted the way he did. However, a central proposition being made is 
that in the policy areas where Nehru’s vision was more clearly articulated, he was more 
successful in getting results in terms of designing policies and institutions to put his ideas into 
action. In order to test this hypothesis it is necessary to conduct a comparative analysis of 
Nehru’s cognitive map as applied to the three policy areas specified. As Axelrod himself 
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admitted, a cognitive map cannot capture the nuances of individual causal beliefs and must 
leave out beliefs that are not causal by nature243, hence the comparisons that are to be drawn 
in this chapter are based on a process that drastically simplifies reality.  
 
A cognitive map, Axelrod specifies, has only two basic elements: concept and causal 
beliefs. ‘The concepts are treated as variables, and the causal beliefs are treated as 
relationships between the variables’.244 To apply this to Nehru’s belief system, the thesis 
refers to various arguments put forward by Jawaharlal Nehru in speeches and books on the 
three themes of secularism, economic development and foreign policy. An attempt is made to 
discuss the three areas comparatively and to examine whether there is a variation in the inner 
consistency and complexity of Nehru’s thoughts on the subject. A representative statement is 
chosen from three different sources each of which were important platforms from where 
Nehru could launch his position. Hence, in the first case of religion and secularism an ardent 
speech delivered when he was invited to preside over the Congress’ Punjab Provincial 
Political Conference in 1928, was one of Nehru’s early opportunities to make his views on 
critical issues known to a wider audience. On economic policy, a section from Nehru’s 
Presidential address to Congress in 1936 is examined. This was an important occasion given 
that provincial elections were just around the corner and Nehru had been advocating a focus 
on economic issues and socialism. Finally, on foreign policy Nehru’s 1934 book, Glimpses of 
World History, a key text on his understanding of international diplomacy and world politics, 
is used for a representative extract. Although the timing and specific purposes of each source 
differs, the texts are considered insightful since each carried a particular focus related to the 
three policy areas of secularism, economic development and foreign policy. Hence, it was 
                                                 
243 Axelrod, R. Structure of Decision. The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites. (Princeton University Press, 
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assumed that they could be used to reflect Nehru’s concerns and considerations on the 
particular theme. While views and interpretations of the world certainly change over time it is 
posited that actors retain predispositions, especially on issues that have been singled out for 
attention from an early stage on. In Nehru’s case,  this chapter demonstrates that the issues of 
communalism and secularism, economic development and socialism, diplomacy and 
internationalism were matters of central concern to him. 
 
Having extracted some initial observations based on a simple codification245, the 
analysis made at the end of the chapter serves as a prism through which to examine Nehru’s 
choices and decisions that feature in detail in chapters 5, 6 and 7 on the Planning 
Commission, Panchasheela and the Hindu Code Bills respectively. The following steps are 
taken: (1) All ‘conceptual variables’ are pinpointed. These are terms that can take on different 
values such as ‘security’ which can be of a greater or smaller amount. Following Axelrod’s 
methodology, cognitive maps frequently contain concepts variables for utility which refers to 
the unspecified best interests of the actor or what he considers to be in the best interests of the 
country or community.246 Other typologies include ‘goal’ variables which are variables that 
directly affect the utility variables and ‘policy’ variables which the individual seems to 
designate as being susceptible to control or manipulation.247 (2) Additional properties of the 
cognitive map concern the nature of the causal paths, or the chains of causation. There are 
basically two types of path: positive paths which contain an even number of negative 
assertions and negative paths with an odd number. (3) An important property of the cognitive 
map is path balance or the degree to which parallel paths between pairs of related variables 
                                                 
245 The Coding Rules that are followed are set out by Margaret Wrightson in Axelrod, R. Structure of Decision 
(Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 291 -332. 
246 Axelrod, R. Structure of Decision (Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 59. 
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have the same sign. This is held to indicate the consistency of the policy choice implied 
which is defined as ‘the setting of a policy variable to a certain value so that all causal effects, 
direct or indirect, have a positive effect on utility.’248 
 
 
 
3.4.1. Nehru on Religion and Secularism. 
 
 
“Communalism, of course has to be fought ruthlessly and suppressed. But I really do 
not think it is such a power as it is made out to be. It may be a giant today but it has feet of 
clay. It is the outcome largely of anger and passion and when we regain our tempers it will 
fade into nothingness. It is a myth with no connection with reality and it cannot endure. It is 
really the creation of our educated classes in search of office and employment.”249 
 
The above quote exemplifies Jawaharlal Nehru’s thinking on the challenge of 
accommodating religion within modern politics as will be seen from the following overview 
of his early writings and speeches. To begin with however, a system of coding is applied in 
order to assess the causal assertions inherent in the above statement and to extract a cognitive 
map for this particular theme of the role of religion in society. The first step is to identify 
conceptual variables that the author emphasizes. In this case these are the following: 
A = the Suppression of Communalism (goal / utility variable) 
B = Anger and Passion / our tempers (policy variable) 
C = Myth (goal variable) 
D = Educated Classes (policy variable) 
 
The next step is to look for the direct correspondence between variables.  
                                                 
248 Ibid. p. 120. 
249 Nehru, J. Presidential Address at Punjab Provincial Conference, April 11, 1928, Gopal, S. (ed.) Selected 
Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series One, Volume 3, (Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1972), pp. 219 – 230. See 
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1. More Anger and Passion means it is more difficult to suppress communalism (positive 
relationship: both increase in value): B     +     A 
2.  The creation of an artificial myth hinders the ability to suppress communalism 
(negative relationship): C      -       A 
3. The Myth is created by the Educated Classes (strategic, rational behaviour, positive 
relationship): D     +     C 
4. The actions of the educated classes add to the generation of anger and passion 
(positive relationship): D     +      B 
 
What are interesting are the following observations: 
1. There is no positive utility associated with any of the variables. Communalism is a 
highly negative phenomenon and all the other variables are either intervening 
obstacles (anger and passion) or the outcome (a myth) of vested interests (the 
educated classes). 
2. There is no obvious ‘policy variable’ which would be variables which the individual 
seems to designate as being susceptible to control or manipulation by his/her 
government. However, ‘Educated Classes’ might be used as an indication of an 
underlying structural problem that needs to be targeted in order to avoid the outcome 
of Communalism.  
3. An important property of cognitive maps is path-balance, or the degree to which 
parallel paths between pairs of variables have the same sign. The importance of path 
balance according to the formulators of cognitive mapping, lies in its relationship to 
the consistency between policy choices and cognitive maps: ‘A consistent policy 
choice is defined as the setting of a policy variable to a certain value so that all causal 
effects, direct or indirect, have a positive effect on utility. For a policy choice to be 
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consistent, the paths that connect it to the utility variables must be balanced. Path 
balance is therefore a prerequisite for consistency as defined above.’250 
In the example above, the path has three positive and one negative relationship: it 
becomes more difficult to suppress communalism as anger and passion increases 
(positive), the creation of an artificial myth is an obstacle (negative), this myth is 
generated by the goals and actions of the educated classes (positive), the actions of the 
educated classes generate anger and passion as they seek to enhance their 
opportunities (positive). According to the rules set out by Axelrod a path with an odd 
number of negative relationships has a total indirect negative effect on utility and is 
hence imbalanced. 
4. Applied to the case of Nehru and his thinking on religion this exercise implies that 
while Nehru had very strong views on the role of religion in politics, his logic, as 
apparent from this example, is not internally consistent. On the one hand he blames 
irrational ‘anger and passion’ for giving rise to communalism and at the same time he 
recognises the strategic instrumentalisation by the ‘educated classes’. Given these two 
very different explanations for communalism it remains unclear how Nehru proposed 
to go about tackling the problem through concrete policies and institutions. This 
tension and weakness is prevalent in his writings.   
 
On the topic of religion, Nehru propounded various arguments portraying its negative 
effects on society and politics. His earliest published volume, Letters from a Father to his 
Daughter, is extremely negative about the role of religion. Describing the origin of religion 
which, ‘first came as fear....But however, much it may have grown, we see even today that 
people fight and break each other’s heads in the name of religion. And for many people it is 
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still something to be afraid of. They spend their time in trying to please some imaginary 
beings by making presents in temples and even sacrifices of animals’.251 Nor did Nehru 
change his tone depending on the audience. For example, speaking in Varanasi in Uttar 
Pradesh, one of Hinduism’s holiest cities, and presumably therefore to an audience amongst 
which there were people who held religion dear, Nehru had the following to say: 
‘It is strange that for the most trivial things, for childish superstition or silly prejudice people 
take risks and lose their reason in a sea of anger. The vital things, the real things that matter 
pass unnoticed. Ignorance and bigotry put an end to all rational thought. It is almost useless to 
argue or convince. Religion is degraded and in its name are done the most shameful things. 
Indeed religion has become the excuse for many sins. It has little sanctity left and it is trotted 
out in season and out of season and all argument naturally ends.’252 
 
Another common attack against religion was that it was partly to blame for India’s 
weaknesses and a reason why the region had succumbed to imperial rule. With independence, 
the country was to wipe the slate clean and start anew by embracing modernity. The 
radicalism of the early Jawaharlal Nehru shows through particularly in speeches aimed at 
rousing the young. For example in his presidential address to the Bombay Presidency Youth 
Conference in 1928, Nehru proclaimed:  
‘We must aim, therefore, at the destruction of all imperialism and the reconstruction of 
society on another basis…..Our national ideal must, therefore, be the establishment of a 
cooperative socialist commonwealth and our international ideal, a world federation of 
socialist states. Before we approach our ideal, we have to combat two sets of opponents – 
political and social. We have to overcome our alien rulers as well as the social reactionaries 
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of India.......Religion has in the past often been used as an opiate to dull men’s desire for 
freedom….Religion has been the fountain-head of authoritarianism and meek submission.’253 
Similarly, in a Presidential address at the Punjab Provincial Conference in April 1928, Nehru 
reminded his audience, ‘We forget that our ancient civilizations, great as they are, were 
meant for different ages and different conditions. We cannot have today, in an industrial age, 
an early agrarian economy, such as we had in Vedic times; much less can we have in our 
country a civilization meant for a desert country more than 1,300 years ago. And many of our 
traditions and habits and customs, our social laws, our caste system, the position we give to 
women, and the dogmas which religion has imposed on us, are the relics of a past, suitable in 
those far-off days but utterly out of joint with modern conditions’.254 
 
At numerous occasions Nehru expressed his firm conviction that religion and 
religious categories would lose their relevance. For example this crops up during a series of 
articles written between 1933 and 1934, published in various newspapers. In response to 
Muhammad Iqbal who had accused Gandhi of preventing Muslims and the ‘Harijans’255 from 
making common cause at the Round Table Conference, Nehru stated ‘Personally, I am not 
interested in religious labels and I am sure that they will soon disappear, or, at any rate, cease 
to have any political significance’.256  Such statements, of course with the benefit of 
hindsight, imply a deep misjudgement of his people and their socio-cultural conditions. 
Nehru went on to define his outlook which ‘is not religious and I find it difficult to think of 
groups in terms of religion. Sir Mohammad evidently does so to the exclusion of other and 
more modern ways of thinking, and I am afraid he confuses religion with race and culture.’257 
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The unity of India was a central concern for Nehru during this period and almost all his books 
deal with this theme either from a historical, cultural angle or in terms of the success of a 
national freedom movement. Though it is not mentioned explicitly, secularism does begin to 
appear within Nehru’s vision as the glue for holding a state such as India together and 
providing the basis for a national consciousness, overcoming ‘numerous superficial 
differences’.258 The early Nehru did demonstrate an awareness for the challenges in 
establishing a level-playing field where the majority community makes compromises and the 
minority community feels protected and not dis-advantaged. However, as Nehru himself 
pointed out in his retort to Iqbal, ‘What are these minimum safeguards (for the protection of a 
minority) and who is to decide them? The minority itself?.......How are we to know what the 
minority community really desires? Are we to take the opinion of any small group claiming 
to represent the community? And when there are several such groups, what are we to do?’259 
Precisely these questions were to return in the 1950s when Nehru attempted to create the 
institutional foundations for a secular state although, as will be seen later on, the impasse 
created by the Hindu Code Bill reflected some serious miss-calculations.  
 
Much later on, Nehru’s writings in prison reflected a deepening faith in modernisation 
and a ‘scientific rationalism’. Hence the scientific approach was described by Nehru as ‘the 
refusal to accept anything without testing and trial, the capacity to change previous 
conclusions in the face of new evidence, the reliance on observed fact and not on pre-
conceived theory, the hard discipline of the mind – all this is necessary, not merely for the 
application of science but for life itself and the solution of its many problems.”260 Whilst in 
contrast, the methods employed by religion were seen as compounding society’s problems, 
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“Concerned as it is principally with the regions beyond the reach of objective inquiry, it relies 
on emotion and intuition. And then it applies this method to everything in life, even to those 
things which are capable of intellectual inquiry and observation. Organised religion, allying 
itself to theology and often more concerned with vested interests than with things of the 
spirit, encourages a temper which is the very opposite to that of science. It produces 
narrowness and intolerance, credulity and superstition, emotionalism and irrationalism. It 
tends to close and limit the mind of man, and to produce a temper of a dependent, unfree 
person.”261 
 
Although Nehru had his differences with Gandhi he chose not to publicise them too 
much. One such occasion when he did articulate his disagreement with Gandhi’s goals and 
methods occurred in September 1932 when Gandhi went on a “fast unto death” on the subject 
of separate electorates for India’s “depressed classes” which Gandhi considered to be a 
British attempt to divide and undermine Indians along further cleavages. Nehru, on the other 
hand, considered this to be a ‘side issue’, writing in his Autobiography, that he ‘felt angry 
with Bapu at his religious and sentimental approach to a political question.....And his frequent 
references to God – God has made him do this – God even indicated the date of the 
fast......What a terrible example to set!’262 
 
Despite this deeply-held view of religion producing obfuscation, and something 
which must inevitably fade away with modernisation, there are strong inconsistencies in 
Nehru’s thinking on the subject of religion, religiosity and the need for reform. This comes 
out most clearly in the different assumptions underlying his diagnoses and recommendations 
for India’s Muslim and Hindu communities. Hence, he posited that, “a special responsibility 
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does attach to the Hindus in India both because they are the majority community and because 
economically and educationally they are more advanced.”263 However, while Hindus are 
berated for having fallen behind the rest of the world because of inherently retrograde social 
customs like the caste system and unnecessary mystification, the particular Muslim trauma 
had to be treated differently given that it suffered from exogenous shocks. The following 
needs to be quoted at length as it captures this sentiment: 
“Moslems have produced few outstanding figures of the modern type. They have produced 
some remarkable men but, as a rule, these represented the continuation of the old culture and 
tradition and did not easily fit in with modern developments. This incapacity to march with 
the changing times and adapt themselves culturally and otherwise to a new environment was 
not of course due to any innate failing. It derived from certain historical causes, from the 
delay in the development of a new industrial middle class, and the excessively feudal 
background of the Moslems, which blocked up avenues of development and prevented the 
release of talent. In Bengal the backwardness of the Moslems was most marked, but this was 
obviously due to two causes: the destruction of their upper classes during the early days of 
British rule, and the fact that the vast majority were converts from the lowest class of Hindus, 
who had long been denied opportunities or growth and progress.”264 
 
As a result, the narratives Nehru constructed to explain the weaknesses of religious 
communities to cope with modernity rest on different explanatory variables. On the one hand 
Hinduism is portrayed as inherently backward whilst the fate of Islam is to be empathised 
with because of the negative outcomes resulting from its encounter with British rule. This 
lopsidedness persists through most of Nehru’s writings and into his years of policy-making as 
prime minister. For example, although communalism was condemned by Nehru both in its 
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Hindu and Muslim variants, the harsher criticism was always maintained for the Hindu 
Mahasabha.  
 
Another instance of bias arises in his book, The Discovery of India, where Nehru 
devotes quite a few pages to ‘secular’ thinkers and movements like that of Vivekananda, 
Rabindranath Tagore and Annie Besant, but hardly acknowledges the important reform 
movements of the Brahmo Swaraj and Arya Samaj265 which were more explicitly based on 
Hindu philosophy, Hindu practices and ideals.266 On the Muslim front however, Nehru lauds 
the more religious reform movements like Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, leader of the Aligarh 
Movement267 as well as more secular Muslim leaders like Abdul Kalam Azad.268  
Recognising the psychological dilemmas that Indian Muslims faced over matters of history 
and questions of allegiance, Nehru wrote with compassion for the challenges they must have 
faced. For, “to begin with, the new middle classes were almost absent among the Moslems. 
Their avoidance of western education, their keeping away from trade and industry, and their 
adherence to feudal ways, gave a start to the Hindus which they profited by and retained. 
….The Revolt of 1857 was a joint affair, but in its suppression Moslems felt strongly, and to 
some extent rightly, that they were the greater sufferers. This Revolt also put an end finally to 
any dreams or fantasies of the revival of the Delhi Empire.”269 
Underlying this analysis was his deep conviction that, if it were not for opportunist 
trouble-makers and reactionary stakeholders, people would respond automatically and 
primarily to universal economic incentives. Living under modern conditions, Nehru appeared 
to grant no intrinsic need for spiritual, non-material beliefs. In challenging the Hindu 
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Mahasabha leader, Bhai Parmanandji, Nehru asked the following: ‘In the modern world, 
trains, cars and aeroplanes have almost abolished boundaries and built world unity. Books, 
newspapers, the telegraphy, radio and cinema influence us and gradually change our 
ideas….I want to know from Bhaiji what is the stand of our old Hinduism on all these 
matters? He talks about religion and caste civilisations. But the civilization of the modern 
world is that of mighty machinery and gigantic workshops. What have they to do with 
religions?”270 
 
To summarise, the central concept within Nehru’s assessment and understanding of 
religion is that of rationality. The scientifically rational person, is epistemologically speaking, 
someone whose relation to knowledge and reality is primarily positivist and material. Hence, 
religion is portrayed in various negative ways as (a) a veneer, (b) an instrument for power 
politics and, (c) a source of dogmatism and debilitation. In each case the implication is that 
religion contributes to irrational behaviour and this applied to both Muslims and Hindus. At 
the same time Nehru was committed to the argument that material not spiritual factors 
ultimately account for people’s behaviour. In a series of articles on The Unity of India, Nehru 
writes that the Muslims are only technically a minority: ‘They are vast in numbers and 
powerful in other ways, and it is patent that they cannot be coerced against their will, just as 
the Hindus cannot be coerced against their will.....But let us always remember that in political 
and economic matters people do not function as religious groups. The lines of cleavage are 
different’.271 
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Translating such a stance into concrete policy recommendations is problematic since 
in Nehru’s ideal state of the world, religion would simply cease to play a role. In the quote 
with which this section began, Nehru portrays Communalism as ‘a giant with feet of 
clay.....and when we regain our tempers it will fade into nothingness’. How to convince a 
population of this, for whom religion had long been a central institution and an important 
mechanism facilitating exchange and providing social organisation? However, rather than 
focusing upon this as a key policy concern and the need to develop mechanisms and 
strategies to bring about a gradual process of change, Nehru appears to have regarded ‘social’ 
change to be, by and large, a by-product of ‘economic’ change. Thus Nehru could claim that 
the caste system, which had withstood centuries of challenges, was facing an existential 
threat: “That is not chiefly because of some powerful urge to reform itself which has arisen in 
Hindu society…nor is it because of ideas from the west…The change that is taking place 
before our eyes is due essentially to basic economic changes which have shaken up the whole 
fabric of Indian society and are likely to upset it completely.”272 
 
However, in one of his later pieces of writing, The Unity of India, Nehru simply states 
that “There is no religious or cultural conflict in India. What is called the religious or 
communal problem is really a dispute among upper-class people for a division of the spoils of 
office or of representation in a legislature.”273 Given that he saw this essentially as a problem 
of elites and resources, the envisioned solution, presumably, would not need to deal with 
intangibles and imponderables such as identity and values. In other words, Nehru could quite 
comfortably and confidently say, that ‘This will surely be settled amicably wherever it 
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arises’.274 This is markedly different from his approach towards economic planning which 
foresaw the possible objections, hurdles, and the need for consensus-building. 
 
Strangely, in the area of social reform, Nehru seemed to revert most closely to 
policies initiated by the British, an indication, this thesis proposes, of the limited expertise 
and understanding that Nehru had for the problem. This leads to the controversial proposition 
that despite being hailed as founder of a secular state, Nehru contributed very little in terms 
of actually institutionalising secularism. For instance on the topic of reforming Hindu Law he 
presents the following criticism of the British strategy that codified customary law: “customs 
change and are forced to adapt themselves to some extent to a changing environment. Hindu 
law was largely custom, and as custom changed the law also was applied in a different way. 
Indeed, there was no provision of Hindu law which could not be changed by custom. The 
British replaced this elastic customary law by judicial decisions based on the old texts and 
Brahmanic interpretations, and these decisions became precedents which had to be rigidly 
followed. That was, in theory, an advantage, as it produced greater uniformity and certainty, 
But, in the manner it was done, it resulted in the perpetuation of ancient law unmodified by 
subsequent customs…….Change could only come by positive legislation, but the British 
Government, which was the legislating authority, had no wish to antagonize the conservative 
elements on whose support it counted.”275 
 
Nehru was aware of the shortcomings of a project, where codification had drastically 
restricted the capacity for change and adaptation. In his efforts later to introduce the Hindu 
code bills in the mid to late fifties, Nehru was so convinced of the rational righteousness of 
his judgement that he forgot these two important lessons that the British experience should 
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have provided: (1) codification as a form of petrification and, (2) legislation as a product of 
lobbying that is bound to skew original reformist intentions. Furthermore, since Nehru did 
not initiate any process of consensus-building or fact-finding (as he did in the case of 
planning), the Hindu code bill was quickly framed within a highly polarised debate pitting 
‘modernists’ and ‘reformists’ against ‘reactionaries’ and ‘revivalists’. As will be shown in 
chapter seven, Nehru’s attempts to reform Hinduism and the application of Hindu law, fell far 
short of his expectations.  
 
 
3.4.2. Nehru on Economic Development and Socialism 
 
 
Encountering the fashionable creed of Fabianism during his student days in London 
through people like Harold Laski at the London School of Economics, the young Jawaharlal 
Nehru was full of radical ideas. Visiting Russia in 1928 together with his father, Motilal 
Nehru, a series of articles by Jawaharlal Nehru were published in various Indian newspapers 
and then compiled into a book titled, Soviet Russia. Some Random Sketches and Impressions. 
Admitting a ‘fascination for Russia’, he wrote that the conditions in Russia have not been and 
continued to be not very dissimilar to those in India: ‘Both are vast agricultural countries with 
only the beginnings of industrialisation , and both have to face poverty and illiteracy. If 
Russia finds a satisfactory solution for these, our work in India is made easier’.276 The 
‘economic interpretation of history’, or ‘historic materialism’ appealed greatly to the young 
Nehru and his later works often allude to the need to explore the economic as well as political 
roots of problems. For instance in an essay titled, Whither India, written in 1934 there are 
numerous references to class interests and the inevitable conflict over what freedom meant to 
“feudal India of the princes, the India of the big zamindars, of small zamindars, of the 
                                                 
276 Nehru, J. Soviet Russia. Some Random Sketches and Impressions (Allahabad Law Journal Press, 1928), p. 5. 
134 
 
professional classes, of the agriculturalists, of the industrialists, of the bankers, of the lower 
middles class, of the workers.”277 
 
Not much time is spent in Nehru’s writings discussing details or grappling with 
theoretical works either by Laski or Marx (who presumably had an impact on him) and 
instead he propounded a more personal and rather vague interpretation of socialism. Hence in 
the same article mentioned above, Whither India, Jawaharlal analyses the world situation in 
the following terms, ‘capitalism, having solved the problem of production, helplessly faces 
the allied problem of distribution and is unable to solve it.....To find a solution for distributing 
wealth and purchasing power evenly is to put an end to the basic inequalities of the capitalist 
system and to replace capitalism itself by a more scientific system.’ (italics added).278  
 
Similarly, in his 1936 presidential address to the INC, Nehru claimed, “I am 
convinced that the only key to the solution of the world’s problem and of India’s problems 
lies in socialism, and when I use this word I do so not in a vague humanitarian way but in the 
scientific, economic sense. Socialism is, however, something even more than an economic 
doctrine; it is a philosophy of life and as such also appeals to me. I see no way of ending the 
poverty, the vast unemployment, the degradation and the subjection of the Indian people 
except through socialism. That involves vast and revolutionary changes in our political and 
social structure, the ending of vested interests in land and industry, the ending of private 
property, except in a restricted sense, and the replacement of the present profit system by a 
higher ideal of cooperative service. It means ultimately a change in our instincts and habits 
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and desires. In short, it means a new civilization, radically different from the present 
capitalist order.”279 
 
Since this is a representative quotation of the young Nehru it is used as a template for 
analysing his belief system in the area of economic policy.  
 
The conceptual variables in the above quote are the following: 
A. Solving the world’s and India’s problems (goal variable) 
B. Socialism (utility variable) i.e. a ‘higher ideal of cooperative service’ 
C. Ending ‘poverty, unemployment, degradation, subjection’ (goal variable) 
D. Change in the political and social structure (policy variable) 
E. Change in instincts, habits and desires (policy variable) 
F. New Civilisation (utility & goal variable) 
 
The direct correspondence between variables are the following: 
1. Solution of world and India’s problems lies in socialism B   +   A (positive 
relationship) 
2. More Socialism will enable the ending of poverty etc: B   -    C (negative relationship) 
3. Change in structure, i.e. the ending of vested interests, ending of private property will 
bring about ‘higher ideal of cooperative service’: D    -     B (negative relationship) 
4. Ending poverty, unemployment, degradation entails will a change in instincts, habits 
and desires (both positive values): C   +    E  
5. Change (improvement) in instincts, habits, desires will give rise to a new civilisation: 
E   +   F (positive relationship) 
                                                 
279 Gopal, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Series One, Volume 7, (Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1972), p. 
170: Nehru’s Presidential Address at Lucknow, 12 April, 1936. See Appendix for a full reprint of this speech. 
136 
 
 
The following observations can be drawn: 
1. As mentioned earlier an important characteristic to look for in cognitive maps is path-
balance, in other words the degree to which parallel paths between pairs of variables 
have the same sign. This is meant to indicate the consistency of a policy choice. The 
above set of relations produces an even number of negative relationships which, 
according to Axelrod’s calculations is equivalent to a double reversal, producing 
indirectly a positive effect that indicates path-balance. The key inference to be drawn 
is that there is an internally consistent path between the goal, policy and utility 
variables. By analysing the extract on economic policy it can be inferred that even at 
an early stage, Nehru’s thinking on economic matters was more complex and 
coherent. 
2. Unlike his views on religion, Nehru’s writing on economic ideas contains a clear 
picture of the goals to be achieved and the instruments and steps needed. Hence, there 
is a selection of goal and policy variables.  
 
It is nevertheless noteworthy that the term socialism remained under-specified in 
Nehru’s speeches and public pronouncements through the 1930s and 40s for although 
Jawaharlal Nehru believed that the freedom struggle was, in addition to being a political 
challenge, also an economic battle against special class privileges and vested interests, he was 
careful not to rattle Congress party members with too much talk of radicalism. In 1934, for 
instance when Subhas Chandra Bose formed the Congress Socialist Party, Nehru pointedly 
chose to remain outside it, unwilling to isolate himself from the main centre of power 
politics, the INC and power-holders like Gandhi. Statements such as the following made to 
the press in 1936 were rare: “What I seek is an elimination of the profit motive in society and 
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its replacement by a spirit of social service, cooperation taking the place of competition, 
production for consumption instead of for profit.”280 While the concepts underpinning 
Nehru’s vision of Socialism remain relatively under-developed, it is interesting to note that 
his thoughts on how to formulate and apply a socialist outlook to economic policy are 
extensive. What are striking are the institutional requirements and the need for consensus-
building which Nehru recognised to be important early on in his consideration of the 
challenges to and conditions necessary for economic development.  
 
Contributing in 1937 to a book on India’s envisioned federal structure, he made the 
following comments about the need for a National Economic Council: “A modern 
government has to face difficult economic problems and to undertake complicated tasks 
which require careful thought and expert guidance.....The national economic council could 
also be entrusted with the task of planning the economic life of the community under the 
general direction and supervision of the federal government. This task is a stupendous one 
and it may be necessary to create a special planning commission for the purpose.”281 Most 
importantly he went on to emphasize the need for a broad base of representatives, reflecting 
interests across the board, including “representatives of the federating units and also 
representatives of special interests, such as chambers of commerce or industry, agriculture, 
trade unions of industrial workers, peasant organisations, professional and technical 
associations, and scientific experts.”282  
And, this was not merely empty rhetoric. In December 1938 a National Planning 
Committee was formed. Already after its first meeting a questionnaire was issued to all 
participants for feedback on the general line of action and the type of planning. Aware of the 
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possible backlash against radical ideas Nehru realised there was a need to convince people 
first and thus plotted his steps accordingly: “If we start with the dictum that only under 
socialism there can be planning, we frighten people and irritate the ignorant. If, on the other 
hand, we think in terms of planning apart from socialism and thus inevitably arrive at some 
form of socialism, that is a logical process which will convert many who are weary of words 
and slogans.”283 A year later, Nehru was still committed to the task of gradually laying the 
foundations and the seeds for a planned economy in India of the future. Thus, “the super-
structure will inevitably come later. But if even the foundation is laid in men’s minds a great 
national task will have been done.......Ultimately it is not the Committee that will decide the 
future of India or of its political or economic organisation but the people of India who will 
take the final decision. It is for them, therefore, to pay attention to what this Committee is 
doing. Perhaps one of the most important and desirable consequences of our work is to make 
people think of planned work and cooperative society.’284 
 
The extent of thought and analysis that is reflected in Nehru’s writing on the issue of 
economic planning is truly remarkable in comparison with the highly opinionated and 
categorical statements made concerning the role of religion and the need for social reform. In 
a section of The Discovery of India entirely devoted to the National Planning Committee, 
Nehru makes four essential discoveries about the process of consensus-building. In the first 
place he recognised the complexity of the issue at stake. Thinking about how to solve 
economic problems required a multi-dimensional view with an understanding of how 
poverty, unemployment, economic regeneration, even national defence needed an all-
encompassing approach providing for the development of heavy, key industries, medium 
scale industries, and cottage industries, as well as agriculture and in addition, social services. 
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He writes how ‘one thing led to another and it was impossible to isolate anything or to 
progress in one direction without corresponding progress in another. The more we thought of 
this planning business, the vaster it grew in its sweep and range till it seemed to embrace 
almost every activity.’285 
 
The second critical realisation related to the problem of managing a body that 
represented so many different interests and perspectives. The way out that Nehru identified 
was one that envisioned the possibility of synergy emerging from conflict and discussion:  
‘We decided to consider the general problem of planning as well as each individual problem 
concretely and not in the abstract, and allow principles to develop out of such 
considerations.’286  
 
Thirdly, Nehru recognised the value of fact-finding for ‘It did not very much matter 
even if there were two or more reports, provided that all the available facts were collected 
and coordinated, the common ground mapped out, and the divergences indicated.’287 And 
finally, despite the conflict in opinions and approaches, the Committee would have played an 
invaluable role for, ‘When the time came for giving effect to the Plan, the then existing 
democratic government would have to choose what basic policy to adopt. Meanwhile a great 
deal of essential preparation would have been made and the various aspects of the problem 
placed before the public and the various provincial and state governments’.288 
 
In addition, a distinctive approach to the question of economic development seems to 
have been Nehru’s willingness to accept a degree of flexibility and experimentation. This is 
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different compared to the dogmatic instructions that characterise his writing on reforming 
Hindu institutions, and the rather passionate conviction of his reflections on the world 
situation and India’s place in it. For example the essence of planning being ‘a large measure 
of regulation and coordination……no special rule was laid down but it was made clear that 
the very nature of planning required control in some measure, which might vary with the 
industry’.289 And, on land policy, ‘Cooperative farming could be combined either with 
individual or joint ownership. A certain latitude was allowed for various types to develop so 
that, with greater experience, particular types might be encouraged more than others.’290  
 
As a result of this comparatively flexible approach, it is possible to imagine that in the 
process of policy implementation, if one method failed, there were alternatives to fall back on 
without the overall goals of the entire project having to be abandoned. Furthermore, because 
of the efforts at consensus-building there was less risk of reaching a dead-lock. 
 
3.4.3. Nehru on Foreign policy and Internationalism 
 
Since, in his early writings Nehru did not explicitly discuss the foreign policy 
aspirations and tools that an independent India might implement, it is necessary to examine 
his more general appraisal of world politics. For instance, the extensive quotation below 
offers an insight into his perception of international affairs at the time and the global 
dynamics driving, hindering and determining world politics. A cognitive map derived from 
this enables a partial construction of Nehru’s worldview. Written during his time in prison in 
1934 in the form of letters to his daughter, Glimpses of World History reveals Nehru’s 
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approach to history, which he regarded as the ‘story of man’s struggle with living’.291 In the 
penultimate chapter of the book, Nehru purveyed the state of affairs in Europe: 
“The whole past tendency has been towards greater interdependence between nations, a 
greater internationalism. Even though separate independent national States remained, an 
enormous and intricate structure of international relations and trade grew up. This process 
went so far as to conflict with the national States and with nationalism itself. The next natural 
step was a socialised international structure. Capitalism, having had its day, had reached the 
stage when it was time for it to retire in favour of socialism. But unhappily such a voluntary 
retirement never takes place. Because crisis and collapse threatened it, it has withdrawn into 
its shell and tried to reverse the past tendency towards interdependence. Hence economic 
nationalism.”292 
 
The conceptual variables identified in the above quote are the following: 
A. Interdependence (utility variable) 
B. Internationalism (utility variable) 
C. Separate independent national States (periphery variable) 
D. Structure of international relations and trade (policy variable)  
E. The national State and nationalism (periphery variable)  
F. Socialised international structure (goal variables)  
G. Capitalism (policy variable)  
H. Socialism (goal variables)  
I. Crisis and collapse (periphery variable) 
J. Economic nationalism. (policy variable)  
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Based on the text above, the main causal relations observed are: 
1. Greater independence leads to greater internationalism:  A  +   B (positive 
relationship) 
2. Despite there being separate national states, a structure of international relations and 
trade did emerge: C      -     D (negative relationship) 
3. The national State and nationalism conflicts with the process of international relations 
and trade: E     -     D (negative relationship) 
4. Nevertheless, this ought to have generated a socialised international structure: D    +  
F (positive relationship) 
5. But Capitalism does not give way to Socialism: G   -      H (negative relationship) 
6. Instead Crisis and Collapse threatens Capitalism I    -     G  (negative relationship) 
7. The weakening of Capitalism in turn generates Economic Nationalism: G   +    J 
(positive relationship) 
8. Economic Nationalism reverses the trend towards interdependence. J    -    A 
(negative relationship) 
 
The subsequent observations are interesting to note. 
1. On the issue of world affairs, Nehru makes use of a number of conceptual variables, 
most of which he does not de-construct or explain. Hence, it is not clear how he 
measures interdependence and what in observable terms, constitutes greater 
internationalism. 
2. While there is a clear goal variable (a socialised international structure) this is not 
specified in terms of what this entails and how it would differ from the existing 
structure of international relations. 
143 
 
3. Nor is it apparent who the actors are. Instead, Nehru refers to grand processes such as 
Capitalism, Economic Nationalism, Crisis and Collapse as the motors of change. 
4. While this extract does not seem to contain a causal cycle ( A causes B, B causes C, 
and C causes A) there is a dense interconnection between the variables. This suggests 
that Nehru’s thoughts on the subject were rather opaque. On the one hand he 
identifies the progression of interdependence as the source of greater internationalism 
and a step towards a ‘socialised international structure’ and, at the same time he 
observes obstacles that seem to have been generated by the process itself. Nehru does 
not provide a way out except to later on refer to ‘the idealism of working for a great 
human purpose’.293 This rather non-committal position persists in Nehru’s writing and 
speeches on world affairs and the dynamics of international politics. 
 
Given that the major cause for conflict was the psychosis of fear, Nehru envisioned 
the major goal of diplomacy to be to persuade states of the world to cease their practice of 
mutual condemnation and recrimination. In his view, any state that based its foreign policy on 
the traditional conception of power politics was destined to work against its true national 
interests. Hence, Nehru was staunchly against the realists of his time such as Sir Halford 
McKinder, the British geopolitician, Nicholas J. Spykman, the American geopolitician, 
Walter Lippmann, the American journalist. Nehru did not think foreign policy should only be 
about power and, that values such as justice, fairness, tolerance should not only serve the 
power objective. Lippmann’s geopolitical conception of alliances294 was also dismissed by 
Nehru: ‘Such a proposal looks very clever and realistic’ he wrote‚ ‘yet is supremely foolish, 
for it is based on the old policy of expansion and empire and the balance of power which 
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inevitably leads to conflict and war’.295 The traditional effort of states practicing power 
politics through encircling their rivals did not seem like a realistic practice to Nehru either. 
Since the world was round, every country was inevitably encircled by others and there was 
always a potential danger of encirclement. This was seen by Nehru to be a ‘continuation of 
old tradition’ in the style of European power politics, leading him to critique Realist thinkers 
and policy-makers for sticking to the ‘empty shell of the past’ and refusing to ‘understand the 
hard facts of the present’296. 
 
Anticipating the ‘English School’ of the 1950s which proclaimed the need for a via 
media between realism and liberalism or utopianism, Nehru’s writing on international 
relations contained both pragmatic and radical, revolutionary elements. While he did not at 
aim at overhauling the Westphalian system of states, or herald the end of conflict altogether, 
he emphasised the need for international society297. This was to be achieved through a 
transformation of the psychological atmosphere from being one permeated by hostility, 
suspicion and fear to one infused with rationalism, tolerance, friendliness and cooperation. 
The ‘habit of being moderate in language’ as cultivated by Gandhi during the freedom 
struggle, ought to become characteristic of diplomacy he wrote in his book, Unity of India. 
What is interesting and which also echoes the amalgam that the English School sought to 
provide, was the fact that Nehru and his contemporaries, such as Subhas Chandra Bose, did 
not necessarily see a conflict between nationalism and internationalism. On the one hand 
fervent nationalists, fighting for the freedom of their nation, these individuals criticised the 
nation-state system founded on national interests. Emerging perhaps from the collective 
experience of colonialism and liberation, the most important manifestation of this nascent 
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internationalism came in the form of advocating Asian unity and regionalism. Nehru was the 
most articulate early post-war advocate of Asian unity, which he saw as the inevitable 
restoration of cultural and commercial links across Asia that had been violently disrupted by 
colonialism. A strong theme in his books, he organized the Asian Relations Conferences of 
1947 and 1949, the latter being specifically aimed at putting international pressure on the 
Dutch to grant independence to Indonesia. Interestingly, although Non-alignment was to 
become a core pillar of his foreign policy later on, it does not feature at all in his books or in 
his articles of the 1920s, 30s and early 40s.  
 
Using the British Empire as a point of reference, Nehru tried to draw lessons for 
example from British India’s frontier policy: ‘the frontier of India and the lands beyond are 
regarded by the government as a probable theatre of war, and all their policy is directed to 
strengthening themselves for war purposes....The military mind, ignoring political and 
psychological factors, thinks only in terms of extending the bounds of an empire and thus 
making it safer from attack. As a matter of fact this process often ends in weakening a 
country or an empire..... All this has led to the so-called “Forward policy” at the frontier and 
because of this every excuse is good enough to be utilised for a forward move.....This forward 
policy becomes an intense preparation for war, for the great war that is prophesied for the not 
distant future.....The forward policy has another aspect, a communal one. Just as the canker of 
communalism, fostered by imperialism, weakens and injures public life and our struggle for 
freedom so also the forward policy introduces that canker at the frontier and creates trouble 
between India and her neighbours.’298 It is of course puzzling or perhaps ironic that much 
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later on, it was Nehru’s own ‘forward policy’ on the Sino-Indian border that was seen by the 
Chinese as provocative and used as a reason to launch the 1962 war.299 
 
Living through tumultuous times it is understandable that Nehru’s views were to be 
affected by his perception of the injustices witnessed and the events leading up to World War 
Two. A strong streak of internationalism pervades a lot of his analysis of foreign policy in 
general and in particular with regards his ideals for India’s standing in the world. Developing 
an internationalist outlook was considered by Nehru to be vital in order to avoid a narrow 
nationalism which threatened to be ‘an escape sought in dreams of the past...the golden age of 
past times, of Rama Raj’300.301 However, at the same time there are occasions when the 
internationalism was given unnecessary emphasis. For example the ‘Quit India’ resolution 
adopted by the All-India Congress Committee on 8th August 1942 bore the imprint of 
Nehru’s thinking: ‘The Committee approves of and endorses the resolution...and have made it 
clear that the immediate ending of British rule in India is an urgent necessity, both for the 
sake of India and for the success of the cause of the United Nations. The continuation of that 
rule is degrading and enfeebling India and making her progressively less capable of 
defending herself and of contributing to the cause of world freedom.’302 Why, it was thought 
necessary to invoke internationalism alongside the most normal of desires and natural rights 
to be free, is odd and ran the risk of confusing the most basic of national interests with grand 
internationalist rhetoric.  
 
                                                 
299 For an analysis of Nehru’s Forward Policy see R.Rajagopalan, “Re-examining the ‘Forward Policy’ ”, in 
Kumaraswamy, P.R. Security Beyond Survival (Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2004). 
300 The ‘Rule of Rama’ refers to a mythical, golden age of political harmony and virtue. 
301 Nehru, Article published in May 1928, in Gopal, S. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Volume Three, 
Series One, (1972), p. 380. 
302 Quit India Resolution in Zaidi, A.M. The Encyclopaedia of the Indian National Congress, Volume 12, 1939 
– 1946 (Chand & Co., 1981), pp. 390 – 395. 
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A sense of camaraderie with China is another strong theme in Nehru’s writing which 
again seems to fit the great importance given to internationalism. The relationship with China 
was founded upon a feeling of solidarity with a nation and people also engaged in an anti-
imperialist struggle: ‘Like China, India is aspiring and fighting for national freedom. The 
forces of national freedom in both countries extend to each other the hand of sympathy and 
support. They must band themselves together against the urge of imperialism for exploitation 
and conquest....The ancient friendship of the two peoples of China and India must now be 
reinforced by the new camaraderie of the two freedom-loving nations.’303 Nehru nurtured an 
interest in Chinese history and a number of chapters in his book, Glimpses of World History 
focus on China’s development. Discussing the rise and fall of dynasties Nehru proposes 
various explanations for the process of change, the impetus for which he perceived to be 
largely endogenous. Hence decline and decay were seen as stemming from inner weaknesses 
such as corrupt government, decadent elites or even ‘too much parental government’ which 
weakened the people.304 
On a number of occasions China is referred to as India’s ‘great sister in the East’.305 
However, although Nehru accorded great respect for the achievements and resilience of 
Chinese culture and in particular admired the secular nature of Chinese society and 
government, there is an implicit sense of superiority when it comes to the development of 
political institutions. This is evident for example in the way he treats the founding of the first 
Chinese Republic under Dr. Sun Yat Sen.306 Describing the internal tensions within the 
Kuomintang party Nehru observed how the rivalries and different factions eventually led to 
the party breaking up, plunging the country into civil war. What is noteworthy is that Nehru 
                                                 
303 Nehru, J. Newspaper article printed on 21 August, 1938 in Gopal, S. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, 
Volume 9, Series One, p. 209. 
304 Nehru, Glimpses of World History (Oxford University Press, New Delhi 1982), p. 270. 
305 Ibid. p. 328. 
306 Ibid., see chapter 177, pp. 827 -  34. 
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drew no parallels with the case of India and the Congress party. He reveals no anxiety about 
similar developments afflicting the Indian freedom struggle nor does he mention any lessons 
to be learned from the experiences of upheaval in China. In other words while waxing 
eloquent about ancient China and a misty past of sisterhood shared by these two ancient 
civilisations, there is little about modern China, apart from its size, that Nehru explicitly 
refers to as the basis for a future partnership of equality and friendship with India. One 
possible explanation for this is an inherent sense of superiority about India’s political 
development. China, in Nehru’s writings is usually lauded for its artistic and cultural 
achievements but not for its great political and organisational abilities for instance its ability 
to establish and maintain control over such a large empire307. Nehru’s interpretation of 
Chinese history bears the same attitude prevalent in the West at the time, that China out of its 
weakness and decadence had succumbed to superior Western power. 
 
3.5. Conclusion: operationalising a cognitive map . 
 
Through this exercise of examining Nehru’s thinking in three different policy areas 
one is able to identify some of the core ideas that were likely to have influenced Nehru’s later 
choices and preferences. Such an assumption draws upon the work of Axelrod, Shapiro and 
Alexander George308 all of whom held that individuals construct a specific rationale for a 
particular set of actions. While earlier writers such as Alexander George and Nathan Leites 
used the concept of an ‘operational code’, the thesis uses the tool of a ‘cognitive map’ which 
allows for an analysis of causal beliefs or assertions held by the individual. The additional 
                                                 
307 Hence for instance in the chapter on ‘An Age of Peace and Prosperity in China’ in Nehru’s Glimpses of 
World History, the focus is clearly on China’s artistic creativity and not on the abilities of its administrative 
classes and governance.  
308 See for example: Alexander L. George ‘The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of 
Political Leaders and Decision-Making’, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 13/2, June 1969. 
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proposition being made here is that by looking at the three ‘mini’ cognitive maps it is 
possible to draw comparisons with regards to how far Nehru had conceptualised the three 
areas of economic development, social reform and foreign policy prior to India’s 
independence.  
 
Such an approach offers a marked contrast from the usual biographical accounts of 
Nehru that are so widely available which simply recount the narrative of his youth and entry 
into politics. What this chapter has sought to do is identify the actor’s beliefs and premises 
and with the help of a cognitive map to create the prism through which the actor perceived 
and diagnosed the flow of political events. These beliefs are considered important given that 
they provide the norms, standards and guidelines that influence the actor’s choice of strategy 
and tactics, his structuring and weighting of alternative courses of action. With regards 
religion and secularism, Nehru’s thought process indicated a tendency towards seeing things 
in black and white and of understanding problems in terms of stark contrasts. On the subject 
of economic development and socialism the vision conveyed by Nehru demonstrated a 
greater concern with policy, the applicability of socialist goals to India and the need to 
establish consensus-driven methods of attaining socialism.  Finally, on the subject of foreign 
policy there is surprisingly little in his writings and the tendency is towards sweeping 
statements and comments rather than concrete-policy related and India-specific observations.  
Having seen that Nehru’s vision of a secular, socialist and internationalist, independent India 
varied greatly in terms of the challenges foreseen and the possible solutions envisioned, it 
will be easier to explain some of his later tactical choices which will be covered in chapters 
five, six and seven. Using the Constituent Assembly debates, Nehru’s ‘vision’ will be 
contextualised in terms of the alternatives that were being voiced and the extent to which his 
views faced criticism. Before this however, it is necessary to briefly turn to the institutional 
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and ideological setting within which Nehru emerged during the 1930s and 40s for it is 
recognised that the actor’s belief system does not unilaterally determine decision-making but 
that it is an important variable affecting the range of options considered by the actor.  
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Chapter Four 
Contextualising Nehru: his contemporaries and ‘the structure of opportunities’. 
 
4.1. Introduction. 
4.2. Organisation of the Indian National Congress. 
4.3. Nehru as Congress President: a content analysis of his presidential addresses. 
4.4. Nehru’s Contemporaries. 
4.4.1. Rajendra Prasad 
4.4.2. Subhas Chandra Bose 
4.4.3. Vallabhbhai Patel 
4.5. Consolidating Power: the struggle for dominance.  
4.5.1. Nehru’s position within the INC: 1947 – 1955. 
4.5.2. Nehru as political entrepreneur: transforming the Congress-led movement into a 
political party 
4.6.             Conclusion. 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Tactically speaking, Nehru was extremely successful given the fact that by the mid-
1950s his leadership was virtually uncontested. In this chapter it will be demonstrated how 
Nehru tailored his ‘Vision’ in order to minimise the risk of being sidelined within the 
Congress party whilst at the same time carving out a distinct persona and agenda. To do this, 
the chapter examines each of Nehru’s speeches as Congress President (1929, 1936, 1936/37, 
1951, 1953, 1954) and conducts a content analysis to explore the influence of Socialism in 
Nehru’s understanding of world events and as a platform upon which to launch his political 
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agenda. The position of Congress president was of particular importance during the years 
prior to independence. Elected on an annual basis, the role of Congress President provided 
the individual with an opportunity to define his political persona and to make his beliefs 
known to a wide audience. At the same time, and in particular during the 1930s, the 
president-elect had to have Gandhi’s backing and hence represented a position of power and 
prestige. Functioning like a ‘government-in-waiting’, the Congress body issued resolutions 
pertaining to organisational matters, responses to current developments as well as setting out 
general principles conveying the Congress position on policy matters even though the party 
lacked policy-making capability.  
 
The chapter begins with a description of the key bodies within the Congress structure 
as it was in the early 1930s. This structure remained in place following independence in 1947 
albeit with the addition of the Congress Parliamentary Board. Turning to Nehru’s speeches as 
Congress President, an assessment is made of the extent to which socialism adopted a central 
place within his rhetoric as the representative of the Congress party.  Following this a 
comparison is drawn with the speeches of three other contemporary presidents: Rajendra 
Prasad, Vallabhbhai Patel and Subhas Chandra Bose. Such an exercise, it is argued will help 
contextualise Nehru in terms of contrasting him with other political figures, each of whom 
was a representative Congress figure in his own right. The chapter begins with the 1930s and 
ends in the mid-1950s when, it is posited, Nehru was at the peak of his power. For the period 
following independence two decision-making bodies emerged as important instruments of 
influence: the Congress Working Committee and the prime minister’s cabinet. Both are 
examined and used as barometers for Nehru’s rising power. The conclusion summarises the 
shifting ‘structure of opportunities’ and explains the importance of this changing context for 
the following analyses of individual policies in chapters five, six and seven. 
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4.2. Organisation of the Indian National Congress. 
In the pre-independence days the Congress organisation consisted of a pyramidal 
national decision-making structure. At the base were the 21 Provincial Congress Committee 
(PCC) which were obliged to send a list to the Working Committee of the members qualifies 
to vote for the delegates who would then represent the PCC at the All-India Congress 
Committee (A.I.C.C.). The numbers of delegates each province was entitled to was set 
according to whether the province was designated a ‘rural’ or ‘urban’ area and the density of 
population. The elected delegates of each province were obliged to meet on a specific date 
and to propose the candidate or candidates for the Presidentship of the Congress for the 
ensuing year and to elect from among themselves one-twelfth of their number as 
representatives of the province to the A.I.C.C. The A.I.C.C. was treated as an unofficial 
parliament, responsible for carrying out the work programme laid down by the Congress from 
session to session. See the following diagram for an organigram of the Congress party’s 
organisational structure. 
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Figure 3: Organigram of Congress Organisational Structure 
    (based on 1934 Congress Party Constitution) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the apex was the Working Committee, a small executive sub-committee of the 
A.I.C.C. which acted as the cabinet of the movement. The President was allowed to select 
fourteen members from among the members of the A.I.C.C. to constitute his Working 
Committee. Under the 1934 Constitution, the Working Committee was to ‘be the executive 
authority and as such shall have the power to carry into effect the policy and programme laid 
Congress 
President. 
Elected by PCCs
Working Committee. 
14 members selected by Congress President from AICC 
All India Congress Committee (AICC). 
1/12 of PCC members elected to represent 
Province at  AICC. 
PCC delegates propose candidate for Congress 
President. 
Provincial Congress Committee (PCC). 
21 Provinces represented; any person over 18 could become a member. 
Selected members from each PCC vote to elect Delegates from each province. 
Delegates must not exceed one Delegate per 150,000 inhabitants of province. 
Meets as Subjects 
Committee before 
the Annual Session
Annual Congress Session 
Delegates chosen by PCCs 
3 General Secretaries 
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down by the A.I.C.C. and the Congress.’ It had the power to (a) frame rules and issue 
instructions for the proper working of the Constitution; (b) to superintend, direct and control 
all Congress Committees subject to review by the A.I.C.C.; (c) to take such disciplinary 
action as it may deem fit against a committee or individual for misconduct, wilful neglect or 
default.309 
 
After tallying the number of votes recorded in favour of all the PCC-recommended 
candidates, the Working Committee announced the new President-elect. Initially, the 
President had been chosen annually by an ad hoc committee appointed at the yearly Congress 
session. After 1934 however, he was elected directly by the delegates, a change introduced by 
Gandhi who thought a popularly elected President would help centralise leadership and 
galvanise the movement.310 In preparation of the Annual Session of the Congress, which all 
delegates from each province attended, the new A.I.C.C. met as a Subjects Committee a few 
days before. The out-going Working Committee submitted a draft programme of the work for 
the upcoming annual session along with the resolutions carried out by the different PCCs. to 
the President-elect.  
 
Following the formation of the Interim Government in 1946, the setting up of 
Congress ministries in the states and finally, complete independence in August 1947, the role 
of the Indian National Congress underwent a dramatic change. This had to be matched with 
appropriate changes to the organisational set-up so that a new relationship between party and 
government could be formed. The diagram below depicts the new elements in the Congress 
structure after independence.  
                                                 
309 Rao, R. Development of the Congress Constitution (A.I.C.C. New Delhi,1958), p.60 
310 Kochanek, S.A. The Congress Party of India. The Dynamics of One-Party Democracy (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1968), p. xxiii. 
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Figure 4: Organigram of Congress Organisation 
                (based on 1951 Congress Party Constitution) 
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To de-centralise the structure, new tiers had been introduced including the District 
Congress Committee in cities with a population of more than 200,000 and the Mandal 
Congress Committee. Each Provincial Committee was to return delegates to the Congress in 
the proportion of one to every 100,000 population from which one eight would act as 
representatives to the A.I.C.C. The rules for electing the Congress President changed from 
PCCs proposing candidates to any ten delegates jointly suggesting the name of any delegate 
for election as President of the Congress. Each delegate was then entitled to vote. The 
Working Committee was to consist of the President and twenty members, including a 
Treasurer and one or more General Secretaries. As the highest executive authority of the 
Congress, the Working Committee had the responsibility of setting up a Parliamentary Board 
consisting of the Congress President and five other members for the purpose of regulating 
and co-ordinating parliamentary activities of the Congress Legislature Parties. A Central 
Election Committee consisting of Parliamentary Board members and five other members 
elected by the AICC was responsible for conducting election campaigns and making the final 
selection of candidates for the State and Central legislatures. 
 
As Kochanek describes in his book, The Congress Party of India. The Dynamics of 
One-Party Democracy, there were three phases in the evolution of party-government 
relations: ‘The first, a period of transition which lasted from 1946 to 1951, was marked by 
conflict between party and government and by disorder and confusion at the executive level 
of the party organisation as the Congress sought to adapt a nationalist movement to a political 
party.’ This was followed by a ‘period of convergence’ where under Nehru’s guidance, the 
Working Committee ‘came to perform the functions of party-government coordination, 
centre-state coordination and conflict resolution’. A third phase, ‘a period of divergence saw 
the development of a certain equilibrium of power between party and government, centre and 
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states.’311 For the purpose of the thesis the focus here is on the first two phases of 
transformation when the relationship between the Prime Minister and the Congress President 
was in the process of being redefined and the Working Committee took on a new function. 
First, the chapter examines Nehru in his capacity as Congress President. 
 
4.3. Nehru as Congress President: a content analysis of his presidential addresses. 
 
No systematic analysis of Nehru’s presidential addresses is available in the vast 
Nehru-related literature. Given that he was elected president three times before and three 
times after independence, his speeches provide a useful medium through which to examine 
any notable shifts in his position. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Nehru’s 
worldview and political beliefs drew heavily from the school of Fabien socialism that was 
popular at the time. Hence, this section seeks to investigate the presence of Nehru’s socialist 
beliefs in his speeches, to explore the way in which he packaged them so as to enhance their 
appeal to the Congress party while minimising the risk of earning the reputation of being a 
radical and isolating himself. Throughout the 1930s Nehru was aware of his tenuous position 
within the Congress establishment given that he had not worked his way up though grassroots 
activism as had Patel and Prasad nor did he represent a solid regional basis of power, as did 
Bose (these differences are examined in the following section on his contemporaries). Thus it 
is interesting to examine how Nehru tailored his ‘image’ and rhetoric given the compulsions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
311 Ibid. p. xxiii – xxiv. 
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To conduct the content analysis the following steps were followed: 
1. Five presidential addresses were examined. 
2. The unit of analysis was the word ‘socialism’ or ‘socialist’. 
3. Only Nehru’s direct references to socialism were taken note of, either in terms of his 
using socialism as a prism through which to understand and explain world politics to 
his audience or presenting socialism as the source of solutions to India’s socio-
economic problems. 
 
The following table summarises the main elements in each of Nehru’s six presidential 
addresses along with the direct references made to Socialism. 
 
Table 2: Nehru’s Presidential Addresses 
 
 
Year Main Elements Reference to Socialism 
1929 
Lahore 
Session 
 
i.     The world context: a changing order. 
ii.    India as part of a world movement. 
iii.   The stability of India’s social structure & 
 the capacity to adjust to new equilibriums. 
iv.   Most vital question of universal concern 
 is social and economic equality. 
v.    The need to surpass religious differences. 
vi.   Response to British moves:  
 the need for complete independence  
 not dominion status. 
vii.  Three major problems facing India:  
 minorities, Indian states, labour & peasantry 
viii. Congress must work towards an end to the 
 domination of one class over another 
viii. Need for cooperation between Congress and 
 Trade Union 
Refers to the ‘Socialist Ideal’        
(no definition), simply that           
the ‘philosophy of socialism          
has gradually permeated the       
entire structure of society               
the world over’ (p.611). 312 
                                                 
312 All page references refer to the respective Volume of Zaidi, A.M. et al (eds.) The Encyclopaedia of the 
Indian National Congress. (S. Chand & Co. New Delhi, 1980). 
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1936 
Lucknow 
Session 
 
i.     The world context: post WW1 struggle for 
 social freedom. Emergence of two rival 
 systems: capitalist & fascist versus 
 nationalist & socialist. 
ii.  The need for India to break free from imperialist 
 fold otherwise social change impossible. 
iii.   Criticism of British imperialism: repression, 
 poverty, denial of civil rights, fascist 
 mentality. 
iv.   The need for Congress to revive link with 
 masses / the need to turn away from 
 ‘middle-class’ concerns & outlook.  
v.    Need to change constitution. 
vi.   Need to instil socialism within movement  
 but through cooperation with other forces. 
vii.  Socialism can conflict with Congress ideology  
 of khadi programme. Nehru proposed rapid 
 industrialisation as the solution. 
viii. On Untouchability & Communalism:  
 an economic solution will remove  
 the social barriers.  
ix.   On reaching the masses: to organise them  
 as producers and affiliate organisations  
 to Congress. 
x.    Problem of agrarian conditions which have 
 become part of international capitalism and 
 suffer from the pains & crises afflicting it. 
‘The new socialist order of the     
USSR which went from progress     
to progress, though often at terrible 
cost’ (p.86) 
“I am convinced that the only key  
to the solution of the world’s 
problems and of India’s problems 
lies in socialism....in the scientific, 
economic sense.” (p. 94) 
‘Socialism is more than an economic 
doctrine, it is a philosophy of life...  
I see no way of ending poverty, the 
vast unemployment, the degradation 
and the subjection of the Indian 
people except through socialism. 
That involves vast and revolutionary 
changes in our political and social 
structure, the ending of vested 
interests in land and industry as well 
as the feudal and autocratic Indian 
States system.’ (p.95) 
‘I should like the Congress to 
become a socialist organisation and 
to join forces with the other forces   
in the world who are working for the 
new civilisation’ (p96) 
1936 
Faizpur 
Session 
 
i.     World Report: in Europe events moving 
 closer towards war. 
ii.    Decaying world system has led to new desires 
 to abolish poverty, unemployment, 
 betterment of humanity. 
iii.   The need for mass action/ need functional       
          representation in Congress. Need active parti- 
          cipation of organised workers and peasants.  
iv.   The need for a ‘great planned system for     
 the whole land and dealing with all these 
 various national activities’ (p.199) 
‘The disease is deep-seated and 
requires a radical and revolutionary 
remedy i.e. the socialist structure     
of society’ (p188) 
 
‘Backward Russia, with one mighty 
jump, has established a Soviet 
Socialist State and an economic 
order which has resulted in 
tremendous progress in all 
directions.’ (p.192) 
1951 
New Delhi 
Session 
 
 
 
 
 
i.     The interconnection between world events 
 and Indian events, the integration             
 of domestic and foreign policy. 
ii.    India as responsible member of international 
 community: support for UN. 
iii.  The Hindu Code as ‘a symbol of this conflict  
          between progress and reaction in the social   
          domain.’ (p35) 
None 
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Nehru took 
over as 
president 
following 
the resig-
nation of 
Tandon. 
 
      The spirit underlying the Bill ‘was a spirit of  
          liberation and of freeing our people and,         
          more especially, our womenfolk.’ (p35) 
iv.  The need for ‘integrated progress on all fronts,    
          political, economic and social’: land reform,    
          social justice, self-sufficiency in food. 
v.   The need for planning: ‘Nobody likes controls,  
          but controls on certain things become  
          essential when the acquisitive instincts of  
          some individuals or groups come in the way  
          of public good. Private enterprise has to be   
          related to, and brought into the pattern,  
          of the National plan’ (p38) 
vi.   Communalism and separatism as evils      
          resembling fascism.  
vii.  Kashmir to decided by people of Kashmir 
viii. The need for basic unity but whilst     
          encouraging variations in common culture. 
1953 
Hyderabad 
Session 
 
Met after 
one year gap 
due to 
general 
elections, 
1952. 
i.     India as member of comity of nations: 
 respected and responsible. 
ii.    Basic strength of country stems       
 from economic policy. 
iii.   Foreign policy based on friendly relations 
 with all and no interference. 
iv.   Problems in relations with Pakistan. 
v.    Language policy: formation of linguistic 
 provinces a tricky balance between     
            fostering unity and encouraging separatism.  
vi.   The need to fight poverty & unemployment. 
 The Five Year Plan: special emphasis in 
 agriculture, land reform, creation of 
 community centres. 
vii.  Cold War: India to take positions on Korean 
 War, South Africa.  
None 
1954 
Calcutta 
Session 
 
i.     Korea as a test case of Indian foreign policy, 
 policy of non-alignment. 
ii.    Relations with Pakistan complicated by  
 US offer of military aid. 
iii.   The need to root out communalism, 
 provincialism and casteism: the need for 
 local, village bodies to be more active.  
iv.   Next 5 Year Plan to take on land question  
 and employment.  
v.    The need for methods and techniques suited 
 to the problems of a heavily populated 
 underdeveloped country. 
As for nationalisation, most of us 
accept the broad principles of 
socialism, though we may not agree 
on any dogmatic approach to it.’ 
(p.499) 
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 If one supplements the above analysis of Nehru’s speeches with a study of resolutions 
passed during his time as Congress president it is noteworthy how, over time, the resolutions 
came to increasingly reflect Nehru’s rhetoric and to deal with the issues highlighted in his 
speeches. The convergence between Nehru’s speeches and the resolutions issued by the 
Congress is taken as evidence of Nehru’s increasingly pivotal position on central policy 
concerns.  
 
Table 3: Key Congress Party Resolutions313 
 
 
Year Key Resolutions Convergence with Nehru’s interests 
1929 
Lahore 
Session 
 
(1) League Against Imperialism: 
selection of a delegate               
to be considered next meeting. 
(2) Organisation of                
Foreign Department.  
(3) Purna Swaraj          
(Complete Independence)      
Day appointed Jan, 26. 
(1) An organisation Nehru             
was active in. 
(2) Nehru an active proponent         
of enhancing foreign image      
and activities of Congress. 
(3) Nehru the prime proponent        
of ‘Complete Independence’. 
1936 
Lucknow 
Session 
 
(1) Confirmed participation in 
World Committee of struggle 
against War and Fascism, 
Geneva Sep, 1937. 
(2)  Announcement of            
Agrarian programme. 
 
(1) Nehru a proponent of Congress 
participation. 
(2) Announced need for thorough 
change of land tenure and 
revenue system as advocated     
by Nehru. 
 
1936 
Faizpur 
Session 
 
(1) Support for World Peace 
Congress. 
(2) Sympathy for struggle in Spain 
expressed. 
 
(1) Attended by Krishna Menon, 
supported by Nehru. 
(2) Nehru’s emphasis on struggle 
between fascism and socialism   
in Spain. 
                                                 
313 Drawn from Zaidi, A.M. et al (eds.) The Encyclopaedia of the Indian National Congress. (S. Chand & Co. 
New Delhi, 1980). 
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(3) Frontier Policy. 
(4) Announced steps towards an 
All-India Agrarian Programme. 
 
(3) The need to declare friendly 
policy towards all neighbours. 
(4) Recognised peasant unions 
 
1951 
New Delhi 
Session 
 
Nehru took 
over as 
president. 
 
(1) Foreign Policy affirmed. 
(2) Anti-Social and           
Disruptive Tendencies. 
(3) Economic programme 
approved. 
(1) Support for UN, non-Interference 
& plebiscite in Kashmir. 
(2) Establishment of secular,    
democratic state. 
(3) Economic programme included 
Draft Five Year Plan. 
1953 
Hyderabad 
Session 
 
(1) Foreign Policy and           
World Situation. 
(2) Five Year Plan. 
(1) Iterated support for China joining 
UN, India’s policy of peace, 
international cooperation and 
non-alignment. 
(2) Most important task is economic 
advance to realise objectives of 
social justice and equality. 
1954 
Calcutta 
Session 
 
(1) Approval of Korea policy. 
(2) Colonial domination and    
racial discrimination. 
(3) India’s Foreign Policy. 
(4) Planning and Development: 
approval of 5 Year plan targets. 
(1) Billed by Nehru as test case     
of Indian foreign policy. 
(2) European domination must     
be removed as a source of 
international conflict. 
(3) India seeks friendship of all   
and avoidance of 
entanglements, alignment.  
(4) Aim of planning to be 
establishment of Welfare State 
and full employment. 
 
 
The first observation that strikes one is the radicalism of the young Congress 
President. His speeches from 1929 and the two in 1936 were impassioned and daring, openly 
expressing an admiration for the Soviet Union and the merits of socialism. Aware of the lack 
of support for him in 1929 (see chapter three) Nehru was nevertheless willing to cast himself 
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as the radical reformer who was ready to take on the ‘old guard’ including his father, Pandit 
Motilal Nehru who had been the Congress President in 1928 and who supported gradual 
transformation through cooperation with the British and constitutional change. Nehru’s 
subsequent speeches, in contrast are far more reserved and cautious reflecting a wiser, more 
guarded politician at work. It is however, interesting to note that by 1954 Nehru felt 
comfortable again about referring directly to socialism. This propensity grew more marked in 
the following years as the Congress party was brought securely under his wing. By 1955 
Nehru felt secure enough to relinquish the post of Congress president and to hand it over to a 
loyalist, U.N.Dhebar, who remained Congress president for the next four years. 
 
In 1928 Jawaharlal Nehru’s father, Pandit Motilal Nehru, had been Congress 
president. Named after him, the Nehru Report issued in the same year, proposed Dominion 
status for India as an alternative to ‘Complete Independence’. Representing an older 
generation of leaders who had favoured gradual constitutional change to a revolutionary 
overthrowing of the system, Motilal Nehru’s presidential speech had been mostly about 
questions of strategy and how to engage with the British and whether, in settling for 
Dominion status, this might be a small step in the direction of ultimate independence.  
 
One year later, the period of grace granted by the Nehru report, having met with no 
response from the British, Jawaharlal Nehru’s election as Congress President was intended to 
inject a breath of fresh air. In accordance, his presidential speech asserted,  ‘The brief day of 
European domination is already approaching its end...The future lies with America and 
Asia....India today is a part of the world movement.....we march forward unfettered to our 
goal....for this Congress is to declare in favour of independence and devise sanctions to 
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achieve it.’314 The first resolution passed at this session announced ‘Complete Independence’ 
(purna swaraj) as the new goal of Congress and India and, directed all current Congress 
members of any government legislatures or committees to ‘resign their seats’. To establish 
his credentials as a radical reformer, Jawaharlal declared himself in this speech to be a 
socialist and a republican. Three major problems were identified by Jawaharlal as issues of 
the day: the minorities, the Indian States, and labour and peasantry, of which the last was in 
his opinion, the greatest concern of all.315  Reflecting a turn towards socio-economic concerns 
the All India Congress Committee adopted a resolution calling for ‘revolutionary changes in 
the present economic and social structures of society and to remove the gross inequalities.’316 
 
The following year at the 1931 Karachi session it is interesting to draw a comparison 
with Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel’s presidential speech which was altogether more down-to-earth 
than Nehru’s. Much shorter in length, it addressed the practical considerations arising from 
the Purna Swaraj or Complete Independence resolution of 1930. ‘This independence’, Patel 
explained, ‘does not mean, was not intended to mean, a churlish refusal to associate with 
Britain or any other power. Independence therefore does not preclude the possibility of equal 
partnership for mutual benefit and dissolvable at the will of either party....I am aware there is 
a strong body of opinion in the country to the effect that before a partnership could possibly 
be conceived, there must be a period of complete dissociation. I do not belong to that school. 
It is, as I think, a sign of weakness and of disbelief in human nature.’317 Mentioned by Patel 
only in passing, the Resolution on Fundamental Rights, was a result of Nehru’s efforts and 
                                                 
314 See 1929 Jawaharlal Nehru’s presidential address reproduced in Zaidi, A. The Encyclopaedia of the Indian 
National Congress; (Chand & Co., New Delhi, 1980) Volume 9, pp. 601 – 18. 
315 1929 Jawaharlal Nehru’s presidential address reproduced in Zaidi, A. The Encyclopaedia of the Indian 
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316 Ibid., p. 623. 
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would later be described as the first commitment of the Congress to an economic 
programme.318 However, the relatively moderate tone and wording reflected the careful 
balancing act that was at play with Gandhi trying to keep Nehru within the fold of the 
Congress, whilst tempering his radicalism.   
 
Over the next two years the Congress party annual sessions were hampered by the 
widespread arrest of many of its leaders and the threat by the Government to break up 
gatherings. It was only in 1934 that the Congress was able to return to its normal functions 
and under Rajendra Prasad an attempt was made to revive the campaign. In the aftermath of 
the 1935 Government of India Act, Jawaharlal returned to India following the death of his 
wife in Switzerland to preside over the 1936 Lucknow Congress. As in the past, Nehru’s 
speech was longer than other presidential addresses, had a grandstanding style about it and 
was as much about himself as it was about issues.319 The 1936 session however, reflected a 
leaning towards the left wing of the Congress for, in his Working Committee Nehru had 
managed to install two fellow socialists, Narendra Dev320 and Achyut Patwardhan. Also in 
his speech, Nehru made no concessions and stated clearly his preferences and ideological 
inclination. Hence, having cast the challenges facing him, India and the Congress within the 
context of global developments, Nehru pronounced, ‘I am convinced that the only key to the 
solution of the world’s problems and of India’s problems lies in socialism’.321 
 
Going on to explain the ‘scientific, economic sense’ in which he meant the term 
socialism, Nehru stated, ‘That means the ending of private property, except in a restricted 
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319 Zaidi, A. The Encyclopaedia of the Indian National Congress; (Chand & Co., New Delhi, 1980) Volume 11, 
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sense, and the replacement of the present profit system by a higher ideal of cooperative 
service.’322 Furthermore, ‘I have cooperated whole-heartedly in the past with the khadi 
programme and I hope to do so in the future because I believe that khadi and village 
industries have a definite place in our present economy.....But I look upon them more as 
temporary expedients of a transition stage rather than as solutions of our vital problems.’323 
 
Another issue upon which different factions of the Congress were to come to 
loggerheads on was the question of whether provincial elections, as promised in the 1935 
India Act, ought to be contested. Nehru’s suggestion was to contest the elections in order to 
‘carry the message of the Congress to the millions of voters and to the scores of millions of 
disfranchised’324 but ‘to accept office and ministry, under the conditions of the Act, is to 
negative our rejection to it and to stand self-condemned. National honour and self-respect 
cannot accept this position, for it would inevitably mean our cooperation in some measure 
with the repressive apparatus of imperialism, and we would become partners in this 
repression and in the exploitation of our people’.325 A further controversial proposal was that 
the Congress party amend its constitution to provide for affiliations with separate, functional, 
peasant and worker organisations so that ‘the Congress could have an individual as well as a 
corporate membership’.326 The question of functional representation, as a result, became a 
central issue upon which the conflict between the Congress Socialists and the rightist 
Gandhians came to be centred.  
 
                                                 
322 Ibid., p. 96. 
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Despite Nehru’s public pronouncements on socialism and, his views on how to 
change the organisation and priorities of the Congress movement, there were limits to the 
extent of his influence and power. No major resolutions were adopted that year giving effect 
to Nehru’s propositions. Although the election manifesto carried a strong imprint of Nehru in 
terms of its emphasis on poverty and unemployment amongst the agrarian and working 
classes as well as a reference to the Karachi Fundamental Rights resolution it did not mention 
the word socialism anywhere.327  
Re-elected as Congress President at the Faizpur Congress of 1936/37, Nehru spoke of 
a ‘revolutionary remedy: the socialist structure of society’ to combat the problems of 
imperialism and to understand the ‘real content of the swaraj to come’.328 Although Nehru 
made a reference to a ‘Backward Russia (which) with one mighty jump established a Soviet 
Socialist State and an economic order which has resulted in tremendous progress in all 
directions’329, there was no further clarification in his presidential address about what he 
meant by socialism, how it would come about and, with what implications. All in all there 
seems to have been a considerable toning down of Nehru’s radical rhetoric. Nor were any 
major resolutions on foreign policy or economic concerns passed in 1936 /37 which could 
have reflected Nehru’s influence and engagement. This was a contrast compared with the 
previous Lucknow Congress where Nehru’s presence had been much more evident. It is also 
noteworthy that during the controversy over the Presidency in 1939 when Subhas Chandra 
Bose was nominated for re-election (see above), Nehru was careful not to publicly take sides. 
Whilst Sardar Patel, Rajendra Prasad made public statements expressing their disapproval of 
Bose’s candidature, Nehru was visibly silent.330 
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The 1951 New Delhi session is interesting for the moderate tone adopted by Nehru on 
all the core issues raised in the Presidential address. With the country’s first general elections 
approaching it seems logical that he felt the need to cast as broad an appeal as possible within 
the party and across the country. In fact a rather non-committal approach and lack of 
substantive pledges was evident in the Congress Election Manifesto adopted by the All India 
Congress Committee in July 1951.331 Nehru’s speech to the Congress session reflected this. 
On foreign policy, there was no mention of non-alignment, simply that ‘we have a definite 
and positive approach to world problems’.332 Similarly, the issue of the Hindu Code Bill was 
referred to but carefully sidestepped: ‘the Hindu Code Bill, which has given rise to so many 
arguments, became a symbol of this conflict between progress and reaction in the social 
domain. I do not refer to any particular clause of that Bill, which might or might not be 
changed, but rather to the spirit underlying that Bill.’333 With regards to Planning, it is 
significant that no mention was made of Socialism. Instead the Five Year Plan was simply 
portrayed as, ‘a realistic survey of what it is possible to do with the resources likely to be 
available within the limitations of our Constitution and without a marked break from our 
existing social and economic framework’.334 
 
Following its electoral success, the Congress party found itself in government at the 
centre and in most of the states. However, as is reflected in the two following Congress 
sessions, it was as if the party was being made to take a clear back seat in the formulation of 
policy.  Elected yet again as President to both the 1953 and 1954 sessions, Nehru’s 
Presidential speeches are cautious and aimed at maintaining a consensus. No landmark 
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resolutions were adopted and little was revealed about the party’s concrete plan for action.335 
As will be demonstrated further on in this chapter, this reflected a struggle that was going on 
at the time between the Congress in its organisational capacity and Congress as the party in 
government. Only in 1955 was Nehru sufficiently in command to relinquish the position and 
to allow someone else to become Congress President. It was also at the 1955 Avadi session 
that most of Nehru’s policies were explicitly articulated and adopted by the Congress. A 
survey of the resolutions adopted by the 1955 Indian National Congress proves this point 
nicely. The resolution on a ‘Socialistic Pattern of Society’ declared the official goal of 
planning to be, ‘where the principal means of production are under social ownership or 
control, production is progressively speeded up and there is equitable distribution of the 
national wealth’.336 On international affairs, the principles which ought to govern relations 
with the countries of the world were officially proclaimed to be those ‘set out in the joint 
statements issued by India, China and Burma, and more recently by India and Yugoslavia.’ 
Furthermore, ‘the Congress warmly welcom(ed) these five principles of PanchShila. They 
represent the approach and policy of India in international affairs, and put forward the 
alternatives of collective peace to the preparation for collective war’.337 Finally, on the front 
of social reform the Hindu Code Bills were hailed as significant steps towards improving ‘the 
welfare of women and children’.338  
 
In each of the three areas Nehru’s ‘pet projects’, as they had evolved over the first 
eight years of independence, were finally officially endorsed by the Congress party. This 
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came about as a result of unforeseeable events (such as the death of Sardar Patel in 1950) but 
was also due to the strategic and careful consolidation of power by Nehru within the party. 
 
 
4.4.  Nehru’s Contemporaries 
 
Three central figures are chosen as representative of views that could be described as 
having been to the left and right of Nehru. Rajendra Prasad, a veteran freedom fighter went 
on to become the first President of the independent Republic of India and whose position on 
particular issues such as partition, Hindu-Muslim relations, consolidation of the nation, 
economic policy, relations with the industrialists, were popular amongst the more 
conservative wing of the Congress party which included other key political figures such as 
Vallabhbhai Patel.339 To represent the other end of the spectrum is Subhas Chandra Bose. The 
parallel drawn between Bose and Nehru is interesting given that they shared a tendency 
towards radical thinking particularly in the realm of economic policy but Nehru proved to be 
the cannier tactician, willing to temper his radicalism in order to consolidate his position 
within the Congress party first.  
 
To highlight the span of differences between the three contemporaries and Nehru the 
table below juxtaposes the positions of each in the three main policy fields of economic 
development, social reform and foreign policy. Each of the above served as Congress 
President during the 1930s and hence their presidential addresses were used to extract the 
broad contours of their positions. The 1930s was a period when Gandhi more or less reigned 
                                                 
339 Indian barrister and statesman and one of the senior leaders of the INC during the freedom struggle. During 
the first three years after independence in 1947 he served as deputy prime minister, minister of home affairs, 
minister of information and minister of states till his death in 1950.  
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supreme as the maker and breaker of political destinies within the Congress party and the 
position of Congress president was a highly prestigious one as it carried with it the support 
and favour of the Mahatma. Hence, although the four figures were not in direct competition 
against one other they each nevertheless came to occupy a distinct place within the space of 
political agenda-making.  
 
Table 4: Nehru and his contemporaries 340 
 
 
Issues Leaders 
Economic Development Social Reform India & the World 
PATEL 
1931 Congress 
President 
‘Whatever we produce       
in our country we must 
encourage to the exclusion 
of foreign...This is the 
condition of national 
growth. Thus we must 
encourage and carry on 
intensive propaganda         
on behalf of indigenous 
companies, banking, 
shipping and the like.’ 
(p.140) 
‘removing untouch-
ability... no Swaraj 
would be worth 
having without this 
supreme act of self-
purification’. (p142) 
‘it is a fact beyond 
challenge that India 
has given a singular 
proof to the world 
that mass non-
violence is no longer 
the idle dream of a 
visionary or a mere 
human longing... 
Looked at in the light 
of non-violence our 
struggle is a world 
struggle’. (p.133) 
PRASAD 
1934 Congress 
President  
 
‘I was told that the cost     
of transporting coal from 
South Africa to Indian 
cotton mills was the same  
as that of transporting it 
from the coalfields of Bihar 
to the same mills. I am 
mentioning these few 
illustrations and they can be 
multiplied to show how in 
the past the whole policy of 
‘To my mind Truth, 
Non-violence and 
Khadi represent a 
triple force whereby 
we can achieve the 
whole of the Karachi 
Programme and 
more’ (p.382) 
‘Independence is the 
natural outcome of 
all that the freedom 
movement in India 
has stood for.            
It cannot mean 
isolation... It 
contemplates a     
free and friendly 
association with 
other nations for     
                                                 
340 All the below quotes are drawn from the relevant volumes of Zaidi, A.M. et al (eds.) The Encyclopaedia of 
the Indian National Congress. (S. Chand & Co. New Delhi, 1980). 
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the Government of India 
has been regulated with an 
eye no to the benefit of 
Indians but of foreigners’ 
(p.374) 
 
the mutual benefit    
of all’. (p.384) 
 
NEHRU 
1936 Congress 
President 
‘I see no way of ending     
the poverty, the vast 
unemployment,                
the degradation and               
the subjection of the    
Indian people except 
through socialism.’ (p.95) 
- the ending of private 
property except in a 
restricted sense 
- the ideal of cooperative 
service 
- rapid industrialisation 
‘the Harijans have 
constituted the 
landless proletariat 
and an economic 
solution removes the 
social barriers that 
custom and tradition 
have raised.’ (p.97) 
‘we cannot isolate 
India or the Indian 
problem from that of 
the rest of the world’ 
(p.85) 
 
- the freedom            
struggle is part   
of the post-WW1 
global struggle 
for social 
freedom 
 
 
BOSE 
1938 & 39 
Congress 
President 
 
‘I have no doubt that our 
chief national problems 
relating to the eradication of 
poverty, illiteracy and 
disease and to scientific 
production and distribution 
can be effectively tackled 
only along socialist lines’ 
(p407) 
-  reform of land-system, 
abolition of landlordism 
- liquidation of 
agricultural 
indebtedness 
- improvement of 
agricultural yield. 
- industrial development 
under state-ownership, 
state-control 
- Planning Commission 
for comprehensive 
scheme 
 
‘A policy of live and 
let live in matters 
religious.....should be 
our objective.... – a 
policy of complete 
non-interference in 
matters of 
conscience, religion 
and culture as well as 
of cultural autonomy 
for the different 
linguistic areas.’ 
(p.404-5) 
 
‘We should not be 
influenced by the 
internal politics of 
any country or form 
of its state....We 
should aim at 
developing a nucleus 
of men and women 
in every country who 
would feel 
sympathetic towards 
India....through the 
foreign press, 
through Indian made 
films, through art 
exhibitions...’  
(p. 420) 
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As the brief overview indicates the four leaders varied greatly in terms of methods 
espoused, general outlook and the particular objectives voiced. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, 
known for his good relations with the business community and pragmatic attitude, already in 
1931 was calling for moves to stimulate and support local enterprise. Unlike Nehru, who in 
1936, foretold the end of private property, Patel saw the need to make use of what was 
available before inflicting unnecessary destruction simply to make way for something new 
and bigger. On issues relating to social reform Patel’s presidential speech had little to say 
except for the statement relating the abolition of untouchability to an act of self-purification. 
Much more strongly imbued with the language and practices of Gandhi than Nehru was, Patel 
also adhered more to the idea that the individual can, through his actions cleanse society of 
certain evils. This differed from Nehru’s rather top-down approach where state-driven 
programmes changing the economy or issuing sweeping legislation would secularise society. 
Both Prasad and Patel saw India’s use of non-violence as a contribution to humanity and 
possibly to the conduct of international politics. 
 
Prasad comes across as more ‘traditionalist’, firmly embedded in the ideals and 
methods advocated by Gandhi, committed to the notion of truth and non-violence as essential 
guiding principles. Patel, on the other hand, while similarly well-versed in Gandhian thought, 
envisioned the need for arrangements that would provide material benefits to various parties 
at the same time, such as the federal system. While Nehru and Bose occupied the left end of 
the political spectrum, clear differences are also evident between the two. Both had a focus 
on economic problems and solutions, reflecting a shared belief in the benefits of a planned 
economy and rapid industrialisation. However, on the issue of social reform and India’s 
international profile it is interesting to note a crucial divergence. Nehru, especially in the 
1930s, tended to cast his worldview, his analysis of India’s problems as well as his agenda for 
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reform all in terms of socialism. Bose, on the other hand, comes across as more multi-faceted 
given that his view on cultural, identity-related issues proposed they be left out of the ambit 
of state-induced reform. With regards India’s reputation and interests in the international 
arena, Bose anticipated non-alignment as a strategy with his advice that India ought to judge 
according to her interests rather than primarily following principles. This, in conjunction with 
the proposal that India should not simply rely upon a bestowed image but ought instead to 
carefully manufacture one, imply an unexpected closeness between Patel and Bose in their 
pragmatic, matter-of-fact diagnoses. Nehru and Prasad on the other hand seem closer in their 
more strictly doctrinaire approaches. Having briefly surveyed the scope for differences in the 
ideas and prognoses that were ‘on offer’ in the 1930s the following section looks more 
closely at the individuals.  
 
 
4.4.1. Nehru’s Contemporaries: Rajendra Prasad 
 
Born in 1884 in Bihar, Rajendra Prasad was trained as a lawyer when in 1911 he 
joined the Congress party and was elected to the All India Congress Committee. Having set 
up a legal practice in Calcutta, Prasad became a known figure in the Eastern provinces of 
Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Unlike Jawaharlal Nehru, Prasad entered the freedom struggle 
through his experience of grassroots activism in the form of the Champaran movement. One 
of the first movements initiated by Gandhi, the Champaran agitation of 1918-1919 
highlighted the dire conditions of the indigo workers in Bihar. Prasad’s book on Satyagraha 
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in Champaran341 provides an insight into these early experiences and together with a book on 
partition, India Divided342, there are contrasts with Nehru which can be drawn.  
 
Written shortly after his experience of the Champaran satygarha Prasad described the 
long history of peasant struggles in the area, stating that the first recorded outbreak against 
the cultivation of indigo occurred in 1867.343 Prasad’s experiences and study of the peasant 
movement contrast starkly with Nehru’s amazement and shock when he first encountered the 
plight and resilience of the kisans (farmers) in 1920 in the province of Uttar Pradesh. In his 
Autobiography for instance Nehru described how he was ‘thrown almost without any will of 
my own, into contact, with the peasantry.....I realised more than ever how cut off we were 
from our people and how we lived and worked and agitated in a little world apart from 
them.........This realisation came to me during these Partabargh visits and ever since then my 
mental picture of India always contains this naked, hungry mass’. 344  
 
With regards to basic political, philosophical outlook, Rajendra Prasad seems to have 
been primarily concerned with the means of political action and in the second place, with the 
goals. This reflects a position that was closer to Mahatma Gandhi’s thinking and approach 
which emphasised that the nature of action ultimately affected the aims too. Writing in 1919 
when Gandhi had assumed national leadership in the movement against the Rowlatt Bills, 
Satyagraha, was defined as, ‘insistence on truth, and force derivable from such insistence’345 
was a crucial mechanism of the movement which was as important as the goal of liberation 
                                                 
341 Prasad, R. Satyagraha in Champaran (Ganesan, Madras, 1928). 
342 Prasad, R. India Divided (Hind Kitab, Bombay, 1947). 
343 Prasad, Satyagraha in Champaran (Madras, Ganesan, 1928), p. 28. 
344 Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography (London, J. Capec, 1936), pp. 54 - 55, p. 57. 
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the meaning of satyagraha as a weapon of moral force. See The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, (The 
Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, New Delhi, 1965), Vol. XV, p. 249. 
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itself. Hence, the need for regular self-purification and the conscious implementation of the 
‘truth force’ which was to act as the ‘binding force between province and province and the 
millions of Hindustan.’346 As a result, in 1922 Gandhi was willing to suspend non-
cooperation and to risk jeopardising the movement due to the violence that had taken place at 
Chauri Chaura which was a demonstration for him that the movement was not yet ready.347  
 
Prasad, who from the beginning had claimed an affinity with Gandhi’s ideas and 
methods unlike Nehru, who was more sceptical to begin with, echoes this prioritisation. For 
example in his presidential address to the 1934 session of the INC he said, ‘To my mind 
Truth, Non-Violence and Khadi represent a triple force whereby we can achieve the whole of 
the Karachi programme348 and more......Whilst I would have no objection to amplifying the 
Karachi programme and elucidating it...I would say emphatically that we should do nothing 
that compromises by one iota the creed of non-violence.’349 Whereas Nehru, who had been 
one of the key figures behind the Karachi Resolution, invested in the ideals and long-run 
goals of the movement, Prasad remained firmly committed to Gandhi’s focus on the means 
and methods of the struggle.  
 
A further difference compared with Jawaharlal Nehru’s politics can be seen in 
Prasad’s critique of the kind of radicalism for which Nehru stood: ‘My friends the socialists, 
are keen on a more inspiring ideology and would hasten the elimination of all that stands for 
exploitation. I should like to tell them in all humility that there is no greater ideology than is 
expressed by the creed of truth and non-violence and the determination of the country not to 
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347 A major outbreak of violence when, a crowd of villagers set a police station afire in Chauri Chaura in UP, 
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348Principles laid down in the Karachi Resolution by the AICC at Bombay in August 1931 which came to be 
also known as the Fundamental Rights resolution. 
349 Zaidi, A.M. The Encyclopaedia of the Indian National Congress (Chand & Co., Delhi, 1980), p. 382. 
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eliminate the men that stand for exploitation but the forces that do so. Our quarrel is with the 
sin and not the sinner which we all are to a greater or lesser degree.’350 
 
Another interesting difference in approach is evident in Prasad’s world view. 
Commenting on Nehru’s presidency of the Congress party in 1935 Prasad wrote that: ‘An 
atmosphere of war was fast developing in Europe. Italy had invaded Ethiopia. England did 
not approve of Italy’s action but avoided a direct clash with Italy on the issue. All that the 
League of Nations did was to express lip sympathy for Ethiopia......Our socialist colleagues 
wanted the Congress to adopt a resolution sympathising with Ethiopia and refusing India’s 
help to Britain in any future war because of her attitude to the victim of aggression...although 
nothing was father from my mind than that we should help Britain in case of war, I thought it 
premature for the Congress to express an opinion on international affairs’.351 Unlike Nehru, 
Prasad did not believe in the need to be internationalist for the sake of being internationalist. 
Without having the means to actually implement the action and standards one preached, there 
was a danger of turning such statements into empty words and, in the process, losing 
credibility and influence in the future.  
 
On economic policy there is a revealing difference in the way both Nehru and Prasad 
argued about the cow and its dual importance as a symbol of Hindu sentiments and as an 
economic unit of value. Brought to the fore in 1955 when The Indian Cattle Preservation Bill 
was placed before the Indian Parliament seeking a ban on cow slaughter, Nehru’s position 
was to depict the cow only in terms of an economic unit and as part of the wider debate on 
agriculture and economic development. Nehru rejected the Bill on procedural grounds, 
arguing that as agricultural subject it fell under the jurisdiction of state legislatures. Rajendra 
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Prasad on the other hand examined the issue of cow slaughter from a perspective that 
combined the two dimensions of identity and economic value. Hence, in his opinion 
legislation was not needed. Instead what was required was an improvement in the conditions 
of keeping and breeding of cows: ‘If goshalas (sheds and facilities which could be provided 
by the government) are managed properly, cows will become a paying proposition and their 
slaughter will cease automatically’.352 Unlike Nehru who chose to skirt the debate and to turn 
it into a discussion about the secular state, Prasad’s proposition rested upon providing an 
economic solution to a socio-cultural problem by pinpointing its economic, and hence 
negotiable, roots. While Nehru, invested hope and faith in the ability of the state to mould its 
citizens, Prasad’s approach drew upon the inherent basic instincts of the individual to secure 
the best possible conditions given his constraints. Hence, instead of proposing policies that 
entailed the State imposing its interpretation of modernity, top-down, Prasad’s approach 
favoured the creation of incentives for people to behave in a way that was considered by them 
to be the more efficient and rational choice. 
 
Accompanying this divergence in premises is the very different style adopted in his 
writing. Each of Nehru’s main books examined here, An Autobiography, Glimpses of World 
History and Discovery of India are written in a very narrative and pedagogical manner whilst 
Prasad’s texts read more like an analytical treatise. For example in a book outlining the 
grounds for partition, Prasad lays out his argument in a scientific manner. Beginning with the 
problem of how to identify the overlapping contours between State and Nationality, he 
concluded that ‘a State need not be coterminous with a nationality, that in fact the experience 
of national States has ended in failure and created new problems’353, Prasad goes on to prove 
that the Muslims do not constitute a nation and do not need a separate State given that there is 
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much that is shared, such as customs, rites, dress codes and sources of inspiration, which 
have created syncretic blends of language and art and which, most importantly, have a given 
rise to a shared history.  
 
Moving on to analyse the role of the British in fanning communal consciousness, 
Prasad ends with a clever image from geometry: ‘In this race between Muslim League 
demands and British Government concessions, the League is always ahead of the British 
Government by a few lengths and the Hindu majority and all other minorities cannot have 
even an entry. No wonder the base of the Communal triangle lengthens and the angle of 
communal difference widens.’354 Prasad’s analysis leads from one fact and inference to 
another and he even details various alternate schemes providing for complete independence 
versus the reorganisation of the provinces along cultural principles.355 His final conclusion is 
insightful and remains prescient today: ‘It will be a stupendous task to carry out a division of 
all this.......It may well be that when the actual division has been accomplished, the result may 
turn out to be a veritable Dead Sea Apple or a Delhi ka Laddu, which the man who gets it 
regrets as much as the man who does not.’356 
 
 
4.4.2 Nehru’s Contemporaries: Subhas Chandra Bose 
 
As one of Jawaharlal Nehru’s closest contemporaries Subhas Chandra Bose is 
invaluable as a basis for comparison particularly with regards Nehru’s socialism and 
radicalism. Bose was a popular student leader and active in the trade union movement. A few 
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key publications and various published documents provide an insight into Bose’s world view 
and belief system such as his unfinished autobiography, An Indian Pilgrim357 and historical 
work, The Indian Struggle, 1920-1942358 which provide an interesting contrast to Nehru’s 
Autobiography and Discovery of India in terms of how Bose purviews his life within the 
larger context of India’s colonial history. 
 
For example, on the matter of religion Bose’s writing implies that he was much more 
comfortable with the particular mix of spirituality and politics that India’s historical 
experience had generated than Nehru ever was. Surveying the Bengal Renaissance and the 
figures it produced, Bose described a continuing trend where spirituality became wedded to 
politics through Ram Mohan Roy, Sasadhar Tarkachuramani, Pandit Iswar Chandra 
Vidyasagar, Ramakrishna Paramahansa, Swami Vivekananda, Aurobindo and affected other 
leaders across the country like B.G.Tilak and Mahatma Gandhi.359 Experimenting personally 
with yoga and immersing himself in Indian philosophy360, Bose’s adolescent and young adult 
experiences and inclinations are a marked contrast to the preferences for Western sources of 
thought and action that Nehru pursued from an early stage. Though spending eighteen months 
at Cambridge, Subhas Bose retained a strong nationalist streak and tendency towards 
extremist politics, ultimately resigning from his Indian Civil Service position to join the 
freedom struggle. By their late twenties both Jawaharlal and Bose were ‘the heroes of India’s 
youth and the bêtes noires of the British authorities.361  
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Interestingly while the two shared an affinity for radical politics what ultimately 
divided them was their response and strategy towards Gandhi’s personality and politics. 
While Jawaharlal was to move closer and closer to Gandhi, Bose remained loyal to C.R.Das, 
his mentor, a major Bengali leader in the independence movement who, in the 1920s, had 
been one of the sharpest critics of Gandhi’s methods of non-cooperation. Bose therefore, as a 
protégé of C.R.Das, was more willing to openly express his scepticism about Gandhi’s 
political wisdom and style while Nehru, who had decided quite early on to cast his lot with 
Gandhi, opted not to confront him publicly on issues of disagreement and more often than 
not, to do as he was bid. An early indication of this parting of their ways came in 1928. In 
response to pressure from within the Congress Party (led by Motilal Nehru) to accept 
Dominion Status as the party’s objective, Bose and Nehru formed the ‘Independence for 
India League’ to propagate the goal of complete independence. On the eve of the Calcutta 
Congress, Gandhi negotiated a via media, proposing that Congress formally adopt the 
proposition of Dominion Status but that if this were not accepted by the British government 
within one year, the Congress would opt for complete independence and engage in civil 
disobedience. Bose who opposed the resolution, saw it as ‘shirking the duty of launching a 
struggle against the British imperialists’362 while Nehru, chose to support the resolution, 
probably in the realisation that it heralded the return of Gandhi as central power broker and in 
the knowledge that the one year ultimatum to the British was unlikely to yield anything.  
 
Jawaharlal’s election as INC president the following year at the Lahore Congress 
added to the gulf that had been created by the above incident. This was seen by Bose as a 
stratagem by Gandhi to draw Nehru away from the left wing of the Congress.363 Discovering 
that he was not included in the newly formed Working Committee, Bose decided to walk out 
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(see page 153 for a discussion of INC organisation), accusing Jawaharlal of having sold out 
to the ‘Dominion Status school’. Once again, at the 1931 Karachi Congress, Bose was critical 
of Gandhi regarding the Gandhi-Irwin Pact and the Round Table Conference. In 1935, Bose’s 
The Indian Struggle, was published in which he acknowledged that Gandhi had transformed 
the INC from ‘a talking body into a live and fighting organisation’ but he was also highly 
critical: “The asceticism of Gandhiji, his simple life, his vegetarian diet, his adherence to 
truth and his consequent fearlessness – all combined to give him a halo of 
saintliness.....Consciously or unconsciously, the Mahatma fully exploited the mass 
psychology of the people, just as Lenin did the same thing in Russia, Mussolini in Italy and 
Hitler in Germany.”364 Bose deplored the religious and moral undertones of satyagraha and 
the campaign against untouchability which he felt distracted from the main political 
objectives. These were opinions which were very close to Jawaharlal’s impressions at the 
time. However, although the two may have shared the desire to turn Congress towards a more 
progressive direction, Jawaharlal had realised at the 1936 Congress over which he presided, 
that Socialism threatened to divide the party more than unite it. Socialist slogans of class 
struggle, it was argued by the more conservative wing, did not help the Congress-led 
movement which was aimed at freedom first and then socio-economic reform but in fact 
hindered it by helping the government gain the support of landlords and feudal elements. 
 
Arrested upon his return to India, Bose was in prison for almost one year and in a 
gesture both to Bose and to Bengal, Gandhi supported Bose’s candidature for INC president 
in 1938. At the 1938 Haripura Session of the INC, Bose’s presidential address provides an 
insight into his outlook and approach to politics. One of Nehru’s specialities was an 
internationalism which manifested itself in the emphasis he gave to international problems 
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and the need for India to be an active participant in the international arena, albeit more in 
terms of rhetoric than concrete action. Bose, seems to be as, if not more, internationalist than 
Nehru in terms of the broad historical contexts he was able to give his speeches and the 
radical commitments made to internationalist agendas. For example the struggle for political 
freedom of India was portrayed as incidentally also the fight ‘for the economic emancipation 
of the British people as well.’365 Analysing the ebb and flow of past Empires, Bose’s speech 
had a clear historical and structural argument in which he analysed the inherent weaknesses 
and contradictions of the British Empire and the challenges of attaining and preserving 
India’s unity. Referring directly to future policy, Bose took a clear stand on the problems of 
accommodating differences within a framework of equal rights and obligations. Hence, on 
the issue of religion he emphasized that ‘the Congress policy is one of live and let live – a 
policy of complete non-interference in matters of conscience, religion and culture, as well as 
of cultural autonomy for the different linguistic areas.’366 
 
Unlike Nehru’s speeches as Congress party president, Bose dwelt upon a number of 
looming practical challenges such as how to ensure the continued vitality of the Congress 
party when, after winning freedom, it would also became the party to put into effect the entire 
programme of post-war reconstruction. Other problems he considered included generating 
national unity through mechanisms like a lingua franca and a common script; reforming and 
modernising agricultural production as well as industrial development; changing the outlook 
of the permanent services like the bureaucracy to instil a national outlook and mentality. On 
the matter of foreign policy Bose also had a distinctive brand of pragmatism: ‘we should take 
a leaf out of Soviet diplomacy. Though Soviet Russia is a Communist State her diplomats 
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have not hesitated to make alliances with non-socialist States and have not declined sympathy 
or support coming from any quarter. We should therefore aim at developing a nucleus of men 
and women in every country who would feel sympathetic towards India.’367  
 
The case of Subhas Chandra Bose is also interesting in terms of the difference in 
strategy pursued by him. Unlike Nehru who was careful to restrain and temper his beliefs and 
actions in order to maintain a consensus and avoid crises, Bose was willing to openly 
challenge even the Mahatma himself. Standing for re-election as Congress president in 1939, 
against the express wishes of Gandhi and, on top of that, winning the elections, Bose brought 
the rift within the Congress movement between right and left to the fore. Most of the 
members of the Congress Working Committee resigned and Nehru, despite sharing the 
ideological underpinnings of economic policy with Bose, chose not to publicly support him.  
As Bose himself described it, Nehru typically opted for an ambiguous stance: ‘The 
election was followed by sensational developments, culminating in the resignation of twelve 
out of the fifteen members of the Working Committee, headed by Sardar Patel, Maulana 
Azad and Mr. Rajendra Prasad. Another distinguished and eminent member of the Working 
Committee, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, though he did not formally resign, issued a statement 
which led everybody to believe that he had also resigned.’368 After failed attempts to form a 
consensus cabinet, none of which Gandhi agreed to endorse, Bose finally decided to quit in 
May 1939. 
 
Although remaining a member of the INC, Bose attempted to rally leftist forces under 
the umbrella of a Forward Bloc within the Congress party which basically advocated two key 
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positions: issuing an ultimatum for self-government to the British and, establishing Socialism 
as the political creed for independent India. In addition, at the following Congress session in 
March 1940, Bose convened an alternative ‘Anti-Compromise Conference’ close to the 
official site. Lambasting an All India Congress Committee resolution to curb the power of the 
provincial Congress committees, Bose refused to hold elections to the Bengal Provincial 
Congress Committee, of which he was president and in response, the Congress Working 
Committee decided to disqualify him from holding any elective office for a period of three 
years. In July 1940 Bose was arrested and detained by the Government under the Defence of 
India Act but released in early December on medical grounds. He successfully escaped from 
house arrest in January 1941 and set off to Germany and Japan to seek help from the Axis 
powers in liberating India from British rule.  
 
A deeper insight into Bose’s political thinking is provided by a lengthy document 
titled ‘Forward Bloc: Its Justification’ dated 22 March, 1941 which came to be known as the 
Kabul Thesis since it was written in Kabul, where Bose was secretly in transit, having 
escaped house arrest in Calcutta and ultimately reaching Berlin via Moscow. In this 
document he used Hegelian dialectics to demonstrate the emergence of a ‘Leftist Antithesis’ 
in response to a ‘Rightist Thesis’ and to argue how his initiative of the Forward Bloc would 
act as a rejuvenating force. Hence the Forward Bloc had ‘saved the Congress from stagnation 
and death at the hands of the Rightists...It has served to stem the drift towards 
Constitutionalism, to create a new revolutionary mentality among the people and to bring the 
Congress back to the path of struggle....(it) has clarified the issues which separate the Left 
from the Right and has stimulated the intellectual and ideological progress of the 
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Congress’.369 To Bose, Leftism meant in the first place anti-imperialism and only after the 
attainment of independence, would it be equated with Socialism. Unlike Nehru who already 
in his pre-independence days spoke of the need for a socialist outlook and socialist policies, 
Bose was in some ways more pragmatic when asserting that ‘Socialism or Socialist 
reconstruction before achieving our political emancipation is altogether premature’.370 
 
Ultimately sidelined within the Congress party, Bose’s strategy was not an effective 
one as he ended up isolating himself amongst the High Command which, apart from 
Mahatma Gandhi, included others like Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Rajendra Prasad, 
J.B.Kripalani, Bhulabhai Desai, Sarojini Naidu. Nevertheless, Bose played a central role in 
terms of articulating the Leftist position and in paving some of the ground so that Nehru’s 
visions could later take root. The most obvious evidence of this lies in the formation of the 
Planning Commission which was installed under the leadership of Bose. 
 
During the early 1930s Bose’s relations with Nehru were good enough for him to ask 
Nehru to become the first chairman of the newly initiated Planning Commission. However, 
after the 1939 re-election fiasco, Bose’s comments on Nehru are deeply bitter. His sense of 
betrayal and disappointment is palpable in a letter to Nehru dated March 28, 1939 in which 
he outlined various grievances and highlighted the differences between them: ‘You are in the 
habit of proclaiming that you stand by yourself and represent nobody else and that you are 
not attached to any party..........By bearing a non-party label one can be popular with all 
parties, but what is the value of it?’371 Another difference in approach is revealed in Bose’s 
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criticism of Nehru’s statements on international affairs: ‘I feel that we should take 
international politics seriously and utilise the international situation for our benefit – nor not 
talk about it at all. It is no use making a show, if we do not mean business.’372 
 
By 1941 Subhas Chandra Bose was out of the country and increasingly out of the 
picture in terms of Congress politics. It is alleged that he died in a plane accident on 18 
August, 1945 although his body was never recovered. His death in removed a potential rival 
to Nehru from the political scene and in effect, Bose’s vision of India’s economic 
development strategy was absorbed into Nehru’s programme. 
 
 
4.4.3. Nehru’s Contemporaries: Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel 
 
Born, it is estimated in 1875, into a formerly important clan in the princely state of 
Gujarat, Vallabhbhai Patel was brought up adhering to religious beliefs as a way of life and in 
a family with limited resources. Unlike both Nehru and Bose, Patel’s education began 
through a village school from which he worked his way up to complete his studies in law. 
Setting up his own practice in Godra in 1900 Patel self-financed his training as a barrister in 
London in 1910 and returned to India in 1913. Patel’s youth seems to have been spent mostly 
on acquiring an education and setting up his legal practice in order to support his own and his 
brothers’ families. Brought into close contact with Gandhi in 1917 when Patel was elected as 
Secretary to the Gujarat Sabha373 and Gandhi was invited to be its President, his career in 
politics was launched. Together with Gandhi, Patel fought for the rights of farmers to be 
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exempted from payment of land tax when the yield was less than 25 per cent of the normal, 
organising a campaign of non-violent resistance by the peasants which was ultimately 
successful. An older man when he came into contact with Gandhi and joined forces with him, 
Patel was a solid supporter and unquestioning follower; a different generation compared to 
the spirited, idealistic young men that Nehru and Bose were when they joined the nationalist 
movement.  
 
With Gandhi sentenced to six years imprisonment in 1922, Patel was looked upon as 
the leader of the Congress movement in Gujarat and in 1928 with the campaign in Bardoli, 
Patel acquired the status of a hero. Challenging once again the British policy of land taxation, 
in 1928 a tax increase of 22 per cent was announced, Patel launched a non-violent, civil 
disobedience movement protesting the fact that peasants had to pay periodically increasing 
taxes regardless of the size of their land-holdings and the yield produced. Appealing to all 
sections of society, Vallabhbhai managed to put together a united front of Muslims and 
Hindus to fight the Government. After a long campaign an independent enquiry was launched 
into whether the land revenue increase had been justified. Concluding that an increase of 5.7 
per cent was reasonable as against the 22 per cent sanctioned by the Government, the Bardoli 
settlement was hailed a triumph for satyagraha. Catapulted into the limelight of Congress 
politics as a result of the peasant campaign, Patel was elected Congress President in 1931, but 
only after Jawaharlal Nehru had served in 1929 when, at the behest of his father, Motilal 
Nehru to Gandhi, Jawaharlal’s name was proposed. 
 
The differences in style and substance between Jawaharlal and Patel were evident 
from early on. Unlike Nehru, who went through a long period of questioning the 
effectiveness of Gandhi’s techniques and had trouble with the religiosity that Gandhi 
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represented, Patel, despite his lawyer’s conviction for negotiated agreements and the rule of 
law, was more easily able to engage with and implement Gandhi’s principles and methods of 
action. Perhaps this was a result of his upbringing which was closer to Gandhi’s than 
Jawaharlal’s had been or perhaps Patel’s solid rootedness of being connected to the land and 
peasantry in Gujarat gave him a confidence and stability which the young Jawaharlal lacked 
and which compelled him to seek structural solutions and explanations in doctrines and 
ideologies. In the mid-1930s although Jawaharlal propounded socialist ideas and had the 
support of the Congress socialists it was Rajendra Prasad and Sardar Patel who held the upper 
hand in determining the content of Congress resolutions and the membership of the Working 
Committee. Excerpts of Patel’s statement in response to Jawaharlal’s presidential speech of 
1936 are worth reproducing to note the difference in tone and worldview: 
‘While I detest imperialism and admit the inequality between capitalist class and the 
famishing poor, I do believe that it is possible to purge capitalism of its 
hideousness.......There is no difficulty in my subscribing to the doctrine that all land and 
wealth belonged to all.......When we have attained (freedom) it will be time to enforce our 
theories and plans.’ 374 
 
In 1947, at independence Jawaharlal Nehru was sworn in as Prime Minister on 
account of his election to President of Congress in 1946 although Patel had been the favoured 
candidate and only in acquiescence to Gandhi had withdrawn his candidature. Sharing power 
with Nehru as his Deputy Prime Minister, their divergent views on economic matters and 
others came to the fore. Additionally Home Minister and Minister for States and Information 
and Broadcasting and together with his control over the Congress Party machine, Patel 
maintained a formidable concentration of power in his hands. Decrying Prime Minister 
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Nehru’s tendency towards appeasement and idealism, Patel had the tendency to give voice to 
the concerns of the Hindu majority, calling for Muslims who had opted to stay on in India to 
demonstrate their loyalty by not demanding special treatment as minorities or by denouncing 
the acts of aggression committed by Pakistan in Kashmir. 375  
 
Differences between the two were also evident in the Constituent Assembly Debates 
where on the issue of property rights Patel was firmly in favour of securing their protection, 
allowing the State acquisition only for the sake of a public purpose and on payment of fair 
compensation. Nehru, who was concerned about implementing a socialistic programme and 
introducing a reform of the land tenure system pressed that the legislatures should have full 
powers, in the larger national interest, to decide the scale of compensation to be paid. Finally, 
in a victory for Patel over Nehru, the Constituent Assembly accepted that the right to property 
be protected by the Constitution and that the rate of compensation should be subject to review 
by the courts 376.  
 
Combining a toughness and sense of pragmatism, Patel achieved other miracles of 
negotiation such as persuading minorities, including the Muslims, to give up the tradition of 
separate electorates introduced by the British, and the integration of the 554 princely states, 
which was achieved peacefully with the exception of Hyderabad and Kashmir (the latter 
being handled personally by Nehru). It is interesting to note that working closely with Patel 
were figures who in their own right were great public personalities such as Rajendra Prasad, 
who served as President of the Constituent Assembly and later as President of the nation, and 
V.P. Menon who acted as secretary to Patel in the States Department. 
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As has been pointed out by Patel’s biographer, Patel was an adept party man, capable 
of managing the party machine so that important members of all different hues continued to 
support the Congress-led movement. Not so often at the forefront like Nehru and lacking his 
international exposure and persona, Patel had worked closely with Gandhi during the 1930s 
to manage the party organisation to the extent that he was one of the few leading figures to 
have widespread support and respect from across the country. As treasurer of the Congress he 
raised money, courting powerful industrialists and feudal landlords. Later, as President of the 
Parliamentary Sub-Committee Patel experienced firsthand the running of election campaigns 
and the enforcement of discipline in the Congress Ministries. As will be demonstrated in the 
following section Patel remained a formidable force and a power to reckon with until his 
death in 1950. 
 
4.5. Consolidating Power: the struggle for dominance. 
 
Having examined the structure of the Congress Party and the various contending 
figures and viewpoints, the chapter explores the processes through which Nehru consolidated 
his power within the party. 
 
4.5.1. Nehru’s position within the INC: 1947-1955. 
 
Invited by the Viceroy of India, Lord Wavell, to form an interim government, 
Jawaharlal Nehru took the helm on 2 September 1946. It is interesting to note that this 
occurred manifestly because Nehru happened, at the time, to be the President of the Indian 
National Congress, a position he held largely thanks to Gandhi’s powerful intervention in his 
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favour for it appears that Congressmen in general favoured Sardar Patel for this office.377 As 
a result, when independence came less than one year later, Nehru had precedence and it 
seemed automatic that he should become the first Prime Minister of sovereign, independent 
India. The leadership rivalry between Nehru and Patel, though not apparent on the outside, 
soon revealed itself in terms of their fundamentally opposing positions on various issues.  
 
A description of the two by a contemporary, C.D.Deshmukh, who was to become 
Finance Minister in 1950, aptly captures the differences between the two, ‘Temperamentally, 
Patel was a realist, with the common sense characteristic of the sturdy peasantry from Kaira 
District, Gujarat, from which stock he had sprung. Nehru on the other hand, was an 
intellectual with a theoretical commitment to socialism dating back to the days of his early 
manhood and traceable to his sojourns in Europe in the early nineteen-thirties. At the core of 
Vallabhbhai’s realism was the recognition of the foibles of human nature and an awareness of 
its limitations, which stamped him as a conservative. Nehru, unsure as a judge of men, was 
inclined to overestimate the achievement potential of his fellow-beings; he was in 
consequence only too ready to respond to the appeal of socialism. The Nehru-Patel balance in 
the Cabinet was therefore a case of unstable equilibrium, maintained only by a common 
effort on either side not to encroach on each other’s assigned territory’.378 
 
The Congress presidential elections of 1950 proved to be one such point of 
contestation. Two candidates, J.B.Kripalani and Purushottamdas Tandon had the support of 
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Nehru and Patel respectively and their contest was watched as a trial of strength between the 
Prime Minister and his Deputy in the Cabinet. Furthermore, with the First General Elections 
impending, it was recognised that the party office bearers would play a decisive role in the 
selection of candidates for the elections. It is revealing that despite having experienced an 
acrimonious relationship with Kripalani in 1946-1947 when Kripalani was Congress 
President and Nehru, the interim Prime Minister, eventually leading to Kripalani’s 
resignation in 1947379, Nehru opted to support Kripalani over Tandon in the 1950 contest.  
 
Nehru made it known that apart from supporting Kripalani, if Tandon were to be 
elected he would treat it as a vote of no-confidence against himself by the Congress party and 
would resign as prime minister. The election took place on 29 August 1950 and the result was 
announced on 1 September. Tandon secured a majority, with 1,306 votes, Kripalani having 
won 1,052 and Shankarrao Deo, 202. 380 In response to Tandon’s election, Nehru decided to 
place before the 1950 Nasik session a series of resolutions to test whether the party was 
willing to endorse his policies and positions. These resolutions referred to foreign policy, 
particularly towards Pakistan, condemned communalism, reaffirmed the secular state 
concept, and approved the government’s economic policy. All of them were passed by huge 
majorities. However, the unity which Nehru had hoped to test through these resolutions 
quickly revealed cracks when it came to discussing the composition of the party executive, 
the Working Committee. Despite an invitation from Tandon, Nehru refused at first to join the 
new Working Committee. Discussions over the members were brought to a temporary halt 
with only thirteen of twenty members selected. When the rest were announced on October 16, 
1950 it was evident that Nehru had been unable to exert his preferences, for Tandon had 
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dropped all those who had opposed him and created a committee containing eight Provincial 
Congress Presidents. This represented a break with the past when the Working Committee 
had been dominated by individuals who had a broad, all-India appeal as opposed to being 
provincial, party bosses.  
 
On December 15, 1950 Sardar Vallabhhai Patel’s death removed a formidable 
challenge to Nehru’s leadership and the central bastion of the conservative wing of the 
Congress party. However, the next road block emerged in the form of a confrontation 
between Tandon and his Working Committee on the one hand against Kripalani and the 
Democratic Front, which he had formed following his failure to win the presidency. The 
objective of the Front was to ‘purify’ the Congress and, to carry out the central economic, 
social and foreign policies that had been articulated in the Nasik resolutions. With matters 
gradually coming to a head, Nehru eventually took action by writing to Tandon on August 6, 
1951 stating his decision to resign from the Working Committee and the Congress Election 
Committee.381 In the following week, Nehru addressed the Congress Parliamentary Party, 
explaining his reasons for his resignation.382 A motion of confidence in Nehru’s leadership 
was introduced and passed, implying that the conflict was about individuals, leadership and 
policy rather than a clash of roles and procedure.  
 
Eventually Tandon stepped down and on September 8, 1951 Nehru was elected to the 
Congress presidency by a vote of 295 to 4. Appointing Tandon to his Working Committee 
Nehru invited all those who had seceded from the Congress to rejoin the party. Meeting in 
October, the Congress passed a series of resolutions embodying Nehru’s policies on the 
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economy, communalism and foreign policy.383 Although in late 1951 it already looked as 
though Nehru was the undisputed leader within the party, concrete actions had to be taken to 
sustain this position. As Congress President for the next three years, Nehru worked to 
consolidate and secure his power. Handing over the President-ship in 1954 to U.N.Dhebar, 
formerly Chief Minister of the State of Saurashtra and at forty-nine, a ‘new generation’ 
compared with earlier leaders, Nehru could be sure of his protégé’s loyalty In one of his first 
public speeches Dhebar acknowledged the pre-eminence of Nehru in particular: ‘There is 
only one leader in India today and that is Jawaharlal Nehru. Whether he carries the mantle of 
Congress Presidentship on his shoulders or not, ultimately, the whole country looks to him 
for support and guidance’.384 
 
4.5.2. Nehru as political entrepreneur:  
transforming the Congress-led movement into a political party. 
 
Using the resources available to him, Nehru managed to secure his position. Two 
institutions provided the means through which to exert his influence and establish a power 
base: the Congress Working Committee (CWC) and the parliamentary Cabinet. The struggle 
to control the Congress Working Committee was an old one since, as a sub-committee of the 
A.I.C.C. it was the highest authority of the Congress and the chief policy-maker of the 
organisation. It framed the rules for the working of the organisation, controlled the Pradesh 
Congress Committees and took disciplinary action against committees or individuals within 
the Congress. Post-independence, the CWC was charged with coordinating party-government 
relations through the Parliamentary Board and through a second committee, the Central 
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Election Committee it exerted great influence in the selection of election candidates.385 
However, with independence the relationship between the Congress party and the central 
government became a central concern, raising questions about the extent to which the CWC 
ought to continue issuing all-India policies under a federal system, whether a membership 
criteria ought to be developed and the need to introduce fair organisational elections. 
 
In the transformation from a mass movement into a political party in government, the 
composition of the CWC took on a greater importance. On the one hand, it was argued that 
close cooperation and overlapping membership of the CWC and government positions was 
necessary to preserve unity, but at the same time a majority seemed to believe that this 
represented too much of a concentration of power.386 As mentioned above, Purshottamdas 
Tandon’s CWC was composed largely of party bosses from the major states, many of whom 
opposed the social and economic policies of the Nehru government. Under Nehru the 
composition of the CWC underwent a significant alteration. At the 1951 A.I.C.C. session, in 
preparation for the General Elections, the Congress President was given full freedom to select 
his Working Committee, enabling Nehru to drawn upon Central Ministers and Chief 
Ministers. In this way, the Working Committee became a means of coordinating all-India 
Congress policy informally, ensuring that there was little divergence between party 
resolutions and government action. Nehru had also instituted a practice of writing regularly to 
his Chief Ministers and the letters demonstrate how closely he sought to guide and monitor 
their actions.387  
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By 1951 therefore Nehru was in a position to give institutional form to his vision and 
priorities for a modern, independent India. By strategically compromising on some issues, 
such as the degree of socialist rhetoric in order to secure a consensus on economic policy or, 
by encouraging a polemic debate on other fronts, as in the case of the Hindu Code bills, 
Nehru had managed to favourably alter the ‘structure of opportunities’ in his favour. By 1951 
he combined the post of prime minister with that of Congress president and was able to exert 
his influence through both the working committee and, as we shall see below, the Cabinet. 
However, the extent to which Nehru was able in fact to shape the political arena and the 
limits to his power, will come through in the following three chapters when each of the 
individual policies are examined closely. As suggested in chapter one, the instrumentalisation 
of a policy issue, (an indicator of this being when the actor refers to a particular policy more 
in terms of its symbolism rather than its substantive content), is unlikely to generate 
uncontested policy outcomes. On the contrary, such a style of politics and policy-making is 
inherently more likely to run into strong opposition and stringent bargaining positions.  
 
The changing composition of the Cabinet is yet another prism through which to 
follow the growing predominance of Nehru. According to the Constitution it was stated that 
‘there shall be a Council of Ministers, with the Prime Minister at the head, to aid and advise 
the President in the exercise of his functions....The Prime Minister shall be appointed by the 
President and the other Ministers shall be appointed by the President on the advice of the 
Prime Minister’.388 Thus, the Westminster British model of parliamentary Cabinet 
government was instituted and some of the unwritten conventions of the British system were 
written into the Indian constitution.  
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The first Cabinet in fact predated the Indian Constitution. Following the acceptance 
by the Indian National Congress of the British Cabinet Mission Plan, the then Viceroy, Lord 
Wavell, invited Jawaharlal Nehru (in the latter’s capacity as the then head of the Congress), 
to form an Interim Government. Nehru was to the Vice-President of the Viceroy’s Executive 
Council under the proposed arrangement and all the Departments (including the previously 
reserved or British-controlled Departments of External Affairs, Defence, and 
Communications) were to be under the charge of Indian Members. Technically, the Viceroy 
remained the President of the Council but before forming the government, Nehru obtained the 
assurance from Lord Wavell that the Interim Government would, in practice, function like a 
Dominion Cabinet. In other words, the Interim Government was to act like a Cabinet and 
Nehru was the de facto Prime Minister. In reality, Nehru was not quite as free as the Prime 
Minister under a Cabinet system. The task of forming the Government was entrusted by the 
Congress to a special parliamentary committee comprising Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel, 
Maulana Azad and Rajendra Prasad, demonstrating who the helm-leaders were at the time. 
The Cabinet was also not characterised by political homogeneity with some of its Members 
(out of an initial team of nine) also non-Congressmen, namely C.H.Bhabha389, John 
Matthai390, Baldev Singh391, and S.P.Mookerji.392  
 
Jawaharlal Nehru’s first cabinet after independence was sworn in on 15 August 1947 
and consisted of a Deputy Prime Minister (Patel) and twelve other Ministers. Patel it is said 
was virtually self-appointed for, having withdrawn in favour of Nehru at Gandhi’s insistence 
in the leadership contest of 1946, he expected his due. Also in the cabinet, Rajendra Prasad 
was one of the party stalwarts, leaning more towards the right. Three other members, 
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N.V.Gadgil, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur and Jairamdas Daulatram were not Nehru’s own choices. 
Gadgil himself attributed his first appointment in 1947 and, retention in the first cabinet of 
1950, to Sardar Patel. Both Amrit Kaur and Daulatram had not been in the forefront of all-
India Congress leadership, but had been closely associated with Gandhi. Subsequent 
appointments of K.M.Munshi, R.R.Diwarkar and K.Santhanam were seen as falling under 
Patel’s special area of influence, at the time, mainly Bombay and the South. Significantly, all 
of them were dropped after the general election of 1952, Patel having passed away in the 
meantime and Nehru being in a position of strength within the party. In addition to these, two 
other members of the Cabinet – Jagjivan Ram and C.H.Bhabha –owed their positions to 
factors other than the Prime Minister’s personal choice. Jagjivan Ram was included to 
provide representation to the numerous hairjans or Scheduled Castes and C.H.Bhabha was 
included following a decision by the Congress High Command to give representation in the 
government to the affluent and influential Parsee community.393  
 
The limits to Nehru’s power during the early years of independence are evident from 
various aspects. Firstly, there was his inability to remove Patel despite Nehru’s own threats to 
resign. N.V.Gadgil, a ‘Patelite’ also proved to be an obstacle to Nehru.394 In the early years 
after independence Nehru also had to cope with some very vocal critics who were also 
Cabinet members. S.P.Mookerji for instance served as cabinet minister for Industry and 
Supply for two and a half years after which he resigned from the Cabinet on 19th April, 1950. 
He held strong views on the path to economic development given India’s conditions. 
According to his biographer, Mookerji was convinced that in an industrially backward 
country, the primary task was to mobilise all resources, private and governmental to make the 
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country self-sufficient, especially in terms of defence requirements.395 Total nationalisation 
was unwise given the lack of trained personnel and expertise to run industries efficiently. 
Hence collaboration with private industry was essential. This view in addition to the strong 
stance he adopted with regards treating Pakistan as India’s number one enemy brought him 
into conflict with Nehru on issues like how to handle the integration of Kashmir and 
Hyderabad into the Indian Union.  
 
Following the death of Patel in December 1950 and the weakening of the ‘Patelites’ in 
the cabinet, Mookerji was approached to lead a new organisation, the All India Bharatiya 
Jana Sangh which was launched in late 1951. Explaining the need for the new party he said, 
“one of the chief reasons for the manifestation of dictatorship in Congress rule is the absence 
of well-organised opposition parties which alone can act as a healthy check on the majority 
party and can hold out before the country the prospect of an alternative government”.396  
 
It can be argued that Nehru as an uncontested leader really came into his own after the 
success of the 1952 elections. The election manifestos for the country’s first general elections 
offer a useful insight into the political terrain of the time. Whilst the Indian National 
Congress held the clear advantage in terms of resources, a pan-India network and the 
undisputed association with the Freedom Struggle, a few other parties stood for clear 
alternatives to the Congress programme. The Hindu Mahasabha for example, apart from 
projecting itself as the party, that ‘stands for establishment of a Hindu Raj in Bharat with a 
form of Government in accordance with Hindu conception of policy and economy’397, and a 
key player in the Civil Resistance movement, differentiated itself from the Congress on 
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specific policy matters as well. Thus, in foreign policy the Hindu Mahasabha criticised ‘the 
unrealistic and theoretical approach in the sphere of foreign policy (that) has left Bharat 
friendless in the whole world’398, on the economy, ‘the vacillating and indecisive policy of 
the Congress Government in dealing with industry has alienated successfully both capital and 
labour. It has created a sense of insecurity in the minds of investors and has retarded the 
growth of industry.’399  
 
On the subject of social reform, the Hindu Mahasabha protested the ‘attempt by the 
Congress Government to pass the Hindu Code Bill in spite of general protest against the 
disruption of Hindu society.’400 The policy alternatives promised included, a ‘foreign policy 
guided by the principle of enlightened self-interest and reciprocity’401, recognition of ‘the 
sanctity of private property and guarantee(ing) its possession and inheritance to its 
owners’402, and a clear position ‘against legislative interference in religious matters, measures 
like the Hindu Code Bill would be opposed’.403 In all the three policy arenas therefore the 
Hindu Mahasabha took a clear stand.  
 
The Jana Sangh, formed on the eve of the elections, decided to contest for seats in 
both the State and Central legislatures. Challenging the government on a number of issues, 
the Jana Sangh expressed alternative views on topics including the economy, foreign policy 
and communalism. On the whole however, the election results were a debacle for the Jana 
Sangh which succeeded in getting only three of its candidates through out of the 93 who had 
contested on its ticket. In the State legislatures it fared not much better where out of the 742 
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candidates that had contested, only 33 were elected. In some provinces like East Punjab, 
where the Jana Sangh appeared to be the strongest, it could not secure a single vote. The most 
significant gain for the party however, was the recognition of the Jana Sangh as one of the 
four All India Parties by the Election Commission of India, on the basis of the number of 
votes polled by it.  
 
The Communist Party of India (CPI) fared well, emerging only second to the ruling 
Congress Party in Parliament and as the second largest party in a number of State 
Assemblies. However,  even with 26 seats, the CPI did not get more than 4.45 per cent of the 
total polled votes while the Socialist Party which got only twelve seats, and the Kisan 
Mazdoor Praja Party (KMPP) obtained nine seats, polled respectively 10.50 percent and 5.81 
per cent. Its election manifesto criticised the Congress Party on a number of points, most 
importantly the slowness of its land reforms. Lambasting the Nehru Government as ‘a 
Government of Landlords and Monopolists’ the CPI manifesto declared ‘We have before us 
the glorious example of China which under a government of People’s Democracy has 
registered an advance that has amazed the whole world. It has freed the peasants from feudal 
shackles and increased food production by ten million tons. It is fast building its industries 
and roads.....it should not be forgotten that China was more backward than India, had to 
support a far bigger population and its economy was shattered by decades of war and 
devastation’.404 
 
On the whole the opposition fared rather poorly. Collectively, the opposition parties 
secured more than 55 per cent of the total vote polled as compared with the 44.63 per cent 
garnered by the Congress. Yet in terms of seats this translated into an absolute victory for the 
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Congress which acquired 364 seats as against 125 won by the opposition put together. 
Furthermore, the opposition front of 125 was badly divided. The Communists and their allies, 
who had 26 members in the new Parliament, constituted the largest organised group in the 
opposition. The Socialists had 12 members and the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party of Acharya 
Kripalani had 10. Their merger to form the Praja Socialist Party, combined to produce 22 
seats. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh, the fourth All-India Party, secured only 3 members and the 
rest were represented by smaller regional parties or independents. Despite not being able to 
muster together the requisite number of seats to constitute a formal opposition group (50 seats 
were required), MP Shyma Prasad Mookerji emerged as the unofficial spokesman of the 
opposition. Criticising the Government’s kid-glove approach towards Kashmir for example, 
Mookerji raised an important question, “I would like to know are Kashmiris Indian first and 
Kashmiri next or they are Kashmiris first and Indian next, or they are Kashmiris first, second 
and third and not Indian at all?”405 
 
Following the resounding victory in the 1952 elections, Nehru’s Cabinets began to 
reflect the new arrangement of power. His new Cabinet dropped all the ‘Patelites’, including 
Gadgil, Munshi, Diwarkar and Santhanam. It consisted of fourteen cabinet ministers 
(excluding Nehru) and four Ministers of State. Among the fourteen ministers were Kailas 
Nath Katju (Home Minister) and Lal Bahadur Shastri (Railways) – both from Allahabad, 
Nehru’s hometown in Uttar Pradesh. Rafi Ahmed Kidwai (Food and Agriculture), who had 
been close to the Nehrus since the days of Motilal Nehru, was retained. In addition to these 
confidantes, several other Cabinet Ministers like Gopalaswamy Ayyangar, C.D.Deshmukh, 
T.T.Krishnamachari, Amrit Kaur and C.C.Biswas were otherwise political non-entities and 
owed their positions to the Prime Minister.  
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4.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter sought to contextualise Nehru at first, in terms of the ideological and 
intellectual parameters of the time, by comparing him with three contemporaries, Sardar 
Vallabhbhai Patel, Dr. Rajendra Prasad and Subhas Chandra Bose. An attempt was made to 
summarise the differences in positions on key issues as revealed in their presidential speeches 
in the mid to late 1930s. The analysis of these speeches served to highlight how each 
responded to the challenges of the freedom struggle and the differences in the emphasis given 
to issues. Secondly, the chapter demonstrated the institutional constraints of the Congress 
party organisation over which Nehru managed to gradually assert control. By examining the 
various resolutions adopted by the Congress party and the speeches of different Congress 
presidents, the aim was to track Nehru’s emergence as a central figure within the Congress 
party organisation. The chapter has revealed how Nehru’s position on various policy issues 
seemed to harden in some cases and in others, to soften and furthermore, how the 
organisational and institutional mechanisms of the Congress party, as a party in power came 
to serve as instruments of influence and power consolidation. By 1955 it is posited that Nehru 
was at the peak of his power. For the next five sessions the President of the Congress party, 
U.N. Dhebar served as a reliable stooge, allowing Nehru to focus on flaunting his 
international persona and skills of diplomacy, on hammering out the second five year plan 
and fine-tuning his idea of a ‘socialist pattern of society’.  
 
The information presented in this chapter was meant to convey the ‘structure of 
opportunities’ which Nehru sought to mould in his favour, especially after he was chosen to 
be Prime Minister of newly independent India in 1947. Faced with important rivals such as 
Vallabhbhai Patel, Rajendra Prasad and their respective constituencies, Nehru sought to 
206 
 
position himself strategically on a number of central themes, namely economic policy, social 
reform and foreign policy. Opting for a different spatial standpoint on the spectrum of 
positions depending on the issue, Nehru had, by the mid-1950s managed to turn himself into 
the pivotal actor whose choices were to set the parameters for future policy-making. 
Observing this tendency towards dominance, authors such as Rajni Kothari developed the 
idea of a one-dominant party system under the Congress party which, after independence 
continued as a broad-based movement, ‘involving within itself both dominant and dissident 
groups, and functioning alongside government as an agency of political penetration.’406 
However, Kothari’s analysis really focuses on the period after 1962 and how the ‘Congress 
System’ survived the shocks of the 1967 state assembly elections and, not so much on the 
1950s. This period, like in so many other books about India’s modern political development, 
is neglected.  
 
Arguing that time and sequence are important components of the analytic narrative, the 
thesis emphasizes the need for ‘pre-history’ and a more in-depth investigation into the origins 
of institutional arrangements rather than focusing on their replication. Hence, the transition to 
independence and the early years just after independence are considered to be crucial in 
understanding how Nehru consolidated his power. The following chapters turn towards the 
individual policies which act as prisms through which to observe the effects of vision, 
strategy and the structure of opportunities at play. 
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Chapter Five 
The Planning Commission. 
 
5.1. Introduction: the Puzzle. 
5.2. Pre-history: the Origins of Planning in India. 
5.3. The Structure of Opportunities at the time of the Constituent Assembly     
Debates. 
5.4. The Planning Commission: an analytic narrative of original intentions,  
functions and the constraints on institution building. 
5.5. Vision and Strategy in the framing of the First and Second Five Year Plans. 
5.5.1. The First Five Year Plan: negotiated consensus. 
5.5.2. The Second Five Year Plan: “the adoption of the socialist pattern of 
society as the national objective” 
5.6. Analyzing the political origins of planning in India. 
5.7. Conclusion: the Planning Commission as a repository of values.  
 
 
5.1. Introduction: The Puzzle 
 
The first empirical case study is the Planning Commission since it was the earliest of 
the three examples considered here to take formal shape in independent India. Established in 
1950 the Commission has an important pre-history which the chapter begins by surveying. As 
chapter three demonstrated, out of the three areas, Nehru’s thoughts on economic planning 
were the most fully evolved in terms of (a) conceptualising the problems at stake, (b) 
208 
 
foreseeing the challenges ahead and, (3) envisioning possible solutions and methods of 
implementing policy. With this in mind the chapter presents an analytic narrative that 
recounts the setting up of the Planning Commission, the formulation of the First Five Year 
Plan and the substantive shift entailed in the Second Five Year Plan. This makes for an 
interesting investigation given that the first two five year plans are so different from each 
other in content.  
 
Applying the method of process tracing, the narrative is guided by three sets of core 
propositions that were set out in chapter two: 
i. Individuals choose the best action according to stable preference functions and the 
constraints facing them. 
ii. Institutions can be explained by the function they serve. 
iii. Vision alone enables the observer to understand Nehru, the political actor and his 
policy choices. 
 
The argument is made that the changing ‘structure of opportunities’ explains the shift 
in values encapsulated in the Second Five Year Plan. Whilst this was not a deviation from 
Nehru’s original preferences, it represented a dramatic assertion of socialist principles and a 
clear change in the stated priorities of economic development compared with those entailed 
in the first Five Year Plan. This was possible because the costs of making this shift in 
priorities, emphasis and style were not high for Nehru in the mid-1950s. As has been 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, Nehru was at the height of his power then. It is 
proposed that the setting up of the Planning Commission and the first Five Year Plan 
comprised important concessions but it was with the launch of the second Plan that Nehru 
was able to put his vision of economic development into action. Hence the consensus-driven 
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approach was a temporary mechanism with which to gain time for Nehru had demonstrated 
that he held very strong ideas on the path of economic development an independent India 
would opt for. The chapter demonstrates this move away from consensus by tracing the steps 
of policy making and the policy positions adopted by Nehru and his allies.  
 
The implications of the change in strategy are presented in the section on the political 
origins of planning which examines the Planning Commission as a repository of values. 
Three factors are considered in terms of their impact on the long-run shape and nature of the 
Planning Commission in post-independence India. These are (1) the cognitive limitations of 
the actor which include processes such as memory, inference and problem-solving and which 
can generate consequences that do not match the actor’s original stated intentions, (2) the 
sequence of events and the path dependency that is generated as a result of particular choices 
taken at the expense of other options and, (3) the institutional framework which, by 
producing positive feedback effects, can given institutions a ‘life of their own’. It is argued 
that one of the reasons for the persistence of the Planning Commission is that it has served as 
an effective mechanism through which the Prime Minister could exert control over economic 
policy. To this extent, the setting up of the Commission represents a highly successful 
strategy of Nehru, in that he managed to alter the structure of opportunities to his favour, 
achieving this before he infused the policy arena with his policy preferences.  
 
A conclusion summarises the impact of Nehru’s vision and the structure of 
opportunities in the choice of strategy used to institutionalise his preferences. The 
interpretation of data and events that emerges contrasts with existing views on why India 
came to adopt its particular economic strategy of planning with a focus on state-owned heavy 
industry at the expense of other sectors, most importantly agriculture but also education. 
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Economists have argued that the country’s decision-makers were forced to adopt such an 
approach due to economic reasons like export pessimism and the foreign exchange 
constraint407 whilst others have attributed the particular choice of policies to Nehru’s fervent 
commitment and belief in socialism.408 Instead the thesis posits that having employed a 
consensus-building approach to the problem of economic development, Nehru was able to 
successfully set up the Planning Commission soon after independence. This institution 
became both an instrument by which to strengthen his political position and the mechanism 
through which his preferences could be translated into policy. However, as will be 
demonstrated below this was not an uncontested process and Nehru faced strong opposition 
from the business community as well as from within his own party.  
 
Vivek Chibber’s book Locked in Place State-building and Late Industrialisation in 
India provides an invaluable account of how development planning was launched in 
independent India, the strategy employed by the capitalist classes and the response of the 
state.409 As its core research question the book asks why Indian elites failed to actualise their 
state-building agenda and is unusual in that it tries to reconstruct the different positions taken 
by the key actors within a structural context of political incentives that had emerged by the 
time of independence. The conclusion to emerge is also an atypical one, positing that the 
industrial class strongly and successfully resisted state regulation and discipline, and that this 
in turn not only negatively affected the installation of state institutions but also ‘locked into 
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place’ a sub-optimal arrangement.410 This echoes Douglas North’s work on the ‘lock-in’ 
effects of institutions which initially may have produced small advantages but which over 
time become too costly to overturn. 
 
However, despite the uncommon approach, rigorous use of primary sources and 
interesting conclusion, Chibber’s analysis comes across as lop-sided. Using explanatory 
variables such as capitalist preferences with respect to state-building and their impact on the 
outcome of the state-building project, he focuses too much on the agency of the capitalists 
whilst rendering the rest to structural factors or the ‘balance of forces’ which ‘strengthened 
their hand at the expense of the state, through for example, the demobilisation of the labour 
movement’.411 In the process the agency of state actors is neglected and reduced to a weakly 
responsive function where institutions were adapted and altered to accommodate the 
capitalist classes. In the end, despite the fact that the author highlights the deficiencies of 
India’s development model as designed by the country’s founding leaders and the long-run 
costs that were imposed, Nehru emerges virtually untouched, his position and motives are 
mostly unexplored. Hence, ‘For all its shortcomings, the Nehru regime nevertheless evinced a 
degree of integrity that has been altogether absent in the regimes that followed.......there is no 
doubt that the top level of the Congress leadership was quite sincerely committed to a 
developmental agenda. Above all, Nehru’s commanding presence in the cabinet ensured that 
such malfeasance as existed remained within limits.’412 Nehru’s role therefore is seen in 
terms of his being the guardian of good conduct and upholder of moral standards although 
this proposition is not substantiated with evidence in the book. What Chibber overlooks and 
which this chapter seeks to explore, is the impact of Nehru’s own tactical decisions, his 
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willingness to compromise on core goals in order to consolidate his power and his 
instrumentalisation of an institution that was meant to serve the development purposes of the 
state. 
  
5.2. Pre-history: the Origins of Planning in India. 
 
Beginning in the 1930s a general consensus had emerged amongst less developed 
countries about the desirability of state-led rapid industrialisation. This was also the case in 
India.413 Since the collapse of world markets during the Great Depression political pressure 
from business groups had advocated the need for protection from international competition, 
the need for state assistance in the acquisition of inputs, especially finance and raw materials 
as well as the need for some central coordination of economic policy. As a result this period 
saw the confluence of capitalist pressure and the interests of the political elite in favour of an 
interventionist state.  
 
A variety of views and perspectives on economic development were available in the 
public arena in India during the 1930s. Within the Congress, Mahatma Gandhi and 
Jawaharlal Nehru did not see eye to eye on social and economic questions. Big business, 
influential in Congress policy-making and fund-raising, was apprehensive about planning, 
particularly as socialist-minded leaders like Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose, gained some 
clout in the party, culminating in the setting up of the Congress Socialist Party (CSP) in 1934. 
Congress policy resolutions had cautiously reflected the need for economic and social reform 
over the years. For example in 1929 at the Lahore Congress a resolution by the All India 
Congress Committee stated that, “in order to remove the poverty and misery of the Indian 
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people and to ameliorate the conditions of the masses, it is essential to make revolutionary 
changes in the present economic and social structure of society and to remove gross 
inequalities”.414 This was followed by the Karachi resolution in 1931, which, while making 
no overt declaration in favour of national planning, included the following, “Currency and 
exchange shall be regulated in the national interest…..The State shall own or control key 
industries and services, mineral resources, railways, waterways, shipping and other means of 
public transport”.415 However, opposition to such an approach was still strong and in 1934 the 
Congress Working Committee, passed a resolution stating that ‘large and organised industries 
are in no need of the services of Congress organisations or of any Congress effort on their 
behalf’.416 Nevertheless Nehru persisted and in his 1936 Faizpur presidential address he 
argued strongly in favour of heavy industrialisation and planning.417 
 
Under Subhas Chandra Bose’s first tenure as Congress president, the Congress 
National Planning Committee (NPC) was constituted in 1938 with Jawaharlal Nehru as 
chairman and a fourteen-member body. These captured a range of views including four 
industrialists, Puroshottam Thakurdas, A.D. Shroff, Ambalal Sarabhai and Walchand 
Hirachand; five scientists: Meghnath Saha, A.K.Saha,Nazir Ahmed, V.S. Dubey and J.C. 
Ghosh; three economists: K.T. Shah, Radha Kamal Mukherjee and M. Visvorsvaraya, a 
representative for industrial workers, N.M. Joshi and a ‘token’ Gandhian, J.C. Kumarappa of 
the All India Village Industries Association. Nehru described the composition of the 
Committee in the following way, “among the members are well-known industrialists, 
financiers, economists, professors and scientists as well as representatives of the Trade Union 
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Congress and of the Village Industries Association. The non-Congress Provincial 
Governments (Bengal, Punjab and Sind) co-operated with this Committee….Hard-headed 
Big Business was there, as well as people who are called idealists and doctrinaire, Socialists 
as well as near-Communists”.418 
 
Nehru as chairman had to find ways of balancing the criticism from conservative 
members who were sceptical of state intervention and the Gandhians who were against big 
business and heavy industry. As a result Nehru attempted to sell planning as an instrument 
that would benefit both cottage and large-scale industries. Hence he cleverly argued that the 
conflict was “one of emphasis. It is clear that in India today the development of cottage 
industries on a vast scale is essential for the well-being of the masses. It is equally clear the 
rapid development of large scale machine industry is an urgent need of the country. Without 
industrialisation no country can have political or economic freedom and even cottage 
industries cannot develop to any large extent if economic freedom is absent”.419 
 
Lasting just two years, the NPC soon fractured on issues that were to become the fault 
lines between state and capital in later years but, the experience as chairman gave Nehru a 
firsthand taste of the challenges of policy-making and consensus building in this field. 
Cataloguing a list of problems facing the development effort, Nehru noted the (1) lack of data 
and statistics; (2) lack of cooperation from the government of India; (3) lack of real interest in 
all-India planning on the part of the provincial governments; (4) lack of enthusiasm among 
‘important elements in the Congress; and (5) the apprehensions of big business.420 
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The NPC however, had not started from scratch. Drawing upon a precursor, Sir M. 
Visvesvarayya’s 1934 treatise on the ‘Planned Economy for India’, industrialisation was 
hailed as the panacea to end all economic troubles. Envisioning the setting up of an Economic 
Council consisting mainly of expert economists and representative businessmen, 
Visvesvarayya recommended a consensus-building approach, where businessmen would be 
incorporated into the decision-making process. Most of the businessmen in the NPC appeared 
to be lukewarm about planning whilst Gandhi’s followers objected to large-scale industry and 
commerce. Nehru, who at the time did not want to risk disunity in the area of economic 
policy, worked hard at developing a middle way. Thus, for instance when a clear division 
manifest itself on the subject of large-scale industry versus cottage industries, Nehru, 
undertook the task of proving that Congress policy, as expressed in the resolutions of the All-
India Congress Committee (AICC), was compatible with large-scale industrialization. On 21 
December 1938 he explained: 
‘It is clear that the Congress considered it unnecessary to push large-scale industries through 
its organization and left this to the State as well as to their own resources. It did not decide in 
any way against such large-scale industry. Now that the Congress is, to some extent, 
identifying itself with the State, it cannot ignore the question of establishing and encouraging 
large-scale industries…..It is clear therefore that not only is it open to this Committee and to 
the Planning Commission to consider the whole question of large-scale industries in India, in 
all its aspects, but that the Committee will be failing in its duty if it did not do so. There can 
be no planning if such Planning does not include big industries. But in making our plans we 
have to remember the basic Congress policy of encouraging cottage industries”.421 
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Gandhi however, remained anti-planning, believing the Committee’s work to be a 
waste of effort and labour422 and it is important to note that Nehru was careful to tone down 
the rhetoric when necessary. Thus, he never officially joined the CSP and did not allow his 
differences with Gandhi to jeopardise his political career in the party, unlike Bose who, stood 
by his strong views on planning in opposition to Gandhi, going as far as to stand for re-
election as Congress president in 1939 against Gandhi’s explicit wishes. Winning the election 
against Gandhi’s candidate, Pattavi Sitaramaya, Bose was ultimately forced to resign and 
subsequently suspended from the party, a development which Nehru did little to prevent or 
reverse.423 Nehru’s extensive jail sentences from 1940 to 1945 dealt the NPC a virtual death 
blow as it was a period during which it had formal existence only. After the end of the war 
three further sessions were held, but these, in the absence of sub-committee meetings and of 
any response from the provinces to an appeal for funds, failed to generate further interest. 
 
In the meantime, planning had been taken up by the British Indian government, in 
response to the exigencies of war and the anticipated needs of post-war reconstruction. One 
of the first steps taken was the creation of an official Board of Industrial and Scientific 
Research that was followed by the establishment of a Reconstruction Committee of the 
Council, under the Viceroy’s chairmanship and associated with a number of expert 
committees representing provincial governments, state governments and non-official 
organisations. In 1944 a Planning and Development Department was created and under the 
guidance of Sir Ardheshir Dalal, provincial and state governments were directed to set up 
their own planning organisations. To provide general guidance the Reconstruction Committee 
formulated and published its Second Report on Reconstruction Planning (1945) which 
provided a summary of the views held by the department of the Government of India. 
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The document was surprisingly bold and socialistic in character. It proposed a fifteen 
year ‘perspective’ plan, and among its aims was the removal of ‘the existing glaring anomaly 
of immense wealth side by side with abject poverty.424 It not only recognized the need for 
large-scale industry but envisaged ownership by the state of those enterprises where private 
capital may not be forthcoming. It gave priority to the development of power resources and of 
important capital goods’ industries. It envisaged a balanced regional development in which 
industry would not be confined to a few provinces and endorsed at least one of the principles 
of Gandhian economics by insisting that industries should be located in rural areas or small 
towns. In matters of rural development it emphasized the importance of building up an 
infrastructure (e.g. irrigation, anti-erosion and land reclamation measures) and pointed to the 
need for popular participation through cooperative societies and panchayats.  
 
Of the other central planning documents issued at this time, one of the most important 
was the Industrial Policy Statement of 1945 which gave greater precision to the principles of 
industrial reconstruction embodied in the Second Report on Reconstruction Planning. Twenty 
major industries were to be brought under the control of the central government, while other 
‘basic industries of national importance’ were to be nationalized if adequate private capital 
for their development was not forthcoming. Aircraft, automobiles, tractors, chemicals, dyes, 
iron and steel, prime movers, electrical machinery, machine tools, electro-chemicals and non-
ferrous metals were mentioned specifically as potential candidates for this treatment. All 
others were to be left to private enterprise, but subjected to licensing, investment controls, 
and measures to ensure a fair deal for labour, the elimination of excessive profits, and the 
improvement of the quality of products. The government was also to have ‘primary 
responsibility’ for the development of transport facilities, power production, scientific and 
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industrial research, and technical education.425 The proposals contained in the document did 
not venture beyond the consensus that had emerged between the Bombay Planners (see 
below) and the government namely: the need to bring industrial policy under central control, 
the necessity for some degree of control over the economy by the state, and the need for some 
distributive measures by the state. To avoid confrontation there was no mention of labour as a 
partner in production or as having a right to share in profits. In addition it was made clear 
that, to the extent that the state did assume ownership or take direct control over enterprise, it 
would be confined to limits set by private capital itself. 
 
An immediate effect of this official planning activity was that it stimulated Indians to 
produce their own plans. Of the three ‘private’ plans that had appeared by 1944 the best 
known was the so-called ‘Bombay plan’, sponsored by some of the country’s most 
distinguished industrialists426: Purshotamdas Thakurdas, J.D.Tata, Sir Ardeshir Dalal, 
A.D.Shroff, Dr. John Matthai. D.G.Birla, Sir Shri Ram, Kasturbhai Lalbhai. Like 
M.Visvesvarayya’s plan, this emphasized industrialization, proposing a quintupling of 
production in fifteen years. ‘Production of power and capital goods’ was to have priority, but 
to avoid hardship, prevent inflation, provide employment and economize capital resources, 
‘the fullest possible use’ was to be made of small-scale and cottage industries in the 
production of consumer goods. 
 
The Bombay Plan proposed to raise India’s income within 15 years by 300 per cent 
and its per capital income by 200 per cent, a goal to be achieved by rapid industrialisation. 
The rise of income in industry was to be 500 per cent, in agriculture, 130 per cent and in 
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services, 200 per cent. A critical hurdle envisioned was the coordination and planning 
organisation, hence ‘a national planning committee in which the various interests concerned 
will be represented and to which the responsibility for drawing up plans will be delegated. 
The actual execution of the plans will be the function of a supreme economic council 
working alongside the national planning committee under the authority of the central 
government’.427 
 
At the same time, the ‘People’s Plan’, promoted by M.N.Roy and the Indian 
Federation of Labour, was a very different kind of document.428 Whereas the ‘Bombay’ plan 
had an empirical approach and said little about the kind of society at which it was aiming, the 
‘People’s’ plan assumed the desirability (and necessity) of socialism and was much 
concerned with the expansion of the public sector of the economy at the expense of the 
private. In this respect it anticipated the ‘socialist pattern’ of the 1955 Avadi resolution and 
the Second Five Year Plan. It did however distinguish itself from the Russian example by 
insisting that collectivization, as a solution to agricultural problems, should be strictly 
voluntary. Moreover it gave emphasis to agricultural development. Another distinctive 
feature was its complete lack of enthusiasm for cottage industries.  
 
Finally, the ‘Gandhian’ plan, more an essay in economic morality, preaching the 
virtues of simplicity, manual labour, local self-sufficiency, decentralization and the 
independent village community429, that revealed the impossibility of transforming Mahatma 
Gandhi’s scattered and sometime ambiguous dicta on economic organization into a logical 
and coherent system. Yet there were some positive contributions for instance in its emphasis 
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on popular participation and insistence that the willing cooperation of the ordinary villager 
must be won and which anticipated the panchayati raj system.430 
 
Without a planning machine in place, the immediate utility of these plans was very 
limited. Such a machine had existed in the form of the Planning and Development 
Department, but which was disbanded in 1946, despite Congress protests. The question of 
what should replace it was referred by the interim government to an Advisory Planning 
Board, with K.C.Neogy431 as Chairman and K.T.Shah432 and Penderel Moon433 as joint 
Secretaries, each of whom had already worked closely with Nehru. Its terms of reference 
were ‘to do a rapid survey of the field and to make recommendations regarding the 
coordination and improvement of planning, and as regards objectives and priorities and the 
future machinery of planning’.434 It was given only two months to produce its report which 
saw light on 18 December 1946. 
 
The most important section of the Board’s report concerned the machinery of 
planning. First, it defined the ‘legitimate functions of any planning machinery established 
under the Central Government’ as, (1) scrutinizing and co-ordinating provincial plans and the 
plans of the central departments; (2) advising on the allocation of central funds for 
development purposes; (3) formulating plans for the development of major industries and 
important minerals; (4) advising on state aid to and state control of industries; (5) advising on 
internal and foreign trade; (6) advising on monetary and financial policy; (7) watching and 
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stimulating progress, compiling and publishing statistics, suggesting the adjustments and 
modifications, and initiating new plans; (8) allocating material resources in short supply; and 
(9) examining the implications of scientific research and discovery for social welfare. Despite 
the lack of specific mention of agriculture, this was the clearest definition of the planning 
function that had emerged from any deliberations so far.435 
 
Some of these functions, the Board pointed out, were already being performed by the 
Co-ordinating Committee of the Cabinet, the Commerce Department, the Tariff Board and 
the Planning Branch of the Department of Industries and Supplies. But there was no specific 
provision for number 7 and none at all for numbers 8 and 9. More importantly, there was ‘no 
agency for taking a comprehensive view of planning as a whole and for tracing the 
interactions and repercussions of all the various plans, projected or in operation’.436 For this 
purpose, ‘a single, compact, authoritative organization is required which should be 
responsible directly to the Cabinet…..and which should devote its attention continuously to 
the whole field of development’. Furthermore, it was emphasized that such a commission 
must be non-political and non-ministerial. It might consist of either five or three members. 
Whatever its size and composition the Commission should be primarily advisory in character, 
except that it would act as a ‘Priorities Board’ for the allocation of material resources.  
 
The Planning Commission which eventually came into being, resembled these 
recommendations very closely except for the fact that it eventually emerged with much more 
of a political role than envisioned. Important support for the creation of a Planning 
Commission came from the Economic Programme Committee of the Congress437, whose 
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membership included Nehru, Abul Kalam Azad438, N.G.Ranga439, Shankarreo Deo and John 
Matthai.440 Appointed by the All India Congress Committee on 17 November 1947, it 
reported unanimously, on 25 January 1948. No immediate action could be taken on the 
recommendations due to the chaos unleashed by partition, the first armed conflict with 
Pakistan, the complex process of drafting a constitution, integration of the princely states and 
the threat of a Communist rebellion. As a result a dispirited feeling had set in by 1950 with 
business confidence at a low.441   
 
The setting up of a Planning Commission in 1950 represented a new beginning, an 
initiative that was spearheaded by Jawaharlal Nehru. As one commentator wrote: ‘It was he 
who converted the Congress to the idea of planning, and he who continued to insist on its 
importance at times when others, superficially more immediate, questions were tending to 
push it into the background’.442 This, it must be admitted was no small achievement, granted 
that the State had been associated with British oppression and Nehru was arguing that with 
independence, the State would reform itself and work towards improving the well-being of its 
people. To understand how Nehru proposed to accomplish this and to trace the continuity 
between Nehru’s approach and the final phase of colonial government it is necessary to turn 
to a closer analysis of the steps that brought about the Planning Commission into existence 
and its mandate for action. 
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5.3. The Structure of Opportunities at the time of the Constituent Assembly Debates. 
 
The discussions surrounding the strategy of economic development and the role of the 
state had by the late 1940s produced something of a consensus between the capitalist, 
industrialist leaders and the Congress party, as seen above. However, at the same time a more 
radical interest group had formed in the shape of the labour movement under the umbrella of 
the All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), an autonomous federation whose leadership 
included Congress members but also extended to Communist Party members. Since the 
Congress had decided not to allow functional representation of organisations within the 
movement, the AITUC had by independence evolved its own leadership cadre and following. 
Furthermore in August 1946, the All India Congress Committee passed a resolution that was 
highly critical of the strike activity that had been launched, decried the exploitation of labour 
unrest and called for legislation on labour issues. 
 
Facing the two wings of capital and labour interests Nehru sought to establish himself 
as the bridge-builder. Heading the interim government, Nehru constituted an Advisory 
Planning Board (APB) to draw up the broad framework for plans. A report by the APB in 
mid-1947 enunciated a set of policies that broadly represented continuity with earlier 
statements. The idea of state assistance to industry, financial and logistical, remained at the 
core of the programme for national development and central to this remained the commitment 
to protecting local firms from foreign competition. At this point therefore various statements 
and reports were issued assuring the capitalist classes that the new state would be committed 
to using public funds as a means of accelerating the development of private industry. In late 
1947 the Congress appointed a committee to produce a draft for the party’s economic policy. 
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Chaired by Nehru and dominated by Gandhians and leftists443 the recommendations were in 
keeping with the previous trend, calling for land reform, fair wages, labour rights, economic 
planning but it also stood out for recommending a progressive socialisation of industry.  
 
Faced with an outcry by business leaders and simultaneously, the exit of the Congress 
Socialists from the Congress party in March 1948, this marked a low point in Nehru’s attempt 
at consensus-building and heralded a change in his strategy. Seeking to retain his position as 
pivotal actor however, in early 1948 Nehru led a discussion in Parliament against a proposed 
resolution endorsing a socialist path for Indian development.444 Nehru’s reply centred on the 
need to judge according to the circumstances and to bring about change in a manner that 
would not upset the present structure or interfere with production.445 Nehru’s public position 
became one of urging that existing industry be left alone and that future industry needed to be 
reserved for the state.446  
 
Shortly after this the government issued its Industrial Policy Statement (IPS) which 
laid down the broad contours of industrial policy for the country and followed in the footsteps 
of Nehru’s new approach. The IPS rejected nationalization as an instrument of policy and 
attempted to dilute the elements that had displeased the business sector in the report of the 
Congress Economic Programme Committee. The IPS divided industry into three areas: the 
industry to be reserved for the state, a second in which existing private firms would be 
allowed to expand but where new undertakings would be the responsibility of the state, and a 
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third which would be left to private capital but subject to state regulation. In the first 
category, defence, railways and atomic energy were mentioned and the second section 
concentrated on capital goods and infrastructure. With socialisation of industry off the agenda 
the next hurdle in policy formulation became the degree and nature of regulation that the state 
would exercise over capital. This formed the substance of the Industries Development and 
Regulation Act (the IDRA) which marked the next step in the translation of the Congress 
program into policy.   
 
Within two months of the release of the IPS, a bill governing industrial policy was 
submitted by the Congress for passage in the Assembly. The motives behind the bill were 
twofold: first, to take power over industrial policy away from the provincial governments 
(which had been the decision-makers in industrial policy under the British) and second, to 
devise a mechanism through which to keep investments in congruence with economic plans. 
Industrial licensing emerged as the instrument through which the central government could 
maintain a control over industry. In March 1949 the bill was submitted to the Constituent 
Assembly for approval as the Industries (Development and Control Bill).447 The bill 
mandated that every new industrial establishment above a certain size, as well as every 
substantial expansion of an industrial establishment above the minimum size, would require a 
license.448 It also made contravention of the state’s directions in these matters illegal and 
punishable by law. The bill endowed the state with punitive powers and also condoned the 
use of coercion if it were found that industrialists were undertaking practices that might 
reduce the firms’ production capacity or economic value. A Central Advisory Council for 
Industry was to be set up containing representatives of industry and consultation was to be 
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mandatory on occasions where the state thought it necessary to revoke a licence or to take 
over management of a firm. Nevertheless the ultimate authority lay with the state.   
 
The response from the business community was to condemn the bill and through the 
direct lobbying by industrialists, the passing of the bill was stalled. Hence when the bill was 
introduced in the Constituent Assembly in late March 1949, it was handed over to a Select 
Committee to be reviewed and resubmitted for consideration in the following session. 
Through 1949 and 1950 the various organs of the business community rallied to pressure the 
government. Among the more prominent organisations these included the Federation of 
Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), the Indian Merchants Chamber (IMC), 
the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, the Associated Chambers of Commerce (ASSOCHAM), 
and the Madras Chamber of Commerce. 
 
It is important to note the density of institutions that were already in existence and 
that they were organised enough to exert pressure on the government. At this point Industry 
Minister, S.P.Mookerjee explained both privately and publicly that the government was 
willing to make the bill more acceptable to both domestic and foreign business and was open 
to suggestions but that the administration was constrained by having to avoid appearing as 
though it was succumbing to pressure from the business community.449  
 
Presenting its own bill to the government, FICCI proposed that all authority to license 
and the disciplinary power accompanying it, be withdrawn. Instead the industrial policy 
would be carried out through the formation of industrial committees in each industry which 
would be staffed primarily with businessmen from that particular sector. The state would still 
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have the power to regulate but this would be filtered through two mechanisms: the Central 
Advisory Council as well as the sectoral industrial committees. Hence regulation would take 
the form of self-regulation. In essence the proposal by FICCI represented an attempt to table 
a maximalist position in order to put the state on the defensive and to open up space for 
negotiation and more realistic demands. State intervention, it was recognised, was inevitable 
as well as desirable given the economic constraints that business faced both in terms of 
demand and supply capacity. Hence, they could not attack ‘planning’ per se but sought to 
minimise the disciplinarian powers of the state.  Taking action, the business community 
launched a massive lobbying campaign, targeting V.B. Patel who was known to be pro-
capital as well as Nehru’s chief rival in the cabinet and in the party.450 
 
In 1950 therefore the path for India’s economic development had not yet been set 
given that there were competing actors and ideas about what would be most effective and 
beneficial. Nevertheless despite the reservations and uncertainty surrounding its terms of 
reference, the Planning Commission came into being in early 1950, representing an initial 
successful step in the direction towards Nehru’s vision of a planned, socialistic economy.  
 
 
5.4. The Planning Commission: an analytic narrative of original intentions, functions 
and the constraints on institution building. 
 
The Government of India’s intention to create a Planning Commission was announced 
to the interim Lok Sabha on 28 February 1950 by the Minister of Finance in his budget 
speech and the Commission was subsequently established on 15 March by Cabinet 
                                                 
450 See Chopra, P.N. (ed.) The Collected Works of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (Konark Publishers, Delhi, 1999), 
Vol. XIV “Note to Nehru on Economic Malaise”, 30 Dec.1949, p. 270. 
228 
 
resolution. Some criticised the method of bringing it into existence, arguing that the passing 
of a law would have been preferable. The Commission was however, originally conceived as 
an ‘arm’ of the Cabinet, to have purely advisory status, and its creators evidently thought that 
the less formal method of creation would afford greater flexibility and possibility of 
experimentation.  
 
The resolution began by briefly recounting the history of economic planning in India and 
explaining the circumstances which demanded a better co-ordination of development 
programmes: ‘The need for comprehensive planning based on a careful appraisal of resources 
and on an objective analysis of all the relevant economic factors has become imperative. 
These purposes can best be achieved through an organisation free from the burden of the day-
to-day administration, but in constant touch with the Government at the highest level.’ The 
Commission created to meet this need, was to take as its basic terms of reference the 
following Directive Principles of State Policy embodied in the Constitution451: 
(a) that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of 
livelihood; 
(b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so 
distributed as best to serve the common good; and 
(c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of 
wealth and means of production to the common detriment. 
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Establishing itself firmly from within the Constitution, the Commission was to perform the 
following seven functions: 
1. Make an assessment of the material, capital and human resources of the country, 
including technical personnel, and investigate the possibilities of augmenting such of 
these resources as are found to be deficient in relation to the nation’s requirements; 
2. Formulate a Plan for the most effective and balanced utilisation of the country’s 
resources; 
3. On a determination of priorities, define the stages in which the Plan should be carried 
out and propose the allocation of resources for the due completion of each stage; 
4. Indicate the factors which are tending to retard economic development, and determine 
the conditions which in view of the current social and political situation, should be 
established for the successful execution of the Plan; 
5. Determine the nature of the machinery which will be necessary for securing the 
successful implementation of each stage of the Plan in all its aspects; 
6. Appraise from time to time the progress achieved in the execution of each stage of the 
Plan and recommend the adjustments of policy and measures that such appraisal may 
show to be necessary; 
7. Make such interim or ancillary recommendations as appear to be appropriate either 
for facilitating the discharge of the duties assigned to it or on a consideration of the 
prevailing economic conditions, current policies, measures and development 
programmes; or on an examination of such specific problems as may be referred to it 
for advice by the Central or State Governments. 
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The resolution also specified, clearly and briefly, the Commission’s role in the system 
of government: ‘The Planning Commission will make recommendations to the Cabinet. In 
framing its recommendations, the Commission will act in close understanding and 
consultation with the Ministries of the Central Government and the Governments of the 
States. The responsibility of taking and implementing decisions will rest with the Central and 
the State Governments’. 
 
Named as the chairman, Nehru was originally the only minister member. The deputy 
chairman, Gulzarilal Nanda was a prominent Congressman with a special knowledge of 
labour questions. Among the other members, V.T. Krishnamachari was an administrator with 
long and varied experience, Chintaman Deshmukh, a retired ICS man who had served as 
Governor of the Reserve Bank, G.L. Mehta, a businessman who had been President of the 
Indian Tariff Board, and R.K.Patil an administrator and politician who, at the time of 
appointment was working as Food Commissioner. However, the Commission soon veered 
towards becoming more of a ministerial body, beginning, as early as in May 1950, when 
C.D.Deshmukh, upon succeeding John Matthai as Finance Minister, became a member cum 
minister. Then, in 1951, the Deputy Chairman, Gulzarilal Nanda, was appointed both 
Minister of Irrigation and Power and Minister of Planning. In the latter capacity, his main 
duty was to act as liaison between the Commission and the Houses of Parliament. 
C.D.Deshmukh’s successors as Finance Minister, T.T.Krishnamachari and Morarji Desai, 
were also appointed members of the Commission, setting in place the convention of the 
Finance Minister automatically becoming a member. Further ministerial appointments in 
1956 included V.K.Krishna Menon as Minister without portfolio and later Minister of 
Defence, who also became a Planning Commission member, and in 1962 when former 
Finance Minister, T.T.Krishnamachari returned to the Commission in the capacity of Minister 
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without Portfolio. By late 1962 the Commission contained no fewer than five minister 
members, all of high status in the political hierarchy. 
 
As a critic, D.R.Gadgil452 had this to say about the Planning Commission: ‘The 
preparation of the plan itself may be said to have two aspects. The first is that of definition of 
the planning problem and of the proper approach of planning in India, and the construction of 
a framework of the plan. The second is detailed formulation of programmes, targets and 
outlays together with estimations of proceeds of taxes and loans, foreign aid, and with 
making explicit economic policy decisions involved in the whole process. In relation to the 
first, it has been admitted on all hands that the performance of the Indian Planning 
Commission has been at an exceptionally high level… 
 
In relation to the drawing out of detailed programmes, targets etc, the position at the 
beginning of the First Five Year Plan was comparatively easy. The Planning Commission 
confronted a situation in which a large number of commitments had already been entered into 
by the Union and the state governments….The task the Planning commission had to perform 
was essentially that of rationalisation, co-ordination, some pruning, and, very sparingly, a 
little addition……The main achievement of the Planning Commission within two years of its 
establishment therefore was formulation of the general Indian approach to planning and the 
coordination of programmes and policies of the Union Ministries and the Central 
Government so as to put the large majority of the existing commitments in a fairly orderly 
framework. The Planning commission, at this stage, is seen retrospectively to have proved of 
                                                 
452 Economist and later, deputy-chairman of the Planning Commission. 
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considerable use in persuading state governments to rationalise their schemes of expenditure 
and moderate their continuous demands on the centre”.453 
 
Nevertheless, offering an early warning Gadgil emphasised the fact that ‘If the 
Planning commission looks upon itself as a technical and advisory body, it can make an effort 
to make the examination of individual proposals and its total recommendations as objective 
as possible…However, if in one and the same authority, both aspects of the process 
(formulation and execution) are inextricably mixed, one or the other must suffer. Inevitably, 
it is the objective approach that suffers’.454 
 
A further problem Gadgil noted concerned “the activities of the Planning Commission 
regarding formulation and execution of policy..... This is due to the impossibility of 
discovering what specific advice has been tendered by the Planning Commission in any 
particular context, apart from what is contained in the two plan reports. The difficulty arises 
not only because there is no published record of the later communications of the Planning 
Commission, but also because the Planning Commission is active in this sphere to the extent 
of even advising individual ministries about matters to be placed before the Cabinet….. the 
activities of the Planning Commission in this context appear indistinguishable from the those 
of the ministries and the Cabinet”.455 ‘The situation can be remedied only by going back to 
the functions of the Planning Commission as originally laid down and making the Planning 
Commission fulfil them…..The Planning Commission as an organisation, not under any 
particular ministry and with powers in the appropriate context to deal directly with central 
ministries and governments of states, should retain its present status. What is important is that 
                                                 
453 D.R.Gadgil, Planning and Economic Policy in India (Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Poona, 
1965), p. 154 – 155. 
454 Ibid., p. 163. 
455 Ibid. p. 166. 
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it should no longer have any executive functions and should not be mixed up with the 
essentially political process of final policy-making. Final decisions regarding economic 
policy should fully rest with the special committee of the Cabinet…..’456 
 
At the same time there was opposition to the Planning Commission from within the 
cabinet, with Finance Minister, John Matthai ultimately making it his reason for resignation. 
His major objection was that the Planning Commission was superseding the cabinet in major 
decisions and aspired to becoming a ‘super-cabinet’.457 His statement of resignation is worth 
quoting extensively:  
“In regard to existing plans the Planning Commission of the kind now set up is totally 
unnecessary and in fact is hardly qualified for the work. The Ministries concerned are in a 
much better position to determine the order of priority.… I have objected not merely to the 
idea of a Planning Commission but also to its method of working. The main reason urged for 
setting up a Planning Commission was that the Government was preoccupied with the day-to-
day administration and therefore, had little leisure for thinking and planning ahead. But the 
way things are working out today, the Planning Commission have been asking for a voice in 
the discussion of current economic problems and have in fact, with the approval of the Prime 
Minister, been associated with the Cabinet in these discussions.…The result is that the 
Commission tends to become a parallel Cabinet and secondly it increases the area of 
argumentation and discussion.…In my opinion Cabinet responsibility has definitely 
weakened since the establishment of the Planning Commission. 
                                                 
456 Ibid. p. 170. 
457 See the correspondence between Matthai and  Nehru in Gopal’s Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series 
2, Vol. 14, part 2, pp. 227 – 250. 
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The members of the Planning Commission have been given the same place in the warrant of 
precedence as cabinet ministers and their salaries and allowances have also been fixed in 
accordance with those of cabinet ministers. 
…The present arrangement under which the Finance Minister becomes a member of the 
Commission will accentuate this trend. It is an unsound arrangement that a cabinet minister 
holding the key portfolio of finance should be a member of a committee of which the 
working head, namely the deputy chairman, is a paid employee of the Government. The 
arrangement is bound to weaken the authority of the Finance Minister and also of the 
Cabinet”.458 
 
Mathai’s resignation put Nehru on the defensive and he had to issue statements 
promising that the Planning Commission would not encroach upon ministerial prerogatives. 
In the direct aftermath Sardar Patel also wrote to Nehru expressing disapproval of the 
Commission’s actions to which Nehru quickly responded that the Planning Commission ‘was 
anxious not to do anything which comes in the way of any ministry’.459  As the above shows, 
whilst there were voices supporting a planning apparatus with strong powers of enforcement, 
there was by no means an unanimous consensus. Key figures and close advisors to Jawaharlal 
Nehru like K.T.Shah and Gulzarilal Nanda supported a strong Planning Commission which 
would have the power not only to impose discipline on firms but also to control the policy 
process. However, when the Planning Commission was finally installed in March 1950 its 
powers were clearly limited. Its enumerated powers were basically advisory with real power 
left to the ministries. The Commission’s prerogative was confined to devising comprehensive 
plans and ‘making recommendations to the cabinet’ which had no binding power. Even after 
Matthai’s resignation, a number of ministers expressed their dislike of the Commission and 
                                                 
458 Quoted in Hindustan Times, June 3, 1950. 
459 Nehru to Patel. 5/25/1950 in Gopal’s Jawaharlal Nehru Selected Works, 2nd Series, vo. 14, part 2. 
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Nehru complained that it fell upon him to plea with ministries that they cooperate with it in 
policy implementation.460 In the meantime the actual centres for administering and 
implementing industrial policy remained where they had been: budgeting remained with 
Finance, trade with Commerce and so forth.  
 
However, despite the disagreements over the nature and scope of the Planning 
Commission’s mandate, what scholars have highlighted is the dramatic, substantive and 
procedural changes that were brought about with the introduction of the Second Five Year 
Plan. Baldev Raj Nayyar for instance describes the First Five Year Plan as limited both in its 
aims and the demands that it made on the population, and that the planners readily 
acknowledged this character of the Plan. It was not a Plan which envisioned the government 
acting as an independent variable with the goal of restructuring the economy and society, 
although there was undoubtedly an emphasis placed on the important role of the State in 
economic transformation. He points out the timid nature of the public sector effort and how a 
major reliance for development was placed on the private sector.461 Equally, the planners 
were reluctant to impose any sacrifices on the population, and their policy recommendations 
in respect of resource mobilisation were characterised by moderation and restraint. The 
planners seemed to be conscious of the constraints under which they had to function 
recognising that, ‘For planning to proceed with the necessary momentum and continuity, it is 
essential that the country adopts a programme of action which reflects the unity of outlook 
and approach among the members of the party in power and draws forth at the same time the 
support and co-operation from shades of opinion outside the party. It is through enlargement 
of the area of agreement that conditions can be created for the most effective mobilisation of 
                                                 
460 See Gopal,S. Jawaharlal Nehru, Volume 2, (Cambridge Mass, Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 99. 
and Nehru to Rajagoplachari, 10/7/50, JNSW, 2nd Series, Vol. 15, part 1. p. 34.  
461 Nayar, Baldev Raj The Modernisation Imperative and Economic Planning, (Vikas Publishing, New Delhi, 
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the community's resources towards the common objective of all-round economic 
development’.462 
 
Despite this limitation, the planners did conceive of their objectives in larger terms. 
Taking their cue from the Directive Principles in the Constitution463, they stated at the 
beginning of the First Plan document that, the ‘central objective of planning in India at the 
present stage is to initiate a process of development which will raise living standards and 
open out to the people new opportunities for a richer and more varied life’. The path to 
eliminating poverty was seen as lying not only in redistributing wealth but also in increasing 
production. As a result the planners were torn throughout the Plan between the compulsions 
of production and the necessity of distribution. While committed to creating a more equal and 
just society, no frontal attack on inequalities was planned, for they were anxious to ‘ensure a 
continuity of development without which, in fact, whatever measures, fiscal or other, might 
be adopted for promoting economic equality might only end up in dislocating production and 
even jeopardizing the prospects of ordered growth’.464 
 
Apart from the concern over production, there was at the same time, a more 
fundamental conception, a Parsonian conception – of the nature of society and politics 
underlying the social change.465 The planners advocated the belief that the basic premise of 
democratic planning is that society can develop as an integral whole and the position which 
                                                 
462 First Five Year Plan, Chapter One: ‘Planning: Economic and Social Aspects’, available on Planning 
Commission official website: http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/index9.html 
Seen last on 8.09.2008 
463 Section IV, Article 38 of the Constitution. 
464 First Five Year Plan, Chapter One: ‘Planning: Economic and Social Aspects’, available on Planning 
Commission official website: http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/index9.html 
Last seen on 9.09.2008 
465 By ‘Parsonian’ the thesis is referring to the idea that social structures are central to an understanding of 
society and, that social functions can be deduced from these structures.  
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particular classes occupy at any given time can be altered without reliance on class hatreds or 
the use of violence. No shattering of the inherited social system was thus envisaged, rather 
faith for progress in this direction was placed in the privileged classes that they will respect 
the democratic system and the changes that result from its operation. The state’s obligation to 
promote change was accepted and even the undertaking of risks in this direction was urged 
but only in the context of ‘an appraisal of the capacity of the community to hold together 
under the stress of major structural changes and of its various sections to maintain a high 
standard of discipline and restraint while the necessary adjustments are taking place’.466 
 
The allocation of resources among the different sectors of the economy represented 
little effort at changing the structure of the economy. The planners recognised that ‘the 
backwardness of the Indian economy is reflected in its unbalanced occupational structures’, 
with nearly 70% of the population employed in agricultural occupations though even this had 
failed to assure food self-sufficiency. The complementarity of agriculture and industry was 
clearly underlined, but it was felt necessary ‘on economic as well as on other grounds, first of 
all to strengthen the economy at the base and to create conditions of sufficiency and even 
plenitude in respect to food and war materials (since these were) the wherewithal for further 
development’.467  
 
The first plan was launched within a year of the formation of the Planning 
Commission, at a time when the machinery to actually translate the stated aims and goals into 
practice had to be tested. Development Councils at sectoral and industry levels had been 
proposed as the link between the state and industrialists but were yet to come into existence. 
These were meant to gather information, develop targets, identify firms that were laggards 
                                                 
466 Ibid. 
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and make recommendations on where additional investment was needed. Congress ministers 
described their function explicitly as a “brake” to be placed on the state’s use of coercion 
over firms.468 Speaking to critics in the Constituent Assembly, Industry Minister H.K.Mahtab 
explained the role of the Councils in the following manner, ‘The introduction of the 
Development Councils is the most important feature of the Bill (the IDRA). These Councils 
will keep in close touch with the industries, and try to help them in all possible ways. Issue of 
directions will come in only when the Development Councils will fail in their method of 
persuasion....’469 Whilst these bodies were meant to act as an interface, the members were to 
be nominated by the state and would be invested with state powers to coerce firms into 
complying with overall developmental goals and priorities as issued from above. Held up 
because of resistance from the business lobby, by the time the First Five Year Plan had been 
officially launched, the Development Councils were not yet in place and the Industries 
Development and Regulation Act (IDRA) which articulated the government’s industrial 
policy was itself under attack and review.  
 
Hence, at the time of the First Five Year Plan although the Planning Commission was 
the agency in charge of designing plans in India, it did not have direct control over the critical 
instruments needed to implement a plan – the annual budget, the allocation of investment 
licenses and the allocation of foreign exchange which remained under the different ministries. 
It is interesting to note the self-effacing tone adopted by Nehru in his letters to members of 
the cabinet in 1952 at the start of the first five year plan. For example, in letters to his 
Minister for Planning, Gulzarilal Nanda dated September 8 and 10, Nehru was insistent that 
                                                 
468 See Industry Minister H.K. Mahtab’s speech on October 11, 1951, Constituent Assembly (Legislative) 
Debates (Delhi: Government of India, 1951), column 4649. 
469 Ibid. Columns 4649 – 4650. 
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the Planning Commission ought to present its report to the Cabinet for consideration.470 By 
late 1953 however, Nehru was voicing his concern about the way in which the Planning 
Commission was developing. In his words, it ‘(had) become much too amorphous and 
diffused a body and ha(d) no organic unity left’.471 This was due to the struggle for power just 
before and after independence as a result of which the supporters of a strong planning 
apparatus were forced to compromise and graft the Planning Commission onto the existing 
economic set up rather than restructuring the latter around the aims of economic planning. 
This had long-run repercussions for India’s economic strategy which adopted as a core 
principle, the dispersal of authority which meant that the planners had no control over how 
other agencies interpreted and implemented policy.  
 
In theory the Planning Commission ought to have been involved at two critical stages: 
at the initial point of formulating the plan based on an appraisal of the state of the economy 
and of particular sectors. Then, based on sectoral reports, the Commission would begin the 
process of setting targets for each sector which would in turn be translated into annual plans. 
Within the annual plan individual investment projects would be up for bidding and realised 
through the granting of licenses to applications. The funding for these projects would come 
from a portion of the annual budget known as the capital budget and theoretically the 
economic ministries would submit projects each year to the Finance Ministry, which would 
check to ensure that the projects were within the limits of the annual budget, sending them to 
the Planning Commission for a final vetting so as to ensure their conformity with the targets 
of the plan.472  
                                                 
470 Gopal, S. (ed.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series Two, Volume 19 (Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial 
Fund, New Delhi, 1989 -), pp. 101 – 103. 
471 Ibid., Series Two, Volume 24, p. 128. 
472Chibber, V. Locked in Place. State-building and Late Industrialisation in India. (Princeton University Press, 
2003) p. 179.  
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In practice the planners were marginalised. Planners found it difficult to elicit the 
necessary information from ministries. According to Chibber’s research, the Commission 
came to increasingly rely upon its own sources of information, often gathered by outside 
statistical organisations that used past trends rather than actual industry information as the 
basis for forecasting.473 Furthermore the machinery for operationalising the plans was 
delayed until the end of the second plan. Until the third plan, the process of integrating the 
five year plan into annual budgetary provisions was left up to the Finance Ministry and even 
after this was officially changed, the Finance Ministry continued to play the central role in 
budgeting without consulting the Planning Commission at all. Nor was the flow of 
information streamlined in any organised way. Ministries were not made to establish any 
uniform machinery for transmitting information to and from the Planning Commission. In 
fact it was common knowledge that the ministries jealously guarded whatever flow of 
information did occur both vertically (between the ministry and the Commission) as well as 
horizontally (between ministries). As a result no ongoing process for evaluating plans was put 
in place. 
 
Compounding all this was the internal structure of the Indian State which maintained 
the principle of ministerial autonomy. Each ministry was handed its task and no other agency 
had the power or authority to demand results. Restructuring the state was not an option so 
instead inter-ministerial committees of high-ranking bureaucrats were created, adding yet 
another node in the increasingly complex maze of the state apparatus. A side-effect of this 
framework was that, in response to these conditions, the ministries felt the need to further 
protect, maintain and consolidate their autonomy and self-sufficiency.  
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The practical difficulties and inefficiencies notwithstanding, Nehru’s ability to 
influence the overall direction of economic policy was enhanced through the establishment of 
the Planning Commission. This can most notably be seen in the way in which the 
Mahalanobis strategy became the operational model for the Second Five Year Plan (see 
below). As Michael Brecher, an observer at the time put it,  “Nehru’s role in the planning 
process is crucial, despite the fact that he lacks expert knowledge of economics and finance. 
In fact, he influences the entire process, from the drafting stage to implementation. Firstly, he 
stands at the centre of the decision-making structure by virtue of his positions as PM, 
Chairman of the Planning Commission and Chairman of the National Development 
Council474 – and because he is Jawaharlal Nehru. He is the link between the planning 
agencies and the Government and is brought into any matter requiring cabinet approval, 
notably broad decisions concerning targets, aims and priorities. Secondly, because of his 
multiple positions and personal prestige he is the central focus of attention for all pressure 
groups – the Commission itself and individual members, Cabinet Ministers with special 
projects, State Ministers seeking attention to their local needs, Congressmen anxious to 
please their constituents, trade unions and employer associations, and special interest groups 
or individuals like Vinoba Bhave475 and cooperative associations, community development 
officials etc. …..Not the least important is his role as liaison between the planners and the 
people. Nehru is the most effective salesman of planning in the country as a whole”.476 
 
Hence, while Nehru may not have been involved in the minutiae of policy formulation 
and implementation he was a central interlocutor who carried the political weight needed for 
                                                 
474 Set up in August 1952 the National Development Council (NDC) consisted of the Prime Minister 
(Chairman), Central Cabinet Ministers, Chief Ministers of the States and Members of the Planning Commission. 
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a certain perspective to gain predominance within the party and the cabinet. As a result it 
becomes necessary to study Nehru’s pronouncements on the subject of planning and 
economic development to gain an insight into the preferences that had come to hold sway by 
the mid-1950s. The substantive shift that occurred with the Second Five Year Plan is 
illuminating as a demonstration of the extent to which Nehru felt secure enough by the mid-
1950s to finally institutionalise a socialistic programme of economic development.  
 
 
5.5. Vision and Strategy in the framing of the First and Second Five Year Plans. 
 
5.5.1. The First Five Year Plan: negotiated consensus. 
 
Ostensibly with the aim of promoting discussion, the First Five Year Plan was 
preceded by a Draft Outline. Emphasizing the democratic nature to the Indian approach to 
planning, the document foresaw an important role for private initiative and investors. 
Furthermore the checks and balances of the federal system were invoked to ensure that the 
Centre could not dictate to the States. The ‘Pre-Plan’, as it came to be known, underlined the 
need for unanimity and consensus, arguing that without it the sacrifices necessary could not 
be made.477  
 
Planning was conceived of as a democratic process, not merely in the sense that the 
governments doing it was responsible to an electorate as wide as the whole adult population, 
but that the people themselves would participate actively both in the formulation of the plans 
and in their implementation. Thus, ‘Democratic planning presupposes an overall unity of 
                                                 
477 For a reaction at the time see Singer, H.W. ‘India’s Five Year Plan: A Modest Proposal’, Far Eastern Survey, 
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policy combined with proper diffusion of power and responsibility. In such planning, not 
only the Governments of States but also local self-governing bodies, such as municipalities, 
district and taluka boards and panchayats, and various functional organisations have to play a 
vital part. Measures to promote a healthy growth of such institutions, are, therefore an 
integral part of democratic planning (emphasis added)’.478 
 
The publication of the Draft Outline provoked considerable public discussion, as it 
proclaimed was its intention. Between July 1951 and December 1951 when the final version 
of the First Five Year Plan was submitted by the Commission to the government, the Outline 
was examined in detail by the central ministries and the state governments, debated in 
parliament, in most of the state legislatures and in many district boards and municipal 
committees in addition to being widely commented on by the press. During this period Nehru 
was careful to emphasize the cautious approach of the plan for, ‘it did not proceed on the 
basis of sweeping away the present economic and social structure of the country’.479 It is 
significant that in his major speeches defending the Planning Commission and the first Five 
Year Plan in the legislative Nehru rarely used the term socialism, and if at all, then only to 
make the point that the plan was far from socialist.480 
 
When the plan was debated in Parliament on 15 December 1952, it is interesting to 
note the number of amendments proposed to the government’s resolution. One member 
criticized the Commission for ‘over-expectation’ and ‘unwarranted optimism’ and predicted 
that its misconceived effects would result in the ‘disorganisation of the entire economic 
system’. Socialist-inspired amendments pointed to the Commission’s failure to give 
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479 Nehru, Interim Lok Sabha Debates, 15 October 1951, Col. 5044. 
480 See for example his speech in response to the Motion re. The Five Year Plan: Interim LSD, 15 Oct, 1951, 
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expression to the Directive Principles of the constitution and criticized the plan’s ‘reactionary 
‘industrial policy and demanded that the means of production, including land, should be 
nationalized.481 Nehru’s main contribution to the Lok Sabha debate did not consist of details 
on the planning process or envisioned outcomes, but rather his attempt to mediate by 
emphasizing the flexibility of the First Five-Year Plan. ‘The method of planning’ he 
explained, ‘is ultimately the method of trial and error’.482 
 
An important feature that distinguished the Indian machinery of planning compared 
with other developing countries, was the fact that in the Indian system, planning and 
budgeting were to be completely separated. The budget for both current and investment 
expenditure was the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance which also was to have 
complete control over all resources including external assistance. Thus, the system envisaged 
close cooperation between the Commission and the Finance Ministry and any differences 
were to be resolved through discussion between the Deputy Chairman and the Finance 
Minister, or by reference to the Cabinet. As a result, the system made the Planning 
Commission responsible for the longer term goals of development and medium-level 
investment planning; the Finance Ministry for raising the resources for investment and 
current expenditure, fiscal policy and expenditure control; and the Reserve Bank of India for 
monetary policy. This was a healthy approach considering there was always going to be a 
conflict between the requirements of long-term development and the need for short-term 
stabilisation but it also meant that cooperation between the three institutions depended 
heavily on the individuals in place. 
 
                                                 
481 See discussions on Resolution re. Five Year Plan: Lok Sabha Debates,15 December, 1952. 
482 LSD, 1952, pt.2, vi, col. 2498. 
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The responsibilities for sectoral planning, policy formulation and project selection 
were to be shared by the Commission with the planning divisions of each of the sectoral 
ministries.  When planning was first undertaken in India, the decision to install the Prime 
Minister as Chairman of the Planning Commission had both a personal and an institutional 
significance. Jawaharlal Nehru had demonstrated a long-run consistency in prioritising 
planning as the main instrument for economic development. At the same time it was a tactical 
move, to enable him to exert control over the policy-making process through an un-elected 
institution. It is significant to note that throughout his years as Prime Minister and the many 
additional roles he adopted, Nehru did not relinquish his position as Chairman of the 
Planning Commission. In the long-run this set a precedent, ensuring that all subsequent prime 
ministers would occupy the Chairmanship.  
 
 
5.5.2. The Second Five Year Plan:  
‘the adoption of the socialist pattern of society as the national objective’. 483 
 
By the time the second Five Year Plan was up for assessment, the ‘grand debate’ over 
planning had reached its peak intensity. Broadly speaking three positions had formed, ranging 
from the view that planning could act as an aid to capitalist development without property 
redistribution, as exemplified in the Bombay Plan, the Leftist argument that planning needed 
to be accompanied by State agency in the form of a radical redistribution of assets especially 
land and finally, the official view which envisioned a strong public sector, with the Planning 
Commission taking centre stage but without addressing seriously the goal of land 
redistribution. 
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In its implementation the First Five Year Plan seemed to be a success, though critics 
alleged that this was due to good monsoons, a general worldwide post-war spurt in economic 
activity and the vigour of private enterprise. In any case, it is striking to note that national 
income increased by eighteen per cent rather than the eleven or twelve per cent that was 
initially expected. The capital-output ration worked out to 1.8:1 and food grains production 
increased by twenty per cent It was in a climate of optimism, generated by the success of the 
First Plan, that the Second Plan was formulated and the planners, aimed to give the economy 
a ‘big push’ as well as bringing about fundamental structural changes in the economy. The 
government now moved to assert itself as the independent variable in bringing about 
economic transformation. As a result the Second Plan came to resemble the model of 
planning implemented in the Soviet Union primarily in terms of the shift in favour of capital 
goods industries484, adopting what came to be known as the “Feldman model”.485 The more 
proximate model of the Plan lay in the plan-frame developed by P.C.Mahalanobis, the head 
of the Indian Statistical Institute, submitted by him to the Indian Government on 17 March, 
1955. In this model, the importance of the heavy or the capital-goods industries is derived 
from two basic assumptions. First, that capital goods installed in a particular sectors was 
specific to that sector and, therefore, non-shiftable and, secondly, working under the premise 
of a two-sector economy, it was argued that rather than attempt to increase savings, an 
investment in capital goods would enable a structural change in the economy. 
 
By 1954 Mahalanobis had emerged as Prime Minister Nehru’s chief economic adviser 
and in this capacity played a strategic and historic part in the formulation of the Second Plan. 
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However, his association with Nehru dates back to the pre-independence period. They had 
known each other socially and had met at the house of Rabindranath Tagore, to whom 
Mahalanobis was related. In 1940 they first discussed intensively, issues relating to economic 
planning. In a memoir he writes, ‘after the day’s work was over, we started talking and after 
dinner we sat up till two in the morning’.486 At the time Nehru was chairman of the National 
Planning Committee established by the Congress Party. 
 
The theoretical foundation of the Second Plan written in March 1955, came to be 
published in an article.487 The two chief aims of the Plan-frame were stated as (1) increasing 
the national income at the rate of five per cent annually, and (2) providing eleven million new 
jobs over the Plan period. The basic strategy was to give a major thrust to heavy industry and 
mines. As the Plan-frame noted, ‘In the long run, the rate of industrialisation and the growth 
of the national economy would depend on the increasing production of coal, electricity, iron 
and steel, heavy machinery, heavy chemicals and the heavy industries generally which would 
increase the capacity for capital formation….’488 
 
Apart from the parallels in content between the Second Plan and the Soviet model, 
there were also physical links. Near the end of 1953, at the request of Mahalanobis, Finance 
Minister C.D.Deshmukh provided funds for setting up an Operational Research Unit at the 
Indian Statistical Institute to begin studies on planning. Soon thereafter, this Research Unit 
began inviting economists and specialists from abroad for consultation. Significantly, these 
foreign experts were all Marxists or left-oriented economists. Among these was Professor 
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487 P.C.Mahalanobis, ‘The Approach of Operational Research to Planning in India’, Sankhya, XVI (Dec, 1955), 
pp.3-62 and P.C.Mahalanobis, The Approach of Operational Research in Planning in India (London, Asia 
Publishing House, 1963). 
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Charles Bettelheim of France, Ragnar Frisch from Norway, Oskar Lange from Poland, 
Richard Goodwin from the UK, a team from the Soviet Union headed by D.D.Degtyar of 
Gosplan, the Soviet Planning agency.489 
 
The Second Five Year Plan as a result moved away from the consensus-driven 
approach that had characterised the first plan and instead began to emphasise strongly its 
socialist character. Nehru’s increasingly assertive statements echoed the radicalism of his 
early days as Congress President in the mid 1930s (see chapter four). For instance in 
November 1954 at a meeting of the National Development Council, Nehru gave expression to 
the kind of society he eventually envisioned for India. He rejected capitalism, stating that “a 
system which is based purely on the acquisitive instinct of society is immoral” and its days 
are over. He went on to say: “The picture I have in mind is definitely and absolutely a 
Socialistic picture of society. I am not using the word in a dogmatic sense at all. I mean 
largely that the means of production should be socially owned and controlled for the benefit 
of society as a whole. There is plenty of room for private enterprise there, provided the main 
aim is kept clear”.490 It is striking that despite the gap of twenty years, Nehru’s publicly stated 
beliefs on the subject of planning and economic development had not changed very much. 
The statements he was issuing in the mid-1950s could have been pronouncements he had 
made as a young member of the Congress party in the early 1930s.  
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A month later, in December 1954 the Lok Sabha passed a resolution stating that the 
achievement of a ‘socialistic pattern of society’ was the objective of the economic policy of 
the government. This was further confirmed in January 1955 when, at the annual session of 
the Congress party held in Avadi, another resolution declared that, ‘in order to realize the 
object of the Congress Constitution and to further the objectives stated in the Preamble and 
Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitution of India, planning should take place 
with a view to the establishment of a socialistic pattern of society, where the principal means 
of production are under social ownership or control, production is speeded up and there is 
equitable distribution of the national income”.491 Later, in May 1955, the National 
Development Council directed that “the Second Five Year Plan should be drawn up so as to 
give concrete expression to policy decisions relating to the socialist pattern of society”.492 
Gulzarilal Nanda, cabinet minister and later, Planning Minister explained, ‘An economy 
based on the socialistic pattern does not preclude the existence of a private sector, particularly 
in agriculture and small-scale industry and commercial operations. It has, however to be 
brought into harmony with the public and private sectors….The leading principle in the case 
of the private sector should be not individual profit and control over resources but the service 
of the community accompanied by a certain emphasis on flexibility of organisation and 
adaptability to changing conditions….. In India we have conceived of the socialistic pattern 
of society as also incorporating two other ideas, namely, decentralization of power and 
initiative and the building-up of various social and economic institutions in such a way as to 
serve the interests of the small man and of the people of the villages’.493  
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From three separate directions then – the economic technocrats at the Indian 
Statistical Institute and the Planning Commission, foreign economic advisers with their leftist 
orientation, and the top-level political elite with its recently affirmed socialist commitment – 
thinking on planning converged on the acceptance of an economic strategy patterned after the 
Soviet model, at least in its ambitious goals and sectoral priorities, if not entirely in its 
methods. This acceptance found its reflection in the Plan-frame and eventually without 
serious modification in the final Second Five-Year Plan. However, before the Second Plan 
was finally accepted, it went through a complex series of steps (1) the preparation of the 
Plan-frame in March 1955 (2) consideration and acceptance of the Plan-frame (a) in April 
1955 by the Panel of Economists appointed by the Planning Commission and (b) by the 
National Development Council and its Standing Committee in May 1955; (3) consultation by 
the Planning Commission with state governments from July to December 1955; (4) the 
preparation of a Draft Memorandum on the Second Plan, and discussion on the Memorandum 
in the National Development Council and the Consultative Committee of the Members of 
Parliament in January 1956; (5) the publication of the Draft Outline of the Second Plan in 
February 1956 for public discussion and comment; (6) consideration and approval of the 
Draft Outline by the National Development Council and the Lok Sabha in May 1956; (7) 
preparation of the Draft Second Five Year Plan; (8) consideration and approval of the Draft 
Plan by the Lok Sabha in September 1956; and (9) publication of the Plan in November 1956. 
 
The Plan as it finally emerged, differed from the first plan in important aspects. 
Firstly, the Second Plan was a need-based rather than a resource-based plan.  Second, the 
particular strategy chosen for economic development did not provide for quick returns. There 
were not going to be immediate ‘pay-offs’ from the investment undertaken. The pride of 
place in the allocation for heavy industry went to iron and steel which for the planners held 
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the highest priority since, more than any other industrial product, the levels of production of 
these materials were to determine the tempo of progress of the economy as a whole. Heavy 
industry projects however, have a long gestation period and therefore do not offer immediate 
returns either in terms of goods for consumption or profits for further investment. Equally, 
the high capital intensity of the investment involved was likely to aggravate an already 
difficult unemployment situation. Corresponding with the heavy emphasis on industry there 
was reduced emphasis on agriculture. This was less in the formal commitment to the 
importance of agriculture than in the allocation of funds in the Plan. In the First Plan the 
allocation for agriculture and community development was 15.1 per cent of the total Plan 
outlay, but this came down to 11.8 per cent in the Second Plan, while that for irrigation and 
flood control was reduced from 17.0 per cent to 10.1 per cent.  
 
Furthermore, with the Second Plan the government undertook the execution of 
enterprises and tasks for which it was not adequately equipped. On the one hand, neither the 
government, nor for that matter the country, possessed in adequate measure the modern 
technological and scientific skills necessary in the new branches of economic activity. On the 
other hand, the government was equally poorly equipped from the viewpoint of 
organisational and managerial resources, given the large-scale expansion contemplated for 
the public sectors. Equally overwhelming tasks were being assumed in the realm of cottage 
industries and agrarian reforms, for which the leadership had neither the will nor the 
organisational ability. More generally, in relations to government capabilities in the execution 
of a tightly integrated plan such as the Second Plan, there remained questions as to the extent 
to which the central government could persuade the private sector in a mixed economy, and 
the states in a federal system, to do its bidding, and in the event of failure, as to the likely 
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distortions that would result in the economy. All this meant that a lot of responsibility and 
authority was bestowed upon the Planning Commission.  
 
Questions about the economic strategy proposed for the Second Plan and its 
implications for society and politics were first raised when the Plan was put to a Panel of 
Economists in April 1955, consisting of twenty one eminent experts, with Finance Minister, 
Deshmukh as chairman. Whilst reservations and implicit warnings were voiced by a number 
of the panellists there was only one who questioned the whole basis of the Plan-frame, its 
assumptions and the size. In a vigorous note of dissent, Professor B.R.Shenoy warned of the 
risks involved in the Mahalanobis strategy.494 He termed the plan-frame “over-ambitious”, 
strongly opposed deficit-financing in the magnitude suggested by the plan and asked that the 
Plan should fit the resources of the country. As he pointed out, ‘the inability of the Plan-
frame to place more than about seventy five per cent of the resources required for the Plan 
under the usual sources and the reliance on deficit-financing for the rest is broad evidence 
that the size of the Plan far exceeds the available savings.”495 
 
Shenoy underscored the basic incompatibility between the economic strategy 
incorporated in the Plan-frame and the political framework adopted by India, and pointed to 
the possible socially explosive consequences.496 He was insistent that the Plan should stay 
within the bounds of available resources and, to remain consistent with individual freedom 
and democratic institution, should not impose forced savings on the population. He asked for 
the plan to move in line with the available savings in the economy, urged the removal of 
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remaining physical controls and opposed the extension of nationalisation. The fact that the 
Panel of Economists (appointed by the Planning Commission) was otherwise unanimous in 
their support for the plan is suggestive of a ‘yes-man’ culture that had emerged by the mid-
1950s within the advisory circles surrounding Nehru. 
 
Voices of dissent outside this inner core however, continued to warn against the 
dangers of financing a plan through higher taxation and the reliance on cottage-industries for 
consumer goods production. At the meeting of the Standing Committee of the National 
Development Council in July 1955, the Chief Minister of West Bengal, Dr. B.C.Roy strongly 
attacked the Plan arguing that investment in heavy industry would lead to no substantial 
increase in employment. He was sceptical about the people extending support to a Plan that 
was not beneficial to them and criticised the overly top-down approach. Roy even voiced his 
opposition to the idea of physical controls on the private sector for these could not be 
implemented “unless there was totalitarianism”.497  
 
In February 1956, the Draft Plan of the Second Five Year Plan was published, and 
this also came under criticism. The most noteworthy aspect of this criticism was what came 
to be known as the ‘Neogy Dissent’ – a note of dissent on the Draft Plan submitted by 
K.C.Neogy, a member of the Planning Commission. In his view the Plan was “unrealistic and 
over-ambitious, and its massive superstructure has been raised on precarious foundations.”498 
Nonetheless, the National Development Council approved the Draft Plan. 
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As the Lok Sabha took up the Draft Outline for discussion in May 1956 and the final 
Plan in September 1956, there was criticism from Communist MPs that it did not conform to 
the original Plan-frame and there were critics of the basic strategy and of any attempt to push 
the Plan closer to the Plan-frame. Several members worried about the dangers of deficit 
financing and significantly, even the World Bank was of the opinion that the Plan was over-
ambitious.499 Singling out for special consideration the criticisms of the Plan and the 
warnings given to the government if it proceeded with the Plan, places out of focus the 
reception given to the Plan at the various stages of its formulation. The majority of the 
economists and planners and most of the political leaders favoured the strategy and the size 
of the Plan, notwithstanding their reservations on particular aspects of the Plan. A discussion 
of the criticisms and warnings does however, have the merit of bringing out the fact that the 
government proceeded with the Plan fully cognizant of the risks it was undertaking. It is also 
significant to note that within a year of implementing the Second Five Year Plan all the 
strains that were feared came to the fore; increased dependence on foreign aid, stringent 
controls on foreign exchange transactions, a rise in prices, failure to meet the food production 
and employment targets.  
 
 
5.6. Analysing the political origins of planning in India. 
 
The goals of economic planning in India are generally held to have been pre-
eminently welfare goals. The First Plan paid homage to the welfare and egalitarian goals 
embodied in the Directive Principles of State Policy which are a part of the Indian 
Constitution. The welfare aims of the approach underlying the First Plan are obvious from the 
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declaration that the “central objective of planning in India at the present stage is to initiate a 
process of development which will raise living standards and open out to the people new 
opportunities for a richer and more varied life”.500 Such aims are often generalised beyond 
the First Plan to India’s entire planning experience. As part of this objective, it was planned 
to double per capita income within thirty years but the investment programme envisaged in 
the Plan was a modest one. No large-scale programme for industrialisation or for 
modernisation of the economy was apparent. It was with the Second Plan that a large-scale 
industrialisation effort was launched with an emphasis on heavy industry and it is here that 
the planning goals call for an investigation. 
 
The Second Plan re-emphasized the welfare goals of the First Plan, now cast under 
the umbrella term, the ‘socialist pattern of society’, by declaring its objectives, apart from 
‘rapid industrialisation with particular emphasis on the development of basic and heavy 
industries,’ to be, the raising of living standards through a considerable increase in national 
income, expansion of employment opportunities, and reduction of economic inequalities, and 
a wider distribution of economic power. However, unlike in the First Plan, welfare objectives 
were not simply an end in themselves but instead were to become part of a greater project 
with ends such as modernisation and industrialisation. Hence, the Second Plan’s explanation 
that, “Low or static standards of living, underemployment and unemployment, and to a 
certain extent even a gap between the average incomes and the highest incomes are all 
manifestations of the basic underdevelopment which characterizes an economy depending 
mainly on agriculture. Rapid industrialisation and diversification of the economy is thus the 
core of development. But if industrialisation is to be rapid enough, the county must aim at 
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developing basic industries which make machines, to make the machines needed for future 
development. This calls for substantial expansion in iron and steel, ferrous non-metals, coal, 
cement, heavy chemicals and other industries of basic importance”.501 
 
This then laid the basis for a political commitment to economic strategy, one that 
aimed and promised to result in self-reliance. During the course of the Third Plan it was the 
term self-reliance that came into increasing usage and the Draft Outline of the Fourth Plan 
made it the first of eight principal tasks.502 The humanitarian and welfare aspects of Nehru’s 
views on economic planning are taken for granted: his deep-rooted and earnest concern for 
the removal of poverty, his passion for economic progress, his commitment to egalitarian 
goals and social justice, his suspicions of the profit motive and the spirit of acquisitiveness 
and competitive violence associated with both, his aversion to capitalism and his conviction 
that socialism was the ideal social and economic system.503 However, if the record is 
examined more closely, it becomes apparent that economic achievements were also to serve 
the grander schemes of attaining economic independence, preserving political freedom, 
gaining military securing and enhancing national power.  Hence for Nehru, just like in the 
cases of the Hindu Code Bills and Panchasheela, the setting up of the Planning Commission 
and the adoption of planning and a socialistic pattern as the country’s development strategy 
was inherently linked to the overall project of nation-building and state-consolidation. 
However, it is noteworthy that this linkage was widely promulgated only once Nehru had 
managed to establish a position of authority and legitimacy for himself.  
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The connection between the economic strategy and national independence in Nehru’s 
thinking is evident in the inception of the heavy industry strategy for the Second Plan. At that 
very meeting of the National Development Council in 1954 where Nehru articulated his 
picture of the socialistic society and where he advocated the heavy industry strategy, he also 
recognised the strategy’s contribution to national independence. He admitted that heavy 
industry would contribute little to employment, and that to solve the unemployment problem 
through heavy industry would require “an investment running into astronomical figures. And 
yet it is essential for us to have many industries, for we cannot build up a sound economy and 
be independent of other countries without developing a good number of heavy industries”.504 
Nehru repeated the message a month later in the Lok Sabha. “Real progress must ultimately 
depend on industrialisation”, he said and continued, “industrialisation ultimately depends on 
heavy industries. Even to preserve our national independence, and, much more, to raise our 
standards of living, heavy industries are essential”.505 At the Avadi session of the Congress 
party, where the resolution on the ‘socialistic pattern’ was passed he emphasized, “We want 
heavy industry because without it we can never really be an independent country”.506 
 
Most revealing in respect of the linkage between heavy industry and the protection of 
the country’s independence in Nehru’s thinking is a lengthy discourse by him before the Lok 
Sabha on precisely this subject in 1956. Interestingly the subject under discussion was not 
planning but defence and Nehru was trying to answer criticism regarding India’s defence 
preparedness in the context of American military aid to Pakistan. He acknowledged that India 
was not adequately prepared for modern warfare, but went on to ask: “What is the equation of 
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defence? In what lies the strength of a people for defence? Well, one thinks immediately 
about defence forces – army, navy, air force. Perfectly right. They are the spear points of 
defence. They have to bear the brunt of any attack. How do they exist? What are they based 
on? The more technical armies and navies and air forces get, the more important becomes the 
industrial and technological base of the country”.507  
 
Elaborating on this point, “The real strength of a country develops by industrial 
growth which implies the capacity to make weapons of war for the army, navy or the air 
force”.508 To critics who wanted Five Year Plans put aside so that there could be immediate 
concentration on defence, Nehru retorted: ‘But the Five Year Plan is the defence plan of the 
country. What else is it? Because defence does not consist in people going about marching up 
and down the road with guns and other weapons. Defence consists today in a country being 
industrially prepared for producing the goods and equipment of defence.509 
 
The absolute centrality of heavy industry for the country’s independence was 
emphasized in the discussions about the Second Plan as well. At a meeting of the National 
Development Council, when it considered the draft of the Second Five Year Plan, Nehru 
stated on 1 May 1956, that the decision for the rapid industrialisation of the country had been 
made ‘because we feel that without the growth of industry there can be no real progress from 
the point of view of our country’s being able to preserve its freedom”.510 Even after the Sino-
Indian crisis of 1962, at a special meeting of the National Development Council, convened to 
consider a possible reorientation of development plans, Nehru had little patience with those 
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who advised suspending the Third Plan because of the defence emergency. By making this 
link between defence and planning Nehru had found a way to add to the weight and 
importance of planning as the instrument of economic development as well as a mechanism 
through which to set the priorities of policy. In effect, Nehru inter-locked India’s defence 
outlook with the demands of the planned economy and, in the process, argued that the 
country’s defences depended not so much on the evaluations of its generals and national 
security experts, but rather on the planners running the economy. As a tactical move to dispel 
criticism this may have strengthened Nehru’s vision of ‘the commanding heights of the 
economy’ to be the purview of heavy industry but, in the longer-run, it meant that debate on 
the country’s strategic constraints and options were eclipsed. 
 
Since the founding of the Swatantra Party in 1959511, the heavy industry strategy of 
the government had come under severe attack from the party’s spokesman, Minoo Masani, 
who advocated a strategy more oriented towards agriculture and consumer goods. The Sino-
Indian border crisis and the damage it did to government authority brought on a motion of no-
confidence against the government in August 1963. Nehru responded to Minoo Masani. ‘It is 
essential if you want industrialisation, as we want it, to have a base, an industrial base. Apart 
from pure industrialisation, it is essential for our strength, for our military strength, defence 
strength to have an industrial base….I say you cannot even remain free in India without an 
industrial base’.512 
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Continuing, Nehru underlined his concern for economic independence, ‘We want real 
freedom. Real freedom is not merely political freedom; it is economic freedom in two senses. 
One in the sense that you do not have to rely on other countries. You are friends with them, 
you co-operate with them, you take their help, but you are not dependent upon them to carry 
on either for defence or anything else. And the second economic freedom I mean is economic 
freedom for the vast masses of our country, that is their having higher standards of living, 
leading a good life not only physically, materially, but culturally and otherwise, and putting 
an end, as far as possible, in stages if you like, to these gross differences that exist in India, 
which are not good for any country from any point of view’.513 
 
Earlier in 1963, in a speech to the Standing Committee of the National Development 
Council, he explained the need to take a longer view for the country’s future, ‘As for the 
development plans, they were and are meant to raise the standard of living of our people, but 
they are also meant essentially to strengthen the nation altogether. It is not real strength for us 
to get arms or aeroplanes from abroad although that becomes very necessary in a crisis. The 
real strength comes from our relying largely on our production, on our own resources. In fact, 
you know that the big and powerful countries of the world are the countries which have 
industrialised themselves and thereby gained strength, whether for war or for peaceful 
progress. Real strength therefore comes from industrialisation from modern techniques, 
whether they apply to agriculture or industry. The real test of strength is how much steel you 
produce, how much power you produce and use’.514 
 
In the early days, during the formulation of the First Plan and in the course of the First 
Plan’s operation, the link between heavy industry and national independence had been 
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present in Nehru’s mind. Speaking in March 1952 at the annual session of the Federation of 
Indian Chambers of Commerce, Nehru had cautioned against excessive dependence on 
foreign aid and reminded his audience of the virtues of self-sufficiency: ‘I say that it is better 
that we go slow, but depend on our own resources, rather than take up grand schemes which 
make us lean on others. I would go further and say that we should follow this principle of 
self-sufficiency and self-help even in the matters of arms and armaments. I am in favour of 
depending on arms made in India rather than import from abroad, whatever their 
excellences’.515 However, these kinds of statements were rare and it was only with the 
Second Five Year Plan that the argument of self-sufficiency was explicitly linked with the 
need for a socialist approach.  
 
More common at the time of the First Plan was the following statement made in the 
Lok Sabha towards the end of 1952 in which Nehru made no reference to the role of the State 
and did not speak of a need to curtail private enterprise so as not to alarm big business and 
capitalist interests. At the same time to appease the Gandhian following, Nehru did not 
dismiss the importance of cottage industries. Instead he claimed, ‘I have no doubt at all that 
without the development of major industry in this country, we cannot raise our levels of 
existence. In fact, I will go further: We cannot remain a free country because certain things 
are essential to freedom; Defence – leave out other things – which if we do not have, we 
cannot remain a free country. Therefore, we have to develop industry in that major way, but 
always remembering that all the development of industry in that major way does not by itself 
solve the problem of the hundreds of millions of this country and we have to increase the 
smaller village industry and cottage industry in a big way also’.516 
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The important point to emerge is that in the case of economic policy, the shifting of 
substantive parameters came after the establishment of policy instruments and the setting up 
of an institutional framework. This is reflective of the fact that in the field of economic 
policy, Nehru did not have a free hand. Due to the structure of opportunities as determined by 
the competing groups of interests and the rivalry with Sardar Patel, Nehru was compelled to 
adopt a more moderate position. Additionally, given that his thinking and pre-independence 
writing on economic policy had reflected a tendency towards pragmatism and expediency, it 
was not as intellectually anathema to him to make the strategic compromises necessary. This 
attitude, as will be seen in the following chapters, differed in the cases of foreign policy and 
the reforming of Hindu law. 
 
 
5.7. Conclusion: the Planning Commission as a repository of values. 
 
Given the relatively dense arrangement of institutions that existed at the time of 
independence to represent the interests of various actors such as the state, the business 
community and labour, Nehru’s actions were more tightly constrained than in the other policy 
areas (as will be seen in subsequent chapters). As a result, the outcome of his preferences, 
seen in terms of the Planning Commission and the first two five year plans, reflected a 
complex process of bargaining and accommodation. This could have given rise to ‘empty’ 
rhetoric and a powerless, pointless institution. However, because Nehru’s own preferences in 
terms of goals and policy and vision of India’s economic development were quite clearly 
conceptualised, the institution of the Planning Commission emerged not only as political 
instrument but also as a repository of values guiding India’s economic development.  
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Regardless of whether the choice of economic policy was sub-optimal in the long-run, 
the point is that the Planning Commission emerged as an enduring institution that has played 
a role in the policy-making process. Chibber argues that India’s path of development is 
representative of the phenomenon where inefficiencies are locked into place and which 
become difficult to change and remove over time. However, at the same time it is remarkable 
that despite concerted attempts to liberalise and alter the system, already in the 1960s and 
then through the 1970s and 80s and finally reaching the full-blown liberalisation process of 
the 1990s, the Planning Commission survived as an institution, adapting and altering its role 
according to the times. This observation will be further examined in the final chapter 8 where 
a comparison is drawn across the three policy areas and the institutions that each generated.  
 
The following table summarises the key phases in the processes of establishing the 
Planning Commission, launching the first Five Year Plan and re-casting in the second Plan. 
Each phase is contextualised in terms of the ‘structure of opportunities’ under which Nehru 
was operating, in other words, the objections and alternatives voiced by other leaders and 
institutions and his own position of power within the Congress party and in parliament.  
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Table 5: Phases in the process towards planning 
 
 
 
PHASE 
 
 
STRUCTURE OF 
OPPORTUNITIES 
 
STRATEGY / OUTCOME 
1930s 
Debate within Congress 
 
1934  CSP formed 
1936  Nehru: Congress 
 President  
1938  Bose: Congress 
 President  
 
 
General scepticism about state 
intervention. 
Gandhian approach of cottage 
industry, village-based  economy 
more dominant. 
Nehru working his way up within 
Congress. 
1938  National Planning Committee:                     
broad-based membership of industrialists, 
financiers, economists, academics, Gandhians, 
representatives of Trade Union Congress.  
 
Nehru’ statements: the need to combine large-
scale planning with village focus and cottage 
industries. 
1940-45 
War and Post-war years: 
Turn towards Planning 
  
Board of Industrial & 
Scientific Research  
Reconstruction Committee 
1944-46  Planning & 
Development Department 
1945 Industrial Policy 
Statement 
 
Competition between Plans: 
1944  Bombay Plan  
1944  People’s Plan  
1944  Gandhian Plan 
 
1946  Interim Government set up 
Advisory Planning Board. 
Emergence of All-India Trade 
Union Congress (AITUC). 
 
Nehru in jail. 
 
Advisory Planning Board tried to please  
both labour and capital lobbies. 
 
 
 
 
1947 - 50 
Independence & Planning 
 
1947  Economic 
Programme Committee  
of Congress 
 
1948  exit of Congress 
Socialists from INC 
 
 
Criticism of government by 
Federation of Indian Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (FICCI), 
the Indian Merchants Chamber 
(IMC), the Bengal Chamber of 
Commerce, the Associated 
Chambers of Commerce 
(ASSOCHAM), and the Madras 
Chamber of Commerce. 
 
Nehru leading interim government. 
 
1948  Independent government issued Industrial 
Policy Statement rejecting nationalisation. 
 
1950  Setting up of Planning Commission: 
broad-based membership. 
 
1950 - 1954 
Teething troubles 
 
 
Criticism of Planning Commission 
Resignation of Finance Minister 
Nehru faces challenges within 
Congress  
1951 – 1956  Moderate First Five Year Plan  
Highly limited functions of Planning 
Commission. 
 
Mid-1950s  
Turn towards Socialism 
 
 
 
1950  Death of Patel 
1954  Mahalanobis is Nehru’s 
economic adviser 
Nehru unchallenged within INC and 
in parliament 
1956 – 1961  Second Five Year Plan:           
focus on heavy industry / increased    
government control over industry. 
‘Socialistic Pattern of Society’ resolution. 
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What can be seen from the above study is that in the process of articulating a vision 
for India’s economic development, Nehru followed a successful set of strategies which 
included (a) toning down his radicalism in order to occupy centre space within the Congress 
party, (b) demonstrating his willingness to compromise and build a consensus on economic 
policy in the years before and after independence (c) consolidating his power through the 
Congress Working Committee and the Prime Minister’s cabinet (d) the setting up of an 
institution through which to influence policy implementation directly and, once all this had 
been achieved (e) he invoked his vision of a ‘socialistic pattern of society’. This sequence 
varied in other cases considered in the following chapters due to the different structure of 
opportunities and cost-benefit conditions facing Nehru. As has been demonstrated in this 
chapter, the costs of proclaiming socialism as the creed guiding economic development for 
India were too high in the 1930s and in the early years after independence, when Nehru had 
yet to consolidate his power and sideline the alternatives being voiced. Born under these 
constraints and compulsions it is posited, in chapter eight, that the Planning Commission 
emerged primarily as an instrument of power and less as an institution embodying a particular 
set of ideals. As a result, it has been able to survive ideological shifts in the arena of 
economic policy-making.  
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Chapter Six 
The Panchasheela Agreement. 
 
6.1. Introduction: the Puzzle. 
6.2. Pre-history: British India’s foreign policy. 
6.3. Nehru on foreign affairs: the Constituent Assembly Debates 
6.4. The discourse on foreign policy: alternatives to and critics of Nehru. 
6.5. The Panchasheela Agreement: an analytic narrative of institutions, functions   
            and constraints. 
6.6. The Implications of Panchasheela. 
6.7. Analysing the Origins of the Panchasheela Agreement. 
6.7.1. K.M.Panikkar 
6.7.2. T.N.Kaul 
6.7.3. Krishna Menon 
6.8. Conclusion: Vision and Strategy in the Panchasheela Agreement. 
 
 
6.1. The Puzzle 
 
This chapter examines a second case of policy-making under Nehru: the signing of 
the Panchasheela Agreement. It explores the sequence of strategies employed and analyses 
the variation in tactics and manoeuvres compared with those used to institute planning as the 
stratagem for India’s economic development. Signed on 29th April 1954, the Panchasheela 
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Agreement was at the time hailed as a major foreign policy achievement for India. In Nehru’s 
words: 
“India does not propose to join any camp or alliance. But we wish to cooperate with all in the 
quest for peace and security and human brotherhood…..Peaceful coexistence is not a new 
idea for us in India. It has been our way of life and is as old as our thought and 
culture…..From this it has naturally followed that we should keep ourselves free from 
military and like alliances and have not joined any of the great power groups that dominate 
the world today. It is in no spirit of pride or arrogance that we pursue our independent policy. 
We should not do otherwise unless we were false to everything India has stood for in the past 
and stands for today. We welcome association and friendship with all and the flow of thought 
and ideas of all kinds, but we reserve the right to choose our own path. That is the essence of 
Panchsheel ”.517 
 
During the years leading up to independence Jawaharlal Nehru is usually portrayed as 
one of the few leaders with an interest in foreign affairs and international politics. His travels 
abroad and engagement with international causes like the Sino-Japanese war, the Spanish 
civil war and the anti-colonial movement (Brussels conference) established him as the expert 
in foreign policy. It is certainly the case that Nehru wrote extensively on international issues 
in the form of articles and books in which he often revealed a concern for global problems. 
The perception of India abroad and the country’s potential to be a major player in the 
international arena were also repeated themes in Nehru’s analyses although the envisioned 
instruments of India’s foreign policy remained vague. Contrary to common thinking 
however, Nehru was not the sole source of thinking on foreign affairs and the only formulator 
of options that were open to India. Both during the freedom struggle as well as after 
                                                 
517 Panchsheel, The Publications Division, (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, GOI, July 1957), p. 13. 
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independence, alternative views were being voiced but these have been ignored in the 
literature since, by and large, these failed to be incorporated into the early phase of 
independent India’s foreign policy.  
 
The policy towards China in particular generated heated discussions, both in terms of 
India’s bilateral relations with its unpredictable and relatively unknown neighbour, the newly 
established communist People’s Republic of China, as well as raising questions about the 
general principles underlying India’s foreign policy. As a result, the Panchasheela Agreement 
serves to concentrate the debate on India’s China policy and India’s international strategy of 
non-alignment, providing a useful prism through which to explore the rationale behind 
India’s foreign policy choices in the early 1950s. The Panchasheela Agreement is a crucial 
point in recent Indian history because it officially endorsed India’s recognition of Tibet being 
a part of China and as a result, what had been Tibet-India borders became China-India 
borders for the first time.518 What is curious about the agreement is why Nehru went ahead 
with it despite there being a substantial amount of scepticism and objection voiced in 
parliament and secondly, why Nehru felt it necessary to be conciliatory towards China when 
India was under no immediate pressure to do so. 
 
These questions have not been answered in the existing literature. In fact the existing 
material on Nehru’s foreign policy is surprisingly thin given that he was hailed and continues 
to be seen as the progenitor of modern Indian foreign policy. Various publications are 
available which simply describe the international context at the time and the various foreign 
                                                 
518 For a copy of the agreement see Mehra, P. The North-Eastern Frontier. A Documentary Study of the 
Internecine Rivalry between India, Tibet and China. Volume 2 (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1980), pp. 165 
– 171.  
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policy challenges India faced.519 Furthermore, while Nehru’s contribution to the policy of 
Non-Alignment is a popular topic it has not generated analytical works.520 This is particularly 
the case with regards Panchasheela, about which for a long time there was only one book in 
English that examined the Agreement and its repercussions: Born in Sin: The Panchsheel 
Agreement, the Sacrifice of Tibet by the French scholar, Claude Arpi.521 However, like 
Neville Maxwell’s infamous India’s China War522, Arpi’s book is highly polemical and 
considered to have been heavily biased. In Arpi’s case the book is seen as leaning heavily 
against the Chinese whilst in Maxwell’s case, he was regarded as having been far too critical 
of India.  
 
In 2004, to commemorate the fifty years anniversary of the agreement, a retrospective 
volume of collected articles edited by former ambassador, C.V. Ranganathan was published 
under the title, Panchsheel and the Future. Perspectives on India-China Relations.523 Whilst 
interesting as material through which to assess the ongoing relevance and symbolic value of 
Panchasheela the contributions to these volumes are uniformly uncritical, providing little 
insight into the motivations and politics behind the agreement of 1954. Another example is 
that of the respected India scholar, Rothermund who points out the inherent problems with 
Nehru’s China policy in a succinct paragraph: 
‘Nehru relied on the anti-imperialism of the Chinese revolutionaries. When they occupied 
Tibet in 1950, he did not object and immediately ceded the extra-territorial rights in Tibet. In 
1954 India and China concluded a border treaty which unfortunately did not specify the 
                                                 
519 Singh, I. Between two fires: towards an understanding of Jawaharlal Nehru’s foreign policy. (Sangam 
Books, London, 1998), Nizami, T.A. (ed.) Jawaharlal Nehru, the architect of India’s foreign policy. (Icon 
Publishers, New Delhi, 2006). 
520 For a representative text see: Bajpai, U.S. (ed.) Non-Alignment. Perspectives and Prospects (Lancers 
Publishers, New Delhi, 1983). 
521 Published in 2004 by Mittal Publications, New Delhi. 
522 Published in 1970 by Jaico Publishing House, Bombay Maxwell’s book was initially banned in India. 
523 Published by Samskriti, New Delhi. 
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border but only mentioned some passes open for trade between India and Tibet. The treaty 
also included the five principles (Panchasheela) of peaceful coexistence which Nehru 
repeatedly emphasized in subsequent years but which did not mean anything to the Chinese’. 
524 However, his analysis does not go on to explore the reasons behind Nehru’s fallacies, 
leaving the reader instead to speculate about Nehru’s intentions and capabilities.  
 
This chapter begins with a pre-history to India’s foreign policy options and priorities 
as moulded by the experience of being a British colony. The subject of India’s borders is 
intimately linked to the colonial period, given that Britain maintained a strict control over 
defence policy and was, in fact, responsible for the treaties to which India refers to in 
claiming its modern-day frontiers. This is followed by a quick summary of Nehru’s insights 
on India’s foreign policy, the instruments and goals and the priorities that would set India 
apart from other nations and the prevailing norms of realpolitik (see chapter three for details). 
His position as revealed in the Constituent Assembly Debates is examined to identify whether 
there was any change from his pre-independence writings.  
 
Given that Nehru chose to associate himself so closely and intimately with the making 
and implementation of Indian foreign policy, the controversy surrounding his China policy 
makes for an ideal window into the discussions of the time. Using an analytic narrative, the 
various stages of policy-formulation, articulation, debate and implementation are examined, 
with the 1954 agreement acting as the culminating policy outcome. By following the 
sequence of events, exploring the alternatives that were voiced and rejected whilst keeping in 
mind the particular domestic political context (as depicted in chapter four), a case is made 
that Panchasheela took shape as a politically expedient choice aimed at disarming critics at 
                                                 
524 Rothermund, D. The role of the state in South Asia and other essays. (Manohar, New Delhi, 2000), p. 102. 
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home and sceptics abroad. Like with the Planning Commission, the political origins of 
Panchasheela are explored and the argument is made that while the ‘visionary’ element was 
certainly present, this was overshadowed by the political gain Nehru hoped to achieve as a 
result of his foreign policy ‘coup’.   
 
A concluding section argues that Nehru misjudged the Chinese. This was both a result 
of misinformation and bad advice at home from close advisors that Nehru chose to surround 
himself with as well as a deliberate effort by the Chinese to mislead.525 Leaving Chinese 
motivations aside the point still holds that Nehru chose to ignore warnings, objections and 
cautionary advice from across the political spectrum in order to sign a document which 
entailed no material gains for India. In the case of Panchasheela Nehru’s strategy consisted of 
steamrolling his way forward in the face of opposition and calls for prudence and a concerted 
attempt to turn panchasheela and India’s relations with China at large, into a non-issue within 
parliamentary discussions. Ex post facto he justified his decision as part of India’s new way 
of diplomacy. Unlike the Planning Commission, which took shape as part of a process of 
consensus-driven politics, Panchasheela emerged as a highly personal choice on Nehru’s part, 
serving to boost his international persona and to prove his unchallenged position on 
international affairs at home. In the concluding chapter eight of the thesis, the proposition is 
considered that, having set such a precedent, subsequent foreign policy making suffered from 
a highly under-institutionalised framework. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
525 See Ranganathan, C.V. India and China. The Way Ahead after Mao’s India War. (Har-Anand, New Delhi, 
2000). 
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6.2. Pre-history: British India’s foreign policy. 
 
Today India claims the McMahon Line to be its international border with China. This 
is a line that dates back to the 1914 Simla agreement brokered by the British which calls for a 
brief historical background since the legacy India inherited with regards the India-
Tibet/China border was a particularly complicated one. The rise of Britain and Russia as 
colonial powers at the beginning of the nineteenth century coincided with the decline of 
China and as a result Tibet took on strategic relevance in the Anglo-Russian rivalry, known 
then as ‘The Great Game’. Seeking to contain Russian influence in the region and establish a 
British presence, army officer Francis Younghusband led a British expedition in 1903-04 to 
Tibet. Finding the Chinese unwilling to negotiate, since for them the Anglo-Chinese 
Convention of 1890 was still valid in which the British Government had implicitly 
recognised China’s right to speak for, and on behalf of Tibet, and when no resistance was 
met, Younghusband marched on to Lhasa.  The Anglo-Tibetan Agreement of 1904 was 
eventually extracted but, it was a treaty to which neither the Chinese nor the actual Dalai 
Lama at the time was party to and was signed instead by the acting regent. The treaty allowed 
the British to trade in Yadong, Gyantse and Gartok, called for Tibet to pay a large indemnity, 
formally recognised the Sikkim-Tibet border and declared Tibet to be a British protectorate. 
By 1906 the terms of the treaty had been re-negotiated and more ambiguity was injected into 
the status of Tibet with the privileged position accrued to Britain under the 1904 agreement 
appearing to be surrendered and China recognised as having supremacy over the Tibetan 
Government.526  
 
                                                 
526 See Mehra, P. The McMahon Line and After. (Macmillan, Delhi, 1974) for a good overview of the history of 
Sino-British-Tibetan relations. 
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The October 1911 Revolution which led to the downfall of the imperial Qing Dynasty 
and to the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912 exposed the country’s weakness, 
leading to a gradual erosion of Peking’s authority over large parts of western China including 
Mongolia, Sichuan and eventually Tibet. Taking advantage of the turmoil and Tibet’s attempt 
to reassert its independence from China, the British restarted direct negotiations with the 
Tibetan Government which resulted in the Simla Conference of 1913 where Tibet, China and 
British interests were to be represented. For the British, Sir Arthur Henry McMahon was the 
representative. He was then Foreign Secretary of the Indian Government and brought to the 
negotiating table a long experience in boundary-making. It was at this conference that the 
crucial play on words was introduced, the agreement referring to Tibet’s status as being 
‘under the suzerainty but not the sovereignty’ (italics added) of China. As Mehra explains in 
his excellent book, The McMahon Line and After, this sought to impose a legalistic rigidity 
onto what had essentially been an elastic, flexible relationship between the Chinese emperor 
and the Dalai Lama. The other area of long-lasting controversy pertained to the delimitation 
of the India-Tibet boundary which ultimately gave rise to the famed McMahon line and 
which remained shrouded in legal uncertainty throughout the 1920s and 30s given that it was 
a part of the Simla Convention to which the Chinese ultimately had not been a party.  
 
The issue of borders took on urgent relevance in 1935 when, under India’s new 
constitution, it became necessary to define the tribal areas in the North-East in order to place 
them under the control of the government of Assam. The impending separation of Burma 
from the rest of British India made the definition of borders all the more imperative. A clash 
of interests however, was emerging at the time between the India Office and Whitehall which 
appeared less than enthusiastic to publish any maps for fear of antagonising the Chinese and 
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losing their trading privileges.527 World War Two was an additional complication given that 
China was an important bulwark against the Japanese onslaught that threatened British India 
and British interests in South East Asia. By the time of India’s independence the exact status 
of Tibet and the Indo-Tibetan border remained beset by ambiguity. This point was driven 
home at the 1947 Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi, convened by Jawaharlal Nehru, 
to which the Tibetans made a point of attending as a distinct group separate from the Chinese 
with their own independent flag.  
 
In addition to the preoccupations at home and the overwhelming logistics and trauma 
of the partition which divided British India into the two separate nations of Pakistan and 
India, New Delhi at the time of independence had to cope with Tibetan as well as Chinese 
encroachments along its eastern frontier. In Tawang for instance, south of the McMahon line 
and the seat of an important lamaist monastery, a struggle was underway between Tibet and 
the Assam government to establish authority for example in the form of tax collection. 
However, both Whitehall and later New Delhi seem to have had their hands tied, unwilling to 
negotiate directly with the Tibetans for fear of upsetting Peking. 
 
On October 1st, 1949 the new People’s Republic of China was proclaimed, bringing 
an end to more than two decades of civil war and driving out the Kuomintang regime under 
Chiang Kai-Shek from the mainland to Taiwan whilst the Communists took charge in 
Beijing. Not long after taking control, the Communists proclaimed as a central objective, the 
‘liberation’ of Tibet from the alleged intrigues and interferences of western imperialists and 
on October 7th, 1950 the People’s Liberation Army marched into Tibet. 
 
                                                 
527 See Mehra, P. The McMahon Line and After. (Macmillan, Delhi, 1974), Chapters 35 – 39. 
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6.3. Nehru on Foreign Affairs: The Constituent Assembly Debates. 
 
The linkage between foreign policy and nation-building was strongly advocated by 
Nehru and is a theme that became increasingly prevalent in his speeches on foreign policy in 
the run-up to and after independence. In a speech to the Constituent Assembly in December 
1947, Nehru clearly stated that ‘Ultimately foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy, 
and till that time, when India has properly evolved her economic policy, her foreign policy 
will be rather vague, rather inchoate, and will grope about.’528 This link drawn between the 
economy and foreign policy was to persist and explains to some extent India’s policy of non-
alignment which also consisted of receiving economic aid from both blocs, sometimes at the 
same time.529   
 
What is noteworthy is how little the topic of non-alignment came up for discussion in 
the Constituent Assembly for there are comparatively speaking, few debates specifically on 
the subject. In some of the rare occasions when the topic was raised, Nehru spoke of the need 
to navigate the emerging tensions and faultlines of the Cold War where “India, in so far as it 
has a foreign policy, has declared that it wants to remain independent and free of all these 
blocks and that it wants to cooperate on equal terms with all countries”.530 However, it was 
acknowledged that India was going to have to use, what has been called, weapons of the 
weak531, or, as Nehru himself put it, “to function as peace-makers and peace-bringers because 
today we are not strong enough to be able to have our way”.532 Following the logic 
                                                 
528 Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. II, 1947, cols. 1259 – 1265. 
529 For details see Boquérat, G. India’s Politics and Foreign Aid; 1947 – 1966. (Manohar, New Delhi, 2003) 
530 Nehru in the Constituent Assembly Debates (CAD), Wednesday, 22nd January, 1947. 
531 Concept taken from Scott, J.C. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. (Yale 
University Press, London, 1985) where resistance by the poor includes language that shows disgust and disdain 
for the others, recounting of events in ways that blame the rich, foot dragging, feigned compliance or methods 
that are typically indirect and require little organization.   
532 Nehru, Constituent Assembly Debates, Tuesday 22nd July, 1947. 
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underlying the implementation of ‘weapons of the weak’, Nehru opted for an international 
stance which frequently castigated the great powers on their actions and their motives. His 
reprimands and scolding style was perfected by his representative to the United Nations, 
Krishna Menon (see below for more details). By March 1948 Nehru’s statements had become 
grander with him arguing that ‘India even today counts in world affairs and the trouble you 
see in the United Nations or in the Security Council is because she counts, not because she 
does not count.....It is not a question of our viewpoint or of attaching ourselves to this or that 
bloc; it is merely the fact that we are potentially a great nation and big power.....’533 The 
trouble Nehru referred to pertained to the quagmire that was developing over the issue of 
Kashmir and the often unwelcome interventions that India was making on the question of 
Palestine among other issues. It is this tone and belief in the manifest destiny of India to play 
a major role in world politics which progressively intensified in the following years and 
during the decade of the 1950s.  
 
 
6.4. The discourse on foreign policy: alternatives to and critics of Nehru. 
 
Right from the early days, Nehru’s speeches are laden with references to world 
problems. In Nehru’s outlook, India’s interests often seemed to be global rather than national. 
The 1950 war in Korea was one of the first international missions for Nehru and India, and 
China already featured prominently in this for it was India’s special access to China which 
Nehru often referred to. For example, in a speech to the interim parliament in 1950 Nehru 
announced, ‘we were in intimate touch with our Ambassador in Peking and we asked him, as 
we asked our representatives in other countries, to tell us how the various Governments were 
                                                 
533 Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. III, 1948, Columns 1747 – 1772.  
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viewing the scene. We had perhaps a rather special responsibility in regard to China, because 
we were one of the very few countries represented there, and we were the only country, apart 
from the countries of the Soviet group, which could find out through the Ambassador what 
the reactions of the Chinese Government were to the developing events’.534 
 
In the same speech Nehru talked about the Chinese ‘liberation’ of Tibet and 
acknowledged that the government was taken by surprise when China sent military troops 
into Tibet, especially since China had agreed to settling the matter through peaceful 
negotiations.535 Nevertheless Nehru saw no indication in this of China’s duplicity nor did he 
doubt the reliability and credibility of his ambassador, K.M.Panikkar in Beijing.  
 
In fact it was either rather naive of Nehru or highly presumptuous to imagine that the 
information which the Chinese were passing on to Ambassador Pannikkar could be taken at 
face value. To either assume that India had special access or that China was not politically 
savvy enough to be playing its own international game of diplomacy, smacks of arrogance. A 
further slap in the face came on 30 October 1950 when China made it clear in a Government 
note, that Tibet was part of China and therefore entirely a domestic problem and no foreign 
interference would be tolerated. The Chinese army had been dispatched to ‘liberate the 
Tibetan people and defend the frontiers of China’. It also denounced India’s attempt to link 
the Tibet issue with that of China’s United Nations membership and alleged that India had 
been ‘affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet’.536 
 
                                                 
534 Interim Assembly Debates, 6 December 1950, Column 1261 – 2. 
535 Interim Assembly Debates, 6 December 1950, Column 1267. 
536 Reply of the People’s Republic of China to the Memorandum and Note of the Government of India, 31 
October 1950. 
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It is interesting to note that India’s reply was strongly worded. The note described 
India’s amazement at being referred to as an instrument of the foreign hand and assured 
China that ‘it had no desire to interfere or gain any advantage’ and that it had sought a 
peaceful settlement to the Tibet issue, ‘adjusting the legitimate Tibetan claim to autonomy 
within the framework of Chinese suzerainty’. India had no territorial ambitions in Tibet but 
‘certain rights have grown out of usage and agreements which are natural among neighbours 
with close cultural and commercial relations’. These had emerged in the form of trade 
agencies in Gyantse and Yatung and the maintenance of post and telegraph services on the 
route as well as a small military escort to protect the trade route. India, the note stated, was 
‘anxious that these establishments, which are to the mutual interest of India and Tibet, and do 
not detract in any way from Chinese suzerainty in Tibet’, should continue.537 The position 
taken in this document is revealing since it makes clear that while India recognised Tibet as 
part of China, it was keen to maintain its extra-territorial rights. China’s reply of 16 
November ignored the reference to these rights.  
 
Criticising Nehru’s stance, N.G. Ranga’s538 interpretation provides a realist 
alternative to the Nehru vision of foreign policy, drawing attention to the fact that the Chinese 
people may be favourable towards India but the important factor was to gauge the leaders of 
the Chinese people: ‘Who is in charge of the Chinese Government today? Could we be 
indifferent to the fact that only the other day it was none else than the Chinese Government 
which had hinted that India was the foreign power in Tibet which was supposed to be 
queering the pitch?’539 
 
                                                 
537 Note from the Government of India to the Foreign Ministry of China, 31 October 1950. 
538 Freedom fighter, parliamentarian and peasant leader and later joined the Swatantra Party in protest against 
cooperative farming.  
539 Interim Assembly Debates, 6 December 1950, Column 1277. 
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Dr. S.P.Mookerjee540, another vocal member of parliament and critic of Nehru’s 
foreign policy made the point that instead of the laurels Nehru bestowed upon himself and 
India for its role in the Korean crisis, the country ought to learn from the incident, and in 
particular be aware to the fact that China had acquired enormous strength to the extent of 
being able to meet on the battle-ground the finest forces of the United States and other allied 
powers. Following in the wake of China’s intervention in Tibet, the Korean crisis ought to 
have been treated with greater gravity by the Indian government. As he pointed out, ‘We 
have got to look at these problems undoubtedly from the point of view of world peace but 
principally also from the manner in which our own position may be affected’.541 
 
Yet another valid critique was given by Acharya Kripalani542, whose speeches in 
parliament presented a logical dissection of Indian foreign policy, beginning with the 
underlying premises guiding policy to the final intended and unintended outcomes that such a 
policy was likely to produce. As he rightly pointed out in 1950, despite India and Nehru’s 
vocal stance on international issues, at the end of 1950 India could claim no friends in the 
international arena amongst the major powers like China, Russia, and United States. An 
explanation for this was offered by Kripalani, ‘I suppose all these things have happened 
because our basic philosophy is wrong, that is we want to judge every action on its own 
merits. Another reason for this is that we think we will fight for just causes, or is it lost 
causes? Neutrality cannot be combined with the urge to reform the world’.543 Minoo Masani, 
who later went on to co-found the conservative Swatantra party, endorsed India’s 
commitment to world peace but cautioned about the need to develop a system of collective 
                                                 
540 Freedom fighter, national leader and founder of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, precursor to the present-day 
Bharatiya Janata Party.  
541 Interim Assembly Debates, 6 December 1950, Column 1282. 
542 Indian politician, freedom fighter, Gandhian and president of the Congress party during the transfer of power.  
543 Interim Assembly Debates, 6 December 1950, Column 1289. 
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security. As he rightly asked, had India tried to develop a regional system of collective 
security? Apart from the moralistic rhetoric, Masani argued that India needed to take a more 
proactive stance which would demonstrate that the country was not willing to appease or 
condone aggression of any kind. As he pointed out, ‘if we do not do these things.......we shall 
be strengthening those forces of isolationism in the West which will be prepared to write off 
Asia, because Asia is not prepared under its present leadership to defend its own freedom and 
its own collective security’.544 
 
On the subject of China, Masani like the other critics, cautioned that in light of 
China’s actions in Korea, Tibet and Indo-China, together with China’s rhetoric accusing India 
of instigating resistance in Tibet and of Nehru being the running dog of Anglo-American 
imperialism, ‘there can be no longer any illusions about friendship in Asia. By the one act of 
attacking Tibet and deceiving the Indian Government after their assurances given repeatedly, 
they have shown their utter contempt for the idea that we embraced, namely of a free and 
united Asia’.545 
 
Of course there were defenders of Nehru’s position but it is noteworthy that in 1950 
the critics far outnumbered the supporters. Among the arguments promoting Nehru’s vision 
in its early days included the point that ‘with so small a military force at our disposal he has 
succeeded in making India respected out of all proportion to our military strength and today 
the world recognises that we are really independent and that we follow an independent 
foreign policy’.546 The discussions in parliament are also valuable for providing an insight 
into the dilemmas facing the newly founded Indian state in formulating a foreign policy that 
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could be billed as both radically new as well as encapsulating an ancient Indian genius. 
Hence there were those who advocated Communism as the only way to bring about far-
reaching changes to India’s economic and social situation and which in turn implied a more 
favourable attitude towards other fellow communist countries. Others, recognising the merits 
in the goals of Communism rejected its methods, as manifested in domestic politics as well as 
international behaviour. Whilst some proposed that Communism would be more appropriate 
for the Indian condition where discipline, direction and regimentation would bring about 
more results than democracy which reinforced the existing tendency towards a lack of 
cohesion and discipline, others pointed out that in a country where religion played such a 
vital role, Communism would require a spiritual dissolution.  
 
In responding to his critics, Nehru was adamant that ‘the real development and 
strength of an army and a country lies in developing the industrial resources and the economy 
of the country out of which armies and defence forces and everything come’.547 On the whole 
Nehru’s tendency in reacting to criticism seems to have been to call into question the 
expertise and proficiency of his critics. For example, closing the December 6-7th 
parliamentary consideration of the International Situation and India’s foreign policy, Nehru’s 
speech challenges each of his detractors. Thus, he accuses members of being ‘full of light –
they have no need to grope....in the darkness that surrounds us..... They know exactly what 
should be done at any moment. I envy them for this feeling of brightness and lightness’.548 
On the point that India’s foreign policy lacked realism, Nehru countered, ‘It seemed to me 
that those people who pride themselves of being practical politicians normally know nothing 
about realism or about the state of affairs’.549 On the subject of whether India ought to lean 
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towards any one of the two blocs, or whether if at all there were two blocs, Nehru sharply 
retorted, ‘these questions and these arguments are completely out-of-date. They do not count 
today...And today if a person thinks in this manner it merely means he is yesterday’s 
man......and not keeping pace with the changing world and changing events’.550  
 
To dismiss the alternatives and questions proposed and raised by members on India’s 
approach to China, Nehru’s words were often mocking, ‘Do you meant to tell me that I 
should issue an ultimatum to China not to do this or that.....and tell them that it is foolish to 
have a doctrine of Communism’.551 To those who worried about India’s foreign policy as 
being one of sitting on the fence, Nehru again demonstrated an inclination towards 
denigrating those who opposed him: ‘I say we have taken a more active part in the past two 
or three years in foreign policy than many other countries, barring the Big Powers. I do not 
understand this business, except that these people who talk like that know nothing about what 
they are talking of and do not study or read or understand what is happening around them.’552 
The extensive debates in parliament on international affairs reveal that in the very early 1950s 
there was a great interest in the subject and most importantly, there were a number of 
dissenting voices. In particular with regards to India’s strategy towards China much caution 
and circumspection was advocated. The parameters of discourse were wide open and it is 
surprising to read the various standpoints being articulated in opposition to or in criticism of 
Nehru’s policies. Judging from the various stances taken during the parliamentary discussions 
in the early 1950s, it appears that there was a healthy framework for debate in place, 
representing a variety of positions ranging from the extremely hawkish, to the pacifist, from 
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those advocating world peace to the more realist-driven interpretations of international 
politics, the primacy of the national interest and the vital importance of defence.  
 
This is surprising because the literature on India’s foreign relations of the 1950s tends 
to cast Nehru as the sole articulator, formulator and executor of Indian foreign policy, 
unchallenged and unmatched in his expertise and reading of the international situation. The 
narrative above has demonstrated that this was clearly not the case and there were harbingers 
of the problems India was to encounter with China following the ‘liberation’ of Tibet. Hence, 
as one speaker warned, ‘This uncertain boundary line between Tibet and India will be another 
excuse for intervention’.553 
 
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, then the Home Minister, was among the most prescient, 
writing a long letter to Jawaharlal on November 7, 1950 in which he drew Nehru’s attention 
to the danger from China and also recommended certain actions. It is necessary to quote Patel 
at length to get a taste of his perceptive analysis at a time when he himself was very ill and 
soon to die:  “I have carefully gone through the correspondence between the External Affairs 
Ministry and our Ambassador in Peking and through him the Chinese Government. There can 
be no doubt that during the period covered by this correspondence the Chinese must have 
been concentrating for an onslaught on Tibet. The final action of the Chinese, in my 
judgement, is little short of perfidy......Even though we regard ourselves as friends of China, 
the Chinese do not regard us as their friends. During the last several months, outside the 
Russian camp, we have practically been alone in championing the cause of Chinese entry into 
the UNO and in securing from the Americans assurances on the question of Formosa......I 
doubt if we can go any further than we have done already to convince China of our good 
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intentions, friendliness and goodwill....Their last telegram to us is an act of gross discourtesy 
not only in the summary way it disposes of our protest against the entry of Chinese forces 
into Tibet but also in the wild insinuation that our attitude is determined by foreign 
influences. It looks as though it is not a friend speaking in that language but a potential 
enemy.”. Sardar Patel continued, “In the background of this, we have to consider the situation 
that now faces us as a result of the disappearance of Tibet......The Chinese interpretation of 
suzerainty seems to be different. We can, therefore, safely assume that very soon they will 
disown all the stipulations which Tibet has entered into with us in the past”.554 
 
In addition to this, Patel provided a list of actions India ought to take with regards to 
improving intelligence-gathering, consolidating military guards at important routes or areas 
likely to be under dispute, updating communications with frontier outposts, developing a 
policy on the issue of the MacMahon line. Of critical importance, Patel strongly advised the 
need to improve relations with the population on the North-East frontier who needed to be 
fully assimilated into the Union of India which was both a political and administrative task. 
In contrast with Nehru, who spoke always in terms of the international consequences of 
foreign policy or how India’s reputation was at stake, Patel possessed a hardnosed practical 
realism with a primary concern for domestic politics. A note sent by Jawaharlal Nehru 
guiding the foreign department and instructions to be sent to B.N.Rao, India’s representative 
at the UNO on the position to be taken should Tibet come up for discussion in the Security 
Council, provides an apt contrast. In one place the note states, “I think that it is exceedingly 
unlikely that we may have to face any real military invasion from the Chinese side...in the 
foreseeable future. I base this conclusion on a consideration of various world factors.” Going 
on, Nehru provided his assessment of China’s strategic situation: “China, though internally 
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big, is in a way amorphous and easily capable of being attacked on its sea coasts and by air. 
...It is inconceivable that it should divert its forces and its strength across the inhospitable 
terrain of Tibet and undertake a wild adventure across the Himalayas. Any such attempt will 
greatly weaken its capacity to meet its real enemies on other fronts.”555 That this precisely 
might have been the right time for India to take a forceful position before China got any 
stronger did not fit Nehru’s self-perception of being the magnanimous statesman. 
Nevertheless events proved Patel to be the more accurate reader of relations between the two 
countries, and this was despite the fact that he was not the external affairs minister nor did he 
profess to have an understanding of ‘world factors’. The weaknesses in Nehru’s interpretation 
of China’s intentions and perception of India will emerge more strongly in the remaining 
sections of this chapter. 
 
 
6.5. The Panchasheela Agreement: an analytic narrative of intentions,  
functions and constraints. 
 
The Agreement on Tibet (otherwise known as the Panchasheela Agreement) was signed 
in Beijing on 29 April, 1954556. Its practical provisions pertained to the: 
1. Establishment of three trade agencies by each side; 
2. Recognition of a number of trade marts; and 
3. Facilities for traditional pilgrimages in both countries by persons of Hindu and 
Buddhist faiths. 
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Apart from Gartok, to the east of Simla in Himachal Pradesh, the trade agencies granted to 
India were in locations where India already possessed rights and was choosing to relinquish 
these as an act of good faith. These included military escorts stationed at Yatung and Gyantse 
in Tibet and postal, telegraph and public-telephone services along with twelve rest-houses 
and other buildings owned by the Government of India in Tibet. In contrast China was not 
only given completely new rights to set up trade agencies in India but in addition, these were 
to be located in such important cities as the capital, New Delhi and in the state of West 
Bengal Calcutta and Kalimpong which could have been strategically important trade portals. 
It is also noteworthy that throughout the document Tibet was referred to as the ‘Tibet Region 
of China’, clearly endorsing China’s legitimate control over Tibet. 
 
The preamble contains the famed ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ or 
Panchasheela. Literally meaning, the ‘five principles of rules of conduct’ in Sanskrit, 
Panchasheela was drawn from the original Buddhist conception of ten negative prohibitions 
and 18 positive injunctions that must be followed in the pursuit of enlightenment. The five 
principles refer to the basic concepts of moral behaviour which all must follow, known in 
Buddhism as Pansil. This was first applied to politics in Indonesia by President Sukarno who 
in 1945 formulated the five basic principles of his state policy: belief in God, 
humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy and social justice. Given the close relationship 
between Nehru and Sukarno and India’s support of Indonesia’s freedom struggle against the 
Dutch it is quite possible that Nehru borrowed the idea, going one step further to apply the 
guiding principles to inter-state relations.557 
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Signed by India’s Ambassador to China, N.R.Raghavan and China’s Vice-Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Change Han-Fu, the document’s preamble contained the five principles of: 
1. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; 
2. Mutual non-aggression; 
3. Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; 
4. Equality and mutual benefit; and 
5. Peaceful coexistence. 
Describing the agreement in parliament on 15 May, 1954 (after it had been signed), Nehru 
proclaimed, ‘These principles not only indicate the policy that we pursue in regard to these 
matters not only with China but with any neighbouring country, or, for that matter, any other 
country, but it is also a statement of wholesome principles’.558 The way Nehru projected the 
Panchasheela Agreement, it is clear that he considered it to be something which could teach 
the international community something about diplomacy. Arguing that ‘Collective Security’ 
initiatives are equivalent to ‘preparations for collective war’, he portrayed Panchasheela as an 
exercise in ‘collective peace, with no element of aggression against any country’.559 Further 
on in the speech after having covered, what he saw to be, India’s unofficial but morally 
correct stance on the Indo-China problem and the highly independent position taken by India 
advocating clemency for Japanese war criminals, Nehru reiterated the importance of India’s 
approach which ‘is that of trying to work for collective peace....The other collective security 
that, - all the time, by threats and fear of mounting armaments – is not even bringing a 
climate of peace’.560 
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Significantly, Nehru attached the most meaning to the Preamble. The individual 
articles which contained the substance of the agreement and basically signed away India’s 
privileges in exchange for next to nothing were, it seems, not the crux of the matter. The 
emphasis and attention was directed at the preamble containing the five principles of peaceful 
coexistence, which in fact the Chinese were initially reluctant to include! It is also telling that 
the document was signed as the dryly titled, ‘Agreement between the Government of the 
Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Trade and Inter-
Course between Tibet Region of China and India’ and did not technically go by the name 
Panchasheela, the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’. The large number of issues 
dealt with in the document, did not include any reference to border concerns, but addressed 
trade, pilgrim traffic, communications. All these, Nehru explained are small points in 
comparison to ‘the major thing about this agreement...the preamble’.561 
 
On the issue of Tibet and the fact that the 1954 agreement gave de facto recognition to 
China’s recently acquired position in Tibet, Nehru’s defence interestingly, consisted of trying 
to further blur the already thin lines of distinction between the concepts of ‘sovereignty’ and 
‘suzerainty’. Granted that the difference between the two is subtle it is important to note that 
in his speech, Nehru used them interchangeably which must have been a deliberate choice for 
he could have alternatively chosen to emphasize the differences in meaning and to dissect the 
implications for India. Instead, he stated, ‘I am not aware of any time during the last few 
hundred years when Chinese sovereignty or if you like suzerainty was challenged by any 
outside country’.562 
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Although, by May 1954 the open criticism of Nehru in parliamentary debates on 
foreign affairs was considerably less compared with the discussions in 1950, a few voices 
persisted in raising questions about Nehru’s choice of action. It is interesting to note that 
among the last to oppose or question Nehru’s arguments and policy choices, was Acharya 
Kripalani, leader in the Socialist Party. In 1953 Kripalani sharply criticised what he referred 
to as India’s ‘posturing on the international stage’.563 Describing India’s involvement in the 
aftermath of the Korean crisis, Kripalani provided a synopsis of how India’s dabbling in 
international affairs ended up annoying all the parties involved to the point where India’s 
volunteered custodian troops, provided to man the cease-fire line, could not even touch the 
soil of South Korea and had to be airdropped into the neutral zone.564 In a criticism aimed at 
Nehru’s high profile style of diplomacy, Kripalani advocated that especially in times ‘when 
nations are suffering from a kind of hysteria, it will be best for us to cultivate our garden and 
confine ourselves largely to the four corners of the home front’.565 In the 1954 discussion 
Kripalani was a lone voice in condemning China’s actions in Tibet and questioning the 
trustworthiness of China.  
 
In the May 15, 1954 debate Acharya Kripalani was clear in his denunciation of 
China’s actions in Tibet. If India was going to stand up to Western acts of colonial 
aggression, he argued, then India should also be able to condemn China’s act of colonial 
aggression. Describing Tibet as culturally more akin to India than Communist China, China’s 
act of deliberate aggression constituted a case where, ‘one nation by force of arms, or fraud 
occupies the territory of another nation’.566 Going on to puncture the grandiose portrayal of 
the Asian Prime Ministers Conference held in Ceylon which Nehru had depicted as unique 
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and historical, Kripalani pointed out that ‘An Asian Prime Minister’s Conference without the 
Near East, without Japan, without even China, does not become an Asian conference’.567 
Cautioning that neutrality lasted only as long as it served a nation’s purpose, Kripalani was 
one of the few to openly state that the conference did not contribute anything concrete other 
than simply adding to the prestige of India and Ceylon.  
 
This is interesting because by 1954, communist voices, like H.N.Mukerjee568 had 
considerably toned down their opposition to Nehru, especially following the 1954 
Panchasheela Agreement which had bestowed so many advantages on Communist China. 
Since the early 1950s, Mukerjee had been advocating an even more positive and pro-China 
stance to be taken up by India for instance on the question of China’s membership of the 
United Nations. Even in September 1953 Mukerjee’s response to Nehru’s opening speech 
was full of censuring remarks and observations. On the issue of Kashmir (treated as a foreign 
policy subject in the Lok Sabha debates) Mukerjee demanded stronger action and on the 
subject of relations with Nepal he was highly critical of India’s attempt to meddle in 
Nepalese politics. Most crucially perhaps was Mukerjee’s stance regarding India’s 
membership of the Commonwealth. Given Nehru’s support for India’s membership and 
continued close association with Britain this must have threatened to turn into a politically 
explosive issue with sufficient emotive value to be able to rally popular opposition. In his 
contribution to the debates of 17 September, 1953 Mukerjee’s speech was largely devoted to 
criticising Nehru’s relations with Britain and the image that was being created of India and 
Pakistan acting as ‘the brokers doing the dirty job for these imperialists’.569 Here he was 
referring to the emerging Suez Crisis and the suggestions that were being made at the time in 
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the international press that India and Pakistan, fresh from the Coronation and the 
Commonwealth Conference in London, could carry Britain’s message and press for Britain’s 
case. In this speech Mukerjee accused Nehru’s policies of being pusillanimous, daring him to 
act ‘really and truly in consistency with the spirit of our national movement’.570 Such spirited 
criticism was almost non-existent in the foreign policy debates from the mid-1950s on.  
 
Defending the agreement in the Lok Sabha on 30 September 1954, Nehru lambasted 
his critics who had referred to the ‘melancholy chapter of Tibet’. Advising members of the 
House to read the history of British India, China and Tibet, Nehru asked ‘What did any 
honourable member of this House expect us to do in regard to Tibet any time?...Where do we 
come into the picture unless we want to assume the aggressive role of interfering with other 
countries?’ Answering his own question Nehru added, ‘We do not go like Don Quixote with 
lance in hand against everything we dislike; we put up with these things because we would 
be, without making any difference, only getting into trouble’.571 
 
With the 1954 Panchasheela Agreement, it is possible to note a crucial change in the 
political arena, both in terms of the parameters of debate and in the actual style of foreign 
policy-making. Criticism, dissenting views and a consideration of alternatives to the prime 
minister’s views on India’s foreign policy had become markedly reduced whilst those 
supporting the government dominated the debate. Sycophancy towards Nehru had become 
commonplace by the mid-1950s. Take for example the words of parliamentary member, Mr. 
Joachim Alva572: ‘It should not be merely enough that we have a foreign policy. We have a 
Prime Minister who has perhaps given us the best foreign policy. He will perhaps be known 
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in history as the greatest Foreign Minister our country ever had. Perhaps he is the greatest 
Foreign Minister in the world today’.573  
 
Furthermore, the explicitly pro-Chinese tilt which the Agreement symbolised and 
endorsed through its provisions, resulted in the implantation of a bias towards China in the 
foreign policy making establishment, a constraint which continues to influence India’s policy 
towards China. While the communists were appeased to a large extent by the pro-China 
nature of the agreement, the Socialists remained on the fringes.  Kripalani’s views for 
instance were usually dismissed as unworkable, illogical or even fantastical.574 As a result, 
the ‘socialist’ position, despite Nehru’s professed socialist inclinations, was not incorporated 
into the general corpus of foreign policy goals and priorities. One possible explanation, for 
this is the undue influence that Krishna Menon and K.N.Panikkar (see section below) wielded 
over Nehru and the fact that they were themselves more inclined towards communism rather 
than a more moderate form of socialism. This was probably compounded by the long-running 
rivalry between Nehru and Kripalani dating back to pre-independence days (see chapter 
four), even continuing into 1962 when Kripalani contested a seat in the general elections 
from North Bombay, in opposition to Krishna Menon who was being openly backed by 
Nehru and the Congress party machinery.575 Furthermore, in the mid-1950s it was only the 
communists who posed any real challenge to Nehru as a political force, the rest of the 
opposition being far too fragmented to constitute a real front against Nehru. Hence, policies 
which also won the approval of the Communists meant that Nehru faced no real threat to his 
position in power. 
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6.6. The Implications of Panchasheela 
 
Taking the 1954 agreement to be an affirmation of the good relations between India 
and China, Nehru projected Panchasheela as an internationally-applicable code of conduct. A 
joint statement issued by Prime Ministers Zhou En-Lai and Jawaharlal Nehru on June 28, 
1954 proclaimed,  “If these principles are applied not only between various countries but also 
in international relations generally, they would form a solid foundation for peace and security 
and the fears and apprehensions, that exist today would give place to a feeling of 
confidence”.576 At the Bandung Afro-Asian summit of April 1955 the five principles were 
fully embodied in a ten point declaration which set out the framework governing relations 
amongst member countries and on Independence day, August 15, 1955, Nehru hailed 
Panchasheela as the guarantee of international peace and amity and as a code of conduct for 
application to international problems.577  
 
While Bandung represented a convergence of Indian and Chinese policies on the 
Panchasheela principles, it was China that emerged as the star of the conference. Chou En-
Lai’s speech of 19 April, affirmed China’s allegiance to the Five Principles and underlined 
his endeavour to ‘seek common ground and not create divergence’ but a deadlock quickly 
ensured between countries that were aligned and those that professed a commitment to non-
alignment. The draft resolution on colonialism reached a stalemate when some participants 
insisted that communism should be denounced as a new form of colonialism. An impassioned 
speech by Nehru deprecated the approach of the pro-Western participants whilst Ceylon’s Sir 
John Kotewala demanded that in pursuit of co-existence, China should ask all local 
communist parties in Asia and Africa to disband and use its influence with the Soviet Union 
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to dissolve the Cominform. Nehru, trying to bring about a consensus, recognised that both 
communism and anti-communism (equated with the Cominform and SEATO respectively) 
were dangerous and, that if co-existence was to be real, such organisations would have to 
wind up. The show however, was stolen by Chou En-Lai who made an unexpected and 
sensational statement, announcing China’s willingness to negotiate with the United States and 
to discuss the relaxation of tensions in the Far East and especially in the Formosa area. This 
was regarded as a major breakthrough and a highly praiseworthy gesture on China’s part. As 
a result it was China, and particularly in the form of the individual, Chou En-Lai, who was 
seen to have been the central player at the Bandung Conference. Nehru himself recognised 
this, writing to his Chief Ministers afterwards that, ‘The Prime Minister of China, Chou En-
lai, attracted the most attention both in public and in the Conference. This was natural as he 
was not only playing a great part in the crisis of the Far East (Indo-China) but was rather a 
mysterious figure whom people had not seen.’578 
 
As a result, China at Bandung clearly outdid India, making critical diplomatic gains 
whilst India came away with little that was concrete in terms of policy achievements, apart 
from providing Nehru with the opportunity to play the role of chairperson.579 Providing China 
with a platform through which to demonstrate its independence from the Soviet Union, the 
Bandung Conference enabled China to make contacts with Indonesia, Egypt and Pakistan, 
countries which were later to become important allies. To demonstrate, China’s diplomatic 
offensive it is noteworthy that between November 1955 and February 1956, Chou En-Lai 
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visited eight Asian countries (North Vietnam, Cambodia, India, Burma, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Nepal and Ceylon).  
 
By the end of 1955, Panchasheela had been internationally launched, heralded in 
speeches at home and abroad, enshrined in agreements and used to cement bi-lateral 
relations.580 Nehru had made a concerted effort to embed Panchasheela within a legacy of 
Indian tradition and ethos, portraying it as the natural choice for a country with India’s 
ancient history and experience of peaceful resistance during the freedom struggle. 
Furthermore ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ was often described as the ‘perfect approach between 
two countries to rule out aggression or interference.’581 During these years, leading up to the 
1954 agreement and into 1955, Panchasheela was also promoted as a cornerstone for the 
country’s non-alignment policy.582 For example in his report to the AICC on 10 January 
1955, Nehru proclaimed that ‘At a moment when the countries of the world become 
increasingly intolerant towards each other, we have to remember that tolerance is not only a 
virtue but the only practical approach to the problems of today.....In the international field 
this may be called coexistence and the application of the Panch Shila, the Five 
Principles....This coexistence is not merely an absence of war and conflict but a recognition 
that each country should live its own life and not interfere with others and should have 
friendly approach to other countries, even though they differ from it in many ways.’583 
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6.7. Analysing the Origins of the Panchasheela Agreement 
 
While exploring the stages of conceptualisation and institutionalisation of 
Panchasheela a coterie of close advisors surrounding Nehru, emerges as a key factor in 
explaining why Nehru initiated and extolled an agreement in which China appeared to be the 
major beneficiary. Three individuals are of particular interest: K.M.Panikkar, independent 
India’s first ambassador to China, T.N.Kaul who was part of the negotiations process leading 
up to the 1954 agreement and Krishna Menon, a long-time confidante of Nehru’s and later, a 
cabinet minister. Each were important, and perhaps there were more like them, but these 
three were not only close advisors but also party to the policy-making process where, in the 
capacity of their official positions, they provided back-up and feedback to Nehru in terms of 
his policy towards and, assessment of China. Especially in the field of foreign policy, the role 
of close advisors and particular individuals took on an additional importance, given the 
relatively under-institutionalised and highly personalised style of policy-making that emerged 
with Nehru occupying the position of External Affairs Minister throughout his years as Prime 
Minister. Each of the three individuals under study here held views that reinforced Nehru’s 
impression of China and his aspirations regarding India’s international role. 
  
 
6.7.1. K.M. Panikkar 
 
Educated at the University of Oxford, K.M.Panikkar was a known scholar, historian 
and diplomat. Appointed as ambassador first to nationalist China, under the Kuomintang, he 
continued as ambassador to the People’s Republic of China, putting him in the unusual 
position of serving, back-to-back, two regimes that had been fighting a civil war against each 
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other. Making a point in his autobiography how, during the growing chaos of the civil war in 
China as the Communists took Nanjing in April 1949 he refused to leave, Panikkar wrote, 
“The Americans encouraged other foreigners also to leave, since they felt that such a mass 
exodus would isolate the Chinese government and justify American policy. I was not willing 
to leave by that ship for I preferred to continue my isolation rather than travel under the 
American flag.”584 Instead Panikkar was to become India’s representative under the 
Communist regime and, over the years, one of Nehru’s main sources of information about the 
situation in China, the perception Chinese leaders held of India and the likely responses they 
would have to various scenarios.  
 
Convinced that the policies India had inherited from the British were unsustainable, 
Panikkar wrote that ‘I had even before I started for Peking (i.e. in 1948), come to the 
conclusion that the British policy of looking upon Tibet as an area in which we had special 
political interests could not be maintained’.585 Panikkar is usually blamed for having provided 
the wrong advice to Nehru, for failing to read the signals in Beijing and for transmitting 
wrong information. Nehru himself severely admonished him at the time of the Chinese 
‘liberation’ of Tibet in 1950. For instance, a cable from Nehru dated 27 October 1950, 
criticised Panikkar for being ‘weak and apologetic’ towards the Chinese Government and for 
the fact that information regarding the Chinese Government’s directive to the ‘Liberation 
Army’ was transmitted to India by the U.K. High Commissioner and not India’s own 
Ambassador.586 What is surprising, is how despite such a lapse and cause for embarrassment, 
Panikkar was to continue as ambassador to China till 1952 instead of being recalled. 
Additionally, Nehru’s criticism that ‘our views regarding threatened invasion of Tibet and its 
                                                 
584 Panikkar, K.M. An Autobiography, (Madras, Oxford University Press, 1977) p. 231. 
585 Panikkar, K.M. In Two Chinas, (G.Allen & Unwin, London, 1955), p. 102. 
586 Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Vol. 15, pp. 332 – 3. 
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probable repercussion should have been communicated to them clearly and unequivocally. 
This has evidently not been done’587 is also intriguing, given that India’s public position on 
Tibet, as articulated by the Prime Minister himself, prior to 1950 had been ambiguous. This 
discrepancy provides room for speculation that Nehru’s reprimanding of Panikkar was a face-
saving strategy and not meant to indicate any drastic shift in policy. 
 
As tensions mounted over China’s intentions in Tibet, Panikkar sent a telegram to 
Nehru, dated 19 November 1950, in which he stated that the controversy with China over 
Tibet was a ‘result of misunderstanding on both sides, on their side based on our acceptance 
of their sovereignty and on our side, by a feeling that China brushed aside discourteously our 
friendly advice’.588 His advice, which seemed to reflect primarily Chinese concerns rather 
than India’s strategic interests, advocated the avoidance of any further strain on relations and 
in particular that India should refrain from using the word ‘suzerainty’ when describing 
China’s position in Tibet. Rather than sticking to his earlier position that the word, 
‘suzerainty’ was more appropriate than the ‘sovereignty’ of China in relation to Tibet589, 
Nehru’s response to Panikkar was to acknowledge that the ‘use of word “sovereignty” or 
“suzerainty” is rather academic....Words are not important.’590 Rather than insisting that 
India’s position be clarified to the Chinese, Nehru found himself adhering to Panikkar’s 
advice and concern for China’s perception and insecurity.   
 
Later on as well, Panikkar had the ear of the Prime Minister. When, initially Nehru 
was keen to take up the issue of the frontier with Zhou En Lai, it was Panikkar who 
consistently advised against this. Writing to Nehru on 15 June, 1952 regarding his meeting 
                                                 
587 Ibid. 
588 Ibid. p. 349. 
589 Ibid. Note 18 November, 1950, p. 343. 
590 Ibid. Cable to Panikkar, 20 November, 1950, p. 350. 
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with Zhou En-Lai, Panikkar claimed that Zhou ‘clearly wanted to convey the impression’ that 
the only issues to be settled related to ‘an agreement in principle’ about the ‘transformation’ 
of the Indian Mission in Lhasa ‘into a proper Consulate-General’ as an immediate practical 
step’ and negotiations for India’s ‘special rights like military posts, trade marts and posts and 
telegraphs’.591 Nehru’s reply to Panikkar showed that he was keen on taking up the border 
question. His telegram to Panikkar on 16 June. 1952 read, ‘We think it rather odd, that in 
discussing Tibet with you, Zhou En-Lai did not refer at all to our frontiers. For our part, we 
attach more importance to this than to other matters’.592  
 
However, it is important to note that Nehru was persuaded into dropping the border 
issue. Once Panikkar was had been transferred from Peking in 1952, Nehru could have 
altered India’s stance but instead he chose to continue the approach of not mentioning the 
border. Hence, when officials from Delhi went to China to discuss a trade agreement, Nehru 
issued a directive expressly instructing that the boundary need not be raised.593 
  
 
6.7.2. T.N.Kaul 
 
A careerist in the Indian civil service, T.N.Kaul served as India’s Ambassador to a 
number of countries in addition to being foreign secretary and represents one of the insiders 
who was party to the brokering of the 1954 agreement. Writing in 1989, Kaul offers his 
explanation and understanding of Panchasheela. In the first place it was meant to act as a 
model for other Asian countries: “Panchasheela was the guideline to resolve problems 
                                                 
591 Gopal, S. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 18, p. 474. 
592 Ibid. Vol. 2, p. 178. 
593 Ibid. Vol. 2, p. 179. 
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peacefully, bilaterally and without outside intervention, on the basis of mutual benefit and 
non-aggression, equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual respect for the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of each country”.594 Secondly, Panchasheela was to be 
part and parcel of Nehru’s overall process leading to the “resurgence of Asia and the 
establishment of Asian pride and personality”.595 To achieve this, a key stumbling block was 
how to assuage China’s suspicions and fears? Kaul wrote, ‘he (Nehru) told me, it should be 
our honest and sincere effort to develop friendship and cooperation with our great neighbour 
China because otherwise imperialists and colonialists would try to fish in troubled waters and 
try to divide both countries’.596 Kaul’s interpretation seems to confirm the view that Nehru’s 
aspirations were greater than the sum of India’s core national interests.  
 
Nehru aspired to be amongst the first to evolve a method of peaceful and friendly 
coexistence between two sovereign countries following different socio-economic and 
political ideologies. Nehru envisioned a role for India that went far beyond her actual 
capabilities and resources for exerting influence. It is this conviction which to a large extent 
propelled India’s overtures and concessions towards China despite the warning signals and, 
which explains Nehru’s dog headed enthusiasm for the agreement compared with the 
comparatively, lukewarm Chinese response. Hence, as Kaul noted when the Chinese refused 
to agree to more than 8 years as the duration of the 1954 Agreement, this ‘created a doubt in 
our minds whether the Chinese were really keen on having a peaceful border with India and 
whether they would really respect our territorial integrity’.597 Kaul claimed he warned Pandit 
Nehru that the Chinese were probably thinking of consolidating their hold over Tibet and 
other regions within these 5 to 8 years, and that we ought to do the same. The Indians it 
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595 Ibid. p. 84. 
596 Ibid. p. 85. 
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seems were keen on a 25 year duration, ultimately a compromise was negotiated for eight 
years. Kaul also reported that the Chinese did not want the Five Principles to be part of the 
actual agreement but instead to be announced separately in a press statement. India, however, 
insisted that it be included in the preamble. Furthermore, China objected to mentioning the 
six border passes in the middle sector between Tibet, Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh, 
probably because this implied some recognition of that section of the border. Finally, Kaul 
claimed that the Chinese objected to the mention of Demchok (a pass in Ladakh), a position 
he interpreted as demonstrating their reluctance to upset Pakistan by any reference to 
Kashmir, and additionally, for fear of strengthening India’s claim to Aksai China (in the 
Ladakh area), which the Chinese were interested in as a route linking Sinkiang with Western 
Tibet.598  
 
Panikkar, also writing on the negotiations leading up to the 1954 agreement 
confirmed these observations. Both therefore, at least in hindsight, give the impression that 
the Chinese were tough negotiators and how even though the agreement ultimately benefitted 
them far more than it did India in material terms, it was the symbolic value that was of such 
great importance for India.599 For instance, Kaul described the agreement as, ‘an attempt, the 
first in post-World War II history, to put bilateral relations between the two big countries of 
Asia on a principled basis.’600 
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6.7.3. V.K. Krishna Menon 
 
Amongst Nehru’s coterie of close advisors, Krishna Menon is a central figure. It is 
usually speculated that Nehru’s dependence on and enduring loyalty to Menon stemmed from 
their long acquaintance dating back to the 1930s when Menon was instrumental in providing 
Nehru with contacts and the introductions to London’s high society and, that as a result 
Nehru had always felt indebted to and in awe of him. Madhu Limaye, a scholar of Indian 
politics, puts an extra spin on the mutual partnership, “Nehru’s attachment for Menon was not 
only due to the many services he rendered before and after independence to him. Morarji 
(Desai) says Nehru felt beholden to Menon because he constantly tried to make out Nehru as 
a man greater than even Mahatma Gandhi. There is truth in this observation. I used to meet 
K.Menon frequently in the winter of 1947-48 during my stay in Britain and his recurring 
theme was that we young Socialists should attach themselves to the modernist Nehru rather 
than to Gandhi”.601 Sharing a similar ideological inclination and a passion for international 
diplomacy, far above domestic politics,  Menon was one of the few to last through all three of 
Nehru’s terms as prime minister, surviving even the 1962 debacle after which despite having 
to resign as defence minister, he was supported by Nehru in the 1962 Bombay assembly 
elections. 
 
Through the latter half of the 1930s, Menon played an active role in organising 
Nehru’s visits to Europe as can be seen in the numerous letters between the two.602 As the 
leading figure in the Home League movement in Britain, Menon was probably a more 
publicly recognised figure than Nehru, who was just beginning to make his mark as a radical 
in Congress politics in India. When, in 1935 Nehru visited London, Krishna Menon took it 
                                                 
601 Limaye, M. Cabinet Governments in India, (1989, Radiant Publishers), p. 82. 
602 See for example Gopal, S.  Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 7, p. 16.  
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upon himself to make all the arrangements, organising meetings, speeches and interviews. As 
a result Nehru found himself in the company of upcoming British leaders and intellectuals 
like Harold Laski, Stafford Cripps, Ellen Wilkinson, Carl Heath, Bernard Shaw, Bertrand 
Russell, Aldous Huxley, Paul Robeson and others.603 In 1938 Nehru returned to Europe and 
the two visited Spain together. A letter from Menon to Nehru on 24th May, 1938 reveals the 
extent to which Menon was in charge of Nehru’s ‘public relations’, managing his day to day 
engagements and agenda. Together, they braved the dangers of the Spanish Civil War 
prompting Menon to set up a Spanish Relief Committee in England for which Nehru raised 
funds in India. The experience in Spain cemented their friendship, uniting their commitment 
to the struggle against imperialism and fascism. Letters between Nehru and Menon through 
the late 1930s and 1940s reveal the extent to which Nehru relied on Menon’s knowledge and 
advice on subjects ranging from constitutional matters to international affairs. On various 
occasions Nehru wrote to Menon requesting him to return to India. While he did not do this, 
Menon came back during the negotiations for the transfer of power and was a central figure, 
providing Nehru with support and confidence when having to face other top leaders within 
the Congress such as Rajagopalachari and Sardar Patel. The partnership between Nehru and 
Menon was publicly manifested through the forewords that Menon wrote in Nehru’s books, 
Unity of India, and Glimpses of World History.  
 
In 1951, on Nehru’s suggestion, Menon became the leader of the Indian delegation to 
the United Nations. Closely involved with the diplomacy over the Korean crisis, Menon also 
played an important role at the Bandung Conference and was a key advocate for admitting 
China into the UN. In February 1955 Menon was appointed Minister without Portfolio.  
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While Nehru followed closely the advice of both Menon and Panikkar he ignored the requests 
and advice of others. Hence, on the Uttar Pradesh front, Nehru wrote initially on 12th May, 
1954 to the Secretary General that, ‘I also agree that we should establish check posts at all 
disputed points, wherever they might be and our administration should be right up to these 
borders. This matter has been delayed and we should try to expedite it’.604 Nothing however 
was done and within a few months China had begun to encroach upon territory in U.P. 
Whether this was a case of misinformation and poor implementation, the point is that Nehru 
did not follow up what should have been a priority for national security.  
 
Generally, Nehru’s stance on the border is a highly confused and ambiguous one. On 
the one hand he clearly repudiated the British legacy and did not want India to be seen 
publicly in any way as being a legatee of British privileges in defence strategy and foreign 
policy. Perhaps this was linked to Nehru’s innate conviction that he would fashion a new 
outlook, a new image as well as new instruments of foreign policy for India with implications 
for world peace and lessons for others to emulate in the art of diplomacy. On the other hand, 
the grandstanding aside, Nehru refused to re-think the MacMahon Line which could not have 
represented more of a British colonial legacy. Given that this was a serious roadblock in 
negotiations with the Chinese, one can only speculate as with a lot of other issues, Nehru had 
imbibed a strongly colonial perspective of India’s borders. However, in contrast with Sardar 
Patel who adhered to an equally strong commitment to the colonial legacy of India’s borders 
as well as the need to actively defend them, Nehru’s intransigence on the border issue 
ultimately came into conflict with his proclamations about India-China’s brotherly friendship. 
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Answering a question in parliament on 20 November 1950, on the issue of whether India had 
a well-defined boundary with Tibet, Nehru stated, ‘Tibet is contiguous to India from the 
region of Ladakh to the boundary of Nepal and from Bhutan to the Irrawady-Salween divide 
in Assam. The frontier from Bhutan eastwards has been clearly defined by the McMahon line 
which was fixed by the Simla Convention of 1914. The frontier from Ladakh to Nepal is 
defined clearly by long usage and custom.......Our maps show that the McMahon line is our 
boundary, and that is our boundary – map or no map. The fact remains and we stand by that 
boundary and we will not allow anybody to come across that boundary’.605 
 
This stance did not change over time. Writing to the Foreign Secretary on 1 July 
1954, just shortly after the conclusion of the Panchasheela Agreement, Nehru stated, “We 
should simply refer to our frontier. Indeed the use of the name McMahon is unfortunate and 
takes us back to British days of expansion. All our old maps dealing with this frontier should 
be carefully examined and, where necessary, withdrawn......Both as flowing from our policy 
and as a consequence of our agreement with China, this frontier should be considered a firm 
and definite one which is not open to discussion with anyone”.606 Nehru’s position sounds 
clear but, it was precisely the Panchasheela Agreement, and the grand rhetoric which had 
accompanied it and gone into its making which clouded India’s position. 
 
The fact that these three individuals gained the ear of Nehru and that all basically 
reinforced the same ideas about China suggests that Nehru was very quickly trapped within 
one interpretation. By not entertaining alternatives, his understanding was one-sided and 
heavily biased by the communist-leanings of his colleagues. Furthermore, reading about the 
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individuals it seems likely that each was aware of how to maintain their hold over Nehru – by 
playing on the international ‘statesman’ role. Hence by downplaying the security concerns 
and needs of the county, and over-playing Nehru’s capacities as a diplomat and visionary 
they were able to exert an undue influence over him and foreign policy-making.   
  
 
 
6.8. Conclusion 
Vision and Strategy in the Panchasheela Agreement. 
 
 
 
Tibet plays a critical role in India’s national security given that it shares a 2000 mile 
border with India. Despite the fact that India and China went to war in 1962 over the border 
and that the Panchasheela Agreement effectively came to an end after its eight year validity 
lapsed, the issue of Tibet and the symbolism behind the agreement continue to be of 
relevance in terms of the constraints they impose on India’s China policy. What emerges 
from a close analysis of the sequence of events is that Nehru did not possess a well thought-
out strategy towards China. His early writings reveal that he spent little time considering this 
subject which mostly consisted of visualising Asian unity based on Indian leadership and 
Sino-Indian friendship. Once in power, his policy-making style indicated a tendency to 
respond in an ad hoc fashion to events. This was on occasion justified by Nehru who claimed 
India’s approach to international politics was to think of a response on the basis of assessing 
events as they occurred and on their own terms, rather than part of an overall string of 
causally related moves. However, in 1950 Nehru’s policy on China faced a major crisis. 
China’s ‘liberation’ of Tibet through the use of military force called into question India’s 
ability to influence China let alone world peace. At the time Nehru was proclaiming that 
India had a special role to play in international affairs and was strenuously projecting the 
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country’s role as mediator in the Korean crisis. This was to be a way of launching India on 
the international podium. China’s military intervention in Tibet was however, a flagrant 
rejection of Nehru’s advice to use peaceful methods and furthermore, it exposed the 
weaknesses in Nehru’s defence policy which had not planned for a scenario where India 
would share a direct border with China. The confusion and errors surrounding the use of 
sovereignty versus suzerainty in official notes did not add to Nehru’s credentials as an 
effective statesman and the debates in parliament in 1950 and 1951 contained a number of 
disapproving voices. Furthermore it has to be remembered that Nehru’s position within the 
Congress party was far from secure during this period.  
 
As a result, a foreign policy breakthrough was imperative and Panchasheela 
developed into a timely opportunity to showcase India’s, or rather, Nehru’s diplomatic skills 
and, to confirm the wisdom of non-alignment. With the agreement India waived its rights in 
Tibet as a gesture of good will to China, in consonance with India’s stand on inherited 
colonial privileges, and at the same time, the preamble’s ‘Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence’, acted as India’s voice to the world, through which Nehru hoped to be heard and 
lauded. For a document of such significance, Panchasheela evolved within a relatively short 
space of time, in response to the changed circumstances of the border region. There is no 
evidence in Nehru’s writings of his having pondered or conceived of the idea early on. 
Hence, the move by India to relinquish its rights in Tibet has to be seen as a calculated move 
given that the McMahon line, despite being a colonial legacy, was not put up for negotiation. 
The technicalities of the agreement were worked out in a relatively short period of time (talks 
were initiated in December 1953 and four months later, the agreement was signed) which 
also implies that there was an urgency underlying the initiative which could only have been 
political in nature since there were no economic gains or interests to be made or satisfied. 
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India’s security was also not directly at risk since China was concerned with other threats at 
the time from within and in the Korean Peninsula. As a result, the agreement on Tibet need 
not have taken place at all or, alternatively, it could have restricted itself to its functional 
purpose of clarifying India’s status with regards Tibet, minus the preamble which was 
essentially superfluous.  
 
Instead, by turning the document into an enunciation of visionary principles the treaty 
was given an unrealistic and unsustainable significance. To claim that Panchasheela was 
going to act as a code of conduct was foolhardy given that (a) India did not have the defence 
system in place to ensure its territorial integrity nor (b) an internationally recognised border 
with China. In essence the agreement relied on goodwill on the part of the Chinese as the 
superior military force, and India’s interpretations of the border, as the ‘superior’ moral force. 
Since India’s security in the early 1950s was not threatened by China to the point that last 
measures had to be resorted to, and since India’s security was not enhanced by the 1954 
agreement, as quickly became apparent, it is possible to conclude that the agreement was 
primarily a means through which to boost Nehru’s prestige as a statesman. It appears 
therefore, that Panchasheela, despite its visionary content and the visionary proclamations 
used to promote it, had a clearly instrumental role to play and, was aimed at both audiences at 
home and abroad. Unfortunately, this instrumental value was directly related to Nehru’s 
kudos and not to serving the security interests of the country.      
 
As summarised in the table below, Panchasheela emerged without any clear historical 
lineage, both in terms of the principles and logic that it advocated. Largely the brainchild of 
Nehru and his close advisors, it also was not given adequate room for discussion in the public 
arena of the constituent or legislative assemblies. To a large extent the topic of foreign policy 
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in general and relations with China in particular were, it seems, treated as ‘non-issues’, a 
policy-making manoeuvre which was to have long-run implications.  
Table 6: The Changing Structure of Opportunities  
and Nehru’s Strategy in Foreign Policy. 
 
 
 
PHASE 
 
 
STRUCTURE OF 
OPPORTUNITIES 
 
STRATEGY / OUTCOME 
1930s 
Little attention given     
to foreign policy  
within Congress Party 
 
Nehru was one of the few 
Congress leaders to have an 
interest in international affairs, 
diplomacy and experience in 
attending international meetings, 
extensive foreign travel. 
 
Nehru could establish himself and was 
regarded as the expert on foreign affairs. 
1940 - 47 
World War Two 
& 
Lead-up to Partition / 
Transfer of Power 
 
Nehru imprisoned during much 
of WW2. 
Nehru, along with others 
experienced the travails of 
negotiation. 
 
 
Nehru came to be seen as India’s 
international face. 
 
 
 
1946 - 50 
Constituent Assembly 
Debates 
 
Foreign Policy remained under-
specified but Nehru occupied the 
limelight on taking Kashmir 
issue to UN. 
Congress endorses non-
alignment as India’s foreign 
policy 
 
Nehru projects himself as one of the few 
able to understand & deal with international 
politics. 
Proclaims India’s role is to act as peace-
maker and peace-bringer. 
India was to have a global outlook. 
1950 - 1954 
October 1950: Chinese 
‘liberation’ of Tibet 
  
Criticism of Nehru’s foreign 
policy in parliament, especially 
re. China. 
 
Nehru challenges his critics / questions their 
competence. 
Mid-1950s 
Post-Panchasheela 
 
 
Critics from both left and right 
silenced. 
 
 
Foreign policy becomes a ‘non-issue’ in 
parliamentary debates. 
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The example of Panchasheela demonstrates how Nehru successfully used the structure 
of opportunities to his advantage. Unlike in the case of Planning, there did not exist as wide a 
spectrum of well-formed and well-represented alternatives to Nehru’s worldview and 
prognoses. Hence there was no need, nor was it in his interest to encourage any institutional 
framework for the formulation and conduct of foreign policy, to the extent that foreign policy 
was turned into a non-issue in parliamentary debates and press conferences. Only with the 
outbreak of crises such as the 1950 PRC ‘liberation’ of Tibet or in the build-up to the 1962 
war was Nehru’s decision-making and foreign policy choices brought under scrutiny. The 
Panchasheela agreement, it has been argued in this chapter, emerged not so much as a basis 
for foreign policymaking (it was far too vague in its pronouncements for that) but rather to 
symbolise the success of Nehru’s diplomacy. Serving to silence sceptics and critics both on 
the Left and the Right, the agreement was a coup for Nehru in the short run but failed to set 
guidelines for Indian foreign policy in the longer run. What is noteworthy is that despite the 
highly favourable conditions to mould India’s foreign policy according to his preferences, 
Nehru’s legacy in foreign policy unravelled quite early on after his death. Chapter eight will 
examine further the insight that a lack of constraints produced a legacy that was short-lived. 
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Chapter Seven 
The Hindu Code Bills 
 
7.1. Introduction: the Puzzle. 
 
7.2. Pre-history: Personal Law and Codification under the British. 
 
7.3. Secularism and Social Reform in Nehru’s Vision of modern India. 
 
7.4. The Discourse on Codification. 
            
7.4.1 The Constituent Assembly Debates. 
 
7.4.2 The Interim Legislative Assembly. 
 
7.5. The Structure of Opportunities surrounding the Hindu Code. 
 
7.5.1 The First Lok Sabha (17 April 1952 – 4 April 1957). 
 
7.5.2 Nehru’s Changing Position. 
 
7.6. The Substance and Implications of the Hindu Code. 
 
7.7. Conclusion. The Hindu Code legacy: a triumph of strategy over vision? 
 
 
 
 
7.1. Introduction: The Puzzle 
 
 
Unlike the other two policies, the Hindu Code is an example of Nehru’s parachuting 
onto a policy issue in a policy field where he had next to no practical experience and in a 
subject area where, prior to independence, he had demonstrated little interest. This chapter 
examines the process by which Nehru joined the bandwagon, took up the subject of 
reforming and codifying Hindu law and turned it into a clarion call for social reform and 
secularism. However, as the political risks became apparent in the early 1950s, the initiative 
was stalled and temporarily dropped. When the Hindu Code bills were finally passed in the 
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mid-fifties607, the terms of reference had been altered, transforming what was initially 
supposed to have been a campaign for legal reform, a process of rationalising the legal 
system, into a grand project of modernisation where Hindus as the majority community were 
to set an example in the interest of building a secular society. 
 
The extensive debate that has ensued on the nature of secularism in the Indian 
context, both in terms of written scholarship and amongst policy-makers is indicative of how 
complex and seriously taken, the issue is. Out of the three policy examples in this thesis, the 
subject of secularism has generated the most heated discussion and debate. In the 1963 
classic, India as Secular State, Donald E. Smith had argued that the Constitution of India 
provided a ‘relatively sound basis for the building of a secular state’.608 Writing at a time 
when westernisation and modernisation were seen as forces that would inevitably encourage 
the growth of secularism, Smith was convinced that a state drawn from the liberal-democratic 
tradition of the west could simply be replicated in India. Later writers have discussed the 
difficulties in separating the religious from the secular. Marc Galanter for example argued 
that the Indian State was not primarily concerned with promoting freedom of religion but 
with religious reform.609 Similarly, Jacobsohn describes the Indian approach towards 
accommodating religion as an ameliorative model that ‘embraces the social reform impulse 
of Indian nationalism in the context of the nation’s deeply rooted religious diversity and 
stratification’.610 Rothermund points out the tension within the Constitution relating to group 
and individual rights, raising the question of how a personal law system can be reconciled 
with the promise of equal treatment for all. The Hindu Code, as he points out, was meant to 
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be a way of modernising Hindu law but it nevertheless still referred to exclusively, group 
rights.611 
 
Outright critics of the state’s agenda have included highly respected scholars such as 
T.N. Madan and Ashis Nandy who call for a more indigenous form of secularism given the 
all-embracing character of religion in India (more on this perspective follows later in the 
chapter). Or, as a much earlier scholar, J.Duncan Derrett put it, ‘In reality India is a multi-
religious state.....A multi-religious conglomeration of peoples can allow great freedom of 
religion, since the very fact of multi-religiosity proves the seriousness with which the 
majority accepts the validity, for the whole, of the sincere beliefs of the minorities’.612 Each 
of these positions echoes the discussions that were ongoing at the time of independence and 
the codification of Hindu law became a central issue in the debates on secularism and the role 
of the state in ensuring equality and freedom to all its citizens.  
 
This chapter follows the same structure as the previous two, beginning with a pre-
history of the attempts to codify Hindu law and the evolution of ‘personal law’613 under the 
British. Nehru’s position prior to independence is re-capped and the debate in the constituent 
assembly on the subject of secularism, personal law and the creation of a uniform civil code, 
reviewed.  Following the trajectory of the Hindu Code bills, tracking the process from 
recommendation to enactment, an analytic narrative is made of the sequence of events and 
the shifting balance of power.  The discourse of the late forties and early fifties when the 
                                                 
611 Rothermund, D. The Role of the State in South Asia and Other Essays, ( Manohar, New Delhi., 2000),  p. 93 
612 Derrett, J.D.M. Religion, Law and the State in India (Faber and Faber, London, 1968), p. 31. 
613As opposed to criminal and procedural law, ‘personal law’ referred to issues of marriage, dowry, dissolution 
of marriage, parentage and legitimacy, guardianship, adoption, maintenance, gifts, wills, inheritance, succession 
etc. which were seen by British administrators and legalists as inextricably intertwined with the customs and 
laws of the separate religious communities.  
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codification project was initiated under the stewardship of Dr. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar614 
who also chaired the Drafting Committee that was preparing the Indian Constitution, and 
later, was independent India’s first law minister, is compared with that of the mid-fifties 
when Ambedkar no longer played a role. Unlike the discussions on foreign policy or 
economic planning, Nehru did not take such an unequivocal public stand in the Lok Sabha 
debates on the subject of the Hindu Code. Nevertheless he referred to it often in speeches and 
letters implying that, while he did not have the time, interest or expertise to participate in the 
parliamentary debates, he was willing to make use of the symbolic value of the Bills, in part 
perhaps because his administration’s record on social reform was, otherwise rather poor.615  
 
While the Hindu Code Bills opened up a healthy debate on social reform and set in 
motion important steps for the emancipation of Hindu women, the Bills fell far short of what 
they were originally supposed to be, a stepping stone towards the enactment of a uniform 
civil code applicable to all citizens of India. It is posited that Nehru and the Congress Party 
realised it was not in their political interest to press for a uniform civil code hence, the matter 
was allowed to revolve around reforming retrogressive Hindu practices, generating enough 
dissent and discussion to keep the process in a stalemate. If Nehru had truly sought to 
establish an institution that formally endorsed and upheld secularism, he ought to have 
thrown his weight fully behind the legislation establishing it as the blueprint for a future 
uniform civil code. Instead, the Hindu Code Bills came to represent a highly contentious and 
unfinished project, neither paving the way towards greater equality across communities nor, 
                                                 
614A reputed jurist and leader in the Dalit movement fighting for the political rights and social freedom of 
India’s untouchables. 
615If one looks at the list of bills passed by the Constituent Assembly (legislative) there is little that could be 
construed as  social reform, Most bills were concerned with amendments to the law on banking, transport, 
criminal law, trade. See Kashyap, S.C. History of the Parliament of India (Shipra Publications, Delhi, 1995). 
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as will be argued below, did it truly facilitate Hindu social reform given numerous loopholes 
that were engrained in the legislation.    
 
The Hindu Code Bills, in co-existence with the personal law systems of other 
minority communities, including the Muslims, Christians and Parsees gave rise not only to 
legal confusions but also provided the substance for a highly polarised debate on what 
secularism meant in the Indian context, how it was to be nurtured and protected. In the final 
summary to this chapter it is argued that the uniform civil code was shelved due to political 
reasons and Nehru, who professed to be a secularist, fell far short in implementing his 
aspirations. This is comprehendible on account of the fact that he had little experience and 
knowledge about the matter and as a result, demonstrated limited interest in the subject from 
the perspective of socio-legal reform. As an issue with political and symbolic significance, 
Nehru was willing to back and promote the Hindu Code Bills as long as they did not hurt his 
political fortunes. Although he initially provided the momentum for the project, Nehru 
ultimately disassociated himself from being actively engaged in the formulation of the bills, 
with the result that the final outcome bore little resemblance to the intentions proclaimed 
either by its author, Ambedkar or its interlocutor, Nehru.   
 
 
7.1. The Prehistory:  Personal Law and Codification under the British. 
 
The codification of law was a central component of the British colonial legacy and 
represented an ambiguous combination of the zeal to modernise with the more cunning 
dimension of divide and rule politics. Gaining popularity in eighteenth century Britain, under 
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the influence of Bentham and Mill’s utilitarianism616, codification was seen as a mechanism 
through which society could be improved and ordered. Applied to British India, a series of 
acts were implemented in the 19th century, such as the Code of Civil Procedure (1859), the 
Penal Code (1860), Code of Criminal Procedure (1861), the Indian Succession Act (1865), 
the Indian Contract Act (1872).  
 
Despite the rhetoric about modernisation and emancipation, the British Crown 
refrained from interfering with personal law as this referred to the tradition and customary 
laws of various communities. This was in part due to a fear of upsetting the communities but 
also because the British did not want to run the risk of creating the opportunity for a sense of 
unity and solidarity to emerge across communities. As a result, maintaining the personal law 
system served the dual purpose of keeping powerful community leaders happy as well as 
highlighting and upholding differences between communities. In the process it also sought to 
end the age-old process of syncretism where communities applied a blend of religious 
customs and habits. By setting down Muslim law for the Muslims and Hindu law for the 
Hindus the British strengthened and cemented the sense of difference and separation. Thus 
for example under the 1937 Shariat Act617, it was laid down that Muslims all over British 
India had to function under Muslim Shariat law, including areas in the North West where 
previously, elements of Hindu law had been acceptable.  
 
Various Royal Commissions had been set up to study the case of codifying Hindu 
Law. The first such Commission was formed in 1832 by the House of Commons, following 
by a second in 1853. The findings of these two Commissions stipulated that legislating 
                                                 
616 See Stokes, Eric The English Utilitarians and India (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1959), Chapter One: ‘The 
Doctrine and Its Setting’, pp. 1 – 47.  
617 The full act is available online at Yale University:  
http://www.law.yale.edu/rcw/rcw/jurisdictions/assc/india/India_Musl_Personal.htm.  Last seen on 9.09.2008 
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personal law was beyond the mandate of the government and even if such powers could be 
exercised it would stunt the development of Hindu Law. A third and fourth Commission was 
set up in 1861 and 1875 respectively but they all abandoned the task as impossible. 
 
Unlike the cases of planning and foreign policy however, there was a wide-spread 
indigenous response to codification, initially led by Indian legislators but also taken up by 
leaders of the reformist movements that had gained ground during the nineteenth century.  
One such example is the scholar and lawyer, Dr. Hari Singh Gour, who at the turn of the 
century had already published extensively on British Indian Law. In 1919 he produced a 
volume comprising about 1200 pages divided into XXVI chapters containing a ‘Hindu Code’. 
In subsequent attempts to enact Hindu Law, both before and after independence, it was Dr. 
Gour’s Hindu Code that was used as the template.  
 
Broadly speaking, two main systems of Hindu customary law were being used in 
parallel during the British administration. These were known as the Dayabhaga School 
prevalent in Bengal and the Mitakshara School which held sway in other parts of country 
except Malabar where a matriarchal system was in place. Both texts are believed to have been 
composed around 1100 AD and came to be used as a point of reference when the British took 
over legal administration of India, giving rise to what came to be known as ‘Anglo-Hindu’ 
law.  
 
To give an impression of how the two systems differed from each other, their 
diverging views on inheritance is portrayed. According to the Dayabhaga School, a son 
cannot, while his father is living, claim the portion of ancestral property to which he 
otherwise has a right from the moment of birth. In the Mitakshara School on the other hand, 
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the son has a right to demand his share at any point in time and even against his father’s will. 
On the death of the father in the Dayabhaga system there is an immediate succession, a 
transfer of property with the sons inheriting. If they chose to keep the inheritance undivided 
they become ‘tenants-in-common’, not joint tenants in that each can dispose of his share 
without the consent of the others. In the Mitakshara system there is no succession upon the 
father’s death. The sons enter into possession of the property by right of ‘survivorship’. If 
they remain undivided none of them can dispose of his share without the consent of the 
others. As. Robert Lingat describes it, ‘the two systems correspond to two types of family: 
the one resembles a patriarchal family in which the father is the sole master of the estate; the 
other a joint family where the assets are the collective property of the members’.618 Both 
systems have a long tradition and can claim the authority of the smriti.619  
 
 
7.3. Secularism and Social Reform in Nehru’s Vision of modern India 
 
On the subject of religion, Nehru wrote extensively. Lambasting religious beliefs and 
traditions for the negative effect they had on the capacity for reasoned behaviour, the attack 
on religion was not however, accompanied by a conscious discussion of how the state ought 
to go about reforming a traditional society.  Little attention seems to have been devoted to the 
highly complex challenge of managing social reform in a population as traditional and 
diverse as that of India. Even if, as a trained lawyer, Nehru believed in social engineering 
through legislation, he seems to have not spent much time reflecting upon the difficulties of 
                                                 
618 Lingat, R. The Classical Law of India (Oxford University Press, Third Edition, 2004), p. 174. 
619Smriti translates as ‘tradition’ and differs as a basis for ‘law’ from ‘revelation’ in that it does not claim to have 
been directly transmitted from a divine source, but to be an indirect perception of law or duty, dharma, founded 
on memory. The smriti refer to a complete portion of sacred Hindu literature including the six Vedangas, the 
epics (the Mahabharata and the Ramayana) and the Puranas.  
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formulating and implementing such policy. Judging from the amount of space devoted to this 
subject in Nehru’s writing, it would appear that compared with his passion for international 
politics and world history, as well as the details of planning and strategies for economic 
development he reflected upon, in the area of social reform Nehru was weak in terms of 
knowledge about the social conditions of India and not particularly interested in the efforts of 
past and current social reformers and the challenges they had faced.  
 
Deeply engrained in Jawaharlal was the belief in progress and the need for 
modernisation. This, as was shown in chapter three, was associated with scientific, rational 
thought and regarded as the fundamental basis for Europe’s supremacy over Asia. Thus, 
religion and religious ways, particularly of the Hindu caste system, were seen as the obstacles 
to modernity which had to be dismantled. During the 1930s and 1940s the side-effects of 
codification were already evident. These included a process of petrification, whereby the 
endogenous capacity to adapt to the times was stunted and the British found themselves 
colluding with the more conservative sections of society, codifying and setting in stone the 
more restrictive interpretations of religious law. Despite this, Nehru refrained from 
commenting extensively on the subject which suggests that he was not following the debates 
and discussions of the time.  In his efforts later to introduce the Hindu Code Bills, Nehru 
could have learned from the British experience which demonstrated that codification 
removed an internal mechanism for change and modification and that legislation involved a 
process of lobbying that was as likely to promote a more conservative interpretation as it was 
to generate a progressive one. Furthermore, since Nehru did not initiate any attempt at 
consensus-building or fact-finding as he had done in the case of planning, the Hindu Code 
Bill quickly became mired within a highly polarised debate pitting so-called modernists, 
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reformists and rationalists against the ‘reactionaries’, ‘revivalists’ and luddites of Indian 
politics.  
 
A further weakness in Nehru’s writing is the limited consideration given to the issue 
of secularism, what the concept meant, whether it had different connotations in Western and 
non-Western contexts and most importantly, how it could be translated into policy. At no 
point in the texts considered in chapter three does Nehru discuss the difference between the 
idea of secularism as religious pluralism, where the state adopts a non-preferentialist stance 
and, inter-religious tolerance as a social philosophy and, a potential, indigenous form of 
secularism arising from India’s own social, historical experience. As T.N. Madan explains in 
his book, Modern Myths, Locked Minds, the paradox is that ‘Indian secularism is indeed 
religious’620 given that in the classical Hindu tradition, the ancient texts do not recognise a 
mutually exclusive dichotomy of the religious versus the secular, nor the idea of religion as a 
private activity. Furthermore the Hindu religious tradition, Madan points out, may be pluralist 
in character but it exists within a strict hierarchical framework which cannot translate into an 
ideology of equality. The very real challenge therefore that faced Nehru, and which he did 
not seem to occupy himself much with, intellectually, was to find social resources, other than 
Hinduism, to promote an ideology of secularism that valued human reason and agency and 
rejected religion as fake or, as the ‘opium of the masses’.  
 
As Nehru noted much later on and in some frustration, ‘We talk about a secular state 
in India. It is perhaps not very easy even to find a good word in Hindi for ‘secular’. Some 
people think it means something opposed to religion. That obviously is not correct.....It is a 
                                                 
620 Madan, T.N. Modern Myths, Locked Minds (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1997), p. 197. 
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state which honours all faiths equally and gives them equal opportunities’.621 Nehru’s 
problem however, remained that he could not find an indigenous basis upon which to build a 
state policy of secularism. Religious pluralism as expressed through inter-religious 
understanding and mutual respect and which could have found its ground in India’s cultural, 
historical heritage was not enough. Instead Nehru was adamant that the state pursue a policy 
of neutrality towards all religions but at the same time act as the agent and instrument of 
public welfare and social advancement. 
 
Critics of Nehru’s secular agenda and its long-run impact are not manifold but two 
stand out: T.N.Madan and Ashis Nandy. Written in the mid and late 1980s, Nandy published 
a radical critique of ideological secularism and an appeal to recovering religious tolerance. As 
he put it, ‘If secularism is not to become a reformist sect within modernity, (it) must respect 
and build upon the faiths and visions that have refused to adapt to the modern worldview’.622 
He went on to explain that it is not people of faith but the religious zealots and secularists 
who are against religious tolerance and religion respectively and who bring about a 
deadlock.623 Likewise, T.N.Madan in a critical article in 1987 posited that ‘In the prevailing 
circumstances secularism in South Asia is impossible as a credo of life because the great 
majority of the people are in their own eyes active adherents of some religious faith. It is 
impracticable as a basis for state action either because Buddhism and Islam have been 
declared state or state-protected religions or because the stance of religious neutrality or 
equidistance is difficult to maintain since religious minorities do not share the majority’s 
view of what this entails for the state. And it is impotent as a blueprint for the future because, 
                                                 
621 Gopal, S. Jawaharlal Nehru: an anthology. (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1980), pp. 330 – 1. 
622 Nandy, A. ‘An Anti-secularist manifesto’, Seminar 314 October, p. 2.. 
623 See Nandy, A. ‘The politics of secularism and the recovery of religious tolerance.’ Alternatives 13, 1988. 
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by its very nature, it is incapable of countering religious fundamentalism and fanaticism’.624 
Nehru nonetheless professed secularism as his credo, putting his faith in the Constitution and 
the legislative process which, as will be shown below, turned out to produce its own 
contradictions and obstacles. 
   
 
7.4. The Discourse on Codification 
 
7.4.1. The Constituent Assembly Debates 
 
The Constitution as it was in 1950 did not contain the word ‘secularism’ anywhere 
and the word ‘secular’ occurred only once to denote a particular religious practice.625 The 
additions of ‘secular’ and ‘socialist’ to the description of India as a ‘sovereign republic’ came 
through the 42nd Amendment in 1976 (during Indira Gandhi’s Emergency rule). In the 
Constituent Assembly Debates, a prominent member, K.T. Shah had tried, through two 
amendments, to have India declared a secular state. However, B.R. Ambedkar who was 
piloting the Draft Constitution rejected both proposals on the grounds that it was not 
advisable to impose a particular form of social organisation on future generations.  
 
A survey of some of the key articles reveals some of the unresolved tensions in the 
Constitution relating to the challenge of balancing equal rights and duties for all, with the 
freedom of religion. Articles 25 to 30 (from Part III dealing with ‘Fundamental Rights’) 
guarantee ‘freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion 
                                                 
624 Madan, T.N. ‘Secularism in its place.’, The Journal of Asian Studies, 1987, Vol. 46/4, p. 748. 
625 Article 25 (2a) under the section on Fundamental Rights states: ‘Nothing in this Article shall affect the 
operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law – regulating or restricting any economic, 
financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice.’ 
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(25), ‘freedom to manage religious affairs’ (26), ‘freedom as to payment of taxes for 
promotion of any particular religion’ (27), and ‘freedom as to attendance at religious 
instruction or religious worship in certain educational institutions’ (28). They protect the 
‘interests of minorities’ (29), including their ‘right....to establish and administer educational 
institutions’ (30). However, nowhere does the Constitution of India define the concept of 
minorities and, clauses such as Articles 29 and 30 have been criticised for implying that 
minority status is a privilege. Most controversially of all, Article 44 (from Part IV pertaining 
to the non-justiciable, ‘Directive Principles’) declares that ‘the State shall endeavour to 
secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India’.   
 
The concurrent application of personal law systems not only stands in the way of a 
uniform civil code but also clashes with the claim that there are fundamental rights for all 
guaranteed under the constitution. For example Article 14 which promises equality before 
law or Article 15 which prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or 
place of birth. Another tension emerges over whether the Constitution in fact endorses the 
continuation of the personal law system after independence. Hence while Article 13 of the 
section on Fundamental Rights states that ‘All laws in force in the territory of India 
immediately before the commencement of this Constitution in so far as they are inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, by void.’ it was 
argued that since Article 44 and entry 5 of the Concurrent list626 recognised different personal 
codes, it was to be recognised as a distinct category. 
 
                                                 
626 Marriage and divorce; infants and minors; adoption; wills, intestacy and succession; joint family and 
partition; all matters in respect of which parties in judicial proceedings were immediately before the 
commencement of this Constitution subject to their personal law. 
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All in all, the discussions about the need for and the shape of a Hindu Code took place 
in four different legislating bodies, each with different actors and mandates. Initially, the Rau 
Committee produced a report in 1944 which was tabled in the Central Legislature. 
Constituted in 1941 to consider lacunae in the Hindu Women’s Property Act (1937)627, the 
report recommended a comprehensive Code for all Hindus. It was essential to work on an 
overall code because the Committee found “that the Hindu Law is a complicated organised 
structure, the various parts of which are inter-connected so that an alteration of one part may 
involve alteration of others.” Piecemeal legislation, it was warned, ran the risk of encouraging 
contradictions and ambiguity.  
 
The work of the Committee was interrupted by the war and resumed in 1944 and the 
Report was ultimately submitted to the Legislative Assembly in 1947.  Introduced to the 
Constituent Assembly in 1947 by B.R. Ambedkar, then Chairman of the Constitution 
Drafting Committee as well as the interim Law Minister, it was referred to a Select 
Committee which undertook to rework the clauses. His opening speech summarised the key 
changes that a Hindu Code proposed to introduce: ‘this Bill, the aim of which is to codify the 
rules of Hindu law which are scattered in innumerable decisions of the High Courts and of 
the Privy Council, which form a bewildering motley to the common man and give rise to 
constant litigation, seeks to codify the law relative to seven different matters’.628 The seven 
areas and the proposed changes as seen by Ambedkar are listed in the table below. 
                                                 
627 The Rau Committee’s terms of reference consisted of the following:  
(1) to examine the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937 and to suggest amendments to the Act as 
it would (1) resolve the doubt felt as to construction of that Act, (2) clarify the nature of the right 
conferred by the Act upon the widow and , (3) remove any injustice that may have been done by the 
Act to the daughter.; and, 
(2) to examine and advice upon (1) the law of inheritance Bill and (2) the Hindu Women’s Right to 
separate Residences and Maintenance Bill. 
628 CAD legislative debates Vol. IV 9th April, 1947 as reproduced in Moon, V. (ed.)  Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar 
Writings and Speeches, Vol. 14 /1  (Education Department, Government of Maharahstra, 1995), p. 5. 
325 
 
Table 7: The Hindu Code and existing legislation. 
(as reproduced in Moon, V. (ed.)  Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches, Vol. 14 
/1  (Education Department, Government of Maharahstra, 1995) 
 
Area of Legislation Proposed reform 
 
Rights of Property of deceased 
Hindu who has died intestate 
without making a will, male 
and female. 
 
The Hindu Code adopted the Dayabhag rule, under which 
the property is held by the heir as his personal property with 
an absolute right to dispose it of either by gift or by will or 
any manner.  
(Different from the Mitakashara system where the property 
of a Hindu is not his individual property but belongs to a 
‘coparcenary’ consisting of father, son, grandson and great 
grandson. All these have birth-right in property which passes 
on anyone member of the coparcenary through survivorship 
to the members that are left and not to any heirs of the 
deceased.) 
 
On intestate succession to females: Consolidation of 
different categories of stridhan629 into one single category of 
property and with a uniform rule of succession. 
 
Sons are given a right to inherit the stridhan and are given 
half the share which the daughter takes. 
 
Gives the woman ‘absolute’ rights to do what she likes with 
the property after her death (previously it had to go back to 
relatives of husband) 
 
Property given as dowry to be treated as a trust property. 
 
General order of succession. 
 
Adoption of Dayabhag rule where succession is based on 
heir-ship through blood relations and not based on cognate 
or agnatic relations. 
Daughter and widow of a pre-deceased son are given same 
rank as son in inheritance. 
Daughter is given share of father’s property 
Recognition of much larger number of female heirs. 
The mother succeeds before in preference to the father. 
 
Laws of maintenance 
 
Dependents of deceased entitled to claim maintenance from 
those who inherit property. 
Recognises that wife may live away from husband and 
separate maintenance can be granted. Conditions when wife 
                                                 
629 Refers to the woman’s wealth in Classical Hindu Law. 
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can claim maintenance: if husband is (1) suffering from 
loathsome disease (2) if he keeps a concubine (3) if he is 
guilty of cruelty, (4) if he has abandoned her for two years 
(5) if he has converted to another religion (6) any other 
cause justifying her living separately.  
 
Laws of marriage  
 
Recognition of sacramental and civil marriage. Conditions 
for both not so different but registered marriage must be 
registered in accordance with provisions in the Bill while 
sacramental marriage may be registered if parties wish to do 
so.  
The Bill dispenses with identification of caste and sub-caste 
for a valid sacramental marriage / identity of gotrapravara630 
is not a bar to marriage / Monogamy is prescribed.  
 
Laws of Divorce. Introduced law for dissolution of marriage: 
-declaration of marriage null and void 
-have marriage declared invalid 
-dissolution of marriage. 
 
Grounds for Invalidation: if one party living at time of 
marriage with another spouse / if relation of parties within 
ambit of prohibited-degrees / impotency / parties being 
sapinda631 / parties are lunatic / guardian’s consent obtained 
by force or fraud /  
 
Grounds for divorce: 
Desertion/ conversion to another religion / keeping of a 
concubine or becoming a concubine / incurably unsound 
mind / virulent and incurable leprosy / venereal disease in 
communicable form / cruelty. 
 
 
Laws of Adoption. 
 
 
Husband will have to obtain consent from wife. 
If a widow wants to adopt, she can only do so if there are 
positive instructions left by the husband authorising her to 
do so through a registered deed or provision in a will. 
 
Laws of Minority and 
Guardianship.  
Nothing new.  
                                                 
630 Gotras, 18 in all, are patrilineal clans whose members claim descent from Hindu Sages and hence usually 
restricted to the Brahmin section of society. In classical Hindu law intermarriage was banned between kin in the 
patrilineal line of descent from putative gotra ancestors.  
631 A person is said to be a Sapinda of the other if they are connected by a blood tie as far as the third generation 
in the line of ascent in the case of a mother and fifth generation in the case of a father. 
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Ambedkar is the pivotal figure at this time because of his close involvement in 
revising the Rau Committee report. There were also a number of other important voices 
expressing scepticism or support for the Hindu Code, providing a useful insight into the 
public discourse, which on the whole, was more unanimous in its views than in subsequent 
legislatives. As seen from the news papers then, this was carefully followed, with regular 
reports detailing the positions of various speakers. Whilst the news paper reports are not 
analytical or reflective in the least, they do demonstrate that the debates were publicised. This 
is important because this represented one of the ways through which individuals, charting out 
their political careers in independent India for the first time, could make their positions and 
views known to a broader public.632 So, the speeches being made in the constituent assembly 
were also directed at an external audience and thus have the value of being an indicator of 
how broad sections of society might have thought at the time. 
 
The objections raised at this point covered a wide gamut of opinions, ranging from the 
more conservative and orthodox representatives, to those who felt the Bill did not go far 
enough. Amongst the ‘orthodox’ fears were that the introduction of women’s shares would 
introduce litigation and ultimately lead to the destruction of the joint family system and the 
argument that Hindu law had a divine origin and ought not to be played around with. On 
technical grounds, the legitimacy of the Constituent Assembly to legislate on such matters 
was questioned as well as the legal problem of agricultural land being beyond the purview of 
the House given that it qualified as a Provincial subject.633 Various members expressed 
concern over the fact that a secular State ought not to be legislating on matters with religious 
implications and especially when the legislation referred only to one community.634 In 
                                                 
632 See for example Hindustan Times at the time. 
633 CAD (leg) debates, 9th April, 1948. 
634 Ibid. 
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addition the challenge of uniformity was further highlighted by the question of whether tribal 
communities, classified as Hindu because they were not Muslim, Christian or Parsee, would 
agree to abide by codified Hindu laws.635  
 
Nevertheless the views expressed in this first round of debates on the Hindu Code 
after independence reflected procedural concerns about the implications of such a code but 
was not marked by polemics. Ambedkar himself, responding to the first round of queries and 
criticism answered pragmatically, ‘I believe there is no necessity that a uniform law of 
inheritance should apply to all sorts of property. Property varies in its nature, varies in its 
importance in the social life of the community and consequently….Indian or Hindu society 
may come to the conclusion that land which is the foundation of its economic life had better 
be governed by the law of primogeniture so that neither the junior sons nor females may take 
part in the inheritance’.636  
 
Shortly after this, in November 1948, article 35 (the future article 44 enunciating a 
uniform civil code) in the draft constitution came up for discussion. A strong Muslim position 
emerged on the issue of personal law. For instance Mr. Mohamad Ismail Sahib from the 
Muslim constituency of Madras proclaimed that, “The right of a group, or a community of 
people to follow and adhere to its own personal law is among the fundamental rights and this 
provision should really be made amongst the statutory and justiciable fundamental 
rights…..Now the right to follow personal law is part of the way of life of those people who 
are following such laws; it is part of their religion and part of their culture….The secular 
                                                 
635 Ibid. 
636 Ibid. 
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State, which we are trying to create should not do anything to interfere with the way of life 
and religion of the people”.637  
 
Another member categorically stated, ‘as far as Mussalmans are concerned, their laws 
of accession, inheritance, marriage and divorce are completely dependent upon their 
religion’.638 A general mood of suspicion with regards the intentions of a uniform civil code 
prevailed. As mentioned above it is important to remember that speakers were catering to a 
wider audience than that of the assembly. Mr. B.Pocker Sahib Bahadur, a Muslim candidate 
from Madras demanded to know, “the real intention with which the clause has been 
introduced. If the words “Civil Code” are intended only to apply to matters of procedure like 
the Civil Procedure Code and such other laws which are uniform so far as India is concerned 
at present, well nobody has any objection to that, but the various civil Court Acts in the 
various provinces, well I would only say, Sir, that it is a tyrannous provision which ought not 
to be tolerated”.639 
 
Two lone voices who stood up for the uniform civil code were B.R. Ambedkar and 
K.M. Munshi640, who pointed out that (a) the idea that personal law was somehow an intrinsic 
part of religion, was a British legacy and, (b) that there was nothing immutable about either 
Hindu or Muslim law.641 These discussions demonstrate that there was a strong Muslim 
opposition to any form of intervention by the State in the realm of personal law. Whilst the 
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idea of a uniform civil code was tolerated as a non-justiciable Directive Principle, it was 
made sure that personal laws were protected via the Concurrent List, entry 5 in the 7th 
Schedule.  
 
7.4.2. The Interim Legislative Assembly. 
 
The next arena in which the Hindu Code was specifically addressed was in the interim 
legislative assembly when Ambedkar’s revised draft was tabled for discussion in February 
1949. This seems to be the stage at which clear divisions emerged and when members 
questioned the legitimacy of the assembly to legislate on such matters. Responding to the 
challenge, Nehru made one of his first statements on the subject: “We do attach the greatest 
importance to it, as I said, not because of any particular clause or anything, but because of the 
basic approach to the vast problem in this country which is intimately allied to other 
problems, economic and social. We have achieved political freedom in this country, political 
independence. That is a stage in the journey and there are other stages, economic, social and 
others, and if society is to advance, there must be this integrated advance on all fronts. One 
advance on one front and being kept back on other fronts means functioning imperfectly and 
also means that the first advance also is in danger. Therefore, we have to consider this matter 
in this spirit, how we should advance on all fronts, always keeping in view of course, that the 
advance is coordinated and meets with the approval of the great majority of the 
population….”.642 In the face of continued opposition and demands that the Hindu Code Bill 
be made applicable to every Indian643, Nehru’s suggestion was to ‘put an end to the present 
                                                 
642 15 December, 1949, reproduced in Ambedkar’s Writings and Speeches, Vol. 14/1, pp. 763 – 4. 
643 For instance: Shri Jhunjhunwala: “When a particular kind of legislation is being enacted for the welfare of 
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should they not be left free to practice their own religion and act according to their own ancient ideas?...I would 
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stage of consideration of this motion by adopting it, and then the House may permit the 
Government to take those informal steps which I have indicated in regard to consultation 
about the various parts and clauses”.644 By ‘informal steps’, Nehru was referring to his 
suggestion that he speak off the record to individuals who had objections or concerns about 
the bill.  
 
When the discussion was resumed in the interim legislature in February, 1951 the 
positions had hardened further, resulting in a complete deadlock on the subject in which out 
of the 28 speakers, 23 opposed the Bill. In September 1951 when an attempt was made to 
break the Code down into separate sections and to consider just part 22 relating to Divorce 
and Monogamy the discussion had to be abandoned with just 4 clauses passed.  On 
September 27th, 1951 Ambedkar resigned from his cabinet position as Law minister, citing 
amongst other reasons, his frustration with the slow progress on the issue of the Hindu Code 
Bill and directly blaming the Prime Minister for dragging his feet.645  
 
Anticipating the newly elected, first Lok Sabha, President Rajendra Prasad, delivered 
his Presidential Address on 6 August, 1951. In his speech he mentioned the Hindu Code as an 
important concern of the new government. Given that he was one of the more outspoken and 
powerful critics of the Hindu Code (see below) it is likely that he was under instructions to 
make a mention of it in, what was after all, a historical and highly publicised speech. 
However, the limit of Nehru’s influence is indicated in the fact that President Rajendra 
Prasad only mentioned the Bill in passing, right at the end of a speech which had gone on at 
length into details about Korea, the need for five year planning and the goal of abolishing the 
                                                                                                                                                        
like to know why it should not apply to everybody and why it should apply only to Hindus?” (Ambedkar’s 
Writings and Speeches, Vol. 14/2 p. 829). 
644 15 December, 1949, Ambedkar ‘s Writings and Speeches, Vol. 14/1, pp. 763 – 4. 
645 Reproduced in Ambedkar’s Writings and Speeches, Vol. 15. 
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zamindari system.646 Given that Nehru had emphasised the great social, cultural and 
international importance of the Hindu Code it seems surprising that the only reference to it in 
the President’s address was as ‘a bill, which has long been before Parliament for some 
years..My Government hope that this will be passed during this session’.647 
 
The debates in the first Lok Sabha, over the years of 1954 and 1955, leading up to the 
enactment of the four Hindu Code Bills are important in demonstrating how the terms of 
debate had moved. Through the select committee and constituent assembly days, a core 
element of the debate had been the issue of religion and questions regarding the extent to 
which the State might be justified to intervene on personal law were heavily discussed. The 
discourse of the mid-1950s however, was much more focused on the need to reform Hindu 
law because of its entrenched inequities and archaic social customs. Lauding the importance 
of the acts for Hindu women, the discussion of whether the Hindu Code was to be a precursor 
to a Uniform Code or, whether it would act as a model for the reform of other personal law 
systems was considerably reduced. This is an intriguing change in the discourse and reflects 
the evolving configuration of power relationships within the Congress party as well as in the 
legislative, to which the chapter now turns. 
 
7.5. The Structure of Opportunities surrounding the Hindu Code. 
 
7.5.1. The First Lok Sabha (17 April 1952 – 4 April 1957) 
 
In 1952 the decision was made to split up the Hindu Code and to work on it in a 
piecemeal fashion. This, it was claimed would speed up the process and enhance the 
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likelihood of it being passed. It was over this decision that Ambedkar finally resigned in 
frustration and it is surprising that the government, having won a thumping majority in the 
1952 elections (see chapter four) did not feel confident enough of passing a Bill in its entirety 
through parliament. According to the model applied in the thesis, Nehru’s behaviour can be 
explained using strategic reasons based on the political constraints of the time: (a) he was not 
yet sure of being able to garner support on what had become a controversial issue within the 
party and, (b) he was unwilling to risk a defeat in public and hence, took a calculated decision 
to opt for the piecemeal approach. This tactical reasoning is borne out by the fact that Nehru 
did not invest much time in discussing the substance of the Hindu Code and the details of the 
individual bills. If he had done so he would have realised the deep contradictions contained 
within the clauses and the problems these posed in the implementation of such legislation. 
Both of these points are explored further in the sections below. 
 
The decision to split the Hindu Code into separate bills delayed the process by 
allowing each to become bogged down in controversy, the same objections being voiced 
repeatedly. The discussions were to a large extent an unnecessary repetition of the clause-by-
clause considerations undertaken by the interim legislature in 1950. Furthermore, during the 
process of reconsidering the clauses, now in the form of separate Bills, Nehru made next to 
no comments in the debates. By not explicitly throwing his weight behind the Hindu Code in 
this second avatar, yet supporting the piecemeal approach, Nehru’s ambiguous position 
resulted in a set of contradictions and weaknesses. For instance, as a result of the Bill by Bill 
and Clause by Clause breakdown, the discussions and objections centred upon details and 
minutiae and not upon the wider question of whether this was paving the way for a uniform 
civil code, as recommended in the Constitution.  
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Beginning with the Hindu Marriage and Divorce Bills, then-Law Minister Biswas 
explained, ‘There is nothing to prevent any two Hindus marrying under the ordinary law. 
This Bill seeks to amend the ordinary law so as to make certain portions of it compulsory. 
(for example) ....if this Bill becomes law, every Hindu marriage must be a monogamous 
marriage....We want to make monogamy compulsory as a rule of law for all Hindu 
marriages’.648 What is noteworthy is that at the end of this discussion the Law Minister 
himself stated, ‘In fact I was wondering if I should not have a general law which will apply 
not merely to Hindus but to all, and will provide that upon marriage there should be equal 
distribution of property between the partners’.649 In subsequent debates, the government’s 
position gradually shifted to being against the idea of a Uniform Civil Code and, went out of 
its way to assuage fears of legislation that would impose restrictions and bestow rights 
uniformly across all communities.  
 
The next component of the Hindu Code to come under discussion in the Lok Sabha 
was the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Bill. Introducing it to the House was the new Law 
Minister Pataskar who, pre-empting the question ‘Why is this Bill confined only to Hindus?’, 
proposed that, ‘A common uniform code is no doubt our objective and if I can say so, this is a 
step in the right direction. Let us try to have one common uniform code for the Hindus 
themselves’.650 This was not a very satisfactory answer given that it did not explain why, 
Hindu Law had to be codified first, why no action was being taken with regards other 
systems of personal law, nor why no discussion was being encouraged by the government on 
the likelihood and practicality of a uniform civil code. Although the Hindu Code was meant 
to act as a blueprint for other personal law systems, none of the others (neither Muslim, 
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Christian or Parsee) underwent a similarly rigorous process of scrutiny and a clause by clause 
examination. 
 
Strong criticism was voiced by Lok Sabha member Deshpande whose arguments are 
useful to highlight for their wide-spread resonance at the time. As Deshpande put it, ‘In this 
country I find a tendency amongst people that whenever the Hindu Code Bill comes, 
everybody becomes very enthusiastic and says that now we are starting a crusade against 
everything that is old, everything that is reactionary, everything that is feudal, and so progress 
will come.’651 Deshpande described how polarised the debate had become by the mid-fifties: 
‘When we come to oppose it, we are called communalists and reactionaries, or reactionary 
communalists, and those who support it are the secularists, non-communalist and the 
nationalistic legislators’.652 As Desphande pointed out, the efforts of the Government did not 
seem to be directed at consolidating a secular and strong state but rather to ‘shun everything 
that is Hindu’.653 Whilst this may have been an exaggerated claim it is true that through the 
Hindu Code Bill the Government sought to introduce radical changes to traditional Hindu 
society, striking at its roots such as the joint family system. For example through the Hindu 
Minority and Guardianship Bill the aim was to limit guardians to just the father and mother, 
by abolishing any de facto guardians, thus ruling out the age-old custom of elder brothers, 
uncles, grandparents taking over as guardians in the eventuality. Another valid observation 
that was made by Deshpande was the lack of statistics and data. If the Government was so 
convinced about the evils of polygamy and the need to protect against it, then it ought to have 
conducted a survey to identify the extent to which it was being practiced by Hindus. Simply 
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to declare it a social evil, embedded in Hindu practice without providing any proof was a 
simplistic and casual way of going about such fundamental social reform.   
 
Other oddities in this Bill which reflect the tensions released when the State starts to 
involve itself explicitly in defining and setting limits to tradition and culture, lay in the 
definition of, to whom the Bill applied. Clause two, it was pointed out, stated ‘This Act 
applies to any person who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms or developments 
including Lingayats, Brahmos, Prathansamajists or Arya Samajists’.654 Whether the Arya 
Samajists would appreciate being treated as Hindus by inclusion only, became a point of 
contention in the discussion as well as the question of where Jains, Buddhists and Sikhs were 
to be fitted in. A proposal from a member of the House was to simplify and clarify the 
definition by simply stating that ‘except for the communities mentioned, all persons 
domiciled in India may be governed by this Act’.655 
 
As one of the main voices supporting the Hindu Code, B.C. Das defended the Hindu 
Minority and Guardianship Bills on the grounds that the Bill had a clear social perspective 
which aimed at giving the mother her rightful place.656 However, the arguments that Das 
ended up using to justify his position were indicative of the thorny parameters that had come 
to frame this debate. The discussion quickly turned into an argument over the merits and 
demerits of Hinduism and the more general issue of the role religion was to play within the 
political arena. The need to consider these themes was of course pressing at the time when 
the nation was in the process of giving substance to its constitution. However, using a Bill 
that attempted to squeeze religious stipulations into a secular form, as the basis for such a 
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discussion was bound to cause confusion. For example Das’ logic brought him to the scenario 
where a father may decide to change his religion and as a result, being then a non-Hindu he 
would lose the right to become guardian of his child. As he put it rather provocatively, 
‘According to the present law, a person even if he changes his religion, he can continue to be 
the guardian. What do you require? A Hindu or a citizen?’.657 This is precisely the crux of the 
matter for, was the Hindu Code Bill seeking to produce ‘better’ Hindus or ‘better’ citizens? 
‘Better’ Hindu citizens might have been the answer but how was that to be reconciled with 
the ideal of a secular nation-state? 
 
Obviously, if the Hindu Code Bill was concerned with Hindu Law, the persons who 
claimed its jurisdiction had to be and continue to be Hindus but this caused consternation 
amongst members who raised questions about whether the child in question had to be brought 
up as a Hindu and whether this meant being an orthodox Hindu? ‘Religion’, Das argued ‘can 
take care of itself. No religion can sustain itself if it remains stuck up in the mud, if it cannot 
move with the people, if it cannot keep pace with the times, and a religion which cannot keep 
pace with the times is dead’.658 Das urged the Government not to be timid in introducing 
social measures and to have a clear perspective but this was precisely the weakness of the 
Hindu Code, its intentions were inherently ambiguous. A possible solution, as suggested by a 
parliamentary member, Mrs. Sucheta Kripalani, would have been to amend the existing 
Guardians and Wards Act659, instead of introducing an entirely new Bill.660  
 
Another valid criticism pointed out by various speakers was the fact that more often 
than not it was the demerits of Hinduism that were highlighted and the need to modernise, to 
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fit in with the times that was emphasized. What such standard tirades ignored were the 
practices that had evolved over time precisely in response to local conditions. It was possible 
to conceive of these serving a purpose in the new nation, of providing a foundation for 
stability and a backbone of continuity during times of sudden change and limited resources. 
As Sucheta Kripalani pointed out, ‘In our system today, the joint family system may be very 
bad, but it still persists. That system has got some good features also....in the Indian society as 
it is situated today, we have got unemployment, our income is not very high, the financial 
needs are there. With all these things, it is absolutely imperative that certain members of the 
family should be looked after by other members. It is a kind of socialistic system in a way, in 
a crude form maybe, that in a joint family the weakest members of the family are looked 
after. Now, here we have not recognised the joint family at all’.661 Contrast this argument 
with Nehru’s view of the joint-family which he described as being a ‘relic of a feudal age, 
utterly out of keeping with modern conditions”.662 
  
A number of legal arguments were launched against the Bills individually and 
generally. Codification it was posited, was not the ideal, for it encouraged a ‘process of 
petrificaction....for when you codify and it gets some interpretation our doctrinaire decisions 
comes into play and law becomes static and law becomes unprogressive’.663 On practical 
grounds, some members cautioned against formulating laws in a country which lacked the 
resources to implement them. N.C. Chatterjee pointed out, ‘A man coming from one part of a 
country may have to travel 250, 300 or 400 miles before he can come to a High Court, and 
you know in every High Court, it is much more costly than in District Courts’.664 
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Responding to the various points raised in the discussion Law Minister, Pataskar’s 
defence centred upon the charge (which he made at various occasions) that, ‘on an analysis of 
what I have been able to hear, I find that suspicion, prejudice and misconception are at the 
bottom of many of the criticisms which have been levelled at this Bill’.665 Labelling the 
opponents or critics of the Hindu Code Bills as obscurantist, bigoted or simply plain ignorant 
was to have a polarising effect: those supporting the Bill representing the liberal, reformist 
minded section of society versus the obstructionist and obscurantist zealot. It must be noted 
that in the 1954 debates, the voices of criticism and the demands for clarification far 
exceeded those who were in favour of the Bills.  
 
In one of the final discussions on the Hindu Marriage Bill in April 1955, Law 
Minister Pataskar once again summarised the purpose of the bill which revolved around the 
fact that, ‘codification is in the best interests, (it) could make the law certain and at the same 
time mark the progress that has taken place in what has now come to be called the Hindu 
society’.666 On both counts this was challenged, as the Bills instead of providing certainty 
raised a number of contradictory interpretations as well as inviting criticism that the 
principles codified did not always represent the most progressive elements of Hindu law. 
Referring to the need to rectify the imbalance in rights and privileges enjoyed by men 
compared to women, Pataskar also described the act to be ‘a measure of social 
importance’.667 
 
The reasons that the Government put forward in defence of the Hindu Code Bills are 
manifold and, at times contradictory. On 2 May 1955, in one of the last debates on the Hindu 
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Marriage Bill, Law Minister Pataskar argued that the bill aimed at removing the anomalies 
which were the result of foreign administration and which had established a system where 
‘Hindu law as at present is not the law laid down by the Smriti, but is the law which for 
hundred years was laid down by judges, who, because they did not know any Shastras, took 
the advice of pundits; and these pundits also differed’.668 As a result the Government 
proclaimed to be acting as a social reformer and at the same time, claimed that it wanted to 
preserve, even revive a purer form of Hindu law. Such an attempt to disarm opposition was a 
fine line to tread and ended up producing criticism from conservatives, who found the bills 
disrespectful of Hindu traditions and beliefs, as well as from progressives, who lambasted the 
bill for not being radical enough. By 1955 the arguments of the government had grown very 
confused. On the one hand there was the claim that it was acting towards a secularisation of 
law, where the intention to introduce uniformity was meant to aid a secular state in 
administering the law. At the same time, the extensive references by the Law Minister 
himself to issues like whether samskar was equal to sacrament in Hinduism, drew religion 
directly into the heart of the discussion.  
 
Although each of the acts that were to constitute the Hindu Code, were discussed 
separately, there needed to be an internal consistency to make them compatible with each 
other. Hence the definition as to whom the law would be applicable had to be made crystal 
clear. Secondly, in terms of the application of the Act it had to be evident as to how the 
Hindu Code version differed from existing common law. What seems to have dogged the 
Law Minister’s response throughout the discussion on the various Acts, is the underlying 
confusion of why, if this was being done in the name of secularism, was it thought necessary 
to codify only Hindu Law. If the implication was then that Christian, Parsee and Muslim 
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personal law did not need codifying, then the objective should have been clearly articulated 
as the need to bring clarity to Hindu Law and introducing a measure of uniformity across the 
numerous Hindu communities in the different areas of marriage, inheritance, guardianship 
and divorce.  
 
However, the process was complicated by the reformist undertone which sought to 
modernise Hindu law and the project of bringing it into conformity with changed social 
circumstances. This is the position that Nehru seemed to adopt for he was not interested in 
the details of the legislation but simply the argument that, to attain a modern state, certain 
social habits had to be removed or, instilled in its population. That he refrained from applying 
the same principles to other communities indicates that his approach was tactical rather than 
being driven by overarching reformist principles. To examine this contention more closely 
the following section depicts the shifting stance of Nehru and the compromises he was 
willing and not willing to undertake. 
 
7.5.2. Nehru’s changing position 
 
Between the years of 1950 and 1955 Nehru was able to position himself in such a way 
as to emerge as the unchallenged leader of the Indian National Congress. This was by no 
means inevitable given the fact that there were rival factions within the party and other 
strong, respected political figures. It is therefore interesting to study the evolving balance of 
power through the prism of the Hindu Code Bills which at one point turned into an issue of 
brinkmanship. When Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel died on 15 December, 1950, the most viable 
contender for leadership was removed. With Patel gone, Nehru had to find a way of asserting 
his leadership amongst Patel’s followers and to do so without exacerbating factionalism 
342 
 
within the party. Following a strategy he had honed during his days of pre-independence 
Congress politics, Nehru was able to combine moral grandstanding and public proclamations 
with moderation and compromise when it came to translating his declarations into party 
resolutions or government policy, in order to avoid controversy. Thus, in the case of the 
Hindu Code, Nehru made important statements committing himself and the party to the 
project but as seen from above, progress on the bills was slow, and in the end had to be 
postponed to a time when there was a more pliable cabinet and Lok Sabha, following the 
1952 elections.  
 
Nehru’s correspondence with President Rajendra Prasad about the Hindu Code is 
incisive and sheds light on the internal power struggles that were occurring.669 Writing in July 
1948 in response to the discussions being held in the interim assembly about a Hindu Code, 
Prasad contended that the proposal had not been considered at a party meeting and that to 
hurry things without going through a proper discussion, the proposal had been put up for a 
second reading on the last day of the assembly’s session, during the last hour and was then 
simply referred to a Select Committee. This implied a deliberate attempt to bypass the normal 
process of debate and dialogue that ought to accompany a bill under consideration before the 
party tabled it in the legislative body.    
 
In his reply Nehru argued strongly in defence of the Hindu Code, “To try to smother it 
now or postpone it would create some kind of a crisis and the reputation of the Congress 
would undoubtedly be affected. As it is, it is being stated widely that the Congress is a 
reactionary and a very conservative body now, which dares not face any radical change. We 
are called not only socially reactionary but a police state which suppresses civil liberties and 
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the like. In this context if we push out this bill, we shall not only confirm this growing 
conviction of our excessive conservatism in India but would also go down in the mind of 
foreigners outside India”.670 Apart from taking into account the loss of reputation, Nehru 
posited that the question was one of merit: “The Cabinet has declared itself in favour of it 
twice at least. Personally I am entirely in favour of the general principles embodied in it. Are 
we therefore to give up something that we consider right and on which so much labour has 
been spent, because some people object?”671 
 
In response, contending that the dispute was as much about content as about 
procedure, Prasad stated that he did not know “when and where we made a promise or gave 
an assurance about the Bill (relating to the Hindu Code). If any assurance was given to the 
Constituent Assembly by the Government, the objection to the competence of these bodies to 
take up this matter at this time and during this session without any reference to the electorate 
remains”.672 Prasad had always questioned the mandate of an unelected assembly to rule on 
such crucial matters. Furthermore, as he pointed out, and which Nehru later admitted, the 
Congress had not spent much time discussing the idea of a Hindu Code or codification itself 
as a principle. Nehru’s retort was to argue that the issue had been in the public domain for the 
last two or three years and could have been raised for internal consideration. Why, he did not 
raise the topic is left unclear. His reply to Prasad consisted of the following: “It is perfectly 
true that the AICC or the Working Committee have not considered it. Nor is it in the election 
manifesto. Normally such matters of legislation have not been considered by the Working 
Committee or the AICC. Considering that this question has been before the country for the 
                                                 
670 Nehru to Prasad,  22 July, 1948 in Gopal, S. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Volume 7, Second Series, 
p. 499. 
671 Ibid. p. 500. 
672 Prasad to Nehru, 24. 07. 1948 in Choudhary, V. (ed.) Dr. Rajendra Prasad: Correspondence and Select 
Documents, (Allied Publishers Ltd, New Delhi, 1986), Vol. 9, pp. 240 – 1. 
344 
 
last 2 or 3 years, if members of the AICC or the Working Committee wished to consider 
them, they could certainly have done so. This applies to the party too, which has been 
watching every stage of this legislation, and yet did not consider it worthwhile to discuss it at 
a formal party meeting when any member could have brought it forward”.673 
 
Nevertheless, sensing the internal discontent regarding the bill and probably realising 
that it would not be a popular electoral subject, Nehru found ways to hold up the process and 
to postpone consideration of the Bill till after the general elections. Explaining his strategy to 
Ambedkar in a letter in February 1949,  “I feel we should try our utmost to make passage of 
the Bill easy. There is obviously a great deal of opposition to the bill both in the House and in 
the country. We may pass the Bill in spite of this opposition. But that will mean two things: 
(1) continuous opposition and delay in the passage and possibly success I preventing it from 
passing this year, (2) obstruction in the implementation of the Bill when passed….Because of 
this, I told the executive meeting of the party that while I was opposed to any further 
references to the old or to a new Select Committee or to further circulation, I was prepared to 
have certain controversial clauses in the Bill informally considered by members interested. 
We are not going to have a clause by clause consideration of the Bill during this Session. 
There is no chance of this being done till the autumn Session. That means that we have got 
about 6 months. During this period we might well arrange for this informal consideration of 
special clauses of the Bill. Persons consulted may be some of the members of the old Select 
committee or some other also. If necessary we might even consult some non members. It has 
been suggested to me that perhaps some judges might be consulted…I think that this 
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procedure will facilitate the passage of the Bill. We may modify some provisions somewhat 
and gain larger approval”.674  
 
The rather cavalier manner in which Nehru refers to modifying some provisions and 
putting up controversial clauses for informal discussions must have enraged Ambedkar who 
had invested time and effort in preparing the lengthy document containing a revised version 
of the original Code that had been produced by the Rau Committee.  
 
At this point therefore, in February 1949, it seems Nehru was already thinking of 
ways to avoid the controversy that was likely to be generated over the Hindu Code within the 
assembly session. Such an attitude suggests that Nehru had not realised the immensity of the 
issue at stake and had not really taken seriously the extensive discourse it had already 
generated in the Constituent Assembly debates. Hence he was unable to envisage the 
concerns and roadblocks it was likely to produce. This appears in stark contrast to the 
importance that Ambedkar had given to the project and the deep significance that it contained 
for him not only as an act of reforming illiberal practises in Hindu society but also as a step 
towards laying the ground for a uniform civil code.  
 
Arguing from the lawyer’s point of view, Ambedkar in fact had a much clearer 
argument for why the Hindu Code was necessary and would be beneficial. Rather than speak 
in grand terms of the need to modernise and do away with the vestiges of tradition and the 
blinkers of religious dogmatism, Ambedkar’s logic was practical and straightforward: 
“Coming to the question of saving personal law…..The religious conceptions in this country 
are so vast that they cover every aspect of life, from birth to death. There is nothing which is 
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not religion and if personal law is to be saved, I am sure about it that in social matters we will 
come to a standstill. I do not think it is possible to accept a position of that sort. There is 
nothing extraordinary in saying that we ought to strive hereafter to limit the definition of 
religion in such a manner that we shall not extend beyond beliefs and such rituals as may be 
connected with ceremonials which are essentially religious. It is not necessary that the sort of 
laws, for instance, laws relating to tenancy or laws relating to succession should be governed 
by religion.675 By late 1951 Ambedkar had resigned in frustration, first from the cabinet in 
September and then from parliament in October. 
 
Despite discussions in the assembly having been stalled, Nehru maintained in public 
that he was committed to and deeply convinced about the necessity of bringing about a Hindu 
Code. In his presidential address of October, 1951 to the Congress party he claimed that, “In 
India we have these conflicts between reactionary and static elements and dynamic and 
progressive forces. Essentially, it is on the economic plane, but it touches the social life of the 
people in many ways. Thus, the Hindu Code Bill, which has given rise to so much argument, 
becomes a symbol of this conflict between progress and reaction in the social domain. (italics 
added) I do not refer to any particular clause of that Bill, which might or might not be 
changed, but rather to the spirit underlying that Bill. This was a spirit of liberation and of 
freeing our people and, more especially, our womenfolk, from outworn customs and shackles 
that bound them. We cannot progress along one front and remain tied up on other fronts. We 
have therefore, to keep in view this idea of integrated progress on all fronts, political, 
economic and social”.676 
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 Speaking to a press conference in Allahabad on 15 January, 1952 Nehru explained, 
“So far as the Hindu Code Bill is concerned, it consists of certain principles and a mountain 
of details. A very great part of it is mere codification. Hardly any part of it is a complete 
innovation. An attempt has been made in it to bring about a measure of uniformity keeping in 
view at the same time the different customs that have developed through the ages. There is 
nothing in it, so far as I know, and so far as many learned men in the Hindu Law and the 
Shastras have advised us, that is opposed to the basic principles of the Hindu Law or 
Dharma...…So far as I am concerned, I am convinced that the progress of the Indian people 
must be on all fronts – political, economic and social. All these are interrelated and 
backwardness in one leads to stagnation and a brake on others. That all-round progress must 
be related to modern condition and should be based on the genius and basic ideas which have 
governed India for a long time past. It is from this point of view that I consider a codification 
of Hindu law necessary” .677 
 
Despite making these public pronouncements it is noteworthy that Nehru rarely 
contributed to the discussion in the assembly. Opposition to the bill was dismissed by him as 
being deliberate acts of disruption but when it came to making constructive proposals or 
providing details for a proper discussion, Nehru was more often absent or silent. This contrast 
between what Nehru said about the Code in public and how little he had to say on its actual 
content during discussions in the legislative assembly suggests that, for him the Hindu Code 
had emerged as a useful issue through which to pitch himself as the party’s social reformer 
and to portray other members, especially those who were counterweights to him, as 
conservative and obscurantist. In this way Nehru could deflect somewhat the criticism he was 
facing from Communists and Socialists about the lack of real reform under his leadership. 
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More evidence of how little Nehru had really reflected upon the implications and 
significance of the Code Bill is contained in the statements that he made to his 
contemporaries in power. For example, in one of his regular letters to Chief Ministers written 
on October 4, 1951, he explained how the Hindu Code had been pending for four or five 
years and how, despite the controversy and the interminable speeches he was still keen for it 
to go through. This he argued was important in terms of bringing about social change for 
“Our social organization has shown both virtues and vices in the past. It has displayed an 
amazing cohesion and continuity….Whatever its virtues might have been in the past, it is 
clear that major changes are required in the present. The Hindu Code Bill represents an 
attempt to bring about some changes without shaking up too much the social organization”.678 
In a letter dated 20 May 1955, Nehru emphasized the radical nature of the bills: “The social 
plane has not been ignored previously because we have always laid stress on the abolition of 
untouchability and the like. But the Hindu Marriage Bill brought us fully square against the 
conservative reactionary forces in the country. Apart from the merits of the measure itself, 
this action of ours has raised out prestige in other countries. It has shown that our 
Government and the forces behind it are progressive on every plane and are not afraid even of 
coming into conflict with orthodoxy”.679  
 
Not appreciating the extent to which religious principles pervaded Indian society, 
Nehru was in danger of underestimating the degree of opposition that such a bill was bound 
to generate. In fact in the end, ironically his prediction is precisely what ensued. Hailed as 
radical reform, the Hindu Code was successfully moulded to produce something that indeed 
did not shake up social organisation. The law makers who dominated the discussion (of 
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which Nehru was hardly part of) made sure that the bills did not fundamentally alter the 
situation.  
 
7.6. The substance and Implications of the Hindu Code. 
 
Since the bills were eventually passed it is important to examine more closely their 
content and their relationship to the existing body of common law. A piece of legislation 
which tends to be neglected and overlooked is the Special Marriage Bill which provided 
couples with the chance to register their marriage, regardless of religion. This was one of the 
most obvious cases of secular legislation yet it is usually sidelined in discussions about social 
reform and the Hindu Code. Passed in 1954, the Special Marriage Act (SMA) re-opened the 
debate on codification in the Lok Sabha and was closely followed by the Hindu Marriage and 
Divorce Bill. What is puzzling is why, having already provided citizens with the option of a 
civil form of marriage it was considered necessary to impose mandatory restrictions on those 
who chose not to opt for it. With the passing of SMA, a victory for secularism was claimed.  
Seeking to reform an earlier bill of 1872 which required one to foreswear religion before 
marrying under that act, the Special Marriage Bill had no such preconditions. As the 
proponents of this bill put it, this Bill ‘is helpful in the preservation of our religion and 
consolidation of our religion’.680 As another member pointed out, the reasons for a new bill 
were many given the changes it was to bring about: 
(1) That this Bill is made applicable to all the citizens of India, irrespective of their 
religion. 
(2) That it is made applicable to the citizens of India outside, or in other words, it will 
have extra-territorial jurisdiction. 
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(3) That the age limit for marriage has been fixed at 18, formerly in the 1872 legislation, 
the age limit fixed for a girl was only 14 and, 
(4) That this Bill provides for the legislation of those marriages also which had been 
performed either before or after the passing of the Bill under some other form or 
under some other law.681 
 
In its initial form the Bill sought to ‘punish’ those who opted for it by depriving them 
of the right of adoption and severing them from the connection to the joint family as a means 
through which to preserve the Hindu system of personal law.682  
When the Bill came back for consideration on 19 May, 1954 Law Minister Biswas explained 
that this ‘is an attempt to lay down a uniform territorial law of marriage for the whole of 
India’.683 The main improvement on the 1872 Act was that under this Act it allowed those 
who did not want or could not be recognised by any one of the recognised religious 
communities, to get married. Furthermore, ‘it was laid down in that Act as originally passed, 
the parties to the marriage would have to sign a declaration that neither of them belonged to 
any of the religions specified, i.e. any community which had any personal law to govern 
it’.684 
 
Another alteration that was to be introduced through the SMA was a provision 
relating to the prohibited degrees of relationship. Given that different communities had 
different ideas regarding whom one could, or could not, marry in terms of blood relations, the 
Act opted for a provision based on eugenics in order to avoid reference to customary 
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variations.685 As Law Minister Biswas explained in parliament in 1954, ‘If you want to marry 
according to your customary law, it is open to you to do so. You need not come under the 
provisions of this Act. This being an Act for the whole of India, irrespective of caste, 
community, religion and so on, it will not do to introduce or to find place for customary 
variations’.686 In fact the discussion that ensued following the introduction of this Act raised, 
as a prime concern, the question of how to reconcile provisions that accommodated 
customary practices with the need for uniformity. As one member of parliament put it, the 
Government ‘wants to show that they are trying to evolve a uniform civil code but, if I may 
so, they are trying to introduce by the back-door the customary marriages’ which he warned, 
ran the risk of committing ‘fraud on the law’.687  
Other objections voiced at the time included that ‘our laws regarding marriage, and 
especially regarding divorce must be in consonance with the economic status of women’. 
Here the speaker argued that in rural India where 73.5 per cent of women were wholly 
dependent on husband, father or other bread-winners and 88 per cent of urban women, meant 
it was unlikely that women would be able to or even choose to avail themselves of the new 
divorce provisions, in fact it may make the more vulnerable.688 The point being made was 
that unlike Europe where the change in the institution of marriage and divorce followed in the 
wake of rapid transformation in the society caused by education, economic status and 
political rights, India was attempting a process of social engineering entailing the reverse 
sequence: induced social change prior to economic and political transformation. Added to 
this, was the attempt to accommodate religious personal law alongside, adding to the 
confusion surrounding the principles underlying India’s social legislation. Whilst the bottom 
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line ought to have been that all Indian citizens were equally free to opt for religious personal 
law or common law, in the end distinctions between the two were blurred.  
 
Further dealing with the wider problem of nation and state building, the ever-sceptical 
Acharya Kripalani asked why there was a need for uniformity at all in the laws of marriage, 
“in a country like India, where nothing is uniform? Neither our dress, nor our food, nor our 
want of food is uniform”.689 Other sceptics and critics pointed out that divorce and remarriage 
was already provided for by the customary law of an estimated eighty per cent of the Hindu 
population and that the Act’s cautious allowance of divorce in fact made this a form of 
‘liberalising’ an upper caste minority at the cost of ‘brahminizing’ the majority.  
 
What these early discussions surrounding the Special Marriage Act reveal, is that 
there was extensive consideration of these Bills and a number of members demonstrated 
foresight in assessing the potential positive and negative implications of such legislation. 
Furthermore the analysis reveals the need to take into account the author’s original intentions 
behind the creation of a law, the setting up of an institution or a choice of policy. For instance 
the original Special Marriage Act as it was passed in 1872 bore the specific desire of Brahma 
Samaj followers who wanted a particular kind of civil marriage, not restricted by the 
injunctions of Hindu laws, because they wanted to marry outside the caste. By 1954 this 
restriction had gone with two pieces of legislation passed in 1946 and 1949690 which lifted 
the restriction on inter-caste marriages. Whilst the intentions were clear in the case of the 
earlier Marriage Act, the 1954 Special Marriage Act remained beset by inner tensions as well 
as confusion arising from its overlapping with the Hindu Code Bills. This is evident, for 
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example, with the introduction of section 7 in the Hindu Marriage Act which restated and 
confirmed the dominance of customary law: 
 
Section 7 – Ceremonies for a Hindu Marriage  
(1) A Hindu marriage may be solemnized in accordance with the customary rites and 
ceremonies of either party thereto. 
(2) Where such rites and ceremonies include taking the saptapadi (that is, the taking of 
seven steps by the bridegroom and the bride jointly before the sacred fire) the 
marriage becomes complete and binding when the seventh step is taken. 
Under Section 3 – Definitions 
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires – 
(a)       the expression ‘custom’ and ‘usage’ signify any rule, which, having been 
continuously and uniformly observed for a long time, has obtained the force of 
law among Hindus in any local area, tribe, community, group or family. 
Provided that the rule is certain and not unreasonable or opposed to public policy. 
 
What was hailed as momentous and modernist was that the Hindu marriage was no 
longer seen as a sacrament but as a contract and that marriage was treated as a conditional 
socio-legal agreement between adult and equal parties. However, as has been pointed out by 
scholars such as Menski, in terms of case law, the Act has not really helped the Hindu woman 
especially on issues of divorce and maintenance because the Hindu man has been able to 
claim that the marriage was not a real marriage as it had not followed strict custom.691 
Despite these internal vagaries the SMA was billed as a ‘step in the right direction’ towards 
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the ultimate goal of a Uniform Civil Code.692 Changing socio-political circumstances, it was 
argued required a new, ‘progressive’ and ‘contractual’ approach to marriage.693 
 
7.7. Conclusion. The Hindu Code Legacy: a triumph of strategy over vision? 
 
The Hindu Code Bills not only draw out the contradictions between Nehru’s goals 
and the outcome but also reflect some of the tensions that are contained within the Indian 
Constitution as a whole, with regards safeguarding both individual and community rights. As 
one member of parliament put it, ‘One section of the House wants that there should be a 
uniform civil code and there should be only secular laws and all religions should be done 
away with, while another section of the House resents interference in religion. Of course both 
have got justification because the Government is in a way, encouraging both. We have got 
the Special Marriage Act which reminds us that our society is secular, and there is the Hindu 
Marriage and Divorce Bill which, at the same time, tries to please the Hindus – 
simultaneously displeasing them by interfering on matters which ought not to be interfered 
with by the Government. There is also the Guardians and Wards Act which is, more or less, 
secular, and now they have brought in the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Bill.694 The 
same member had another wise point to make: ‘there cannot be a uniform civil code unless 
there is a uniform religion for the whole of India. So far as marriage , divorce and other 
things are concerned, each religion has got its own rules......So on that ground, I oppose the 
idea of having a uniform civil code except in matters which are not religious, such as 
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regulation and procedure in Courts and the way in which evidence has to be taken and so 
on.’695  
 
A central problem with the Hindu Code bills was that its mandate was unclear. On the 
one hand, it proclaimed itself as radical social reform and at the same time, it was cast as a 
measure that would strengthen the country’s secular credentials and help cement national 
unity. A letter from Nehru to one of his Chief Ministers in May 1956 is revealing: “This Bill 
(the Hindu Succession Act) and the Hindu Marriage Act have a peculiar significance, not 
only because of the changes they bring about but chiefly because they have pulled Hindu law 
from the ruts in which it had got stuck and given it a new dynamism. In that sense, the 
passage of this legislation marks an epoch in India. It indicates that we have not only striven 
for and achieved a political revolution but that we are equally intent on economic social 
revolution; only by way of advance on these three separate lines and their integration into one 
great whole, will the people of India progress’.696  
 
The problem however, remains whether the Hindu Code represents a step towards a 
uniform civil code or whether it remains a piece of ‘Hindu’ legislation. As has been 
demonstrated above, parts of the Hindu Code sought to institutionalise strictly, sometimes 
even retrogressive, Hindu practices. While other communities were given the ‘freedom’ to 
define, interpret and adapt over time the parameters and content of their personal law 
systems, the Hindus had to accept a formulation of rights and responsibilities codified by the 
State. This has meant on the one hand that other communities cling to their personal law 
systems as an integral right to religious freedom while Hindus have used the loopholes and 
contradictions within the Hindu Code to allow customary law to function when preferred. 
                                                 
695 Ibid., Column 2337 – 8. 
696 Letter dated 10 May, 1956 in Letters to Chief Ministers, Vol.4, p. 369. 
356 
 
The end result has been that a uniform code is highly unlikely to emerge in practice but 
which nevertheless remains a potent device in the game of politics. 
 
The thesis contends that the implications of the Hindu Code were not fully thought 
through and that Nehru, who saw it primarily in secularist, modernisation terms, 
misrepresented what was at stake. Furthermore, the strategy that Nehru adopted differed 
significantly when compared with his actions in the two other policy arenas of foreign policy 
and economic policy. In the case of the Planning Commission the steps that had been 
followed consisted of the following: (a) consolidation of his power, (b) formation of an 
institution through which to shape policy and finally, (c) altering the parameters of discourse. 
The following table sets out the various phases that leading up to the passing of the Hindu 
Code Bills. 
Table 8: The Changing Structure of Opportunities and the Hindu Code Bills. 
 
 
 
PHASE 
 
 
STRUCTURE OF 
OPPORTUNITIES 
 
STRATEGY / OUTCOME 
1930s 
British legislation 
 
e.g. 1937 Shariat law 
 
The debate on codification had 
begun: discussed between British 
legislators, Hindu reform leaders. 
 
Congress did not engage in the 
debate on codification. Religion was 
discussed in terms of communalism 
& representation of religious 
communities. 
 
 
Nehru not involved 
1940-46 
Indian studies of 
Codification 
 
e.g. 1944 Rau Committee 
report 
 
Ambedkar took up the issue early on 
 
 
Nehru not involved at this stage. 
1946 – 49 
Codification Debate in 
 
Ambedkar introduced the issue of 
uniform code in the Constituent 
 
Uniform Civil Code included as non-justiciable  
Directive Principle in Constitution  
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Constituent Assembly 
 
Assembly Debates (CAD). 
Proposed a reworked Hindu Code 
(HC).  
 
CAD revealed strong resistance to 
HC from Muslim and Hindu 
representatives. 
Congress still not openly committed 
to one position. 
 
Nehru proclaimed crucial importance of HC 
 
Nehru proposed ways to delay decision on 
Hindu Code in legislature. 
1950 - 1952 
Build-up to General 
Elections 
 
1951 Resignation of Ambedkar 
opens the arena for Nehru to take 
more prominent position. 
 
Patel, Prasad and Congress 
President Tandon are openly against 
Hindu Code. 
 
 
HC mentioned passing in presidential address by 
Prasad. 
 
1951 HC proclaimed by Nehru as way to 
emancipate Hindu women in report to A.I.C.C 
 
No mention of HC in Congress election 
manifesto 
 
Piecemeal approach proposed by Nehru. 
1952 -56 
Lok Sabha Debates 
&  
Legislation 
 
Extensive discussion of bills in 
Lok Sabha: little participation of 
Nehru 
 
 
Bills are passed with little input from Nehru 
No mention of HC in 1957 Congress Election 
Manifesto 
 
As the table demonstrates the issue of a Uniform Code and the idea of a Hindu Code 
were discussions that largely occurred outside the Congress Party during the 1930s and early 
1940s. If one examines the presidential speeches and resolutions passed by the AICC during 
these years religion was addressed as a concern with regards inter-communal relations and 
communal participation and representation. Nehru’s early writings, as examined in chapter 
two, demonstrate that he too was not involved in the debate surrounding legislation and the 
idea of codification. Voicing his approval of Ambedkar’s efforts in the late 1940s, Nehru 
seemed to throw his support and weight behind the project of a Uniform Civil Code. 
However, it was soon evident that both the Hindu Code and a Universal Civil Code were 
highly contested issues in the Constituent and Interim Assembly Debates and faced strong 
resistance within the Congress party. Proposing to discuss the bill in ways that would delay 
its passing through the interim assembly and referring to it as a piece of social reform 
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legislation (specifically directed at Hindu women) rather than as a grand strategy to secularise 
society at large, Nehru toned down his endorsement. His proposal that it be discussed and 
ultimately passed in a piecemeal fashion ultimately led to the resignation of Ambedkar who 
felt the Prime Minister was engaging in filibuster tactics.  
 
When the issue of codifying Hindu law came back to the legislative debates in the 
mid-1950s, Nehru’s victory at the 1952 elections and his power within the party and cabinet 
had strengthened the hand of the ‘secularists’ and ‘reformers’. Although the debates on each 
of the individual bills dragged on for a few years it was undisputed that eventually the four 
legs of the Hindu Code would be passed. With the wider debate on the merits and demerits of 
the secular state legislating on religion no longer on the table, the critics and opponents to the 
bills sought to restrict the scope of the Bills from within. Hence the bills contained numerous 
contradictions and some even endorsed retrogressive practices in the process of codification.  
Not interested in the details of the bills, Nehru was rarely present in any of the discussions on 
the individual bills. Once they were passed he hailed them as acts of social reform and a vital 
ingredient in the nation-building process but his statements and actions, neither prior to the 
bills nor in their aftermath, do not reveal any consideration of the potential pitfalls, 
inconsistencies and dangers of such legislation.  Nor, ultimately was the Hindu Code 
presented as a Congress party achievement in the election manifesto of 1957. 
 
As an institution therefore the Hindu Code emerged as a highly contested repository 
of values and an instrument of strategy, used by Nehru, his opponents and critics alike. The 
long-term impact of such an institution, where strategy so clearly dictated vision, will be 
examined in relation to the other two cases in the following concluding chapter.  
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Chapter 8 
 
The Conclusion 
 
 
8.1. The shelf life of Nehru’s Institutions: a comparative study of the three policies. 
8.2. Methodological individualism and rationality as heuristic devices:  
Nehru as political actor.  
8.3. An analytic narrative of institution formation: vision and strategy in the  
making of Nehru’s policies. 
8.4. Key Findings of the thesis. 
8.4.1. Path dependence and the origins of institutions. 
8.4.2. Institutional change and development. 
8.5. Nehru as a case study: leadership, policy-making and the analysis of politics.  
 
 
8.1. The shelf life of Nehru’s Institutions: a comparative study of the three policies. 
 
 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru has been the lynchpin of this thesis which sought to 
explore his inner world as well as his external context in order to understand the outcomes of 
his policy choices. He has been portrayed as the central actor and the prime agenda-setter 
during India’s first decade of politics as an independent country. This, it must be admitted, is 
certainly an artifice since there were other important political leaders who played significant 
roles in policy making at the centre as well as at the state levels. The thesis has tried to 
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portray contemporaries of Nehru as well as emphasize the fact that the terms of discourse 
were considerably wide and reflected a broad range of views especially in the early years of 
independence. Nevertheless Nehru is the central figure and, it has been argued, his policy 
choices hold crucial clues to India’s subsequent path of political development. This is 
something that becomes more evident from the table below which tracks key developments in 
the three policy arenas of economic policy, relations with China and social reform covered in 
the thesis. 
 
Table 9: The shelf life of Nehru’s Institutions - 
 the Planning Commission, Panchasheela and the Hindu Code Bills. 
 
 
Policy 
Area 
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000- 
Economic 
Policy 
 
1964 
reassessment 
or planning 
assumptions, 
methods, 
techniques 
and 
machinery 
 
Crisis of 
Planning  
1967 Reform 
of Planning 
Agency  
 
 
Liberalisation 
of trade regime 
under Janata 
government 
 
Nationalisation 
under Indira 
Gandhi 
Liberalisation 
‘by 
stealth’.697 
 
1980 New 
regime of 
industrial 
polices under 
Indira Gandhi
 
1985 ‘New 
Economic 
Policy’ of 
Rajiv Gandhi 
Full-blown 
liberalisation. 
 
1991 
government 
implemented 
reforms. 
Further 
reforms to 
curb state 
power 
Relations 
with 
China 
 
1962 Sino-
India Border 
 
1979 External 
Affairs 
 
1981 vice-
ministerial 
 
1993 visit of 
Narasimha 
 
Trade 
Agreements 
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 War 
 
 
Minister 
Vajpayee’s 
visit to PRC.  
talks & 
border talks 
began 
 
1986 / 87 
Border 
tension 
 
1988 visit to 
PRC by Rajiv 
Gandhi 
Rao & 
signing of 
Peace and 
Tranquillity 
Agreement. 
 
and Special 
Representativ
es Talks on 
the Border. 
Socio-
Religious 
reform 
 
--- 1979  Bai 
Tahira Case 
1985 Shah 
Bano case 
1986 Muslim 
Women 
(Protection of 
Rights on 
Divorce) Act 
1995 Sarla 
Mudgal case. 
 
1998 & 1999 
elections: 
BJP dropped 
Uniform 
Code in 
manifesto. 
2004 
elections: 
issue of UCC 
avoided by 
both BJP and 
Congress-led 
alliances. 
  
What is interesting to note is how in each of the three cases the institutions which took 
shape under Nehru’s leadership, the Planning Commission, Panchasheela and the Hindu 
Code, persisted in varying forms and functions to shape their respective policy areas over the 
subsequent forty years. In the case of the economy, the Planning Commission continues to be 
an important node in the policy-making, resource-allocation process despite the exogenous 
shocks of liberalisation and the push towards integrating the economy with the global 
economy that occurred from the 1990s onwards. The Commission has been an important 
source of research and reports on a number of economic sectors including agriculture, 
education, employment, health, infrastructure, rural development, social justice. On its own 
website its evolving functions are aptly described in the following way: 
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“From a highly centralised planning system, the Indian economy is gradually moving towards 
indicative planning698 where Planning Commission concerns itself with the building of a long 
term strategic vision of the future and decide on priorities of nation. It works out sectoral 
targets and provides promotional stimulus to the economy to grow in the desired direction. 
With the emergence of severe constraints on available budgetary resources, the resource 
allocation system between the States and Ministries of the Central Government is under 
strain. This requires the Planning Commission to play a mediatory and facilitating role, 
keeping in view the best interest of all concerned. It has to ensure smooth management of the 
change and help in creating a culture of high productivity and efficiency in the Government. 
The key to efficient utilisation of resources lies in the creation of appropriate self-managed 
organisations at all levels. In this area, Planning Commission attempts to play a systems 
change role and provide consultancy within the Government for developing better systems. In 
order to spread the gains of experience more widely, Planning Commission also plays an 
information dissemination role.” 699 
 
Although the Planning Commission continues to set sector-wise targets these are not 
binding nor do they matter in a liberalised economy where the required output is importable 
and excess demand can be met through imports. As explained by the current Deputy 
Chairman, Montek Singh Ahluwalia in a recent article, the old import controls that came to 
be known as the ‘licence permit raj’ have been recognised as an impediment that served only 
to provide protection for domestic produces against foreign competition and led to high cost, 
low quality domestic produce which could not be exported. The highly complex and 
                                                 
698 Italics added, see below for an explanation. 
699 Planning Commission official website: http://planningcommission.nic.in/aboutus/function.html as seen on 11 
October, 2008. 
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discretionary import control system also promoted extensive corruption.700 Nevertheless there 
is scope for the Planning Commission to play an important role by sketching out a broad 
perspective of the economy over the longer term, a provision that has come to be known as 
‘indicative planning’. As Ahluwalia describes it ‘By indicative planning, I mean defining 
broad national goals and objectives and presenting an internally consistent picture of the 
evolution of the economy......... Indicative planning can help to highlight the longer term 
structural changes that are likely to arise as a consequence of such growth and the challenges 
they pose in terms of action to be taken sufficiently in advance. For example, what would a 
10 per cent growth, and the growth of manufacturing of around 14 per cent per year, mean in 
terms of the pace of urbanization and are our systems for urban planning capable of 
responding to this challenge?’701 
 
As can be seen from the above the Planning Commission has been a successful case 
of institutional adaption. Initially set up to oversee the implementation of each stage of the 
five year plan and as a mechanism through which the Prime Minister exerted some control 
over economic policy, today it works as part and parcel of the market economy and in 
conjunction with a number of stakeholders including producer representatives, consumer 
groups, state actors and a number of ministries. It is telling that Monteq Singh Ahluwalia, a 
man closely associated with the reforms of 1991, one-time employee at the World Bank and 
former Indian Finance Secretary, is today the chairman of the Planning Commission. In his 
article Montek Singh Ahluwalia outlines three ‘new’ roles for the Planning Commission 
today. These are, the preparation of ‘indicative plans’ exploring the feasibility and 
implications of alternative scenarios of faster growth over the long term; the preparation of 
                                                 
700 Ahluwalia, Montek Singh, Seminar, Issue Number 589, September, 2008 
http://www.indiaseminar.com/2008/589/589_montek_singh_ahluwalia.htm as seen on 11 October, 2008. 
701 Ahluwalia, Montek Singh, Seminar, Issue Number 589, September, 2008 
http://www.indiaseminar.com/2008/589/589_montek_singh_ahluwalia.htm as seen on 11 October, 2008. 
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plan budgets in cooperation with the Ministries where the Commission can play the role of 
‘interlocutor, advisor, honest broker, persuader and to some extent, also incentiviser’ and 
finally, the task of providing critical evaluation of policies and their effectiveness.702  
 
The case of Panchasheela stands in stark contrast to the durability and adaptability of 
the Planning Commission. After the shock of the 1962 border war, Sino-Indian relations 
seemed to go into deep-freeze during the rest of the 1960s and 1970s. The ice was broken in 
1981 when vice-ministerial talks were initiated. Despite this development the two countries 
came close to war in 1986 – 87 focusing on a remote valley in India’s Eastern border area. In 
addition to representing a disputed section of the McMahon line the sector was of strategic 
importance to both India and China. It was in fact here that heavy fighting broke out in 
October 1962 and from here that China launched its major offensive into plains of India.  
 
Responding to Chinese claims to territory south of the McMahon line the Indian 
Parliament passed a bill in 1986 transforming the union territory of Arunachel Pradesh 
(90,000 square kilometres of land that China also claimed) into the twenty-fourth state of the 
Indian Republic. Ultimately diffusing the crisis, the two countries moved towards 
rapprochement and India accepted the long-standing invitation to its then Prime Minister, 
Rajiv Gandhi, Gandhi’s landmark visit in 1988 constituted a major shift with India dropping 
its long-held insistence that normalisation of relations would only be possible once the border 
/ territorial issue had been resolved. A series of agreements were signed, a joint working 
group on the border was set up, and an annual exchange of foreign ministers was agreed to. 
Gandhi also indicated a willingness to cooperate with China on macro issues such as the 
creation of a New International Economic Order, disarmament and pollution. Echoing the 
                                                 
702 Ahluwalia, Montek Singh, Seminar, Issue Number 589, September, 2008  
http://www.indiaseminar.com/2008/589/589_montek_singh_ahluwalia.htm as seen on 11 October, 2008. 
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Zhou En-lai, Nehru days of the 1950s when India and China had joined forces on issues such 
as the Korean War, decolonization and disarmament an attempt was made, briefly to 
demonstrate a united front on certain global issues. However, like Panchasheela of the mid-
1950s this simply masked the reality that the two countries were likely to be competitors, a 
fact that was borne out by the low figures of trade between the two throughout the 1980s and 
1990s. The process of ‘normalisation’ continued and the 1990s saw the signing of two ‘Peace 
and Tranquillity Accords’ which brought about some demilitarisation of the border. 
Panchasheela as a doctrine or a ‘rules of engagement’ remains however an ‘empty document’ 
given the fact that the whole stretch of border continues to be disputed territory. 
 
Nevertheless Panchasheela has retained an emotive and rhetorical value, flourished at 
symbolic events such as the Asian-African conference or during official visits by 
representatives from either side. For instance during a recent visit to Beijing in January 2008, 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Premier Wen Jiabao of the People’s Republic of China 
resolved to promote the building of a harmonious world through developing a ‘Strategic and 
Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity’ between the two countries. Mentioned in 
their joint statement was the belief that ‘in the new century, Panchasheela, the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, should continue to constitute the basic guiding principles 
for good relations between all countries’.703  
 
However, although the principles have survived the substantive content of the original 
agreement no longer stands. In answer to a question in parliament on 30 April, 2008 
regarding whether India had signed any agreement with China on the issue of Tibet and if so, 
what issues were agreed upon, the Minister of External Affairs, Pranab Mukherjee replied 
                                                 
703 ‘A Shared Vision for the 21st Century of the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China. Accessed 
through the official website of Indian Ministry of External Affairs, http://meaindia.nic.in/ on 11 October, 2008. 
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that ‘On 29 April 1954, India and the People’s Republic of China signed the “Agreement 
between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse 
between Tibet Region of China and India”. This Agreement was aimed at promoting trade 
and cultural intercourse between India and Tibet Region of China and facilitating pilgrimage 
and travel by the peoples of India and China. The Agreement lapsed in 1962.’ (emphasis 
added).704 The lapse in 1962 occurred on technical grounds given that the original agreement 
was time-bound to being renegotiated after an eight year period. However, it is significant 
that after the 1962 border war there has been no extension or re-negotiation of the 1954 
agreement.  
Unlike the Planning Commission which re-moulded itself to fit in with the times and 
Panchasheela which has been relegated to symbolic rhetoric, the Hindu Code, having flared 
up as a highly contentious political issue in the 1970s and 80s, has taken a backseat. 
Following the burst of legislative activity in the 1950s there were no further moves towards 
uniformity on a national basis. With the initiative from the government gone, the courts took 
on the role of trying to achieve greater uniformity. For instance in 1979 the Supreme Court 
took a first step when it granted maintenance to Bai Tahira under Section 125 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure which grants a wife, including a divorced wife, the right to maintenance 
from her husband. Section 127 of the Code limits this right with the provision that a woman 
would not be entitled to maintenance if she receives a sum under any customary law or 
personal law. In Tahira’s case an amount had been agreed to under Muslim law by both 
parties at the time of marriage, an amount which the Court declared to be unreasonable. The 
Court went as far to state that ‘no husband can claim under Section 127 (3)(b) absolution 
from his obligation under Section 125 towards a divorced wife except on proof of payment of 
a sum stipulated by customary or personal law whose quantum is more or less sufficient to do 
                                                 
704 Accessed through the official website of Indian Ministry of External Affairs, http://meaindia.nic.in/ on 11 
October, 2008. 
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duty for maintenance allowance.’705 Further attempts by the Courts to inject uniformity in 
personal laws however, became embroiled in political considerations. 
 
The Shah Bano and Sarla Mugdal cases are good examples of the political 
controversy surrounding the discussion of a universal civil code. In the 1985 case the 
Supreme Court decided in favour of a Muslim woman, granting her maintenance from her 
divorced husband. Muslim personal law had not condoned such support and the judgement by 
the Supreme Court was seen as the State endangering Islam in India with the implicit 
motivation of imposing a uniform civil code. Initially welcoming the Court’s ruling, the then 
Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi succumbed to pressure and decided to enact the Muslim 
Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 which confirmed the supremacy of 
Muslim personal law in cases of Muslim divorce. By reversing the Court’s decision the Act 
enraged women’s groups, progressive Muslims, secularists as well as Hindu nationalists who 
asserted that minorities were being pampered and privileged at the expense of the majority 
community.  
 
The 1995 Sarla Mudgal case addressed the attempt of Hindu men to circumvent the 
ban on polygamous marriages. Under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, a Hindu who 
marries while still married to someone else is acting illegally, an act that could result in the 
voiding of the second marriage and in the man going to jail. The same restriction does not 
apply to Muslim men who under their personal law system are allowed to have multiple 
spouses, a disparity that was sealed with the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, one of the Hindu 
Code Bills. This resulted in a number of Hindus converting to Islam . The Supreme Court 
decided to take action by declaring the second marriage of a Hindu husband converted to 
                                                 
705 Quoted in Pal, R. ‘Religious Minorities and the Law’ in Larson, G.J. (ed.) Religion and Personal Law in 
Secular India (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2001), p. 30. 
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Islam as invalid. If a Hindu husband wanted to re-marry the law required him to first dissolve 
the earlier marriage in accordance with legal requirements provided for Hindus seeking a 
divorce.  
 
The case brought out two particularly interesting tensions. On the one hand, it was 
criticised that under codified Hindu law, the 1955 Hindu Marriage Act provided various 
loopholes to bigamous husbands and at the same time, in the name of modernisation, had 
done away with traditional sources of Hindu law which had recognised and provided for the 
rights of wives in polygamous marriages. This surprisingly was a point of view raised by 
feminist writers, an example of which is Flavia Agnes.706 The other underlying tensions to be 
brought to the fore by the Sarla Mugdal case was the Court’s affirmation of the institution of 
monogamous marriage and its equation with ‘justice, equity and good conscience’, which by 
implication meant that those who engaged in polygamy, including the Muslims who, though 
protected by law, were in fact to be seen as violating ‘the rules of natural justice’.707 In fact 
Justice Kuldip Singh, who ruled upon the case asserted at the time, ‘When more than 80% of 
the citizens have already been brought under the codified personal law there is no 
justification whatsoever to keep in abeyance, the introduction of “uniform civil code” for all 
citizens in the territory of India’.708  
 
Both cases bring out well the fears, frustrations and conflicting visions surrounding the 
uniform civil code. Nehruvian nationalists see the code as critical to the project of 
modernisation; advocates of civil rights see it as vital to the expansion of equal opportunities; 
                                                 
706 See Agnes, Flavia Law and Gender Equality: The Politics of Women’s Rights in India. (Oxford University 
Press, New Delhi, 1999). 
707 Language used by Justice Kuldip Singh. See Jacobson, G.J. The Wheel of Law. India’s Secularism in 
Comparative Constitutional Context. (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2003), pp. 112 – 3. 
708 Ibid. p. 114. 
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members of religious groups see the code as a threat to their cultural identity while Hindu 
nationalists are suspected to welcoming it precisely because it would bring an end to the 
constitution’s defence of ‘special privileges’ to minorities. The fact that the Uniform Civil 
Code project has taken on such a multi-valent significance has naturally turned it into a 
highly instrumental and polemic issue. However, by the late 1990s it had retreated again into 
the background as the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party contested elections and sought 
to bring together a secularist coalition of partners. Similarly in the elections of 2004 the issue 
of a uniform civil code was strategically avoided by both the Bharatiya Janata Party and 
Congress-led alliances.  
The three trajectories briefly described above was meant to demonstrate the extent to 
which the issues that were of central concern at independence such as, the delimitation of 
India’s borders, protecting socio-cultural differences while ensuring equality for all and 
providing the state with the power to plan and manage the economy, have continued to be 
core themes in Indian politics. On each, Nehru left his imprint by way of a particular 
institutional legacy, Panchasheela, the Hindu Code and the Planning Commission 
respectively and they have shaped the range of options available to actors within the 
particular policy field. What this thesis has tried to do is to highlight, through process 
tracing, the considerations related to power politics that led to Nehru’s choices of policy. 
It is posited that the usual approach of simply looking at policy outcomes does not give a 
full picture of the innate limitations and resilience. Three central findings on the long-run 
resilience of institutions are proposed: 
1. Institutions born out of a drive for consensus are likely to be more adaptable with the  
times (the example of the Planning Commission). 
2. Institutions that represent deeply-held values of the author and do not appear to have 
any other basis for legitimacy are likely to be untenable (Panchasheela). 
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3. Institutions that are instrumentalised by the author at the time of creation are likely to  
remain contentious (Hindu Code and Uniform Civil Code project). 
 
 
8.2. Methodological individualism and rationality as heuristic devices -   
Nehru as political actor. 
 
The thesis has sought to locate itself within the Weberian tradition of methodological 
individualism which offered an alternative to the dominant approaches of the ‘grand’ 
modernisation theories of the 1950s and 60s. Such theories (examined closely in chapters one 
and two) contended that large social phenomena such as modernisation could only be 
explained by large variables such as social mobilisation, industrialisation and 
democratisation. Methodological individualism on the other hand posits that a social 
phenomenon must be comprehended in terms of why the actors behaved the way they did to 
the effect of producing the phenomenon in question. A further contribution of methodological 
individualism, and particularly Max Weber, was to argue that explaining actions, beliefs and 
attitudes of an actor meant understanding them in terms of reconstructing their meaning to 
the actor. Chapter three aimed at attaining this position of understanding by attempting to 
explain Nehru’s preferences based on his own work and, as far as possible, using his own 
words. This, it is believed, allows for a more nuanced analysis of Nehru, the political actor 
and the impact of his legacy on Indian politics.  
 
Applying the distinction that was drawn in chapter two between value and 
instrumental rationality to the case of Nehru and his impact on Indian politics, the proposition 
is made that Nehru’s policy choices should neither be hailed as the glorified actions of a self-
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abnegating freedom fighter and national hero, nor dismissed as the naive choices of a 
political greenhorn. Both interpretations have been prevalent in writings about Nehru and the 
years that he was in power. A survey of the ‘Nehru literature’ in chapter one demonstrated 
this prevalent bias and explored the implications that this has had for the study of Indian 
politics. The subsequent example is an apt illustration.  
 
Following the death of Jawaharlal Nehru in 1964, the noted scholar, Dietmar 
Rothermund was invited to deliver a lecture under the auspices of the Max Mueller Bhavan 
(the German cultural institute in India) at various institutions and universities in India which 
he titled, Jawaharlal Nehru: Socialist and Mediator. The speech, which was of course meant 
to be a eulogy, nevertheless captures some of the problems that have characterized the 
literature. Rothermund casts Nehru as ‘the ideal type of the radical mediator.....a man who 
wants to transcend the limitations of his political environment both in terms of a new political 
vision and a quest for untapped sources of power’.709 Vision and power are key words but the 
importance of both is lost in the text as he goes on to describe the extent of and limitations to 
Nehru’s radicalism which was rooted in socialism but was not dictated by an ideological 
doctrine. Instead Nehru is portrayed as a highly pragmatic and patient political actor, who had 
‘a detached view of political decisions....(was able to) transcend the level of petty tactics of 
the national movement and refer to the grand strategic alignments and to the inevitable 
progress toward a socialist future’.710 Whilst the content and contradictions in Nehru’s vision 
are briefly mentioned power completely disappears from the portrait of the man and his 
actions. Instead one is left with the impression that Nehru was in fact disinterested in power 
and concerned primarily with the task of mediating the competing aims of groups within the 
spectrum of Indian politics, reconciling the imperatives of economic and political 
                                                 
709 1964 Yearbook, Max Mueller Bhavan Publications, 1964, New Delhi, p. 1. 
710 1964 Yearbook, Max Mueller Bhavan Publications, 1964, New Delhi, p. 15. 
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independence and the urgent need for both radical socio-economic change and political 
stability.  
The invaluable role that Nehru had to play in Indian politics notwithstanding the 
depiction masks the fact that power often motivated Nehru’s decisions and policy choices. 
Like any political leader, Nehru needed to consolidate his position within the Congress party 
and within his government in order to ensure that his policy preferences would prevail. This 
he managed to achieve not only through luck and contingency but also in the strategic use of 
policy issues and debates as was showcased with the examples of the Planning Commission, 
the Hindu Code Bills and the Panchasheela Agreement in chapters five, six and seven. Hence 
one of the driving questions of the research was to ask whether value rationality is as 
important as instrumental rationality in understanding policy choices and the long-run 
implications for policy reform and implementation.  
 
As demonstrated in each of the three substantive chapters, Nehru’s actions and policy 
choices can be best understood as a combination of both. Values help explain Nehru’s 
predispositions towards certain issues over others and his way of perceiving the issue within a 
wider context, be it socialism, secularism or non-alignment. Instrumental rationality on the 
other hand, explains the timing of certain policies, the changes in content and justification as 
policies took shape. What this thesis ends with, is the proposition that instrumental rationality 
as encapsulated in policy choices helps explain their long-run trajectories. The actor’s 
predilections, in this case Nehru’s, are then no longer of central explanatory importance when 
analysing India’s democratic or secular credentials. Rather, Nehru’s, or any leader’s legacy 
needs to be examined in terms of the compromises struck and the confrontations engaged in, 
given the political constraints of the time. It is this strategic dimension to policy making that 
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crucially sculpts the nature, scope and symbolism of a particular policy, making what is left 
out as interesting as what the policy in the end entails.  
 
8.3. An analytic narrative of institution formation -   
vision and strategy in the making of Nehru’s polices. 
 
Institutions are a core feature of political, social and economic life as they provide the 
incentive structure that affects the choices and behaviour of individuals. Political institutions 
are distinct from economic institutions in that within a democratic framework, they need not 
necessarily be enforced but should ideally be adhered to voluntarily. An institution is 
successful if it incorporates a large number of adherents from across the political spectrum. 
As seen from the above, institutions can have markedly different trajectories and even while 
producing highly inefficient social outcomes, can continue to exist. However, while 
functionalists and rational choice theorists might tend to argue the raison d’être of an 
institution can be ‘read backward’ from its current functions or features, the thesis has argued 
that it is necessary to explore the origins of institutions. Only then is it possible to fully 
appreciate the extent to which an institution has evolved and adapted over time.   
 
 Path dependence is a crucial underlying assumption here which posits that once a 
particular path has been chosen, the costs of reversal are very high. What is interesting in the 
three cases that have been investigated here is how each became a vehicle reproducing what 
were essentially colonial practices and preferences711. In the case of the planning 
commission, this represented a continuation in utilitarian thinking which was highly popular 
                                                 
711 See page 96 for a chronological table of Nehru’s career and key national developments as well as the tables 
at the end of chapters five, six and seven for the phases leading up to the Planning Commission, Panchasheela 
and the Hindu Code Bills respectively.  
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in Britain during the nineteenth century at the time of John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham 
and which later took the form of Fabianism in the early 20th century, a strong influence on 
Nehru’s formative years spent in the United Kingdom. At about this time, planning had 
emerged as a popular theme within the Fabian community in Britain particularly after 
Beatrice and Sidney Webb, key members of the Fabian society, visited the Soviet Union in 
the early 1930s and returned to praise the idea of planning as the new way to rationalise the 
economy for the social good712. Panchasheela and India’s policy towards China inherited and 
continued a colonial attitude towards borders and frontiers and finally, the Hindu Code Bills 
replicated the belief in codification which had been initiated by British parliamentarians and 
law makers. Under Nehru’s stewardship therefore in the 1950s it is ironic to note that 
nineteenth century ideologies and practices popular in Britain were being replicated and 
given institutional form in Indian politics. This is an important observation that the thesis has 
tried to explore because the case has been made that while Nehru had his own preferences 
and worldview his choices were also driven by the need to consolidate power, an option 
which more often than not entailed maintaining the status quo as opposed to introducing 
radical change. In other words, although Nehru’s vision was often cast as ground-breaking in 
fact he was more often than not, reproducing preferences of the colonial state. 
 
However, what is interesting is the variation in strategy across the three cases and the 
implications this had for Indian politics in the longer run in terms of the ability of institutions 
to adapt and the extent to which an institution became entrenched within the political arena. 
While the model specified in chapter two of the thesis applied three core explanatory 
variables: Nehru’s Vision, the Structure of Opportunities and the Choice of Strategy to 
explain policy outcome, North provides a valuable insight into the process of institutional 
                                                 
712 See for instance, Bevir, M. ‘Sidney Webb: Utilitarianism, Positivism and Social Democracy’ in The Journal 
of Modern History, Vol. 74 / 2 (Jun, 2002), pp. 217 – 252.  
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change713by modelling four crucial variables: the agent, the source, the process and the path 
of institutional change. The agent of change is the decision maker(s), the entrepreneur, who 
based on his subjective perceptions, will make certain choices that determine the design and 
shape of the institution. Secondly, the sources of change are the opportunities perceived by 
the entrepreneurs, stemming either from a change in exogenous conditions or from the 
acquisition of new knowledge and skills by the actor. As North put it, ‘Deliberate institutional 
change will therefore come about as a result of the demands of entrepreneurs in the context of 
perceived costs of altering the institutional framework at various margins.’714 It is important 
to note that North identifies both the internal world of subjective preferences as well as the 
external world of opportunities and constraints as important determinants of institutional 
change. The process of change is identified as being largely incremental since institutional 
change will usually occur at the margins which are considered most pliable given the 
bargaining power of the interested parties. Finally, the direction of change is in North’s 
opinion characterized by path dependence given that stakeholders emerge with a particular 
bias, and an interest in maintaining the institutional matrix in place.  
 
 
A noteworthy conclusion that North draws is that ‘formal institutions (either 
deliberately or accidentally) lower the price of acting on one’s ideas and therefore increase 
the role of mental constructs and ideological stereotypes in choices.’715 This would suggest 
that in the case of India’s planning and economic development strategies, among the more 
highly institutionalised policy arenas, there was greater scope for entrenched beliefs and 
                                                 
713 North, D. C. ‘Towards a Theory of Institutional Change’ in Barnett, W. , Hinich, M.J. & Schofield, N.J. 
Political Economy, Institutions, Competition and Representation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1993), p. 63. 
714 North, D. C. ‘Towards a Theory of Institutional Change’ in Barnett, W. , Hinich, M.J. & Schofield, N.J. 
Political Economy, Institutions, Competition and Representation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1993), p. 63. 
715 Ibid. p. 68. 
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ideology to play a role in policy choices. The thesis posits that based on the case study of the 
Planning Commission it would seem that such a scenario allows for greater adaptability as 
institutions are able to stretch and accommodate new ideas over time, contributing overall to 
the stability of politics in that particular policy arena. In contrast, foreign policy which was 
under-institutionalised to begin with, and remained so during Nehru’s years as Prime 
Minister, created a void after his death. Finally, in the case of the Hindu-Code which can be 
depicted as a ‘partially institutionalised’ policy arena, politics and policy-making have been 
prone to politicking and instrumentalisation. The following table depicts these insights. 
 
Table 10: The Process behind Nehru’s Policies. 
 
 
 Pre-history Nehru’s 
Vision 
Structure of 
Opportunities
 
Choice of 
Strategy 
Policy 
Outcome/   
long-run 
resilience 
HINDU CODE Was the subject 
of policy 
discourse but 
not 
institutionalised. 
 
Vaguely 
articulated 
Highly 
controversial 
issue. 
Criticised 
from Left and 
Right. 
Filibustering 
Long debate 
Polemic 
discourse.  
Reached a 
deadlock, 
unfinished 
agenda of 
Uniform Civil 
Code. 
PANCHASHEELA No institutional 
lineage 
Moderately 
articulated 
Wide range of 
alternative 
views. 
 
No 
discussion 
in 
parliament 
prior to 
signing of 
agreement 
 
1962 war with 
China. 
Ambiguous 
and 
contradictory 
positions on 
relations with 
China. 
PLANNING Institutionally 
active pre-1947 
Highly 
articulated 
Multiple 
actors 
involved 
Consensus-
driven 
Key actor in 
implementation 
of economic 
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COMMISSION across 
political 
spectrum 
policy. 
Adapted to 
liberalisation 
of the 1990s. 
8.4.    Key Findings of the thesis. 
 
8.4.1. Path dependence and the origins of institutions. 
 
The thesis has made an attempt at understanding a particular set of policy decisions in 
terms of the process that led to their selection. When this happened is considered to be as 
important as how and as a result chapter four was devoted to the context of institutional and 
ideological parameters that framed the range of policy choices available at the time. The past 
therefore is not seen as a source of data nor as a resource for illustrating parallels but is 
considered important on theoretical grounds given that all, social and political, processes 
have a temporal dimension. In the introduction it was argued that timing and sequence 
provide the analyst with useful tools for understanding (a) the origins of institutions and (b) 
the ‘stickiness’ of inherited institution. This premise was combined with a focus on the 
strategic interaction among calculating, rational individuals to produce an analysis of 
‘Nehru’s institutions’. Hence, the fact that the three policy choices of the Planning 
Commission, Panchasheela and the Hindu Code Bills were concluded in 1950, 1954 and in 
1955, 56 respectively is regarded to be as important as understanding the particular 
substantive goals embodied in each. 
 
8.4.2. Institutional change and development. 
 
An extended time frame helps to counter functional interpretations of politics which 
argue that institutional arrangements can be explained by their consequences or that 
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institutions take the form they do, and persist, because powerful actors engaged in rational, 
strategic behaviour seek to produce the outcomes that are observed. Such an understanding of 
politics underestimates the sizeable time lag between actors’ actions and the long-term 
consequences of those actions. Political actors, under the pressure of every-day politics may 
not think deeply about the long-term. Hence, the long-term effects of institutional choices 
must be seen as by-products and not necessarily as embodying the original goals of the 
actors. However, the core insight that has been highlighted in this thesis is to think of 
institutions as fundamentally endogenous to the policy process. In other words, the policy 
process itself is able to alter the manner in which institutions function. This is an important 
proposition because the tendency has been to think of institutions as exogenous, as fixed and 
unchanging. Such a view, it is posited is not wrong but fails to take into account where the 
institution came from. How it was negotiated that one particular institutional form prevailed 
over another? How capable to the institution is of implementing its original intended 
functions and why some institutions are better able to evolve over time in response to new 
issues and the actions of competing institutions? 
 
The institutions that were under investigation here vary in terms of their form. 
Panchasheela was a set of principles incorporated into a treaty signed between India and 
China, the Hindu Code Bills were passed as legislative bills and finally, the Planning 
Commission became part of the administrative bureaucracy of the state. Given the difference 
in form, it is difficult to generalize across the three since the mechanisms of reproduction and 
institutionalization are different in each case. This has not been the primary goal of the thesis 
and it was only in the conclusion that the effects on long-run institutional evolution, 
compared across the three examples, were referred to. It is noteworthy however, that the three 
have acted as ‘carriers’ of Nehru’s vision long after his death and continue to frame the 
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parameters of debate and policy options in current Indian politics. By examining each policy 
closely the thesis tried to draw out the value-driven and instrumental rationality embodied in 
each so as to gain a better understanding of why these particular choices were made over 
others. Furthermore, it was posited that a study of Nehru’s writings and speeches during the 
independence struggle, the period during which his political persona was being moulded, 
revealed the conceptual and logical clarity of his thoughts on various policy challenges. 
Moving to the post-independence period when Nehru was Prime Minister, it was argued that 
the different strategies applied in the policy-making process reflected the contextual and 
political constraints under which Nehru was functioning.   
 
What this exercise has demonstrated is that there are very strong sources of continuity in 
Indian politics, linking contemporary debates and institutions to colonial discussions and 
methods of government. Nehru, did not just represent the new dawn, to which he alluded to 
in his evocative speech at midnight on the eve of India’s independence August 14, 1947 but, 
to a large extent he was the line of continuity that would reinforce the link between India’s 
emergent politics and the British inheritance. This continuity manifest itself not only in the 
institutional form of government but also in the preferences that were to give rise to particular 
policies – the thesis has focused on three of these716. Combined with the fact that as a 
politician, Nehru had to strategically navigate a changing structure of opportunities the 
following insights have been generated about the origin of the institutions underpinning his 
policies: 
1. In a policy field where (i) the actor has invested intellectual resources and recognised 
the complexity of the issue and the challenges involved and, (ii) the actor faces an 
                                                 
716 For a study that examines continuity and discontinuity in a western country see Pfetsch,, Frank R. West 
Germany: Internal Structures and External Relations (Praeger, New York, 1988). In this book path dependency, 
the institutional framework, as well as the decision-making process is examined in terms of how they framed the 
options for West Germany’s foreign policy.  
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uncertain political environment, policy choices are likely to be driven by  long-run 
vision and compromise (The Planning Commission). 
2. In a policy field where (i) the actor has not invested intellectual resources in 
identifying the potential pitfalls and, (ii) the actor faces an uncertain political 
environment, policy choices are likely to be risky (Panchasheela). 
3. In a policy field where (i) the actor has previously invested little intellectual interest in 
the subject and, (ii) faces a certain political environment, policy choices are likely to 
take the form of calculated instrumentalisation (Hindu Code). 
The focus on policies made in the early to mid-1950s has sought to highlight how crucial this 
decade was for India’s subsequent political development. 
 
8.5.  Nehru as a case study: leadership, policy making and the analysis of politics. 
 
As a case study, Jawaharlal Nehru’s policy-making and policy choices shed light on 
the general question of whether politics produces efficient equilibriums over time and 
whether institutions that evolve and persist, can be explained in terms of the political interests 
they are supposedly serving at the time. What this thesis has sought to demonstrate, by 
focusing on the policy making process, is to argue that such perspectives do not take into 
account the constraints surrounding the origins of a particular policy nor the likelihood of 
unintended consequences that become locked-in over time. Using a method of process tracing 
and the analytic narrative helps to understand and identify the inner mechanisms of causation 
and how strategy can congeal particular policy choices. Furthermore a ‘within’ case study 
generates information about the context in which it exists and the particular meaning and 
significance of politics at the time.  
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An important caveat that needs to be re-emphasized is that the thesis has not sought to 
judge the policies of Nehru since this would be an exercise that both, unfairly benefits from 
the privilege of hindsight as well as suffering from the vagaries that can be generated as 
conditions and priorities change over time. Instead the more modest and realistic goal was to 
trace the origins and original intentions at a time when crucial choices and decisions were 
being made. Nevertheless, the thesis is fundamentally interested in how Nehru went about 
conducting politics and the continuous interplay between strategy and vision that guided his 
actions and moulded his preferences or in other words, the aim has been to explore the 
strategic use of authority in a range of different settings that Nehru engaged in.  
 
The topic of leadership in political science gained interest at the turn of the 19th and 
20th centuries when Max Weber defined politics as ‘the leadership, or the influencing of the 
leadership of a political association, hence today, of a state’ and drew attention to the 
question of how leaders derived their legitimacy.717 While this field fell into some obscurity it 
has experienced a revival in recent years in the face of scepticism from the field of political 
science which extolled methods of empirical-driven research, comparison, quantification and 
establishing counterfactuals as opposed to interpretive approaches. The result has been the 
relinquishing of responsibility to political biographers, historians, journalists, and former 
diplomats whose biographies about political leaders and personalities mostly do not make an 
attempt to employ modes of analysis and methodological tools that the social sciences have to 
offer. Rather than providing the grounds for generalisation, the inclination has been to 
produce writing that relies on empathy, personal recollections and a free-flowing narrative 
without addressing the problems of whether terminology and concepts held the same meaning 
                                                 
717 From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology.  Gerth, H.H.  & Mills, C.W. (Oxford University Press, New York, 
1958), pp. 77 – 78. 
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for the subject as for the reader or writer, or discussing the mechanisms of causality assumed 
by the author.  
 
The purely descriptive biography assumes that ‘facts’ are neutral and enough to 
enlighten the reader. However, often the nature of the sources and the selection of the data 
introduces a hidden bias for instance the fact that much of the widely available documents of 
Jawaharlal Nehru have been officially sanctioned by the Gandhi family which means that one 
does not know what has been withheld from public knowledge. Hence, unlike existing 
biographies of Nehru the thesis emphasized the use of parliamentary debates, party 
documents and the writings of Nehru’s contemporaries. Furthermore, by reproducing the 
notion of great men in history, existing perceptions of the heroes and villains in history are 
reproduced, a problem the thesis noted in chapter one. Of course this is not always the case 
and the art of writing biographies has produced many impressive examples of rigorous and 
path-breaking scholarship.  
 
The study of Nehru has been a useful exercise in terms of raising new kinds of 
questions such as why Nehru turned into such an authoritative figure, and why he became the 
kind of leader that he was or, was perceived to be, a ‘gentle colossus’ as one contemporary 
put it718 or ‘India’s ineffectual angel’ as another.719 In the hope however, of producing 
something that was ultimately comparable, the thesis sought to highlight two critical 
variables as having an impact on individual action: the political environment and the 
personality or inner world of the actor. Conceptualised as ‘vision’ and ‘strategy’, the 
argument was made that the successful leader understands the constraints of his context, the 
                                                 
718 Hiren Mukherjee, then leader of the Communist Party of India, wrote a book at the time of Nehru’s death in 
1964 with this title. 
719 Nirad Chaudhuri in a review article that appeared in the Times Literary Supplement, December, 1975, about 
the first volume of S. Gopal’s biography of Nehru. 
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‘structure of opportunities’ as well as the wider compulsions. While the individual does not 
act in isolation, both vision and strategy are essential ingredients if, he or she is to navigate 
the multiple challenges and opportunities particular to the times.  
  
Such an approach lays the basis for analysing an array of political leaders, ranging 
from the dictatorial to the democratic, providing one framework through which for example 
to examine President of the United States, Barak Hussain Obama or President of Iran, 
Mamhmoud Ahmadinejad. The rules of candidate selection and policy making obviously 
differ widely, but once these are taken into account, both are treated as actors with certain 
idiosyncrasies predisposing them to certain formulations and ideals but whose strategic 
understanding of the context, how to stay in power and how to enhance their power, crucially 
determine the contours of policy. With context a central ingredient in the model, path 
dependency is part of an explanation that takes history just as seriously as contingency. 
Hence neither President Obama nor President Ahmadinejad can be seen as entirely divorced 
from the events and policies that preceded them. Jinnah, the leader of independent Pakistan 
and a contemporary of Nehru, could be studied in a similar manner to generate useful insights 
into why his vision of a secular, democratic state for Muslims with a sturdy rule of law failed 
to evolve into resilient institutionalised policies.   
 
The thesis has sought to engage in an analysis of Indian politics that allows for both 
generalisation and particularity. Western political science and political theory have, in recent 
times, often been accused of bearing a normative bias and a Eurocentric view of how 
democracy should work and what the outcomes of modernisation should be. The approach 
adopted in the thesis provides for a study that examines processes generated by a particular 
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historical, institutional environment as well as political impulses that are the engine of 
politics everywhere.  
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Methodological note on sources. 
 
As primary sources the thesis has used legislative debates and published material. This 
includes the private documents of individuals (Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel, Rajendra 
Prasad, Subhas Chandra Bose) as well as party documents (Congress Party) and party 
manifestos and reports of institutions. In addition to self-portraits or self-appraisals in the 
form of Nehru’s autobiography and books, what has also been used as a primary source is the 
material written by his contemporaries so as to get different viewpoints of the political 
context (see for instance Kripalani, Masani, Gadgil, Kaul, Panikkar, Mahalanobis). 
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